Filed 9/24/26 In re C.K. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re C.K., a Person Coming B351686
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ Los Angeles County Superior
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Court No. 23CCJP02119
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Sumako McCallum, Judge. Affirmed.
Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
A mother of a six-year-old returns to this court after the
juvenile court ordered adoption as the child’s permanent plan.
The mother agrees the child should remain with the
paternal aunt. She argues the court erred and abused its
discretion in selecting adoption over legal guardianship, however,
because 1) the record did not establish the aunt preferred
adoption over guardianship, and 2) when selecting adoption, the
court impermissibly considered the future involvement of the
mother and other family members in the child’s life.
Although she raised neither point at the selection and
implementation hearing, we overlook this forfeiture and conclude
both points lack merit. The trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion in ordering adoption.
On the first point, the record shows a social worker
provided the aunt detailed information about adoption and legal
guardianship several times, covering the benefits of each and the
differences between them. The aunt, in turn, developed a “strong
parent-child bond with the child” and consistently expressed her
desire and commitment to adopt. She expressed no interest in
guardianship. She confirmed she was “looking forward to making
the child a permanent part of her family.” And she told the
Department she was not interested in a post-adoption contact
agreement with kin.
The aunt’s words and actions show her preference was
adoption. Contrary to the mother’s arguments, she had a “proper
choice” to pursue guardianship.
The mother faults the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services for not asking the aunt explicitly
what her preference was and for not including her response in its
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reports. This was unnecessary under the relevant statute and
considering the steps the Department and the aunt did take.
(See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26 (b), (c)(1)(A); see also In re
Samantha H. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 410, 414, 416 [refusing to
read additional requirements into section 366.26 before ordering
adoption as the proposed plan]; In re D.R. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
885, 890–892 [juvenile court should have ordered adoption
instead of legal guardianship, as adoption is “the preferred
permanent plan” and the child’s grandmother was “willing to
adopt” and “committed to adopting” the child].)
The mother relies on distinguishable cases that do not help
her. For example, the grandmother in In re Fernando M. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 529 testified she preferred legal guardianship
over adoption, there was evidence a social worker coerced her to
accept adoption, and the juvenile court made no finding she was
willing and able to adopt the child. (Id. at pp. 533, 536, 538.) In
re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 406 also involved pressure to
adopt, this time by the children’s attorney. The grandparents
there said they were unwilling to adopt because they wished to
remain the children’s grandparents; instead, they wanted to raise
the children as legal guardians and maintain the mother’s
visitation with them. (Id. at pp. 411–413, 419.) In this context,
K.H. aptly recognized courts may consider a “relative caregiver’s
preference for legal guardianship due to family dynamics” when
assessing the relative caregiver exception to termination of
parental rights. (Id. at p. 416.)
Turning to the second point, the mother’s argument is
unsupported by the record. Specifically, the record does not show
the court relied on the future involvement of family members in
selecting adoption as the child’s permanent plan.
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The mother’s argument relies entirely on a single
Department report showing that the paternal aunt was open to
supervising parental visits, if appropriate, and that another aunt
was willing to be a part of the child’s support system. This does
not show the juvenile court erred.
We presume the court knew and followed the law and
considered appropriate factors in reaching its decision, absent a
record showing otherwise. (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th
336, 361; Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 908, 921.) This record does not show otherwise.
In making the adoption orders, the court relied on the
paternal aunt’s expressed commitment to adopt. It noted this
aunt had taken at least one step to facilitate adoption. It
recognized the child had lived with the aunt for more than seven
months. The court also found the parental bond exception was
inapplicable, the child was adoptable, and adoption was in the
child’s best interest.
The mother has not demonstrated the juvenile court
considered impermissible factors, applied the wrong standard, or
otherwise erred in ordering adoption.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the challenged order.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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