Filed 7/15/26 In re C.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re C.C., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087990
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J292601 &
J292602)
v.
OPINION
A.P. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant A.P.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant C.C.
1
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Helen C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendants and appellants A.P. (mother) and C.C. (father) appeal from an order
terminating parental rights over their minor children. They argue the juvenile court erred
by failing to apply the beneficial parental bond exception to adoption. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mother and father have two minor children that are the subjects of this
dependency: L.C. (born 2020) and C.C. Jr. (born 2022).
In March 2022 San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the
“department”) received a referral alleging mother and C.C. Jr. both tested positive for
methamphetamine after C.C. Jr.’s birth. The department contacted hospital staff, who
confirmed that C.C. Jr. exhibited withdrawal symptoms. When the department met with
mother, she denied any drug use, that she had been sober since a psychiatric
hospitalization in 2019, and explained the positive test as a consequence of visiting a
home where there were methamphetamine users while she was pregnant. Mother also
admitted that she had diagnoses for obsessive-compulsive disorder and depression, but
was not taking medication or in therapy for either. When the department spoke to father
a few days later, he admitted he and mother relapsed and used methamphetamine while
mother was pregnant.
2
Later that month the department filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (b)1 for both children. The petitions alleged that C.C. Jr.
tested positive for methamphetamine at birth, mother and father both had unresolved
substance abuse issues, mother had unresolved mental health issues, and father knew or
should have known about mother’s issues and failed to protect the children from them.
The court found the petition stated a prima facie case and detained the children from the
parents on March 24, 2022.
The court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing in April 2022, where it
sustained the allegations in the petitions, removed the children from the parents’ custody,
and ordered reunification services. It ordered two hours of supervised visitation twice a
week for both parents.
During the six month review period, the department reported that the parents
generally participated in four hour visits once a week. Visits were at the caregiver’s
home, supervised by paternal grandmother. The caregiver told the department the parents
were not attentive to the children’s needs during visits, and spent them sitting on the
couch watching television. However, when a social worker supervised a visit, the parents
seemed attentive. Nevertheless, near the end of this supervised visit, father began to
argue with the caretaker over the length of the visit, became upset, “and sped away in his
car, which was on a residential street.”
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3
The court held a six month review hearing in October, 2022, where it continued
the parents’ reunification services.
During the next review period, mother progressed to eight hour unsupervised
community visits. However, relatives and friends reported concerns to the department,
including that the parents paid much more attention to L.C. than C.C. Jr., that they
appeared generally uninterested in the children, that they sometimes smelled like
marijuana when they visited paternal great-grandmother’s home, and that father
roughhoused with C.C. Jr. in inappropriate ways—including by pretending to choke him.
A caregiver also reported that the parents showed “ ‘extreme emotional detachment’ ”
towards C.C. Jr. and father “admitted . . . he does not feel the same way towards [C.C.
Jr.] than [sic] he does towards [L.C.]” At one visit in the caregiver’s home, father
ignored C.C. Jr. for a half hour after arriving, screamed in C.C. Jr.’s face until he cried,
then ignored him once he started crying. C.C. Jr. started crying during a diaper change,
and according to the caregiver father responded by saying “ ‘[s]hut up you’re
annoying.’ ” In addition, the caregiver had to remind father to stop L.C. from hitting or
biting C.C. Jr., but father failed to do so, and the caregiver had to intervene after L.C. hit
C.C. Jr. twice. Father then got upset, yelled in a way that upset the children, left the
house, slammed the door, and drove away “ ‘in a dangerous way.’ ” The caregiver later
said “incidents of [father] being verbally abusive by yelling and using foul language is a
common occurrence during the visits.”
4
Because of these concerns, the department again had a social worker supervise a
visit. The social worker did not observe any serious issues, but noted that father was
much more engaged with L.C. than C.C. Jr.
The court held a 12 month status review hearing in April 2023. Mother testified
that the caregivers, relatives, and friends mischaracterized the visits, and that some never
even witnessed visits. The department admitted it was unable to independently verify the
complaints, interviewed no one other than the caregiver, and was aware there was bad
blood between the parents—particularly father—and the caregiver.
After hearing testimony, the court expressed concern that the contents of the
department’s report was not supported by the department’s testimony or investigation,
and stated that it would not rely on the report in making its findings and orders. The
court continued reunification services, expanded mother’s visitation to one overnight per
week, and gave father three hours of unsupervised visitation each week.
The department supervised visits between the children and father in April 2023.
The department noted that father made an effort to interact with C.C. Jr., but that L.C.
had “aggressive tantrums, which consists of screaming, throwing herself on the ground,
and hitting when she is redirected, or does not get her way,” and these behaviors
“demand[ed] a great deal of supervision.” During this same period, the department also
reported that mother’s visits progressed to weekend visits, and there were no known
issues.
5
In July 2023, the court returned the children to mother and gave her family
maintenance services “on the condition that the father not reside in the home,” or have
unsupervised contact with the children. In January 2024, the court returned the children
to both parents with family maintenance services.
However, people continued to report concerns about the parents’ supervision.
C.C. Jr. sustained accidental burns from a hot bowl of soup, and L.C. was able to gain
access to a knife. Both children left the home while the parents were asleep. They were
found by residents of a mobile home park, with L.C. up to her knees in the community
pool and C.C. Jr. nearby. Law enforcement returned the children to the parents.
In April 2025 the department made an unannounced home visit. The social
worker was initially unable to get anyone to open the door, though the children tried to
talk to them through the window. When mother finally came to the window, she seemed
“half-asleep,” and it took her nearly 10 minutes to let the social worker in. According to
the social worker, mother seemed to lack control over the children, who were playing
with and in the refrigerator and requesting sweets. Mother said father was home, but in
the bedroom. The social worker asked mother to get him to come out and talk, but he did
not. The social worker then asked to see the bedroom the family shared. Upon entering,
the social worker noted “there was a very strong odor of urine and must,” and that the
floors were covered in either mattresses or detritus like laundry. Mother also told the
social worker L.C. had started taking feces out of her diaper and hiding it in the room.
The social worker asked mother and father to leave the room and join her in the kitchen,
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but only mother joined. Father joined only after being asked a third time. According to
the social worker neither parent “seem[ed] very coherent.” The social worker shared
their concerns “that the children are completely out of control . . . and neither of the
parents were able to do anything to settle them down,” and the parents responded by
blaming each other.
During the visit, L.C. volunteered that mother slapped her. When the social
worker asked L.C. where mother slapped her, L.C. pointed to her face. Mother denied
slapping L.C. and said L.C. “ ‘just says things sometimes.’ ” At the end of the visit, the
social worker interviewed L.C. privately. When the social worker asked how many times
mother slapped L.C., she responded “ ‘too many times.’ ” When asked where mother
slapped her, L.C. pointed to her cheek and her legs.
The department filed subsequent and supplemental petitions under sections 342
and 387, alleging mother physically abused L.C. and that both parents failed to comply
with the family maintenance plan due to unresolved substance abuse issues. The court
found the petitions stated a prima facie case, detained the children from the parents,
ordered supervised visitation, and ordered reunification services pending disposition.
Between the children’s second detention and the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, father missed three visits, but mother attended all visits. However, at a
June 2025 visit, mother and father arrived together, but father did not leave the car,
telling the department he was sick. The caregivers said father told them he and mother
smoked methamphetamine before the visit, which was why father would not come in.
7
The supervising social worker reported mother “was not behaving out of the ordinary,
was speaking clearly,” did not otherwise appear to be under the influence “did not appear
to be an imminent risk to the children,” and was “engaging with the children
appropriately.” Based on this, the social worker allowed the visit to continue. At the end
of the visit, mother admitted she and father smoked methamphetamine before arriving,
having relapsed the previous weekend.
The court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in August 2025,
where it struck the physical abuse allegations but sustained the substance abuse
allegations and failure to comply with the family maintenance plan allegations. The court
also terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In December 2025 the juvenile court granted mother’s request for a bonding study.
That same month the department prepared a report in advance of the section 366.26
hearing. The department reported that mother missed only one visit. Father missed three
visits during the reporting period.
The department said the children were doing well in the caregiver’s care. It
reported the children were adjusting well to the placement, and that the caregivers were
“consistent in meeting the children’s needs and maintaining structure, boundaries and
age-appropriate discipline. The children also appeared “comfortable going to caregivers
for comfort and if they need help,” and will initiate hugs and “vocalize their love for”
their caregivers. The department noted that they had been in the caregivers’ care for
much of their lives, from March 2022 to July 2023, and then again from May 2025 to
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December 2025. For their part, the caregivers said they love the children, have a close
connection, and had a strong desire to adopt them.
Visits were a mostly positive experience, though there remained some issues.
According to the department, with both parents present, the children were generally well-
behaved, and the parents had “an easier time de-escalating their behavior.” When father
was not present, the children would “exhibit more tantrums,” which mother had a harder
time de-escalating on her own. Moreover, though the children enjoyed their visits with
their parents, they were not distressed when separating from the parents, nor did they
struggle to return to the caregivers’ care. Indeed, the department said the children
“eagerly r[a]n to greet [the caregivers] and express[ed] happiness to see them.”
In January 2026 Dr. Elizabeth Stanton conducted the previously ordered bonding
study by observing one of mother’s visits. According to Dr. Stanton the children were
excited and eager to see mother and took turns hugging her when she arrived. Both
children also consistently referred to mother as “mom.” At one point C.C. Jr. told mother
he loved her without prompting. Mother brought an art project for the children, and they
listened to her instructions and asked her for help when needed. Mother and the children
spoke freely about “random topics.” When there was a conflict between the children,
mother successfully resolved it. The children also cooperated with mother’s request to
take a picture together, sitting in her lap and saying “I love you,” when prompted. When
the visit came to an end, the children gave mother hugs and told her they loved her
without prompting.
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Based on this observation, Dr. Stanton concluded “the children engage in healthy
attachment behaviors towards [m]other,” and that mother and children respond
appropriately and affectionately to each other. The children were “relaxed and calm in
[mother’s] presence,” and their “interactions, laughter, and conversations were endless.”
Dr. Stanton also noted that “the children did not engage with [m]other negatively,” when
the visit came to an end. According to Dr. Stanton, “the interactions between the children
and [m]other indicate that a meaningful relationship exists between them, and that
severing contact could be detrimental.”
In February 2026 the department provided additional information to the court,
expressing concerns about a handful of supervised visits since December 2025. At the
first visit, the children were excited to see the parents and “greeted them with hugs and
kisses at their arrival.” But soon both children ran away from the parents, and the parents
“had a difficult time having one on on[e] time with the children.” Mother became
emotional when the children referred to their caregiver as “mom” and corrected them by
saying “ ‘she is not your mother.’ ” The social worker then forbade mother from
speaking about the caregiver, and had to remind her not to do so “more than once.” At
another visit in January 2026 the children were again happy to see mother and greeted her
with hugs and kisses. C.C. Jr. again referred to the caregiver as mom. Mother asked if
she could correct the child, and the social worker forbade her from doing so. During a
February 2026 visit with both parents present, the department observed the parents
“hugging and giving kisses and telling the children they were loved.” But then the
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children tried to run away into another room, and the social worker had to redirect them.
Throughout the visit, the children misbehaved and made it difficult for the parents to
have “a quiet moment with either child.” According to the department L.C. “was
attempting to test boundaries and . . . was allowed to continue to do as she wanted.”
When the caregiver arrived, “the children ran towards her and screamed mom.” This
made mother emotional, and she told the children the caregiver was their aunt. C.C. Jr.
responded “ ‘I have two mommies!’ ”
Based on these visits, the department concluded “[t]he parents have not
demonstrated sufficient bond evidence, as they are unable to provide the structure or
independently redirect the children [sic] behaviors. Additionally, the parents struggle to
keep structure, boundaries, and maintain appropriate authority and control during
interaction with the children.”
The court held the contested section 366.26 hearing in March 2026. Dr. Stanton
testified, repeating her belief that the children’s desire for physical closeness,
spontaneous displays of affection, and comfort with asking for help reflected a close
relationship between mother and the children. However, Dr. Stanton admitted that she
could not say for certain that terminating parental rights would be detrimental. She also
admitted that it is common for children with a strong bond with a person to show distress
when that person leaves, and that the children showed no distress when leaving the visit.
Father and mother also testified. Father said that the children run to him and give
him hugs during visits. They referred to him as “daddy” and were generally excited to
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see him. He said at the end of visits “[t]hey usually get very sad,” and will hug him
without wanting to let go. He said they tell him they do not want him to leave and
sometimes cry.
Mother testified that she met all their physical, emotional and medical needs
before removal. She said the children refer to her as “mommy,” are excited to see her at
visits, and that at the end of visits they sometimes refuse to pull away and say they want
to stay with the parents. According to mother L.C. was particularly affectionate during
visits, offering hugs unprompted, staying physically close, and being emotionally open.
C.C. Jr. also sought mother for comfort, offered hugs, and generally stayed physically
close to her. At the end of visits, C.C. Jr. would usually not want to get in the car to go
back to the caregivers. Mother also disagreed with Dr. Stanton’s representation that the
children showed no distress when visits ended, saying she “didn’t remember all the
details of what I did with my children in the visit.”
After hearing testimony and argument, the court concluded the parents showed
consistent visitation and that they had a beneficial bond with the children, but failed to
demonstrate that terminating that bond would be detrimental enough to outweigh the
benefits of adoption. Specifically, the court noted there was no significant evidence “that
the children decompensated in some way, that they were throwing tantrums or they were
saying I want my Mom or I want my Dad,” at the end of visits. According to the court,
such evidence would have shown “that these kids are so distressed by the absent [sic] of
their parent that it would outweigh any permanency that the Court can provide via
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adoption.” The court said it was hoping Dr. Stanton would provide some evidence of
that, but that she did not. Indeed, the court was skeptical that her testimony could be
helpful, as “she only has seen this family once for two hours.”
Accordingly, the court concluded the parental-benefit exception to adoption did
not apply and terminated the parents’ parental rights.
ANALYSIS
“By the time of a section 366.26 hearing, the parent’s interest in reunification is no
longer an issue and the child’s interest in a stable and permanent placement is
paramount.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) Adoption is the
Legislature’s preferred permanent plan. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567,
573 (Autumn H.).) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s
rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.”
(Jasmine D., at p. 1350.)
To avoid this outcome, the parent must show that termination of parental rights
“ ‘would be detrimental to the minor’ due to any of certain specified circumstances.”
(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) One circumstance, the
parental bond exception, applies where a parent can show they “have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This requires three elements: “(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
13
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 641, 631 (Caden C.), italics omitted.)
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is straightforward. The
question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent
permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) For the second
element, courts may take into account “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative”
effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.)
As for the third element “in assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial
court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent
outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632,
italics omitted.) In assessing this final element, we may not “look to whether the parent
can provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing the relationship with
the parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security
of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
On review, we apply the substantial evidence standard to the findings on the first
two elements and a hybrid standard for the third. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)
Specifically, we review whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child or children for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) “A court abuses its
discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.] But
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‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 641.) However, we review any factual findings underlying that decision for
substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.) In doing so, we look only at the evidence admitted
at the 366.26 hearing. (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 207-208.) Similar to
the abuse of discretion standard, when reviewing the trial court’s underlying factual
findings we “presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every
reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (Autumn H.,
supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) This hybrid standard embodies the principle that as the
reviewing court, we may not “substitute [our] own judgment as to what is in the child’s
best interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard.” (Caden C., at p. 641.)
That being said, “[w]hile each standard here fits a distinct type of determination under
review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very
pronounced,” since both require us to view the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate
order in the most favorable possible light. (Id. at p. 641.)
Here, the trial court found that both parents met the first two prongs of the
Caden C. test—namely, that they regularly visited the children, and that they had a
beneficial bond with the children. The parents contend the trial court’s erred in
concluding that severing this bond would not be so detrimental to the children that it
would outweigh the benefits of adoption. We disagree.
15
First, there was sufficient evidence that adoption would bring significant benefits.
The children seemed well bonded to their caregivers and vice versa. They sought out the
caregivers for comfort and affection and referred to the female caregiver as mom. As far
as C.C. Jr. was concerned, he had “two mommies.” This close bond makes sense given
how much of the children’s young lives was spent in the caregivers’ custody—just over
two years, as much as one-third of J.C.’s entire lifespan. Given this, the children would
likely thrive in a permanent placement with their current caregivers.
Given the deference owed to the trial court’s determination, we cannot say that
either parent has shown the harm from terminating their relationship to their children
would outweigh the benefits their new home would provide. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 1110 [under third element, “the parent must show that terminating [a
substantial, positive, emotional] attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home”].) The record
certainly contains evidence that terminating the relationship would be detrimental. For
instance, both parents testified that the children did act distressed at the end of visits, and
were excited and affectionate during them. Dr. Stanton also testified that the termination
of the relationship could have serious negative effects on the children’s well-being.
However, there was also significant evidence that the harm of terminating this
relationship would not outweigh the benefits of adoption, and we are obliged to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination. As the court noted,
the only evidence that the children were distressed at the end of visits came from the
16
parents; even Dr. Stanton did not observe such behavior. This “tends to support the
juvenile court's conclusion that the relationship was not so substantial that its severance
would be detrimental.” (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 693.) The department also
observed the children not behaving or being affectionate with the parents at visits. On at
least two occasions, the children ran away from the parents, and the parents had difficulty
controlling them and needed department intervention. Both times, the department
reported that these behaviors made it difficult for the parents to get one-on-one time with
the children.
Finally, though “a parent’s lack of progress in addressing the issues that led to
dependency is not determinative,” that lack of progress “can be relevant in assessing
whether the interaction between parent and child ‘has a “ ‘negative effect’ on the
child.” ’ ” (In re Dy.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153, 164-165.) The department argues the
parents’ failure to supervise, provide structure, or properly care for the children’s needs
should be taken into consideration. We disagree, as these elements all go to “whether the
parent can provide a home for the child,” but “the section 366.26 hearing is decidedly not
a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 634.) However, the parents’ relapse after the initial reunification is relevant,
because the parents admitted to smoking methamphetamine before a visit. In fact,
according to the caregivers, father missed the visit entirely because he had smoked
methamphetamine. This speaks directly to whether the relationship between the parents
and children is worth preserving even if the parents’ custody of their children must be
17
severed. That is, this is evidence that the parents prioritized their substance use over their
children even when they had limited time with their children, knew that this time would
be supervised, and knew that they were generally under scrutiny for substance use. This
evidence suggests there is a high chance that the parents would continue abusing
substances while interacting with their children, or in lieu of interacting with their
children; such activity would impact their ability to have a beneficial relationship with
their children.
In short, the record does not indicate that terminating the children’s relationship
with the parents would be to their detriment. Accordingly, we affirm the order
terminating parental rights.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
LEE
J.
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