Filed 9/17/26 In re C.T. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re C.T., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E088042
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J306192)
v. OPINION
X.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Affirmed.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and David R. Guardado, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
The juvenile court found true allegations in a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 3001 petition filed by plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children
and Family Services (the department), removed C.T. (minor, born December 2023) from
defendant and appellant X.A.’s (mother) custody, and granted mother reunification
services. On appeal, mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s true
findings on the allegations and the court’s removal of minor from her custody. We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2025, the department received a referral alleging general
neglect. The reporting party alleged that the previous night, mother, a dependent minor
herself, returned to the facility from a “self-pass inebriated.” Mother was stumbling and
unable to stand up straight. She went to her room and passed out. Mother’s family, who
were apparently watching minor while mother was out, attempted to return minor to her
care; however, mother was unable to care for minor. Staff at the facility intervened and
cared for minor for about 12 hours because mother would not wake.
It was reported, “This is not the first time it has happened, and mother has returned
to the placement intoxicated before. During the month of September, the mother has
been coming back to the facility intoxicated more frequently. [A] [s]taff member could
not give an estimate of how often a month it happens, . . . .”
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
“It was reported that mother has recently been more hands off with [minor] and
has given [minor] to sta[ff] so that they can care for him. Staff stated this happened one
night a couple of weeks ago.” The reporting party indicated the biggest concern was that
mother would continue to be under the influence, forcing staff to care for minor. A staff
member expressed frustration that mother would not care for minor when able, including
giving him his medication, which staff had to do instead.
A staff member said that sometimes minor would go to father’s or the maternal
grandmother’s home.2 Mother “was doing fine up until around 4 months ago when a new
client was placed in the” facility. Minor would go with the new client and come back
intoxicated. “The mother’s behavior has also started to change, and placement has
reported her intoxication occurs about two to three times a month.” Mother was required
to have permission before leaving the facility but had previously left without doing so.
Four prior referrals regarding minor and mother had been received by the
department; three remained open. Mother had commented that minor was “‘a trigger’”
for her. Mother reported that she “went out with her friends and the night ‘did not go as
planned’. She was drinking, became intoxicated, and was sexually abused. The mother
stated she came back in the early morning intoxicated and went to sleep. She explained
that [minor] was with her [stepmother] when she went out and the staff at placement took
care of [minor] while she was sleeping. After she awoke, she went to the hospital to get
2 Father is not a party to the appeal.
3
tested and came back to take care of [minor].” “Mother stated that it was her first time
becoming intoxicated and that she does not need help supporting her son.”
On October 3, 2025, the department took minor into protective custody. Father
reported that he had not seen minor since April 2024; he said mother prevented him from
seeing minor. Father said he received messages from mother about her leaving the
facility and drinking alcohol. He said she “‘sells her body to men.’”
On October 7, 2025, the department filed a section 300 juvenile dependency
petition alleging that mother failed to provide adequate care and supervision of minor due
to intoxication (B-1), had a substance abuse problem (B-2), and that father knew or
reasonably should have known that mother had untreated substance abuse issues and
failed to protect minor (B-3). The court detained minor on October 8, 2025.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report filed October 27, 2025, the social worker
recommended the court find the allegations in the petition true, remove minor from
mother’s custody, and provide parents reunification services. Mother reported that on the
day of the incident, “she was under the influence of ‘alcohol and marijuana.’” She
denied any substance use prior to the incident. Mother indicated she was willing to
participate in random testing. She was in the process of beginning outpatient treatment.
Mother’s assigned staff member from the facility reported she had worked closely
with mother and minor for approximately two years. “She denied having knowledge or
concerns [mother] uses substances and the incident was a surprise to her. She described
[mother] as a ‘good, responsible mother to [minor].’ [She] reported she has observed the
4
mother ‘is always attentive and cares for [minor].’ [She] denied concerns regarding
[mother’s] ability to provide appropriate care and supervision to [minor].”
Father disagreed with the B-3 allegation; he denied any knowledge or suspicion
that mother was using substances. Father said he would see minor once in a while.
On October 29, 2025, the parties agreed to continue the matter for mediation. The
court granted authority to place minor with father under family maintenance services.
In the December 4, 2025, mediation report, the social worker noted that mother
failed to attend. Father submitted on the B-3 allegation; the parties agreed to placement
of minor with father on family maintenance services to include individual counselling
and parenting classes.
On December 11, 2025, the court continued the matter to provide mother another
opportunity to participate in mediation; the court also ordered mother to drug test that
day; the court noted that failure to test would be considered as a positive test. A February
2, 2026, mediation report reflected that mother failed to attend.
At a hearing on February 10, 2026, mother’s counsel indicated that mother had
moved from her prior placement, and counsel had been unsuccessful in getting ahold of
her. Mother had turned 18.
In a March 11, 2026, information for the court, the social worker noted that since
the hearing on October 29, 2025, mother had not made herself available to the
department. She had missed two scheduled mediations. The department referred her to
substance treatment, parenting education, individual counseling, and requested her to
5
participate in on demand and random drug testing. “Despite the department’s efforts to
connect her to services, [mother] has not been enrolled in services due to the mother
being unresponsive. Further, [mother] has failed to visit with the child consistently.”
Mother failed to show for visits scheduled for February l, and 22, and March 1, and 8,
2026. Mother indicated she was “‘prioritizing herself,’” which did not include
prioritizing reunification with minor. Mother submitted certificates of completion of a
nurturing parent workshop and, apparently, a substance abuse therapy program.3
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on March 11, 2026, the department
clarified that its recommendation for disposition was placement with father on family
maintenance services and “discretionary services” for mother. Mother’s counsel argued
the court should find the allegations not true and transition or return minor to mother’s
care. Father’s counsel requested the court dismiss the case with respect to father.
Minor’s counsel requested the court follow the department’s recommendations: “She
hasn’t been in contact with the Department to try to show and demonstrate that she does
not have a substance use problem.” The department noted, “It seems like this really was
not an isolated incident.”
The court found the allegations true, declared minor a dependent of the court,
removed minor from mother’s custody, placed minor in father’s custody with family
maintenance services, and granted mother reunification services.
3 The certificate itself does not reflect what the program involved; however,
mother’s counsel reported, “Mother has explained to me that this is a substance abuse
therapy type of program.”
6
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s true findings on the
allegations and the court’s removal of minor from her custody. We disagree.
A. Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s true findings on all the
allegations. We disagree.
“‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if
there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’”’ [Citations.]” (In re
L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238 (L.O.).)
“‘“‘“However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence.
[Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on
appeal. [Citation.] Furthermore, ‘[w]hile substantial evidence may consist of inferences,
such inferences must be “a product of logic and reason” and “must rest on the evidence”
[citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a
finding [citations].’ [Citation.] ‘The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of
7
fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 323-324 (B.D.).)
1. B-1 Allegation: Failure to Supervise
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s true finding on the B-1
allegation. We disagree.
“By its terms, the first clause [of subdivision (b)(1) of section 300] requires no
more than the parent’s ‘failure or inability ... to adequately supervise or protect the child.’
[Citations.] Indeed, the surrounding provisions in section 300 support the conclusion that
the first clause of section 300(b)(1) does not require parental culpability.” (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629; accord, In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 553 (N.R.).) “In
certain circumstances a parent’s or guardian’s substance-related issues may contribute to
a finding that dependency jurisdiction exists for another reason, such as a ‘failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.’
[Citation.]” (N.R. at p. 540, fn. 9.)
The department alleged in the B-1 allegation that mother failed to provide
adequate care and supervision of minor due to intoxication. Specifically, the department
alleged that on multiple occasions, mother was unable to provide minor with appropriate
care and supervision due to her intoxication, which placed minor at risk of harm while in
mother’s care. Here, sufficient evidence supports the court’s true finding on the B-1
allegation.
8
A social service supervisor reported that mother was apparently doing well until
around four months prior to the referral, when a new client was placed in the same
facility as mother. Mother would go out with the new client and come back intoxicated.
Personnel from the placement indicated that mother had been returning to the facility
intoxicated approximately “two to three times a month.” A staff member reported that
during the month of September, mother had been coming back to the facility intoxicated
more frequently. Father said he received messages from mother about her leaving the
facility and drinking alcohol.
The reporting party indicated mother had recently been more “hands off with
[minor] and has given [minor] to sta[ff] so that they can care for him.” A staff member
indicated this happened one night a couple of weeks prior to the triggering incident. The
reporting party indicated the biggest concern was that mother would continue to be under
the influence of alcohol, forcing staff to care for minor. A staff member expressed
frustration that even when able, mother would not care for minor, including giving him
his medication, which staff had to do instead.
On the day of the incident that triggered the referral, mother returned from a “self-
pass inebriated.” She was stumbling and unable to stand up straight. She went to her
room and passed out. Mother’s family, who were apparently watching minor while
mother was out, attempted to return minor to her care; however, mother was unable to
care for minor. Staff at the facility intervened and cared for minor for about 12 hours
because mother would not wake. Mother admitted she came back to the facility
9
intoxicated, under the influence of marijuana, and unable to care for minor. “This is not
the first time it has happened, and mother has returned to the placement intoxicated
before.”
Thus, contrary to mother’s assertion, this was not a situation where “mother drank
on one occasion.” Rather, it was the culmination of months of incidents based on the
reports of several individuals wherein mother would return to the facility intoxicated and
would rely on staff to care for minor rather than care for minor herself. As the
department noted, “It seems like this really was not an isolated incident.” Moreover,
there were reports that even when not intoxicated, mother would decline to care for
minor. Therefore, substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that mother had
failed to adequately supervise minor.
Furthermore, mother no longer lived in the facility and had failed to make herself
available to department personnel; thus, it was not clear who would care for minor in
future situations in which mother might become intoxicated. Therefore, there was
substantial evidence of risk to minor.
Mother analogizes In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 (J.N.) to the instant
case with respect to her contention that we should reverse the jurisdictional finding. She
repeatedly refers to the circumstances as involving a “single incident,” “one night,” “one
occasion,” a “single occasion,” a “single night,” “one incident,” or an “isolated night.”
As we noted ante, this was not a single incident.
10
In J.N., the court framed the issue as “whether evidence of a single episode of
parental conduct was sufficient to bring the three children within the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction.” (J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) The appellate court noted that,
“The court did not find, and nothing in the record supported a finding, that either parent
had an ongoing substance abuse problem, and any such conclusion would be conjecture
based upon the record before us. Consequently, the evidence did not establish that any of
the children were at risk of physical harm as a result of parental inability to provide
regular care due to the parent’s substance abuse.” (Ibid.; id. at p. 1026 [“[H]ere the court
did not find that the parents were substance abusers”].)
First, as described ante, “This case does not involve a single act which endangers a
child.” (In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 944 [distinguishing J.N.]; accord, In re
Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261, fn. 7; In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610,
636, fn. 17.) Rather, this case involves several incidents of alcohol abuse, and at least
one case of marijuana use, that could have endangered minor except for the fact that she
lived in a facility with personnel who were forced to care for minor when mother became
unable or unwilling to do so. Now that she no longer lived in such a facility, failed to
participate in services, failed to test, and refused to contact or cooperate with the
department, her potential alcohol induced incapacitation posed a substantial danger to
minor, as it was unclear who would be caring for minor.
Second, in J.N., the court found that neither parent had a substance abuse problem.
(J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) Here, by finding the B-2 allegation true, which
11
we affirm post, the juvenile court expressly found that mother had a substance abuse
issue. Thus, J.N. is distinguishable.
Mother also complains about the evidence adduced against her: “But general,
undated references to unspecified past occasions, offered by interested staff without detail
as to frequency, severity, or effect on [minor], are not substantial evidence of an ongoing
pattern.” Counsel observes that the record contains only a “handful of secondhand,
uncorroborated statements” and “generalized hearsay characterizations” regarding the
multiple incidents of intoxication.
However, section 281 “is now generally understood to authorize the admission of
a social worker’s report—including hearsay in the report—in any dependency
proceeding. [Citation.]” (In re M.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1071; see In re
Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1242-1243 [“hearsay statements contained in social
studies should be admissible even if they do not meet the requirements of the child
dependency exception . . . .”]; accord, In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915.)
“[R]eliance on such hearsay is subject to due process objections if opposing
parties are not timely provided copies, given an opportunity to subpoena and examine the
social worker and the person(s) whose hearsay statements are contained in the report, and
permitted to introduce evidence by way of rebuttal.” (In re Jonique W. (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 685, 698.) “[T]he rules of evidence are relaxed in dependency
proceedings . . . .” (In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 594; accord, In re Lesly G.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 914.)
12
Here, mother’s counsel below did not object, on any basis, when the department
requested, and the court granted, submission of the matter on the social worker’s reports
containing the complained-of statements. Moreover, mother’s counsel could have, but
did not, subpoena the staff members and/or social worker to testify regarding the
statements. Thus, there is no basis to establish why the statements of staff members at
the facility would be biased. Finally, mother’s counsel did not offer any rebuttal
evidence, such as mother’s testimony. Therefore, mother forfeited any objection to the
statements as inadmissible hearsay and the court’s reliance on them. The juvenile court
acted within its discretion in implicitly crediting the reports of staff members that mother
had come back to the facility intoxicated on multiple occasions. (L.O., supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 238 [“issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court”].)
2. Justiciability
The department contends that if any one of the jurisdictional findings are
supported by substantial evidence, this court need not address the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the remaining allegations. We agree in part.
Because we held that substantial evidence supported the B-1 allegation, we decline
to address whether sufficient evidence supports the B-3 allegation. However, because the
B-2 allegation may have served as a basis for the court’s removal order, we exercise our
discretion to determine whether substantial evidence supported it.
“As long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that
another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979
13
(Ashley B.); accord, In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 896.) “‘For this reason, an
appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining
jurisdictional findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297,
308 (Briana V.); accord, L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 237.)
Since we have held that substantial evidence supported the B-1 allegation, any
determination we might make on the B-2 or B-3 allegations will not result in a reversal of
the court’s order asserting jurisdiction. (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)
“However, we generally will exercise our discretion and reach the merits of a
challenge to any jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) serves as the basis for
dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial
to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings
[citations]; or (3) ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond
jurisdiction.’” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763, overruled on other
ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 550; accord, In re Rashad D. (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 156, 164; L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 237.)
We note that without express findings by the juvenile court, because the true
finding on the B-2 allegation concerned mother’s substance abuse, it may have served as
a basis for the order removing minor from mother’s custody. We also note that it could
prejudice mother. Therefore, we will exercise our discretion to review that allegation for
substantial evidence. However, because the B-3 allegation related only to father, it did
not serve as the basis for the removal order, does not prejudice mother, and would not
14
appear to have any additional consequences for mother. Therefore, we decline to review
the B-3 allegation.
3. B-2 Allegation: Substance Abuse
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the B-2 allegation. We disagree.
Substance abuse means “the excessive use of drugs or alcohol.” (N.R., supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 531.) “[F]or dependency jurisdiction to exist due to substance abuse . . . ,
this abuse must render a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and
either cause the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or place the child at
substantial risk of suffering such harm or illness.” (Ibid.) “[T]he government must
establish, as separate elements, that (1) substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian
unable to provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to
suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of such harm or
illness.” (Id. at p. 558.)
“It is reasonable for courts to infer that very young children require a substantial
degree of close supervision. But it is inappropriate to regard a parent’s or guardian’s
excessive use of alcohol or an addictive drug as always being sufficient, by itself, to show
that the parent or guardian is unable to provide regular care for a young child and that the
child is therefore at substantial risk of serious physical harm.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 558-559.)
“[O]ne reasonable inference from a parent’s refusal to submit to drug testing at the
agency’s request, knowing that the agency is attempting to confirm or rule out substance
15
abuse, is that the parent fears such tests would be positive. [Citations.]” (B.D., supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 324, fn. 4.)
The department alleged in the B-2 allegation that mother had a substance abuse
problem from which she was not rehabilitated, and which impaired her judgment and
ability to care for minor. Here, sufficient evidence supports the court’s true finding on the
B-2 allegation.
First, as discussed ante, this was not a situation where “mother drank on one
occasion.” Rather, it was the culmination of months of incidents wherein mother would
return to the facility intoxicated and would rely on staff to care for minor rather than care
for him herself. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s inherent finding
that mother’s use of alcohol was “excessive,” in that she was abusing alcohol, which
rendered her unable to provide adequate care to minor.
Second, as also discussed ante, mother no longer lived in the facility and had
failed to make herself available to department personnel. Thus, it is not clear who would
care for minor in future situations in which mother might become intoxicated and unable
to do so for periods of up to 12 hours. Third, despite the department’s recommendation
and the court’s order, mother failed to test. Fourth, minor was not even two years old
when taken into protective custody. Therefore, there was substantial evidence of future
risk of harm to minor.
16
Minor attempts to analogize B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 315 (B.D.), to the
current case to establish that insufficient evidence supported the B-2 allegation. We find
B.D. distinguishable.
In B.D., the mother had tested positive for opiates at the birth of her child. “She
had also tested positive for marijuana and hydrocodone six months earlier, at her first
prenatal care visit, in October 2021. . . . Mother said the week before giving birth she
was experiencing back pain related to her sciatic nerve. She explained that her aunt gave
her a Norco pill.” (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.) Mother twice refused to test;
however, she later agreed and tested positive for opiates beyond the timeframe from
which it would have remained in her system had she only taken Norco once before giving
birth, as she insisted she had. (Id. at pp. 318-322) She thereafter refused to submit to
further testing. (Id. at pp. 320 & 322.)
The court in B.D. concluded that substantial evidence did not support a finding
that the child “had suffered serious physical harm or illness as a result of [the] mother’s
substance abuse. There was no evidence that the presence of a low level of an opioid
substance consistent with a one-time use of prescription pain medication by [the] mother
constituted serious physical harm or illness.” (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.)
The court additionally concluded, “There was no evidence that mother’s substance
use or abuse endangered the children prior to the instant case,” “[t]here was no evidence
that mother engaged in drug-related behavior that might put the children at risk of harm,”
“[t]here was no evidence that mother was impaired when caring for the children,” and
17
“[t]here was no evidence that mother had a prior child welfare history related to
substance abuse or inadequate care of the children.” (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 330-331.) “[S]ubstance abuse is not by itself sufficient to show a parent cannot
provide regular care for a child and that the child is therefore at risk of serious physical
harm.” (Id. at p. 331.) Thus, the court reversed the jurisdictional finding. (Id. at p. 318.)
Here, setting aside whether we would agree with the court in B.D. that the facts
there were insufficient to find that mother abused substances threatening risk of physical
harm to her child, we find B.D. distinguishable. Unlike the B.D. court’s characterization
of the situation as being the mother’s “one-time use” of narcotics (B.D., supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 327), mother here repeatedly returned to the facility intoxicated and
unable to care for minor.
Unlike B.D.’s assertion that “[t]here was no evidence that [the] mother was
impaired when caring for the children” (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 330), here, the
triggering incident required facility staff to care for minor for 12 hours while mother was
intoxicated and when minor was supposed to be in mother’s care. Unlike in B.D. (id. at
330-331), mother had a prior child welfare history that included allegations of general
neglect. Mother had refused to cooperate with the department, had not tested as
recommended by the department and ordered by the court, and no longer lived in the
facility. Thus, B.D. is distinguishable. Substantial evidence supports the B-2 allegation.
18
B. Removal
Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s order removing minor
from her custody. We disagree.
“Section 361 is the governing statute, and it imposes restraints on the juvenile
court’s authority to remove a child from a parent’s physical custody. [Citation.] It
provides that ‘[a] dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or
her parents, . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence’ that
‘[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there
are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.’ [Citation.]” (In re
M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 958 (M.V.).)
“‘“The elevated burden of proof for removal from the home . . . reflects the
Legislature’s recognition of the rights of parents to the care, custody and management of
their children, and further reflects an effort to keep children in their homes where it is
safe to do so. [Citations.] By requiring clear and convincing evidence of the risk of
substantial harm to the child if returned home and the lack of reasonable means short of
removal to protect the child’s safety, section 361, subdivision (c) demonstrates the ‘bias
of the controlling statute is on family preservation, not removal.’”’ [Citation.]” (M.V.,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 959.)
19
“California dependency laws ‘establish that out-of-home placement is not a proper
means of hedging against the possibility of failed reunification efforts, or of securing
parental cooperation with those efforts. It is a last resort, to be considered only when the
child would be in danger if allowed to reside with the parent. The law requires that a
child remain in parental custody pending the resolution of dependency proceedings,
despite the problems that led the court to take jurisdiction over the child, unless the court
is clearly convinced that such a disposition would harm the child. The high standard of
proof by which this finding must be made is an essential aspect of the presumptive,
constitutional right of parents to care for their children.’ [Citation.]” (M.V., supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 959.)
“We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for substantial
evidence, ‘“keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make its order based on
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.’” [Citation.] ‘[A]ppellate review
of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and convincing
proof must account for the level of confidence this standard demands.’ [Citation.] In
applying this standard of review, ‘the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.] We view the record in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
20
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. [Citation.]” (M.V., supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 960.)
Here, sufficient evidence supports the court’s order removing minor from mother’s
custody. Mother repeatedly returned to the facility intoxicated and unable to care for
minor. The triggering incident required facility staff to care for minor for 12 hours,
during which minor should have been cared for by mother. Mother admitted the truth of
the substance of the report regarding the triggering incident and admitted to using
marijuana. She had also refused to care for minor even when she was not inebriated.
Mother had previously left the facility without obtaining the requisite authorization.
Despite saying she was willing to participate in random testing, mother had
refused to cooperate with the department and had not tested as recommended by the
department and ordered by the court. Mother no longer lived in the facility and had
failed to make herself available to department personnel; thus, it was not clear who would
care for minor in future situations in which mother might become intoxicated. Mother
had a prior welfare history that included allegations of general neglect. Father said she
prostituted herself.
The department had referred mother to multiple services, yet she had not enrolled
in any of them.4 Mother failed to show at two mediations. She failed to make herself
4 Although mother had completed two self-referred services, the department had
not had time to authenticate them or determine whether they were sufficient: “Although
we did receive certificates today, I don’t believe [the department] has seen these or has
had an opportunity to follow up with service providers.” As noted in footnote 2 ante, the
certificate of completion, which mother’s counsel asserted related to substance abuse,
does not actually reflect what the program involved.
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available to her counsel. Moreover, mother failed to show for four visits with minor.
Mother had commented that minor was “‘a trigger’” for her. Mother indicated she was
“‘prioritizing herself,’” which did not include prioritizing reunification with minor. Thus,
mother’s past behavior and current refusal to cooperate with the department supported the
court’s removal of minor from her custody to ensure minor’s physical safety.
Mother notes that by the time of the disposition hearing, six months had elapsed
since the court detained minor: “During that time period there was no further incident, no
evidence of ongoing substance use, and no evidence that [minor] was at risk of any harm
in mother’s care.” Mother observes this is “particularly [true] when mother resided in a
therapeutic placement offering around-the-clock support, crisis intervention, nursing
services, and individual counseling.” “In this case mother had access to a unique wealth
of resources and the juvenile court could have relied on these to ensure [minor’s] safety.
Mother was staying at [the facility,] which provided an extremely supportive and
therapeutic living environment.”
However, mother’s assertions are belied by the record, which reflects that mother
refused to cooperate with the department, had not tested as recommended by the
department and ordered by the court, and no longer lived in the facility. As counsel for
minor noted, “She hasn’t been in contact with the Department to try to show and
demonstrate that she does not have a substance use problem.” Thus, the department
would have no way of knowing whether mother had any subsequent incidents of alcohol
abuse, and, again, as she was no longer living in the facility, there was no way to ensure
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minor’s safety should she subsequently abuse alcohol and become unable or unwilling to
care for him. Substantial evidence supports the court’s order of removal.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
J.
FIELDS
J.
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