Filed 7/17/26 In re C.M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re C.M., a Person Coming B344503
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LB0677A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, John C. Lawson, II, Judge. Conditionally reversed and
remanded.
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court adjudged minor C.M. a ward of the court
and placed C.M. at home on probation after the court sustained
an allegation that C.M. had committed the offense of being a
minor in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 29610.) C.M. does
not challenge the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional or
dispositional findings. He instead contends, and the People
concede, that he received insufficient notice of his eligibility for a
deferred entry of judgment (DEJ), and that the trial court failed
to conduct a DEJ suitability hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 790
et seq.) We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional and dispositional orders and remand the matter to
the juvenile court for further proceedings.
FACTS
A. Prosecution
Long Beach Police Officer Jacob Clavesilla testified that in
the afternoon on November 26, 2024, he and his partner were
driving in a marked squad car when he observed C.M. standing
in an alleyway with another person. Both people were wearing
heavy black clothing, ski masks, and black hooded sweatshirts
with the hoods up. When the officers started to approach them,
they turned away evasively. The officers circled to the other end
of the alley to cut the two off. C.M. and his companion ran. C.M.
was holding his waistband as he ran. C.M. pulled an object that
resembled a gun from his waistband and threw it over a wall.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
The officers detained C.M. Another officer searched the other
side of the wall and discovered a loaded firearm. Officer
Clavesilla and his partner arrested C.M. In custody, C.M. stated,
“ ‘All I did was find a blower.’ ”
B. Defense
C.M. testified that the person he was with was not a friend.
The person had asked him for directions. C.M. was showing the
person where to go when the person looked back and started
running. C.M. ran too because he thought that a dog might be
chasing them. He did not know police were behind him when the
other person started running.
C.M. denied that he had or threw a firearm. He denied
saying that he “found a blower.” C.M. was not wearing the ski
mask over his face. He was using it to cover his hair. He had his
hood up because it was chilly outside.
PROCEEDINGS
On December 2, 2024, the prosecutor filed a petition
pursuant to section 602 alleging that minor C.M. was unlawfully
in possession of a handgun. (Pen. Code, § 29610.) The prosecutor
concurrently filed a JV-750 form that indicated C.M. was eligible
for DEJ; however, there was no declaration of personal service on
C.M. or his parents attached. The prosecutor did not check the
box on the form JV-750 indicating that a form JV-751 was
attached.
Also on December 2, 2024, the prosecutor filed a form JV-
751, but it contained only the file stamp, C.M.’s name, and the
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case number. The form was otherwise blank, and there was no
indication that the form was served on C.M. or his parents, or
that C.M. or his parents were otherwise notified of C.M.’s DEJ
eligibility.
On February 24, 2025, the juvenile court held a contested
adjudication hearing. The court amended the petition to
accurately reflect C.M.’s date of birth.2 The court did not
consider C.M.’s suitability for DEJ at the hearing. The court
sustained the petition and declared the offense a felony. The
court declared C.M. a ward of the court and placed him at home
on probation, with certain terms and conditions. No one
mentioned DEJ until after the adjudication. C.M.’s counsel asked
the court if it would “consider [section] 790.” The court stated
that because the case had gone to trial it was “off the table.” The
court then questioned C.M. and his parents regarding C.M.’s
grades and how he was doing at home. They reported that his
grades were good and there were no problems. The court noted
that there was nothing regarding gang activity in C.M.’s file. The
court explained that C.M. was being placed on probation and told
him “hopefully you do well, and [this] will be a bad memory.”
C.M. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
Section 790, subdivision (a), provides that “whenever a case
is before the juvenile court for a determination of whether a
minor is a person described in Section 602 because of the
2 C.M. was 14 years old at the time of the hearing.
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commission of a felony offense” the minor may be eligible for DEJ
when the following conditions are met:
“(1) The minor has not previously been declared to be a
ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense.
“(2) The offense charged is not one of the offenses
enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707.
“(3) The minor has not previously been committed to the
custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Division of Juvenile Facilities.
“(4) The minor’s record does not indicate that probation has
ever been revoked without being completed.
“(5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the
hearing.
“(6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section
1203.06 of the Penal Code.
“(7) The offense charged is not [one of several listed sexual
offenses].”
Under section 790, subdivision (b), “[t]he prosecuting
attorney shall review their file to determine whether or not
paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a) apply. If the
minor is found eligible for deferred entry of judgment, the
prosecuting attorney shall file a declaration in writing with the
court or state for the record the grounds upon which the
determination is based, and shall make this information
available to the minor and their attorney.” “The form designed
for this purpose is a form JV–750, the completion of which
requires the prosecutor to indicate findings as to the eligibility
requirements by checking, or not checking, corresponding boxes.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(b).)” (In re C.W. (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 654, 659 (C.W.).) If the prosecuting attorney finds
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the minor eligible for DEJ, the attorney provides notice to the
minor and the minor’s parent or guardian utilizing a form JV-
751. (Ibid.) The attorney attaches the form JV-751 to the form
JV-750 and checks the box on the JV-750 indicating that the form
JV-751 is attached. (Ibid.)
The California Rules of Court impose additional notice
requirements, including that “[t]he [juvenile] court must issue
Citation and Written Notification for Deferred Entry of
Judgment—Juvenile (form JV–751) to [a] child’s custodial parent,
guardian, or foster parent” and stating the form “must be
personally served on the custodial adult at least 24 hours before
the time set for the appearance hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.800(c); In re Trenton D. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324
(Trenton D.) [finding no indication that a form JV–751 was
“properly served” and noting rule 5.800(c)’s service
requirements].)
“Upon a finding that the minor is also suitable for deferred
entry of judgment and would benefit from education, treatment,
and rehabilitation efforts, the court may grant deferred entry of
judgment.” (§ 790, subd. (b).) “While [a juvenile] court retains
discretion to deny DEJ to an eligible minor, the duty of the
prosecuting attorney to assess the eligibility of the minor for DEJ
and furnish notice with the petition is mandatory, as is the duty
of the juvenile court to either summarily grant DEJ or examine
the record, conduct a hearing, and make ‘the final determination
regarding education, treatment, and rehabilitation . . . .’ ” (In re
Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123.) “The court is not
required to ultimately grant DEJ, but is required to at least
follow specified procedures and exercise discretion to reach a final
determination once the mandatory threshold eligibility
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determination is made.” (Ibid.; accord, In re D.L. (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 1240, 1243–1244.)
B. Analysis
The presumption that a minor was properly notified of
their DEJ eligibility by either the prosecutor or the court may be
rebutted by the record. (See C.W., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at
p. 661.) We agree with the parties that the prosecutor did not
serve C.M. with the mandatory notice of his DEJ eligibility. The
facts in this case are analogous to those in C.W., supra, 208
Cal.App.4th 654, and Trenton D., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 1319.)
In C.W., the court held that where the prosecuting attorney
neglected to check the box on the form JV-750 indicating that a
form JV-751 was attached, there was no form JV-751 in the
record, there was no evidence that the juvenile court served the
minor or her parents with a form JV-751, and nothing in the
record indicated that DEJ was mentioned at the hearing, the
presumption of proper notice was rebutted. (C.W., supra, 208
Cal.App.4th at pp. 660–661.) In Trenton D., the appellate court
deemed notice insufficient because although the prosecutor filed
the first page of the “Citation and Written Notification for
Deferred Entry of Judgment—Juvenile” form, the first page of
the form omitted any information about a scheduled hearing to
consider minor’s suitability for DEJ, there was no evidence that
the form was properly served, and there was no discussion at the
arraignment hearing about the possibility of DEJ. (Trenton D.,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326.) The Trenton D. court noted
“unfortunate similarities” with C.W. and held that “where, as
here, the minor is not properly notified of DEJ procedures, the
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juvenile court may not fail to consider the minor’s suitability.”
(Id. at p. 1325.)
C.M.’s case has similar deficiencies. There was no check
mark in the appropriate box on the filed form JV-750 indicating
that form JV-751 was attached. Although the form JV-751 was
also filed, it bore no information beyond C.M.’s name and the case
number. There is no indication that C.M. or C.M.’s parents were
personally served with the form JV-750 or the form JV-751.
Finally, at the hearing, the juvenile court did not consider C.M.’s
suitability for DEJ, and there was no mention of DEJ until after
the case had been adjudicated. When counsel did raise the
possibility, it was referred to briefly and only by section number.
Under these circumstances, we agree with the parties that
the record rebuts the presumption that C.M. was properly
notified by either the prosecutor or the court of his eligibility for
DEJ, and that the trial court failed to hold a suitability hearing
as required.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s adjudication and disposition orders are
conditionally reversed. The case is remanded to the court for
further proceedings in compliance with Welfare and Institutions
Code section 790 et seq. and California Rules of Court, rule 5.800.
After giving proper notice under the statutes and rule, the court
shall consider C.M.’s suitability for DEJ based on the record as it
existed at the start of the February 24, 2025, adjudication
hearing. If the court grants DEJ to C.M., the court shall enter an
order stating its prior adjudication and disposition orders are
vacated and shall thereafter proceed in accordance with Welfare
and Institutions Code section 790 et seq. and California Rules of
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Court, rule 5.800. If C.M. is found unsuitable for DEJ, the court
shall reinstate the adjudication and disposition orders challenged
in this appeal, subject to C.M.’s right to have the denial of DEJ
reviewed on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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