Filed 9/8/26 In re Christopher N. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re CHRISTOPHER N., a B352256
Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. DK23704)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
VICTORIA R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Victoria R. (mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile
court implementing a permanent plan of legal guardianship for
her son Christopher N. (born September 2012) pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother argues
the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with their
duties of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224 et seq.) (ICWA). As set forth below, we find the
record supports the juvenile court’s conclusions that DCFS
conducted a thorough inquiry and ICWA does not apply. We
therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order.2
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Maternal grandmother Nadine R. (MGM), who was
previously the legal guardian of Christopher, appealed from an
order terminating her legal guardianship in 2022. We affirmed
the order terminating MGM’s legal guardianship in a
nonpublished opinion in case No. B325916 filed August 23, 2023.
MGM’s sole argument on appeal was the juvenile court and
DCFS failed to comply with their duties of inquiry and notice
under ICWA. Because we addressed some of mother’s current
arguments in MGM’s prior appeal, we rely on and quote
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family
In 2015, the probate court granted MGM legal
guardianship over Christopher because mother was incarcerated.
Christopher has special needs, having been diagnosed with
cerebral palsy and autism. He is nonverbal and uses a
wheelchair. Christopher’s biological father is Bobby Joe N., Jr.
(father), who died in March 2022.
Initial referral and petition3
In June 2017, DCFS responded to a referral that MGM
smoked crack cocaine in the home in front of Christopher. MGM
admitted the allegation and that she started using crack cocaine
about a month prior to the referral due to the stress of caring for
Christopher. MGM denied an allegation that she left the child
unsupervised.
On June 22, 2017, a petition on behalf of Christopher was
filed pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that
Christopher was at risk of serious harm as a result of MGM’s
substance abuse. The petition was later amended to additionally
allege MGM suffered from mental and emotional problems, had a
history of engaging in physical altercations, and that mother had
a long criminal history.
extensively from the nonpublished opinion in MGM’s prior
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).)
3 The following factual and procedural summary is taken
from our previous opinion in case No. B325916.
3
Attached to the petition was an ICWA-010(A) form
indicating MGM reported the maternal family had no known
American Indian ancestry.
Detention
The detention hearing was held on June 22, 2017. MGM
completed a parental notification of Indian status form (ICWA-
020) and reported having no American Indian ancestry as far as
she knew. MGM informed the court she had no American Indian
ancestry but did not know if the child’s maternal grandfather had
American Indian ancestry. The court found no reason to believe
ICWA applied and ordered Christopher detained from MGM’s
custody.
Investigation
MGM subsequently reported possible American Indian
ancestry on the maternal side of the family, but she was unsure
what tribe was involved. She reported American Indian ancestry
in both her family and mother’s paternal family. MGM’s father,
Nathaniel R. (deceased), was part of the “‘Gee chee’ (unknown
spelling) tribe.” He was born in Tallulah, Louisiana. MGM also
stated her mother, Lula M.F.R. is part of a tribe from Arkansas.
In addition, MGM was told mother’s biological father’s family had
American Indian ancestry. MGM stated mother’s paternal
grandmother lived in Arizona but was unable to provide contact
information.
When asked about American Indian ancestry, mother
reported she probably had some but was unable to further
explain. Mother identified Bobby Joe N., Jr., as Christopher’s
biological father and indicated there had been a DNA test. MGM
said father had not had any contact with the child since his birth
and had made clear that he did not wish to participate in the
4
child’s life. Father had made no effort to care for the child or
meet his basic needs.
DCFS contacted Lula, who stated she did not know much
about the family’s American Indian ancestry because her parents
kept it a secret. However, her understanding was that it was
“West Indian or Blackfoot.” Lula reported her mother did not
have any American Indian ancestry, but her father did.
However, Lula did not know where her father was born, what
year he was born, or any further information about him.
Nathaniel was also allegedly American Indian, but Lula did not
know what tribe, nor did she have any information about his
parents or further information regarding American Indian
ancestry related to Christopher.
In August 2017, DCFS sent notice of child custody
proceeding for Indian child (ICWA-030) forms to the Blackfeet
Tribe, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. The notice also mentioned maternal family’s alleged
association with two tribes that are not federally recognized: the
Geechee-Louisiana and West Indian tribes. The notice included
mother’s, MGM’s, and Lula’s identifying information and named
Bobby Joe N., Jr., as Christopher’s biological father.
DCFS subsequently received green card return receipts
from the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior. DCFS later received
documentation from the Blackfeet Tribe indicating Christopher
was not eligible for enrollment.
Jurisdiction and disposition
Father signed a waiver form indicating he did not want to
be physically present at the jurisdictional hearing and gave up
that right. He did not want counsel or to participate by video.
5
On August 22, 2017, mother signed an ICWA-020 form
indicating she might have Cherokee Indian ancestry. The
juvenile court’s minute order noted mother was present in
custody but was not brought into court due to court congestion.
Mother later wrote to DCFS and stated she would be paroled in
January 2018 and wanted to attend court after, but not before,
her release. The juvenile court rescheduled the jurisdictional
hearing.
At the March 13, 2018 hearing, the court noted that in a
last minute information for the court, DCFS reported mother was
institutionalized at Patton State Hospital. She was sent there
from prison rather than being released.4 The court proceeded to
the adjudication given that the petition had been filed in
August 2017 and the court was required to give substantial
weight to the minor’s need for prompt resolution of the matter.
The juvenile court sustained an amended version of the petition
based on MGM’s substance abuse and mother’s criminal history.
The matter was continued for disposition.
On May 29, 2018, the juvenile court declared Christopher a
dependent child and removed him from MGM’s custody. MGM
and mother were provided reunification services, but father was
denied such services. The court found there was no reason to
4 The dependency investigator received a telephone call from
mother on February 6, 2018, stating mother was being held
against her will at Patton State Hospital, and she was sent there
from prison instead of being released. The investigator noted
that during the February 6, 2018 conversation, “Mother was
jumping from unrelated topic to topic and wasn’t able to have a
fully cohesive conversation.”
6
know Christopher was an Indian child and that ICWA did not
apply.
Reunification period
DCFS interviewed mother at Patton State Hospital in
June 2018. Mother was delusional and appeared confused about
reality. She reported false information, such as she owned a
home in Victorville, California and worked at Patton State
Hospital prior to her incarceration. Mother reported she had
many children besides Christopher and provided the names of
the children. DCFS was not aware mother had any children
other than Christopher. Mother reported speaking to
Christopher on the phone and being able to understand the child
even though he was nonverbal. DCFS was unable to obtain
information about mother’s mental health from the hospital due
to privacy concerns, but the hospital social worker indicated she
would try to obtain mother’s consent to release her treatment
information to DCFS.
In July 2018, mother became agitated and had difficulty
understanding Christopher’s diagnosis. Mother maintained the
child was walking and talking when in her care. She appeared
confused about reality. She requested DNA testing be done for
mother and MGM as she suspected the child was not hers.
Mother said she did not want to participate in services and would
follow up with the necessary people once released from the
hospital.
On November 27, 2018, the juvenile court terminated
family reunification services for mother but continued them for
MGM.
7
For the 18-month review hearing, DCFS reported father’s
whereabouts were unknown and that mother remained in
custody at Patton State Hospital.
ICWA proceedings as to father
On January 28, 2019, father made his first appearance in
juvenile court and was appointed counsel. Father filed a
statement regarding parentage (JV-505) and an ICWA-020 form
indicating he might have American Indian ancestry with an
unknown tribe on his father’s maternal side. Father’s paternal
grandmother was no longer living. Father provided the name of
an aunt, Jeanette C., who lived in Florida, but he did not have
her telephone number. Father stated he could try to get in touch
with her via Facebook. The court informed father that DCFS
would be asking him to try to get in touch with her. The court
found it had no reason to believe that ICWA applied but ordered
DCFS to investigate father’s possible Indian heritage.
On March 7, 2019, father confirmed he might have
American Indian ancestry to DCFS. Father provided contact
information for his niece, Ana, as she had more information
regarding paternal aunt Jeanette C. Ana told the social worker
she would provide the information in a week. The social worker
asked father if he would assist and provide the information
sooner. The social worker asked a second time for Jeanette C.’s
contact information, and in its March 13, 2019 report, DCFS
indicated it had not heard from father or Ana regarding the issue
of American Indian heritage.
At the March 13, 2019 hearing, DCFS informed the court it
had reached out to father but he was nonresponsive. As father
was present in court, he stated he had “no idea what tribe or
what my background is.” Father said had been trying to contact
8
his aunt or obtain contact information for DCFS. The court
ordered father to do his best to contact Jeanette C. The court
found no reason to believe that ICWA applied but ordered DCFS
to continue to investigate.
Further proceedings
On March 13, 2019, the juvenile court terminated family
reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to
select and implement a permanent plan for the child.
For the initial section 366.26 hearing scheduled for July 10,
2019, DCFS again sent ICWA-030 notice forms to the Blackfeet
tribe. The notice identified father as also associated with the
Blackfeet tribe and included the name of paternal aunt,
Jeanette C., noting that her current address, former address, and
date and place of birth were unknown. The Blackfeet tribe
responded that based on its enrollment records, the child did not
fall under the provisions of ICWA.
On November 5, 2019, DCFS was contacted by the child’s
paternal half sibling, S.N., who reported father had suffered a
massive stroke and brain aneurism and was hospitalized. Father
was immobile and was being provided 24-hour medical and
nursing care.
On June 29, 2021, the juvenile court reinstated family
reunification services for MGM pursuant to section 388 and took
the section 366.26 hearing off calendar.
On March 8, 2022, the juvenile court again terminated
MGM’s reunification services.
In March 2022, DCFS was informed father had passed
away and obtained father’s death certificate.
At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing on
July 1, 2022, DCFS asked to continue the matter for 90 days for
9
adoption assessment. The juvenile court granted the request and
ordered DCFS to provide “an ICWA update report” and
“to inquire of all known maternal and paternal relatives as well
as any relatives for the legal guardian with respect to any Indian
heritage and provide that information to the court.”
At the continued section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing on October 3, 2022, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to
“make inquiry and interview of all known paternal and maternal
relatives as to ICWA and provide an update in the next report.”
Permanency planning was continued to January 31, 2023.
In December 2022, DCFS petitioned the juvenile court to
terminate MGM’s legal guardianship over Christopher.
On December 13, 2022, the juvenile court granted DCFS’s
section 388 petition and terminated MGM’s legal guardianship
over Christopher. The court found the child’s visits with MGM
detrimental to him and ordered no visits occur.
On December 13, 2022, MGM filed a notice of appeal. On
August 23 2023, this court affirmed the juvenile court’s order.5
Mother remained hospitalized at Patton State Hospital and
had no visits with the child throughout the case.
Permanency planning
In March 2023, DCFS reported Christopher had been in the
home of his current caregiver since July 2017. The caregiver
initially planned to adopt Christopher but MGM’s verbally
aggressive and threatening behavior was taking a toll on her
family. The caregiver was willing to provide Christopher with
permanency through a plan of legal guardianship.
5 This ends the portion of this section taken from our
previous opinion in Case No. B325916.
10
On September 7, 2023, DCFS provided an update regarding
ICWA. On August 21, 2023, DCFS contacted mother and
inquired about American Indian ancestry. Mother denied any
such ancestry and denied having any contact information for
father’s family. On August 21, 2023, DCFS contacted MGM to
inquire as to American Indian heritage. MGM stated there was
none that she knew of. MGM said maternal great-grandfather,
who was deceased, did have American Indian ancestry although
she did not know the name of the tribe. MGM had no contact
information for Christopher’s paternal family.
On August 21, 2023, DCFS contacted maternal great-aunt
to inquire as to American Indian ancestry. The maternal great-
aunt said, “[I]t is possible but I do not have any confirmation that
we are Indian. That would require ancestry research because my
dad passed. My dad’s brother and my dad’s sister also passed so
no one is left to ask.” The maternal great-aunt said while the
maternal great-grandfather possibly had American Indian
heritage, the maternal great-aunt did not know the name of the
ancestor who was American Indian and did not know the name of
the tribe. The maternal great-aunt further stated the maternal
great-grandfather’s relatives were all deceased and no one was
left to interview regarding the family’s ancestry. The maternal
great-aunt did not know how to contact the family’s paternal
relatives.
DCFS further reported that on August 21, 2023, the
dependency investigator searched case notes and reports to locate
paternal relatives’ contact information in order to make ICWA
inquiries, but paternal relative information was not located;
therefore, no further inquiries of the paternal family could be
made.
11
On September 7, 2023, the juvenile court appointed
Christopher’s caretaker as his legal guardian.
On April 5, 2024, the juvenile court denied mother’s section
388 petition seeking liberalized visitation.6
On October 30, 2024, Christopher’s legal guardian denied
Christopher had any American Indian heritage.
On February 21, 2025, the social worker attempted to
contact mother to inquire about American Indian ancestry but
received no response.
On February 21 and August 20, 2025, the legal guardian
denied Christopher had any American Indian ancestry. On
August 20, 2025, mother denied Christopher had any American
Indian ancestry.
On January 15, 2026, the juvenile court again made orders
appointing the child’s caregiver as his legal guardian and
terminated jurisdiction.7
On January 29, 2026, mother filed a notice of appeal from
the court’s orders of January 15, 2026.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
ICWA and related California statutes reflect the
Legislature’s intent “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
6 Mother filed a notice of appeal, but her counsel filed a no
issue brief, and the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.
7 The juvenile court had to refile guardianship paperwork to
address a funding issue.
12
for the removal of Indian children from their families.” (25
U.S.C. § 1902; see In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706,
fn. 3.) An Indian child is defined as any unmarried person under
the age of 18 who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b).)
“The juvenile court and DCFS have ‘an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition
under Section 300 … may be or has been filed, is or may be an
Indian child.’” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) “This
continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty
to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide
formal ICWA notice.” (Ibid.)
“The duty to inquire begins for a county when first
contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to, asking
a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has
any information that the child may be an Indian child, and upon
a county department’s first contact with the child or the child’s
family, including extended family members ….” (§ 224.2, subd.
(b)(1).)
Under California law, the child welfare department’s initial
duty of inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) The term
“‘extended family member’” is “defined by the law or custom of
the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom,
13
shall be a person who has reached 18 years of age and who is the
Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
The juvenile court must also inquire at each participant’s
first appearance in court whether the participant knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.
(c).) In addition, the juvenile court must instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child. (Ibid.)
If the “initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child
is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make
that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e), italics
added.) [I]f that further inquiry results in a reason to know the
child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to
inquire at the first appearance whether anyone ‘knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id., subd. (d)
[defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child
is an Indian child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a
‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child as defined under
§ 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052
(D.S.).)
“[R]eason to believe” means the court or agency “has
information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the
child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or
citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Further
inquiry includes, but is not limited to, interviewing the parents
and extended family members to gather additional family
14
information; contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the
State Department of Social Services for assistance; and
contacting the tribes the child might be affiliated with and
anyone else that might have information regarding the child’s
membership or eligibility in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).)
The duty to provide formal ICWA notice is only required
when the juvenile court has reason to know the child is an Indian
child. (§ 224.2, subd. (f).) A court has “reason to know” the child
is an Indian child if any of the following applies: a person having
an interest in the child informs the court that the child is an
Indian child; the residence or domicile of the child, the child’s
parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation; a participant in
the proceeding informs the court it has discovered information
indicating the child is an Indian child; the court is informed the
child has been a ward of a tribal court; or the court is informed
either parent or the child possess an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2,
subd. (d).)
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1134 (Dezi C.).) “Some
courts apply a straightforward substantial evidence test when
reviewing the juvenile court’s conclusion that ICWA does not
apply. [Citation.] ‘By contrast, other courts have used a hybrid
standard, reviewing for substantial evidence whether there is
reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and reviewing a
finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of
15
discretion.’” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)8 In Dezi C. our Supreme Court
noted, however, that “‘the juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly
diligent is “a quintessentially discretionary function” [citation]
subject to a deferential standard of review ….’” (Id. at p. 1141.)
“‘“On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad
discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.”’” (Ibid.)
II. The trial court did not err in finding ICWA
inapplicable
Mother makes two arguments on appeal. First, mother
argues DCFS failed to make initial inquiry of all known extended
family members. Further, mother argues DCFS failed to satisfy
its duty of further inquiry by failing to contact the Cherokee
tribes. We discuss each argument below and conclude no error
occurred.
A. Initial inquiry of extended family members
The record shows a thorough inquiry by DCFS and the
juvenile court of family members on both sides of Christopher’s
family. Mother names four extended family members who were
known to DCFS who were apparently not questioned regarding
Christopher’s possible American Indian heritage: Christopher’s
half sister, maternal uncle, paternal aunt and paternal uncle.
We address each family member below and conclude these
8 The Dezi C. court expressly declined to resolve this
disagreement. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)
16
apparent omissions do not undermine the juvenile court’s finding
that DCFS conducted a sufficient initial inquiry in this matter.
Christopher’s paternal half sister, S.N., came forward in
late 2020 asking to be an option for permanency for Christopher.
She had not met the child before. Upon interviewing S.N., DCFS
determined there were barriers to consider concerning placement
of Christopher with S.N. There is no indication in the interview
report that S.N. was asked about possible American Indian
ancestry. By 2022 it appears S.N. was no longer considering
being a caregiver for Christopher. In a last-minute information
for the court filed September 15, 2022, DCFS reported: “At this
time, there are no other relatives who are visiting with
Christopher. Maternal-Uncle, who MGM reported was interested
in caring for the child, Adult half-sister, [S.N.], who also reported
an interest in caring for the child does not call or visit with the
child. No other relatives have been in contact with [DCFS] about
visits with Christopher.”
We decline to find the initial inquiry deficient based on
DCFS’s apparent failure to ask Christopher’s paternal half sister
about possible American Indian ancestry. In re C.L. (2025) 116
Cal.App.5th 53 is applicable. In C.L., mother argued the juvenile
court erred in finding DCFS’s ICWA inquiry adequate because
the record did not reflect the agency asked a maternal uncle
about the children’s possible Indian ancestry. (Id. at p. 67.) The
C.L. court disagreed, in part because “DCFS … made inquiries of
all available extended family members in the older generations,”
a strategy which addressed “the realities of generational loss of
information that may have prevented the parents from having
accurate information about their potential Native American
ancestry.” (Id. at p. 70.) The C.L. court noted there was no
17
indication the maternal uncle would have more information than
his own mother, the maternal grandmother, as to whether the
children may be Indian children. (Ibid.; see also In re C.R. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 793, 802 [“The court also reasonably could find
mother’s sister (maternal aunt) would not have had any more
information about the family’s potential Indian ancestry than
their own mother (maternal grandmother) had.”].) Similarly,
here, there is no reason to believe Christopher’s half sister would
have more information than their own father. Father knew no
specifics of his possible American Indian ancestry and was unable
to provide information suggesting Christopher was an Indian
child. There is no reason to believe Christopher’s half sister
would have more information than father.
In addition, DCFS’s last known contact with the paternal
half sister was May 2021. DCFS reported despite searching the
record for contact information for the paternal relatives in
August 2023, it was unable to conduct further inquiries of
paternal relatives. We assume the juvenile court credited
DCFS’s later reported inability to contact the paternal relatives,
including the half sister. (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053
[DCFS is “not required to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue
unproductive investigative leads.”].)
Mother next argues no inquiry took place of the maternal
uncle, who was present at the initial hearing but not questioned
about the family’s ancestry. Maternal uncle was present in court
with MGM, who denied American Indian ancestry. Maternal
uncle did not object or protest when the juvenile court found it
had no reason to believe ICWA applied. In addition, as set forth
in In re C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at page 70, there was no
indication the maternal uncle would have more information than
18
his own mother, MGM, as to whether Christopher may be an
Indian child.
As to the paternal aunt and paternal uncle, father
identified paternal aunt Jeanette C. in his parental notification of
Indian status form in January 2019. The form did not contain
contact information. The failure to contact Jeanette C. was
discussed in detail in the previous nonpublished opinion in case
No. B325916, where we concluded: “MGM argues DCFS ‘did not
interview Jeanette C. or document its efforts to do so.’ However,
the record reveals that DCFS did not have any way of contacting
Jeanette C. Despite repeated attempts to obtain her contact
information, neither father nor his family were able to provide it.
DCFS was not required to conduct an independent investigation
to locate this individual. The record shows that under the
circumstances DCFS undertook the best investigation it was
able, and nothing further was required.” We cited In re C.Y.
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 34, 40, for the proposition that DCFS “has
no duty to conduct an extensive independent investigation for
information.” Thus, “[w]ithout reliable contact information,
DCFS could not reasonably have been expected to interview”
Jeanette C. (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1083.)
Paternal uncle was also referenced in a form father filled
out in January 2019, but father did not provide contact
information. Father is now deceased, and DCFS reported it had
no contact information for additional paternal relatives. Under
the circumstances, DCFS had no way to contact paternal uncle.
As with Jeanette C., DCFS was not required to conduct an
extensive independent investigation to find the paternal uncle.
(In re Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083; In re C.Y., supra,
208 Cal.App.4th at p. 40.)
19
Under the circumstances of this case, mother has failed to
undermine the substantial evidence in the record supporting the
juvenile court’s conclusions that DCFS complied with its inquiry
obligations and ICWA is inapplicable.
B. Further inquiry
Mother argues numerous family members, including
mother, MGM, and father, indicated the child may have
American Indian heritage. These statements, mother argued,
gave the juvenile court reason to believe Christopher was an
Indian child. Mother argues this triggered the juvenile court’s
duty of further inquiry. Such inquiry, mother argues, included
the necessity of contacting the Cherokee tribes.
MGM raised the identical issue in her appeal from the
order terminating her legal guardianship. There, we concluded
the following:
“Under the circumstances of this case, it was not error for
the trial court to decline to order notice to the Cherokee tribe.
Mother’s statement must be considered in view of the mental
health issues from which she was suffering at the time, which
included delusional thoughts. While mother was scheduled to be
released from prison in January 2018, she was instead
involuntarily held at Patton State Hospital due to mental health
concerns. Mother was unable to have a cohesive conversation.
She remained delusional several months later when the social
worker interviewed her at the hospital. Mother then reported
she had many children, although this was known to be untrue.
Mother reported speaking to Christopher on the phone and
understanding him even though he was nonverbal. Mother
insisted Christopher could walk and talk when he was in her
custody, and sought DNA testing because she thought
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Christopher was not her child. Mother’s discharge date from
Patton State Hospital was later extended due to continued
concerns about her mental health. Given mother’s delusions, the
juvenile court was justified in its implied finding that mother’s
statement of possible ancestry with the Cherokee tribe was
unreliable.
“The juvenile court’s decision is supported by the reliable
testimony of mother’s relatives. MGM reported there might be
American Indian ancestry on the maternal side of family, but she
was unsure which tribe or tribes might be involved. MGM noted
that her father, who was deceased, was part of the ‘“Gee chee”
(unknown spelling) tribe.’ She also noted her mother might have
ancestry with a tribe in Arkansas. MGM offered that mother’s
biological father’s family might have American Indian ancestry,
but she did not have the contact information for any of mother’s
paternal relatives. Lula also reported she did not know much
about any American Indian ancestry, as her parents kept it a
secret. She understood the American Indian ancestry to be ‘West
Indian or Blackfoot.’ Lula added that mother’s maternal great-
grandfather may have had American Indian ancestry, but she did
not know where he was born nor did she have any further
information about him. She did not know which tribe might have
been involved nor did she have any information about the parents
of the maternal great-grandfather.
“Significantly, none of mother’s other relatives mentioned
Cherokee heritage in the maternal family. Only mother
mentioned it. And previously, when mother was asked in June
2017 about her American Indian ancestry, she stated that she
‘probably has some because “I have a couple of my grandmas
inside of my body.”’ Mother was unable to further explain any
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ICWA-related information. Thus, her later statement that she
had possible affiliation with the Cherokee tribe lacked
credibility—particularly when it was made near the time she
demonstrated delusional behavior and had to be institutionalized
for mental health reasons.
“As set forth above, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA
findings under the substantial evidence test. (Dezi C., supra, [16
Cal.5th at p. 1134].) There was sufficient credible evidence from
maternal relatives that the Cherokee tribe was not part of
Christopher’s ancestry. The juvenile court was not required to
credit mother’s lone indication of such heritage, viewed in light of
mother’s delusional behavior and forced hospitalization. Notice
to the Cherokee tribe was unnecessary under the circumstances.”
Given our earlier finding that the juvenile court did not err
in declining to contact the Cherokee tribe in this matter, mother’s
argument is unavailing.
Mother has failed to undermine the juvenile court’s
determination that DCFS conducted an adequate inquiry in this
case, and substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA does not apply.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J. GOORVITCH, J.
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