Filed 9/17/26 In re D.C. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re D.C., a Person Coming Under B351051
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP05057A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SARA C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Nancy A. Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________
D.C. (born November 2015) was declared a dependent of
the juvenile court in 2019. He was removed from the care of his
mother, appellant Sara C., who endangered him while under the
influence of cocaine and methamphetamine. D.C. was returned
to her care in 2021, but mother relapsed not long after,
necessitating a second removal. In 2025, mother filed a petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 seeking D.C.’s
return to her care or reunification services. The juvenile court
denied the petition. It found that although mother showed a
change of circumstances, modification of its previous orders
would not serve D.C.’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Initial Petition and Removal of D.C.
D.C. came to the attention of the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) in August 2019. The South Gate
Police Department received a report of a man chasing a
screaming woman. Officers found mother outdoors in a
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 We do not recite the entire factual and procedural background,
as the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its history.
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847, 851.)
2
“hysterical” state, wearing no shoes and with her chest exposed.
She was running into oncoming traffic with D.C. in her arms.
D.C. fell to the street when mother resisted the officer who tried
to take D.C. from her. Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and cocaine. The next day, she did not
understand why she was in jail, claimed she was hearing voices,
and believed people were performing witchcraft on her.
After 23 days in jail, mother pleaded no contest to a charge
of misdemeanor child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a,
subd. (b)). Her sentence included additional jail time, but the
criminal court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed
her on probation.
DCFS filed a petition asserting mother failed to protect
D.C. (§ 300, subd. (b).) It alleged D.C. was endangered by
mother’s substance abuse and mental and emotional problems.
In November 2019, the juvenile court sustained the petition and
declared D.C. a dependent. Reunification services were ordered
for mother,3 including a drug and alcohol program, weekly
testing, a 12-step program, parenting program, and individual
counseling. D.C. was ordered removed from mother’s care and
placed in a foster home.
In August 2020, D.C. was moved to a new home after his
caregiver left the country. D.C. displayed serious behavioral
problems: he hit children and caregivers and threatened to kill a
small child. His conduct required him to be relocated three times
in one month. In September 2020, D.C. was placed on a
psychiatric hold and diagnosed with adjustment disorder.
Subsequently, he was diagnosed with oppositional defiant
3 According to mother, D.C.’s biological father lives in El Salvador.
DCFS was unable to locate him.
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disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and a
depressive disorder.
B. D.C. Is Returned to Mother’s Care
Mother completed a substance abuse program, individual
counseling, and a 52-week parenting program. In March 2021,
D.C. was ordered returned to mother’s care.
Mother lost her housing in December 2021. Around this
time, D.C. missed medical appointments and “a lot” of school.
C. Mother Relapses, and DCFS Files a Supplemental
Petition
In January 2022, DCFS detained D.C. again after learning
of another incident involving mother. Mother’s friend, A.B.,
found her standing on the center divider near the intersection of
two major streets. Mother was carrying D.C. and appeared to be
hallucinating. D.C. was reportedly “terrified and cold,” as he was
barefoot and had been out with mother for hours. D.C. said
mother was “loca” (crazy) and that he saw her smoking a pipe
that made her sick. Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold and
tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine.
DCFS filed a supplemental petition for a more restrictive
placement (§ 387). It alleged mother had a positive drug test,
was involuntarily hospitalized, and had unresolved mental and
emotional problems.
D.C. was ordered removed and placed with foster parents
R.C. and E.G. When he arrived, D.C. was physically aggressive
with other children and struck R.C.
In April 2022, the juvenile court sustained the
supplemental petition. Since her relapse, the court noted, mother
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had failed to enroll in a substance abuse program and missed a
drug test. The court did not order reunification services, finding
mother had exceeded the reunification period (§ 361.5,
subd. (a)(3)), and there was no substantial probability that D.C.
would be returned to her within any extension of time. The court
set section 366.26 permanency planning and permanency
planning review hearings. The hearings were subsequently
continued multiple times as DCFS searched for an adoptive
home.
D. Adoption Is Selected as D.C.’s Permanent Plan
The juvenile court, with the assent of mother’s counsel,
ordered adoption as D.C.’s permanent plan in October 2022.
In October 2023, R.C. and E.G. expressed their desire to
adopt D.C. Though mother was permitted to visit nine hours
weekly, she was visiting once weekly for about two hours.
E. Mother Files Her First Request for D.C.’s Return or
for Reunification Services
In August 2023, mother filed a section 388 petition
requesting D.C.’s return to her home, or alternatively, for
reunification services. Mother described changed circumstances
that included 19 months of sobriety, sustained employment, and
an improved financial condition. DCFS confirmed her completion
of a substance abuse program, negative drug tests, and her
participation in therapy, but it opposed the petition. DCFS
pointed to D.C.’s significant progress with his behavior and
academics during the two years he lived with his current
caregivers and his desire to remain with them. Though visiting
consistently, mother struggled to manage his tantrums. D.C.
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reported that he did not feel safe with mother and did not want to
live with her ever again.
The juvenile court denied mother’s petition after a hearing
in December 2023, finding reunification was not in D.C.’s best
interests. D.C. had experienced instability due to his initial
removal, his return to mother’s care, a second removal due to her
relapse, and four placements. D.C. had found stability in his
current placement, as shown by his calling the caregivers “mom”
and “dad” and his desire to stay with them. The court noted
mother believed that D.C. no longer wanted to go home with her,
and when asked by a social worker about reunifying with mother,
D.C. “immediately yelled no.” In light of these facts, the court
found D.C. was “negatively impacted by the lack of stability and
the back and forth due to mother’s mental health and substance
abuse.”
F. DCFS Locates an Adoptive Home
As of January 2024, mother had been visiting D.C. for two
hours, once weekly. D.C. looked forward to the visits, as mother
brought food and gifts, but he was upset during them and acted
out afterwards. The problems were serious enough that D.C.’s
mental health clinician attended visits.
In August 2024, the caregivers withdrew themselves from
consideration for permanency. They cited constant conflict in the
home due to their inability to manage D.C.’s defiance of women
and fighting with another child in the home.
In February 2025, DCFS located an adoptive family. D.C.
began visiting them in April 2025 and moved into their home in
mid-July 2025.
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G. The Juvenile Court Denies Mother’s Second Request
for D.C.’s Return or Reunification Services
In late July 2025, mother filed another section 388 petition
requesting return of D.C. to her care or reunification services.
She declared that she completed the initial case plan, was
employed, was living in a suitable home, and had maintained her
sobriety since January 2022. She argued that it was in D.C.’s
best interest to be placed in her home. Further, she contended,
the adoptive family had not confirmed their long-term
commitment, and it was not in D.C.’s best interests “to suffer
further emotional rejection” if they did not find him to be a good
fit. Mother claimed DCFS placed D.C. with potential adoptive
parents despite “his expressed desire to be placed” with her.
(Boldface omitted.) She provided no details regarding what D.C.
said to this effect or when he said it.
In September 2025, DCFS reported that the adoptive
family remained committed long-term. D.C. had adjusted well to
living with them and had not exhibited behavioral issues.
Mother’s scheduled visitation was three hours, thrice weekly.
Visits, however, were acrimonious. D.C. made harsh, insulting
comments that made mother cry, and she “[wasn’t] usually
successful” in redirecting him. The adoptive family expressed
concern about D.C.’s mental and emotional state because he was
“very hostile” during visits and “very irritable” afterward. These
issues and D.C.’s request led DCFS to recommend reducing visits
to two hours, once or twice weekly.
A hearing on the petition was conducted in October 2025.
DCFS and D.C. conceded mother’s changed circumstances. They
argued, however, that delaying a plan of permanency and
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granting further reunification services were not in D.C.’s best
interests.
The juvenile court agreed with DCFS and D.C. The court
found mother had demonstrated a change in circumstances, but it
was not in D.C.’s best interest to give mother additional time to
reunify. It noted that D.C. had been with his current caregivers
since April 20254 and had strongly opposed reunifying with
mother. Mother’s visits were reduced because of their “negative
impact” on D.C. D.C., the court found, “has been out of [mother’s]
care for the most part since 2019. He was returned to her and
then re-detained in 2022. He needs to have stability and
permanency going forward. And he is appearing to have that
stability now with his current caregivers.” The court denied
mother’s section 388 petition. Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
Section 388 allows a parent to petition to modify any
previous juvenile court order. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The petitioner
has the burden of showing that (1) there is new evidence or a
change of circumstances and (2) the proposed modification would
be in the child’s best interests. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
833, 845 (J.M.).) In the permanency planning phase of a
dependency proceeding, a parent’s interest in the care, custody
and companionship of the child are no longer paramount, and
instead the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency
and stability. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
When hearing a request for change of placement at this phase, a
4 This was inaccurate. D.C. began visits with the adoptive family
in April 2025 but did not move in with them until July 2025.
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court “must recognize this shift of focus in determining the
ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the
child.” (Ibid.)
We review a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388 petition
for abuse of discretion and review its factual findings for
substantial evidence. (J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 846.) We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment
but merely determine if sufficient facts support the findings. (In
re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321 (Matthew S.).) A
court exceeds the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641.) Therefore, “[i]t is rare that
the denial of a section 388 motion merits reversal as an abuse of
discretion . . . .” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519,
522 (Kimberly F.).)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Mother contends that when the juvenile court decided her
section 388 petition, its best interests analysis was flawed. She
argues that the court treated D.C.’s opposition to reunification
and the perceived stability of his current placement as
determinative. She contends it failed to consider other
circumstances as it should have.
In deciding whether the petitioner has made the requisite
best interests showing, the juvenile court considers the case’s
factual and procedural history. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 586, 616.) It considers the gravity of the problem
leading to the dependency. (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at p. 531.) The court also considers the strength of the existing
bond between the parent and child, the strength of a child’s bond
9
to his or her present caretakers, and the length of time a child
has been in the dependency system in relationship to the
parental bond. (Ibid.) Finally, the court considers the nature of
the change of circumstances, the ease with which the change
could be brought about, and the reason the change was not made
before. (Ibid.)
In this case, substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s determination that D.C.’s best interests would not be
served by returning him to mother, whether immediately or after
an additional reunification period.
First, the problem necessitating dependency was very
serious. Mother was so impaired by her drug use that she carried
D.C. into oncoming traffic and was convicted of child
endangerment for this conduct. Despite completing court-ordered
programs and having D.C. returned to her care, mother relapsed
and placed him in similar danger again. In denying mother’s
petition in 2023, the court found the “lack of stability and the
back and forth” between caregivers negatively impacted D.C.
Further, the bond between D.C. and mother had weakened
significantly. D.C., who was nine years old when the section 388
hearing took place, had spent more than half of his life outside of
mother’s care. D.C. stated he did not miss mother and did not
want to live with her. Visits so distressed D.C. that DCFS
recommended their reduction.5 Meanwhile, D.C. had adjusted
well to living with a family that wished to adopt him.
5 Mother argues the juvenile court should have considered
reinstating reunification services in the form of conjoint therapy to
improve her bond with D.C., but she points to no evidence in the record
showing that such therapy would be appropriate for him. In March
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Finally, though we applaud the significant changed
circumstances presented by mother, they did not require the
juvenile court to find that her requested modification would be in
D.C.’s best interests. It was difficult to make or sustain the
changes. It took years, and relapse had shown itself to be a
realistic possibility.
Based upon the record as a whole, there was substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the proposed
modification would not be in D.C.’s best interests. (J.M., supra,
50 Cal.App.5th at p. 845.) The court reasonably concluded that
D.C.’s need for stability and permanency outweighed other
considerations and should not be delayed by further efforts to
reunify him with mother.
Mother’s remaining contentions challenge the weight the
juvenile court should have assigned to certain factors or evidence.
We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for
that of the juvenile court in determining whether sufficient facts
support its findings. (Matthew S., supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at
p. 321.) Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s decision, it did not abuse its discretion.
2025, the therapist treating D.C. determined it was premature to
consider conjoint therapy.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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