Filed 9/22/26 In re C.J. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re C.J., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL G066608
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. 25DP0494)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
S.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Adrianne E. Marshack, Judge. Request for Judicial Notice. Granted. Motion
to Dismiss. Granted. Appeal dismissed.
Nicole Kronberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
Appellant S.J. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
denying her petition brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section
388 seeking to change placement of her minor child, C.J., from the caregivers
with whom she had been placed to the maternal grandmother, R.J.1 After
holding multiple evidentiary hearings, the court denied Mother’s petition,
finding it was in C.J.’s best interest to remain with her caregivers.
We grant the motion by Orange County Social Services Agency
(the Agency) to dismiss Mother’s appeal based on lack of standing and decline
to reach the merits of the order denying Mother’s petition. Reunification
services were bypassed as to Mother, her parental rights have been
terminated pursuant to section 366.26, and Mother did not challenge either
decision.2 Mother therefore is not an aggrieved party with standing to
challenge the decision regarding C.J.’s placement. The appeal is dismissed.
1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
We grant the Agency’s unopposed request for judicial notice of
the juvenile court’s order issued March 16, 2026 terminating Mother’s
parental rights and ordering adoption as the permanent plan for C.J., as well
as the proposed orders and findings submitted by the parties in connection
with the March 16, 2026 hearing.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.J. was only a year old when she was taken into protective
custody after ingesting fentanyl and becoming nonresponsive while in
Mother’s care. After C.J. was released from the hospital, she was placed with
foster parents who later became her de facto parents (the caregivers).
C.J. was detained and became a dependent child of the juvenile
court. At the jurisdiction hearing in June 2025, the court bypassed
reunification services for Mother because she was going to be incarcerated for
at least four years and would not be able to reunify with C.J. during the
statutory reunification period. The court scheduled a permanency hearing
under section 366.26 for October 2, 2025, which was later continued to
November 14, 2025.
On October 30, 2025, Mother filed a “Request to Change Court
Order” pursuant to section 388, requesting C.J. be placed with R.J., the
maternal grandmother, who had helped Mother care for C.J. prior to the
initiation of the child welfare proceeding.3 The juvenile court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition for November 14, 2025,
the same day on which the permanency hearing was scheduled. However, no
evidence was taken on November 14. Instead, the court ordered the Agency to
expedite the resource family approval (RFA) assessment for R.J. and
continued both the hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition and the
permanency hearing to December 8, 2025.
3
R.J. was considered for but denied emergency placement of C.J.
According to the Agency, there were safety concerns regarding R.J.’s home
because the maternal uncle resided in the home and used methamphetamine
and fentanyl, and because of allegations R.J. had attempted to coach Mother
during the Agency’s investigation, which allegations R.J. later disputed.
3
The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s
section 388 petition on December 8, 2025. The court heard testimony from
R.J. and a social worker. R.J. testified she would be willing to adopt C.J. and
that, if C.J. were placed in her care, she would not allow the maternal uncle
or Mother to reside in the home. As of the date of the hearing, R.J. was
working eight hour days, but she stated she would arrange for babysitting,
including by her other daughter (the maternal aunt), who was 19 years old.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found the
Agency had failed to comply with its order regarding the assessment of R.J.
for relative placement. The court found R.J. to be credible and explained it
would tentatively grant Mother’s section 388 petition pending the Agency’s
review of the safety of R.J.’s residence. The court applied section 361.3 to
Mother’s petition4 and made initial findings pursuant to that section that (1)
Mother preferred that C.J. be placed with R.J.; (2) C.J. had spent a
significant amount of time in R.J.’s care prior to the initiation of the child
welfare proceedings; and (3) there was no evidence R.J. was incapable of
caring for C.J. By then, the maternal uncle had moved out of R.J.’s home. The
court indicated that, “barring anything significant,” it would likely adopt its
tentative ruling at the next hearing.
The juvenile court continued the hearing on Mother’s section 388
petition and the permanency hearing to January 9, 2026. By then, R.J. had
4
Section 361.3 provides that “[i]n any case in which a child is
removed from the physical custody of their parents pursuant to [s]ection 361,
preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child
for placement of the child with the relative . . . .” (Id., subd. (a).) Under the
statute, giving “‘[p]referential consideration’” to a relative who seeks
placement means “that the relative seeking placement shall be the first
placement to be considered and investigated.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
4
been approved for placement of C.J. through the RFA process. The court
granted a request by the caregivers to reopen the evidence on Mother’s
section 388 petition, and it again continued the hearing on both matters to
February 17, 2026. The court ordered that R.J. was to begin caring for C.J. on
the weekends pending the next hearing date and encouraged R.J. to attend
C.J.’s medical appointments.5
At the February 17 continued hearing, the court heard testimony
from one of the caregivers, as well as a senior social worker in the RFA
department, R.J., and the maternal aunt. It also admitted additional
documentary evidence, including Agency reports, a declaration from the
caregivers, and a “Contact After Adoption Agreement” the caregivers had
offered to R.J. Among other things, R.J. testified she believes C.J. sees her
caregivers as her parents and R.J. as her grandmother, the caregivers have
their heart in the right place, and she has nothing bad to say about them.
The court heard argument from counsel before ruling on Mother’s
petition. Minor’s counsel argued it was in C.J.’s best interest to stay with her
caregivers and asked the court to deny the petition. Specifically, C.J.’s
counsel pointed out C.J. had been with her caregivers for nine months by this
time, she was thriving, and that the caregivers, not R.J., were best equipped
to handle C.J.’s medical needs. The Agency also believed it would be in C.J.’s
best interest to remain with her caregivers and raised concerns about R.J.’s
ability to care for C.J., including whether R.J. was equipped to protect C.J.
should Mother or the maternal uncle reenter her home. The court continued
5
C.J. had medical needs requiring medical care, medical
appointments, and assistance from her caregivers.
5
the hearing on the petition and the permanency hearing to February 26,
2026.
On February 26, 2026, the juvenile court announced its ruling. It
reversed its earlier tentative ruling and denied Mother’s petition, explaining
the reasons for its decision in detail, both orally on the record and in a 13-
page written ruling.6 The court found it was not in [C.J.]’s best interest to
move her placement from the caregivers to R.J. The court commended the
caregivers and R.J. for their love and care for C.J. and their commitment to
C.J., stating as follows:
“[C.J.] is extremely lucky. She is surrounded by such love. The
relationship that has developed between Caregivers and Grandma is
absolutely beautiful. I really do hope that it continues. I don’t think that
I have seen a case quite like this in all my time on the dependency bench. [¶]
So I think you all have done things in [C.J.’s] best interest, and there was no
animosity between two kinds of parties, you know, who ultimately wanted
the same thing. That’s really a testament to your love for [C.J.] and your
maturity. It does take a lot of maturity. And I really just want you all to
know how much I think of all of you for your—just what you are doing for
[C.J.]. But I will go ahead and read the relevant portions of the Court’s
opinion so you can understand the legal and factual basis.
6
We commend Judge Marshack for her handling of Mother’s
section 388 petition, which should serve as a model for other juvenile courts
facing similarly difficult child welfare decisions. Although we are not
reaching the merits of the order, the record reflects the court demonstrated
patience in allowing all parties to be heard and not rushing to a decision until
it had all the information it needed to issue a ruling, held the Agency and
other parties accountable as necessary to ensure compliance with applicable
law, and took time to prepare and then explain its ruling to all parties
involved, both verbally and in a detailed written ruling.
6
“(As read) [B]ecause a child’s best interest evolves quickly, the
legislators developed a spectrum of preferences. These preferences are not
evidentiary presumptions. Rather, each preference requires the consideration
of multiple factors all dependent on an examination of evidence relating to
the minor’s current circumstances. [¶] At the outset of a dependency case,
[section] 361.3 requires the . . . Agency and the Court to give preferential
consideration to a relative’s request for placement, meaning that the relative
seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and
investigated. The wisdom of a relative placement preference is somewhat
self-evident as the trauma of removing the child from their home and all that
is familiar can be eased by placement with beloved and recognizable relatives
who can provide needed comfort.
“Courts have also noted that the relative placement preference
both supports and is supported by California’s public policy favoring family
reunification because relative caregivers are more likely to favor the goal of
reunification and less likely than nonrelative caregivers to compete with the
parents for permanent placement of the child.
“Where, as here, a motion pursuant to [section] 388 for a change
of placement is made after the termination of reunification services, the task
of the Court is to determine the child’s best interest. The burden is on the
moving party to show that the change is in the best interest of the child at
that time.”
The court explained in detail the evidence supporting its finding
that it would be in C.J.’s best interest to keep her placement with her
caregivers, concluding: “Despite the relative placement preference, a child’s
bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a relative be
7
rejected. The Court believes that is the case here.” The court continued the
section 366.26 hearing to March 16, 2026.
Mother appealed the February 26, 2026 order. R.J. did not
appeal. At the permanency hearing on March 16, 2026, the juvenile court
terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 366.26.7
DISCUSSION
The Agency moved to dismiss Mother’s appeal based on lack of
standing.8 We grant that motion based on our conclusion Mother lacks
standing to challenge C.J.’s continued placement with the caregivers. We
therefore need not reach the merits of Mother’s appeal.
“Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts
are resolved in its favor, only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal.”
(In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) In a juvenile court proceeding, once
reunification services have been terminated, a parent is no longer considered
an aggrieved person with respect to an order regarding relative placement.
(Id. at p. 238 [a parent who acquiesces in the termination of his parental
rights relinquishes the only interest that could render him aggrieved by an
order declining relative placement]; see In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492,
499 [father lacked standing to challenge denial of relative placement after
reunification services terminated]; Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034–1035 [same].) This is because “after reunification
7
The Agency represents in its motion to dismiss—and Mother
does not dispute—that Mother did not challenge the order terminating her
parental rights and the window to raise any such challenge on appeal has
since lapsed.
8
The Agency also filed a responsive brief arguing that, even if
Mother does have standing, there is no basis to reverse the court’s ruling.
8
services are terminated . . . ‘the parents’ interest in the care, custody and
companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather, at this point
“the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability . . . .”’”
(In re K.C., at p. 236.) Where, as here, a parent “does not contend the order
terminating his parental rights was improper in any respect. . . . he has no
remaining, legally cognizable interest in [the child’s] affairs, including [the
child’s] placement.” (Id. at p. 237.)
In this case, reunification services were bypassed as to Mother,
and her parental rights have been terminated. Mother argues she is
nonetheless aggrieved because, although R.J. testified she wished to adopt
C.J., it is possible R.J. would have agreed to guardianship instead, which
would have left Mother’s parental rights intact. Mother further argues that
even if R.J. were to adopt C.J., Mother would be more likely to maintain a
relationship with C.J. than if the caregivers adopted her.
Mother’s argument seems to suggest, albeit not directly, that she
has standing to challenge C.J.’s placement with the caregivers because the
placement decision may have impacted the termination of her parental
rights. (See In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 237 [parent may be aggrieved
by a relative placement order if “the possibility [exists] that reversing [the
order] might lead the juvenile court not to terminate parental rights”].) We
are not persuaded. Here, reunification services for Mother were bypassed,
Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and C.J. was found to be
adoptable. Mother did not challenge the termination of her parental rights.
(See In re K.C., supra, at pp. 234–235, 238 [finding father who did not contest
the termination of his parental rights in the juvenile court could not be
aggrieved by the court’s order denying grandparents’ section 388 petition to
have his child placed with them and thus had no standing to appeal the
9
placement decision].) Other than speculation, nothing in the record supports
Mother’s suggestion that placement with R.J. might have affected the
termination of Mother’s parental rights. “Speculation about a hypothetical
situation is not sufficient to support standing.” (In re Cody R. (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 381, 390.)
We also reject Mother’s argument that she has standing because
she, and not R.J., filed the section 388 petition and she is appealing the order
on her own petition. “‘[T]he mere fact a parent takes a position on a matter at
issue in a juvenile dependency case that affects his or her child does not alone
constitute a sufficient reason to establish standing to challenge an adverse
ruling on it.’” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 239; see In re A.K., supra, 12
Cal.App.5th at p. 499 [“A person does not have standing to urge errors on
appeal that affect only the interests of others”].)
Under these circumstances, “[t]he only part[y] with standing to
appeal—[R.J.]—did not . . . appeal.” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 239.)
And Mother lacks standing now to raise issues affecting the interests of
others—whether it be C.J.’s or R.J.’s interests. (See In re Gary P. (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 875, 876 [mother lacked standing to raise issues affecting
another person’s interests].)
10
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
DELANEY, J.
11