Filed 7/21/26 In re D.B. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re D.B., a Person Coming Under B341148
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP06290)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff,
v.
V.B.,
Defendant and
Appellant;
D.C.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph D. Mackenzie, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent.
__________________________
V.B. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s exit order
denying him joint legal custody over his son, D.B. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
D.B. (born 2011) came to the attention of the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
when father was detained for suspected child abuse. On
January 2, 2024, D.B. misbehaved during a miniature golf game.
After D.B. ignored verbal admonishments and slammed the car
door, father grabbed D.B. by the back of his head and struck him
twice with a belt. When D.B. fell to the ground in pain, father
struck him again. The altercation left red marks on D.B.’s leg
and arm, and D.B. had a panic attack. D.B. was removed from
father and placed in mother’s home.
Father admitted he hit D.B. with a belt three times on
January 2, 2024, and on at least three prior occasions. He
1 We do not recite the entire factual and procedural background,
as the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its history.
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847, 851.) Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Family Code.
2
pleaded no contest to misdemeanor cruel or inhuman corporal
punishment causing injury to a child. (Pen. Code, § 273d,
subd. (a).) The criminal court entered a three-year protective
order with no-contact and stay-away provisions,2 and it sentenced
father to five days in jail with credit for time served and 10 days
of community labor. The criminal court ordered father to enroll
in a parenting skills program within 30 days and successfully
complete a 52-week program.
Mother and father reported that they shared legal custody
of D.B. At the time of the arrest, D.B. lived with father and was
with mother on alternating weekends. Mother reported,
however, that she had been considering action in the family court
to obtain full custody. After father moved to Oxnard with D.B.,
father did not tell her where D.B. was enrolled in school, and he
would not list her as one of the child’s emergency contacts.
Father also denied her weekend visits with D.B. on several
occasions.
DCFS filed a dependency petition alleging physical abuse
and failure to protect based on the January 2, 2024, incident,
father’s arrest, and past occasions when father struck D.B. with a
belt. In February 2024, the juvenile court sustained the petition
as amended. It found the allegations true, as well as an
allegation that father’s “inappropriate discipline” endangered
D.B.’s physical health, safety, and well-being. D.B. was declared
a dependent. Father was ordered to complete a 52-week
parenting skills program, participate in individual counseling to
2 Though the record is unclear, the parties assert the criminal
court either terminated or modified the protective order in April 2024,
allowing father to have visitation.
3
address case issues, anger management, parenting skills and
child expectations, and to comply with all criminal court orders.
DCFS provided father with referrals to free and low-cost
parenting programs and counseling in January, April, and
June 2024. By late July 2024, however, he had not provided
DCFS with documentation showing his enrollment in these
services. Meanwhile, DCFS reported that D.B. enjoyed living
with mother, was regularly attending school and receiving
appropriate healthcare, and that mother disciplined him by
taking his electronics away.
The juvenile court conducted a six-month review hearing in
August 2024. Legal custody of D.B. was the primary contested
issue at the hearing. Mother’s counsel argued that this was a
domestic violence case, father had barely begun to address the
problem, and issues of power and control made it appropriate for
her to have sole legal and physical custody. Father’s counsel
submitted on DCFS’s recommendation that mother have sole
physical custody, argued the case did not involve domestic
violence, and asked the court to follow DCFS’s recommendation
of joint legal custody. The court asked D.B.’s counsel about her
“feeling” on mother’s domestic violence argument, noting that “if
it’s strong enough,” the court could order sole physical and legal
custody. D.B.’s counsel declined to take a position on the issue.
The court denied father’s request, stating: “Even though
we may not have found [domestic violence] to be true in the case,
it is evident that this is a domestic violence situation, and . . . the
Family Code makes it clear that the custodial parent should
have . . . primary residence and sole legal custody as well as
physical custody.” The court awarded mother sole physical and
legal custody of D.B. and terminated its jurisdiction. Father’s
4
counsel then argued there were no allegations of domestic
violence, only physical abuse and inappropriate discipline, and no
legal basis to give mother sole legal custody.
Father appeals from the custody order, challenging only the
court’s denial of joint legal custody.
DISCUSSION
When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
dependent child, it may issue an order determining custody of the
child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4, subd. (a).) In doing so, the
focus and primary consideration must always be the child’s best
interests. (In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094 (N.M.).)
The court need not give a specific statement of reasons when
making a custody order. (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
704, 713.) We review a custody order pursuant to section 362.4
for abuse of discretion and will not disturb it unless the
determination was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.
(N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.)
On appeal, father contends the juvenile court applied
Family Code section 3044’s3 presumption against awarding sole
or joint custody of a child to perpetrators of domestic violence. He
argues the court misapplied the law because the presumption
3 Subdivision (a) of section 3044 provides: “Upon a finding by the
court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic
violence within the previous five years against the other party seeking
custody of the child, or against the child . . . there is a rebuttable
presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of
a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is
detrimental to the best interest of the child, pursuant to Sections 3011
and 3020. This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance
of the evidence.”
5
does not apply in dependency cases, citing In re C.M. (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 101, 108 (C.M.).4
Preliminarily, we observe that father did not bring to the
juvenile court’s attention his assertion that the section 3044
presumption did not apply in dependency proceedings. Father
has forfeited his argument on appeal. (In re Dakota H. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [a party may not assert theories on
appeal which were not raised in the trial court].)
Even if not forfeited, father’s argument is unpersuasive. It
is not clear that the juvenile court applied the section 3044
presumption to the exclusion of all other relevant considerations.
The court did not specify a particular section of the Family Code
or make findings under section 3044. Though the court
acknowledged that a custodial parent “should have” legal and
physical custody when there is proof of domestic violence in a
case governed by the Family Code, its comments did not indicate
an abdication of the court’s duty to consider the totality of the
circumstances and D.B.’s best interests. (N.M., supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.)
To the extent the juvenile court found guidance in
section 3044, any error in its doing so was harmless. When
father moved D.B. to Oxnard, he did not tell mother where D.B.
went to school and withheld the child from weekend visits,
4 The C.M. court affirmed an order granting joint legal custody
and rejected the father’s argument that the juvenile court erred by not
applying the section 3044 presumption. The court reasoned that
dependency proceedings were not among those to which the
presumption applied, and father made no legal argument why the
court should depart from precedent holding that the Family Code is
inapplicable in dependency cases unless expressly stated. (C.M.,
supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 109–110.)
6
indicating an inability to coparent successfully. Father admitted
striking D.B. with a belt on at least four occasions, and the most
recent incident resulted in injury to D.B., a criminal conviction,
and father’s incarceration. Both the criminal and juvenile courts
ordered father to complete a year-long parenting skills program,
and the juvenile court ordered individual counseling. By the
review hearing, however, father had completed only four
parenting classes and received no counseling. His near-total
failure to comply with the court orders prevented him from
gaining parenting skills and emotional insight that both courts
deemed necessary. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s implied finding that it would be detrimental to D.B.’s best
interests to give father joint legal custody, particularly as D.B.
was doing well in mother’s care. The court did not abuse its
discretion.
7
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s custody order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
COGLIATI, J. **
** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
8