In re C.O. CA4/3

Filed 8/31/26 In re C.O. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re C.O., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065786

v. (Super. Ct. No. 23DL1192)

C.O., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Joe T. Perez, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Kristine A. Gutierrez and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.O. was convicted in 2016 of the murder of John Doe. After a
change in the law, C.O.’s case was transferred to the juvenile court in 2024,
and following a restitution hearing, the court ordered C.O. to pay $11,400 in
restitution to John Doe’s mother. C.O. appeals from the restitution order. He
argues the court abused its discretion because the only evidence presented at
the restitution hearing was oral testimony from John Doe’s mother with no
corroborating documentation. He also asserts the restitution award was
based on hearsay and speculation, and the restitution hearing was so
fundamentally unfair as to violate his due process rights.
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in awarding restitution
because, with one exception, there is a factual and rational basis for the
amount of restitution ordered. We reject C.O.’s claim of a due process
violation. We therefore affirm the restitution order as modified to reduce the
amount of restitution from $11,400 to $10,390.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2016 a jury convicted C.O. of the second degree murder of
John Doe. The trial court sentenced C.O. to a prison term of 18 years to life.
In 2023, C.O.’s case was transferred to the juvenile court
pursuant to Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 32). In July 2024, the court denied the petitioner’s
motion to transfer C.O. to adult court.1 The court later declared C.O. to be a
ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, released

1 This is a juvenile justice proceeding, we refer to the prosecution

as the petitioner.

2
him from custody subject to terms and conditions, and ordered him to pay
restitution.2
At the restitution hearing in July 2025, John Doe’s mother, E.M.,
was the only witness. She requested a total of $13,400 in restitution for
medical expenses and lost earnings. E.M. testified that as a consequence of
John Doe’s death, she was admitted to a hospital three times, visited a
medical clinic twice, and ceased working for five to six months.
As to each of those components of restitution, E.M. testified as
follows:
First Hospitalization. Two weeks after the death of John Doe,
E.M., who suffers from diabetes and anemia, had to be hospitalized for a day
due to elevated and uncontrollable blood sugar levels. Grief stricken, E.M.
had stopped eating and “[e]verything was out of control.” At the hospital,
E.M. was given a blood transfusion to stabilize her condition. E.M. did not
have health insurance and had to pay out of pocket for her medical
treatment. E.M. did not keep any receipts or invoices because she did not
realize she might need them in the future. She testified she had paid between
$1,200 and $1,300 based on her memory of having made monthly cash
payments of about $250 to $260. She did not go back to the hospital to try to
get the bills, and nobody asked her to do so.
Second Hospitalization. About one month after John Doe’s death,
E.M. was again admitted to the hospital because, due to ongoing grief, she
was about to go into a diabetic coma. She was in the hospital for about two
days, during which she received the same treatment as she had received
during her first visit. E.M. never saw the hospital bill, but gave it to John

2 All further statutory references are to this code unless

otherwise indicated.

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Doe’s father, who told her the charges amounted to $1,600. E.M. personally
went to the hospital to make monthly payments of $187. E.M. could not recall
the exact number of payments, but the total amount was $1,600. She did not
keep receipts or invoices for those payments.
Third Hospitalization. About six weeks to two months after John
Doe’s death, E.M. was admitted to the hospital for a third time. She had not
been eating enough due to grief, and her anemia had worsened. E.M. testified
the cost of the third hospital visit was $1,300 to $1,400, but the juvenile court
struck that testimony as lacking foundation. She also testified she had gone
to the hospital three or four times to make cash monthly payments of $150.
Sometimes John Doe’s father made payments.
Medical Clinic Visits. E.M. twice visited a medical clinic because
her blood sugar level and anemia continued to be out of control due to stress
and sadness caused by John Doe’s death. During the first visit, E.M. received
an iron injection to treat anemia. She paid $150 in cash for the injection and
$120 for two boxes of injections she could administer at home. During the
second visit to the clinic, E.M. paid $170 to $180 for an insulin injection to
control her blood sugar level.
Lost Wages. After John Doe died, E.M. “lost energy for
everything” and was unable to work for five to six months.3 She worked from
home “assembling packaging.” The company she worked for would deliver
materials to her home and pick up completed work. Her weekly earnings
depended upon the amount of packaging she completed, but the average was
$320 to $350 per week, paid in cash, for the three years prior to John Doe’s

3 E.M. testified that on the day John Doe was killed, she was

supposed to work but when her boss found out about her son, he told E.M.
she was not going to be able to work and took the work from her.

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death. After five or six months, E.M. returned to work, and she continued to
work for the same company until it closed about nine years before the date of
the restitution hearing.
The juvenile court ordered restitution in the sum of $11,400. The
court reached that figure in the following way:
For the three hospitalizations, the juvenile court used the lower
of the two numbers testified to by E.M. Thus, the court used $1,200 for the
first hospitalization, $1,600 for the second hospitalization, and $1,300 for the
third hospitalization, for a total of $4,100. The court impliedly found E.M.
had paid the full amount for each hospitalization.
For the clinic visits, the juvenile court found that for the first
visit, E.M. paid $150 for the iron injection and $120 for the two boxes of
injections she would administer at home. The court found E.M. paid $170 for
the second visit. For the two visits, the court calculated a total of $340, and
that amount added to $4,100 for the hospitalizations came to a total of
$4,440.4
For lost earnings, the juvenile court found E.M. had earned
between $320 and $350 a week for the three years before John Doe’s death
and used $335 as the “mid range” of those two figures. The court allowed five
months of earnings at four weeks per month which, at $335 per week, yielded
$6,700 in lost earnings. The court then added $6,700 to the $4,440 and
ordered restitution in the amount of $11,400.5

4 The $4,440 is a miscalculation because the amount for E.M.’s

clinic visits should be $440 ($150 + $120 + $170 = $440), not $340, which
makes the total $4,540, not $4,440.

5 This is also a miscalculation as $6,700 plus $4,440 equals

$11,140, not $11,400. Additionally, as indicated previously, the total for

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DISCUSSION
I.
OVERVIEW OF RESTITUTION LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The California Constitution guarantees a crime victim’s right to
receive restitution directly from the person convicted of the crimes for which
the victim suffered loss. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A); see In re
S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 803.) In juvenile proceedings, this right is
enforced through section 730.6, which requires the juvenile court to order
restitution to the victim of a crime. (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 803.)6
In pertinent part, section 730.6, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “The
court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary
reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.” Restitution shall
“identify each victim, . . . and the amount of each victim’s loss to which it
pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the
victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred” as a result of
the youth’s conduct. (Ibid.) Such losses include, as relevant here, “[m]edical
expenses” and “[w]ages or profits lost due to injury incurred by the victim.”
(§ 730.6, subd. (b)(1)(B) & (C).) For purposes of restitution, “‘victim’” includes
“[t]he immediate surviving family of the actual victim.” (§ 730.6, subd. (d)(1).)

hospitalization and clinic visits should be $4,540. This amount, plus $6,700,
totals $11,240. This correction will be reflected in our disposition.

6 The parties cite Penal Code section 1202.4 as governing the

award of restitution in this case. The correct statute, however, is section
730.6 because restitution was compensation for economic loss caused by
conduct for which C.O. was adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile court.
(§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) Supplemental briefing is unnecessary because
Penal Code section 1202.4 and section 730.6 are nearly identical and
generally have been interpreted in the same way.

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A restitution order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. (In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361 (J.L.).) The court’s
factual findings supporting restitution are reviewed for substantial evidence
(In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661) and a restitution order that is
based upon an error in law constitutes an abuse of discretion (In re Travis J.
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 202–203). “[A] victim’s restitution right to
restitution is to be construed broadly and liberally.” (J.L., supra,
121 Cal.App.5th at p. 361.)
A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion if “‘“‘there is a
factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered.’”’” (J.L.,
supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 361.) ‘“[T]he court may use any rational method
of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to
make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of
rehabilitation.’” (In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.)
“‘[T]here is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact
amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is
there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be
recoverable in a civil action.’” (Id. at pp. 855–856.) Nonetheless, a juvenile
court “must use a ‘rational method’ of calculation and must rely on facts
found by a preponderance of the evidence” to make the victim whole. (In re
S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102.)

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II.
THE JUVENILE COURT’S RESTITUTION ORDER IS NOT
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

A. Oral Testimony Without Documentary Evidence May Support a Restitution
Award
C.O. challenges the amount of every component of the restitution
award. Before turning to each of those components, we address a point
underlying C.O.’s entire appeal: E.M.’s testimony was the only evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing. C.O. argues E.M.’s testimony was
“unverified” and lacked documentation and, therefore, was insufficient to
support the restitution award. Without documents and other paper records,
C.O. argues, “the court had nothing solid on which to anchor its findings” and
the restitution award was based on speculation.
Oral testimony, standing alone, may be sufficient evidence to
support a restitution award. “Restitution hearings are intended to be
informal” (People v. Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 684), and section
730.6 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof. (J.L., supra,
121 Cal.App.5th at p. 362). A prima facie showing of loss may be based on the
victim’s testimony. (In re S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1102; People v.
Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) “‘Once the victim makes a prima facie
showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the [minor’s delinquent]
acts, the burden shifts to the [minor] to disprove the amount of the losses
claimed by the victim.’” (J.L., supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 362.) Reliance on
E.M.’s testimony without supporting documentation thus does not render the
restitution award invalid.
In addition, the juvenile court’s decision reflects the court
impliedly found E.M. to be credible. “‘Conflicts and even testimony which is

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subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it
is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility of a
witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202.) C.O. argues E.M.’s
testimony was sometimes internally inconsistent; however, “inconsistencies
and conflicts in the evidence go to credibility of witnesses and weight of the
evidence, which are matters for the trial court.” (In re S.A. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149.)

B. There is a Factual and Rational Basis for Every Component but One of the
Restitution Award
As to the first hospitalization, E.M.’s testimony supports the
$1,200 in restitution ordered by the juvenile court. E.M. testified she paid, in
cash, a total of $1,200 to $1,300 by making monthly payments of $250 to
$260. C.O. argues that testimony was speculative. C.O. never objected on the
ground of lack of personal knowledge or speculation (see Evid. Code, § 702,
subd. (a)), and E.M.’s testimony was based upon personal knowledge of the
treatments E.M. received and the payments she made. C.O. argues E.M.’s
testimony is inconsistent because, he claims, she also testified she made
monthly payments of $150. However, C.O.’s citation in support of that
proposition is to E.M.’s testimony about payments made in regard to the
third hospitalization.
As to the second hospitalization, C.O. argues there is no
evidentiary support for the restitution award because E.M. testified she
never saw the hospital bill but learned of its amount from John Doe’s father,
who told her the bill was for $1,600. C.O. posed a hearsay objection, and
E.M.’s testimony about the amount of the hospital bill was indeed double
hearsay. (See People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 550–552.) A judge at

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a restitution hearing has nearly unlimited discretion in deciding the type and
source of information to consider (People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266,
1275). We need not determine whether the juvenile court overrelaxed the
rules of evidence: E.M. also testified she made monthly payments, in cash, of
$187 and, while she could not recall how many payments she made, she
testified the total paid was $1,600.7 E.M.’s testimony is neither hearsay nor
speculation because E.M. had personal knowledge of the treatments she
received during the second hospitalization and of the payments she
personally made for those treatments.
As the Attorney General acknowledges, the juvenile court erred in
calculating restitution for the third hospitalization. Although the court struck
E.M.’s testimony that she paid between $1,300 and $1,400 for the third
hospitalization, the court ultimately awarded $1,300 in restitution. The
Attorney General suggests we reduce the amount of restitution for the third
hospitalization to $450 or $600 based on E.M.’s testimony that she made

7 E.M.’s testimony about payments for the second hospitalization

included the following colloquy:
“[The petitioner:] Do you recall . . . how many payments you
made?
“[E.M.:] To be honest, I don’t recall, but there were several. I
don’t recall how many there were.
“[The petitioner:] Do you recall how much each payment was?
“[E.M.:] Those were $187.
“[The petitioner:] And you said it’s about [$]1,600 total?
“[E.M.:] Yes.”
This testimony reasonably could be interpreted to mean that E.M. knew she
made about $1,600 in payments or as a reference to her prior hearsay
testimony that John Doe’s father told her the amount of the hospital bill was
$1,600. Under the substantial evidence standard, we must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the restitution order (In re Aaron J. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1053), and so we interpret E.M.’s testimony to mean
E.M. paid about $1,600.

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three or four cash payments of $150 each. The Attorney General alternatively
suggests we order a limited remand for a new restitution hearing to address
this one issue. Remand is unnecessary. The court impliedly found E.M.’s
testimony about making payments to be credible and, when faced with
alternative figures, always chose the one that would lower the amount of
restitution. We therefore shall reduce the restitution award by $850, which is
the amount produced by allowing restitution of $450 (3 x $150) for the third
hospitalization and subtracting $450 from $1,300.
E.M.’s testimony was sufficient to establish the amounts she
incurred and paid for the two visits to the clinics. She had personal
knowledge of the treatments she received at the clinics and of the amounts
she personally paid for them. C.O. did not object to E.M.’s testimony on the
ground of lack of personal knowledge or speculation.
The juvenile court’s award of restitution for lost earnings is
supported by substantial evidence. The amount of lost earnings was not
based on speculation, as C.O. claims, because E.M. had personal knowledge
of her job responsibilities, earnings, and inability to work. In her testimony
she described those responsibilities and stated her average earnings for the
three years before John Doe’s death were $320 to $350 per week. She testified
she was unable to work for five to six months after John Doe’s death. C.O. did
not object to any of E.M.’s testimony regarding lost earnings on the ground of
lack of personal knowledge or speculation. In calculating the amount of lost
earnings, the court employed a “‘rational method’” to make E.M. whole. (In re
S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1102.) The court used $335—the midpoint
between $320 and $350—as the amount of E.M.’s weekly earnings. By doing
so, the court was not speculating, but using a reasonable means of
determining E.M.’s actual loss. The court allowed five months of lost

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earnings, not six, and accorded four weeks per month.8 The court then made
a rational calculation of E.M.’s lost earnings by multiplying the number of
weeks (20) by $335 per week.
C.O. cites Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300 as
holding that “a restitution order cannot be based solely on averages or other
uncertain calculations.” C.O. misreads Luis M. In that case, the juvenile
court imposed restitution in favor of a city and against a youth under section
730.6 based upon nine acts of defacement by graffiti. (Luis M., supra, at p.
303.) The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s judgment
which directed the juvenile court to vacate its restitution order and hold a
new restitution hearing. (Id. at p. 303.) The high court did so because the
amount of restitution was based on an estimate of the city’s annual cost of
abating all graffiti within the city rather than “a rational estimate of the
cost” of cleaning up the youth’s graffiti. (Id. at pp. 309–310.)
Here, in contrast to Luis M., the restitution award was based on
E.M.’s testimony as to the actual costs E.M. alone incurred as a result of C.O.
murdering John Doe. Further, Luis M. does not bar the use of estimates and
averages in calculating the amount of restitution. To the contrary, the Luis
M. court concluded that in calculating restitution a court need not ascertain
the exact amount of loss, cited with approval a case upholding a restitution
award based upon estimates and averages, and noted a court retains broad
discretion to estimate costs incurred by a party seeking restitution. (Luis M.
v. Superior Court, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 309, 310.)

8 Using four weeks per month yields 20 weeks (5 x 4 = 20), which

is a lower number of weeks than in actuality. Using 30-day months, five
months yields 150 days which is 21 weeks and three days (150 ÷ 7).

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C.O. argues several cases “underscore[]” the petitioner’s “failure to
provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation.” None of the cases C.O. cites are
apt because all deal with a situation in which no evidence was presented to
support a restitution award. (See In re Travis J., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 203–204 [no evidence in record to support restitution order]; People v.
Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 653 [claim of restitution for burial
expenses was not supported by testimony or documents and was not
mentioned in the probation report]; People v. Vournazos (1988)
198 Cal.App.3d 948, 958–959 [no evidence restitution was based on
statutorily required replacement cost of stolen property and repair cost of
damaged property].)
III.
THE RESTITUTION HEARING AND AWARD DID NOT VIOLATE
C.O.’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
A hearing to determine the amount of restitution might violate
due process if the procedures used by the court “‘are fundamentally unfair.’”
(People v. Marrero (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 896, 911.) This may be so if the
court relies upon unreliable or false information. (People v. Arbuckle (1978)
22 Cal.3d 749, 754–755; see Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, 370,
fn. 13 [“[T]he Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
may constitute a further bar to admission of, for example, unreliable
evidence”].) But application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does
not render a hearing fundamentally unfair. (People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1097.)
C.O. argues the juvenile court violated his due process rights by
admitting and relying upon unreliable hearsay, in particular, E.M.’s
testimony about the amount of the bill for the second hospitalization. Any
error in permitting E.M. to testify about the amount of the bill for the second

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hospitalization was a matter of application of the ordinary rules of evidence,
subject to the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 standard of prejudice.
(See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [“error in admitting
evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test”].) On the record before us,
even if the court erred in admitting this testimony, it was not reasonably
probable the court would have reached a decision more favorable to C.O.
without that testimony because E.M. testified she personally made cash
payments totaling $1,600. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
C.O. briefly argues, almost in passing, that his due process rights
were violated when the juvenile court overruled his hearsay objection to
E.M.’s testimony that her doctor had indicated her symptoms were due to
stress from John Doe’s death. C.O. did not object to that testimony. C.O.
objected a few moments later when E.M. testified her doctor told her the
blood sugar spike she was experiencing were “a result of what was going on.”
The court allowed that testimony but only for “whatever weight I think
is . . . appropriate.” We cannot say that ruling was erroneous in light of the
relaxed standards of a restitution hearing, but if the court erred, it was an
application of the ordinary rules of evidence and not a due process violation.
C.O. argues reliance on E.M.’s testimony without any supporting
documentation made the restitution hearing fundamentally unfair by leaving
him with “no means to investigate whether the amounts claimed were
accurate.” We disagree. In its restitution brief, the petitioner advised C.O.
evidence of restitution would be provided primarily through E.M.’s testimony
and it was anticipated E.M. would unlikely be able to provide documents and
receipts. E.M.’s testimony was not unreliable: E.M. had personal knowledge
of the medical treatments she received, the amounts she paid for those
treatments, and her earnings in the years before John Doe’s death. C.O. was

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permitted to, and did, cross-examine E.M. to try to impeach her credibility
and show the amount of costs she claimed to have incurred were inaccurate.
E.M.’s testimony provided enough information for C.O. to have subpoenaed
E.M.’s hospital and clinic records, and C.O. could have requested a
continuance of the restitution hearing pending receipt of those records. As
stated in People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 692: “If defendant felt
that the only way to challenge the figures was to obtain documentation . . .
then it was up to [him] to seek receipts or other materials . . . in order to meet
[his] burden. If [he] needed a continuance for that purpose, it was up to [him]
to request it. Defendant was not deprived of due process of law.”
C.O. argues the 10-year gap between the time of the offense and
the restitution hearing “compounded” the problem of lack of documentation
and due process “demands more, not less, reliability when the passage of time
has eroded independent means of verification.” C.O. cites no authority for the
proposition that, due to the passage of time, the lack of documentary evidence
in the present case violated his due process rights. While memories tend to
fade over time, the mere passage of time does not necessarily make a
witness’s testimony unreliable. Rather, the passage of time’s effect on a
witness’s memory is a factor the trier of fact may consider in assessing
credibility. (See CALCRIM No. 226 [factor in assessing credibility is “[h]ow
well was the witness able to remember and describe what happened”].)

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DISPOSITION
The restitution order is corrected and modified by reducing the
amount of the award to $10,390. As modified, the postjudgment order is
affirmed.

MOTOIKE, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SERVINO, J.

SCHWARM, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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