Filed 8/10/26 In re C.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re C.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT E088331
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
(Super.Ct.No. DPIN2400280)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.
C.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Natalie Keller,
Commissioner. Affirmed.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Minh Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Assistant County Counsel, and
Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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C.V. (Mother), appeals from an order of the juvenile court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating parental rights to her daughter, C.C., who is
now six years old.1 Mother argues the juvenile court erred by failing to make an express
finding by oral pronouncement on the record that C.C. is likely to be adopted. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2024, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services
(DPSS) received a referral alleging C.C. was being subjected to general neglect and
physical abuse by her parents. Three weeks later, DPSS removed C.C. from her parents’
home and placed her with her paternal grandparents. DPSS filed a petition under section
300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c), and its allegations were found true by the juvenile court
on January 2, 2025, at which time reunification services were ordered for C.C.’s parents.
C.C. remained with her grandparents, where she had already lived for most of her life.
Her grandparents were willing to adopt her if reunification efforts failed.
Prior to the six-month review hearing, DPSS recommended termination of
reunification services and identified adoption by C.C.’s grandparents as the case plan
goal. According to the status report, the grandparents agreed to adopt C.C. and C.C.’s
parents chose not to participate in reunification services because they wanted to move
forward with C.C.’s adoption.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2
At the six-month review hearing, which the parents failed to attend, the juvenile
court terminated reunification services, noting that there had been no visitation or
engagement in services by C.C.’s parents within the prior six months. The court set a
section 366.26 hearing for implementation of a permanent plan.
Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, DPSS submitted a preliminary adoption
assessment as an attachment to an addendum report. DPSS also filed an updated section
366.26 report with a case plan update and attached recommended findings and orders.
DPSS recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption,
noting the grandparents’ love and care for C.C. and their willingness to adopt her. DPSS
found the likelihood of C.C.’s adoption was “high.” The recommendation portion of the
preliminary adoption assessment includes DPSS’s finding that C.C. is adoptable and that
her grandparents want to adopt her, as well as DPSS’s conclusion that the “likelihood of
[C.C.] being adopted once parental rights have been terminated is extremely high.” The
preliminary adoption assessment is cited throughout DPSS’s disposition report.
On April 21, 2026, at the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court stated on the
record that it read and considered DPSS’s section 366.26 report and its addendum report
with the preliminary adoption assessment. The court terminated parental rights, adopted
DPSS’s proposed findings and orders, and ordered a permanent plan of adoption for C.C.
The court designated C.C.’s grandparents as the prospective adoptive parents. That same
day, Mother filed a notice of appeal of the termination of her parental rights.
The juvenile court signed its written order the day of the section 366.26 hearing,
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but the order was not filed until three days later. That order includes an express finding,
“by clear and convincing evidence, that it is likely [C.C.] will be adopted.”2
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights should be
reversed because the court failed to expressly state on the record that it found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that C.C. is likely to be adopted.3 We agree with DPSS that
there is no statutory requirement of an express adoptability finding and that substantial
evidence supports an implied finding of adoptability.4
A. Juvenile Court’s Express Adoptability Finding
Mother’s appeal rests solely on her contention that the juvenile court failed to
expressly state on the record, by oral pronouncement, its adoptability finding as required
2 On July 8, 2026, DPSS filed an unopposed motion to augment the record to
include the juvenile court’s order signed April 21, 2026, which was not included in the
initial record prepared by the juvenile court. Because the juvenile court’s order is a
required component of the clerk’s transcript, augmentation is proper and we grant DPSS’s
motion and deem the copy of the motion and supporting documents submitted by DPSS
with the motion to augment part of the appellate record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.407(a)(6) [“judgment or order appealed from” as required component of clerk’s
transcript], 8.410.)
3 Mother initially argued in her opening brief that the juvenile court record
included “neither an oral pronouncement nor a written order reflecting that the court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that [C.C.] is likely to be adopted.” (Italics
added.) After DPSS moved to augment the record to include the April 21, 2026 signed
order, Mother refocused her argument in her reply brief to the trial court’s failure to make
an oral pronouncement of its adoptability determination at the section 366.26 hearing.
4 DPSS also argues forfeiture based on Mother’s failure to raise the issue of lack
of express finding during the section 366.26 hearing. Because Mother has not met her
burden of demonstrating that the juvenile court erred, we need not address DPSS’s
forfeiture argument.
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by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(1).5
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) states that the juvenile court shall terminate
parental rights if it “determines, . . . by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely
the child will be adopted.” (Italics added.) Rule 5.725(e)(1) states that the juvenile court
“must follow the procedures in section [366.26], as appropriate.”
“When ‘the issue on appeal involves the interpretation and proper application of
the dependency statutes,’ our review is de novo.” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718,
728.) “Our focus when construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of
the Legislature. ‘ “ ‘We first examine the words themselves because the statutory
language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “If
the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said,
and the statute’s plain meaning governs.” ’ [Citation.] But a statute ‘ “should not be
given a literal meaning if to do so would create unintended, absurd consequences.
Instead, ‘intent prevails over the letter of the law and the letter will be read in accordance
with the spirit of the enactment.’ ” ’ ” (In re J.M. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 707, 714.)
The provisions at issue are straightforward. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1),
requires the juvenile court to make an adoptability determination. Rule 5.725(e)(1)
requires the juvenile court to follow the procedures set forth in section 366.26. Mother
has not cited, nor are we aware of, any authority requiring the juvenile court to expressly
state on the record, orally or in writing, its adoptability finding. We see nothing in the
5 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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plain language of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), or rule 5.725(e)(1), which might
require such an express finding.
Notably, other subdivisions of section 366.26 specifically require the juvenile
court to state its findings or reasons on the record. Subdivision (c)(1)(D) states: “If the
court finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child . . . , it
shall state its reasons in writing or on the record.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D).)
Subdivision (f)(1) requires the juvenile court to “state on the record its reasons for” a
finding that an unrepresented child would not benefit from the appointment of counsel.
(§ 366.26, subd. (f)(1).) The inclusion of language involving statements on the record in
subdivisions (c)(1)(D) and (f)(1), and the exclusion of the same in subdivision (c)(1),
indicates the Legislature did not intend to impose a requirement that the juvenile court
expressly state its adoptability determination on the record. “When one part of a statute
contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from another part of
the statute indicates the Legislature intended to convey a different meaning.” (Cornette v.
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73.) “Ordinary interpretive
principles instruct us to treat that choice as meaningful.” (People v. The North River Ins.
Co. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1, 26.)
We note that the juvenile court did make an express finding of adoptability in this
case as shown in its written order. But neither section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), nor rule
5.725(e)(1), require the juvenile court to expressly state its adoptability determination on
the record. We presume the court understood the applicable law and correctly applied it
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in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772,
780 (Tilley) [“As a general rule ‘ “a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and
followed the applicable law” ’ ”].)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court Order
Notwithstanding the express nature of the adoptability finding in the court’s
written order, the finding could also be implied. A finding of adoptability may be implied
if supported by substantial evidence. (In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 253
(Kristin W.); see In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1166 [“Where the statute
does not mandate explicit findings, and where substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s order, findings may be implied”].)
Under the substantial evidence test, “we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all
conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.] An appellate court does not reweigh the
evidence.” (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165; In re Michael G. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 [“The substantial evidence standard of review is generally
considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not
the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts”].)
“The question of adoptability usually focuses on whether the child’s age, physical
condition and emotional health make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt that
child.” (In re Michael G., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) “[T]he existence of a
prospective adoptive parent, who has expressed interest in adopting a dependent child,
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constitutes evidence that the child’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other
relevant factors are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the child. In other
words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the child
is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent
or by some other family.” (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1312.)
Substantial evidence supports a finding C.C. will likely be adopted. The juvenile
court adopted DPSS’s findings as its own. Those findings establish that C.C. is six years
old and is in good physical and mental health. C.C.’s grandparents are the prospective
adoptive parents, and C.C. has been living with them since her placement in December
2024. The preliminary adoption assessment establishes the grandparents’ fitness and
willingness to adopt C.C., and it is undisputed that she is “happy living with the
prospective adoptive parents. . . . [and they] have a healthy attachment and they fit
together easily.”
Mother argues Kristin W. “does not authorize implied findings under current law
because it was decided before the current version of section 366.26 and before the
adoption of . . . rule 5.725.” In addressing adoptability findings under the former section
366.25, the Kristin W. Court authorized implied adoptability findings supported by
substantial evidence: “Section 366.25, subdivision (d)(1) requires the trial court to make
a finding regarding whether it is likely the minor can or will be adopted before
authorizing the governmental agency to proceed under Civil Code section 232. However,
this finding need not always be express. [Citation.] This court can imply a finding if
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there is substantial evidence to support it.” (Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 253.)
Although Kristin W. was decided under the former section 366.25, it is not apparent that
the section 366.25 statutory scheme was materially different from the present section
366.26 in relation to the adoptability determination, nor does Mother provide any
authority or analysis supporting her argument.
Mother does cite In re B.D. in support, but even that case acknowledges implied
findings of adoptability. (In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 823 [“Without the social
worker’s flawed section 366.26 Report, we see no substantial record evidence to support
an adoptability finding, whether viewed as an express finding of special adoptability or
an implied finding of general adoptability” (Italics added)].)
In sum, substantial evidence supports an implied finding of adoptability. There is
no indication that the juvenile court committed an error of law or that its adoptability
determination was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, to constitute an abuse of
discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Because Mother presented no
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the juvenile court understood the applicable
law and correctly applied it. (Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 780; In re J.F. (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 70, 79 [“The juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is
appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error’ ”].)
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
MCKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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