Filed 8/4/26 In re D.M. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re D.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G066559
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 24DP0850,
v. 24DP0850A)
F.L., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert Goodkin, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
F.L. (Father) appeals from a jurisdiction/disposition order,
contending the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering supervised
visitation with his child. Because the record sufficiently shows the child’s
safety would be at risk if visits were unsupervised, we affirm.
FACTS
Father exposed his child, D.M., to domestic violence. She saw
when Father “grabbed” her mother’s arm in 2022 and, in April 2023, the child
verbally intervened when Father “tried to throw the mother’s cell phone out
of” a car. The children were also at the family home when police officers “‘had
to convince’” Father to hand over the mother’s and children’s phones, in
November 2023.
The Orange County Social Services Agency filed a petition in July
2024 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300),1 after D.M. saw Mother throw a vase that
injured Father’s arm, causing the child to feel scared and cry. The juvenile
court sustained the petition and, in October 2024, declared D.M. a dependent
minor, “but release[d] the minor to the parents” under protective orders that
included an order to “not engage in domestic violence.”
Police arrested Father in June 2025 for “strangling” the mother,
who had locked herself “inside of her bathroom and” waited there “until her
children came home.” A police officer saw arm bruises on the mother, who
estimated “nine incidents in the past” when Father had “grabbed her neck
and applied pressure.”
Though mother secured a restraining order, Father immediately
violated it by “going to the home while” she and D.M. were there. The next
1 All statutory references are to this code.
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day, Father “told the child’s adult sibling that the mother needs to drop the
charges against him and threatened that it was not going to be good for
mother if she did not drop the charges against him.”
The juvenile court granted a protective custody warrant removing
D.M. from Father’s custody in July 2025. The Agency filed a supplemental
petition (§ 387) and the court held a detention hearing where it ordered the
child to remain in the mother’s custody under protective orders.
Father failed to participate in substance abuse testing that he
had agreed to in his case plan. He tested positive for alcohol in August 2025.
That year, he did not appear for drug tests once each in August, September,
and November, and three times in December. He failed to communicate with
the testing system over 20 times between August and December. In the first
week of 2026, Father failed to communicate with the testing system for six
consecutive days.
Father showed a lack of insight into the risks presented to D.M.
He discussed “case-related matters” with the child during a visit. To a
counselor, Father “denied all responsibility for domestic violence” when
confronted with “police documentation.” The Agency noted it had “serious
concerns about” Father’s “aggressive communication style,” “inconsistent
stories,” and “ongoing efforts to minimize domestic violence.”
The Agency filed a first amended supplemental petition (§ 387) in
October 2025 because it learned police had responded to a “domestic violence
incident involving” the parents two months earlier, without either parent
notifying the Agency. Father had “grabbed a phone,” the mother “attempted
to retrieve” it, and Father “pulled away,” causing the mother “to lose her
balance” and fall down stairs.
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The juvenile court sustained the petition and extended its
protective orders. It found Father had “routinely ignored” restraining order
terms and ordered “Father to receive eight hours of supervised visitation.”
The juvenile court denied Father’s requests for unsupervised
visitation or, in the alternative, that the child’s “adult sibling be authorized
to supervise the visitation.” The court explained it was denying the requests
because, first, Father had “not expressed, explained or understood” the effects
“of domestic violence on the minor.” The “second reason” was that “[f]ather
voluntarily chose to stop drug testing.”
The juvenile court addressed Father’s assertion he was “unable to
utilize the full hours of visitation” because D.M. was “refusing to” go to the
new “visitation center.” The court clarified Father could “utilize[e] family
members or friends to supervise his visits out in the community, any number
of places.” The court noted Father had “not provided any names that the
Agency was able to successfully convince to supervise the visits.”
DISCUSSION
Father’s sole contention is that the court abused its discretion by
limiting his contact with D.M. to supervised visitation.
While juvenile courts should order “visitation between the
parent . . . and the child” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A)), they must ensure that
“[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child” (§ 362.1, subd.
(a)(1)(B)). “The power to regulate visits between dependent children and their
parents rests with the juvenile court and its visitation orders will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (In re D.P. (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070 (D.P.) [affirming order for supervised visitation when
“unmonitored visitation could place [the child] at risk”].)
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Here, the juvenile court reasonably ordered supervised visitation
given the ample evidence supporting its concerns about the child’s safety.
First, Father showed a lack of insight into the risks posed by his
domestic violence. (See In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 562 [“even
if they are not physically harmed, children suffer enormously from simply
witnessing the violence between their parents”]; In re S.R. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 204, 223 [“insight needed to avoid” abuse risk].) D.M. saw Father
grab her mother’s arm in 2022 and, in 2023, intervened when Father tried to
throw the mother’s phone out of a car window. Father then strangled the
mother in 2025—after nine prior incidents of grabbing her neck. Two months
later, Father caused the mother to “lose her balance” and fall down stairs.
The Agency was concerned about Father’s “ongoing efforts to minimize
domestic violence,” as when he “denied all responsibility for domestic
violence” to a counselor. Father also dragged his children into the aftermath
of his domestic violence, such as when he discussed “case related matters”
with the child and told D.M.’s sibling to tell their mother “to drop the charges
against him and threatened that it was not going to be good for mother if she
did not drop the charges against him.” And he repeatedly violated restraining
orders, such as going to the family home while the mother and child were
there, and attempting to communicate to the mother through the child’s
sibling.
Second, Father refused to comply with his case plan’s required
substance abuse testing. Following his positive test result in August 2025, he
did not appear for testing five times and failed to communicate with the
testing system over 20 times. These failures not only showed a risk to the
child’s need for an environment “free from the negative effects of substance
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abuse” (§ 300.2), they confirmed Father’s disengagement from his case plan
and reinforced the risk from his lack of insight.
We reject Father’s position that unsupervised visits should have
been granted because “[t]here was no allegation of father directly harming
[D.M.] and the record showed [the child] felt safe.” A history of direct harm to
the child is not necessary to “jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(B); accord D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 [supervised
visitation appropriate “[a]lthough mother had never been directly violent
toward” the child].) Even a case that Father cites confirms that a visitation
can be denied when it would “pose a threat.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491.) Father’s lack of insight and substance abuse
challenges posed a sufficient threat to the child.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Father that “it was an abuse of
discretion for the court not to allow unsupervised visits in a public setting.”
Father’s lack of insight, repeated restraining order violations, and failure to
test as directed sufficiently warranted greater guardrails on his visitation
than the mere presence of disinterested strangers.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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