Filed 9/29/26 In re C.C. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re C.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SERVICES
DEPARTMENT,
A175795
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. JD2500008)
L.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
At a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated
reunification services for L.D., the mother (hereafter, mother) of now five-
year-old C.C., after she failed to participate in any of the services provided by
her case plan and did not visit C.C. Mother now appeals, arguing there is no
substantial evidence she was provided reasonable reunification services.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Solano County Health and Social Services Department
(Department) commenced this dependency case on February 11, 2025,
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alleging both parents failed to protect C.C., then three years old, due to their
substance abuse and a history of domestic violence between them. The
details concerning mother’s struggle with drugs and her abusive, four-year
relationship with father are accurately recounted in the opening brief.
On March 4, a few weeks after C.C. was detained, mother met with the
Department’s social worker.1 During that meeting, which mother’s own
mother also attended as a support person, mother expressed a desire to
regain custody of C.C., acknowledged she was in need of substance abuse
treatment and expressed willingness to engage in mental health services,
parenting education and domestic violence services. She was given various
service referrals and had a supervised visit with C.C. that day.
Subsequently, she missed all of her weekly drug tests for the month.
The following month, on April 1, 2025, mother’s counsel made an oral,
unopposed request to appoint a guardian ad litem for mother. No reasons
were given, the request was unopposed (including by mother who was present
in court) and the court appointed another attorney as mother’s guardian ad
litem.2 Mother subsequently missed all of her weekly drug tests that month,
1 References to “the social worker” are to the Solano County social
worker assigned to C.C.’s case. A social worker from Butte County, assigned
to the infant sister of C.C. born in Butte County after the Solano County
dependency was initiated, is mentioned in this opinion. We will refer to that
social worker as “the Butte County social worker.”
2 “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must
appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. [Citations.] The test
is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or
consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case.”
(In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910; Code Civ. Proc., § 372.) A parent’s
“deliberate failure to cooperate with counsel, without more, does not
demonstrate incompetency.” (In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67, 79.)
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too, and she continued to use drugs in the months that followed. In July, she
gave birth in Butte County to a baby girl who weighed 3.10 pounds at birth
and tested positive for fentanyl, resulting in a referral to the Butte County
social welfare agency; mother admitted using fentanyl a few days before the
birth; the baby was removed from her custody and placed together with C.C.
Subsequently, on August 5, 2025, the court sustained the allegations in
this case and ordered reunification services. Mother’s case plan included
“The effect of the guardian ad litem’s appointment is to transfer
direction and control of the litigation from the parent to the guardian ad
litem, who may waive the parent’s right to a contested hearing.” (In re
James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 910.) “Before appointing a guardian ad
litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, however, the juvenile court
must hold an informal hearing at which the purpose and powers of a
guardian ad litem and the reasons for believing the parent incompetent are
explained to the parent and, if the parent does not consent to the guardian ad
litem’s appointment, the parent is given an opportunity to argue that a
guardian ad litem is not required.” (Id. at p. 904.) “The court or counsel
should explain to the parent the purpose of the guardian ad litem and the
grounds for believing that the parent is mentally incompetent. [Citation.] If
the parent consents to the appointment, the parent’s due process rights are
satisfied. [Citation.] A parent who does not consent must be given an
opportunity to persuade the court that appointment of a guardian ad litem is
not required, and the juvenile court should make an inquiry sufficient to
satisfy itself that the parent is, or is not, competent. [Citation.] If the court
appoints a guardian ad litem without the parent’s consent, the record must
contain substantial evidence of the parent’s incompetence.” (Id. at pp. 910-
911.)
That procedure was not followed here, and so no record was made as to
whether mother actually “lacks capacity to understand the nature or
consequences of the action or proceeding” or “lacks capacity to assist [her]
attorney in the preparation of the case” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(4)
(A), (B)) as opposed to, for example, having simply declined to cooperate with
her lawyer (In re Samuel A., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 79). No evidence
was introduced and no argument was made about that subject, and the court
made no findings concerning it.
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counseling, substance abuse testing and treatment, and requirements that
she complete a psychological evaluation and a domestic violence prevention
program. Mother did not attend the hearing.
Over the next six months, mother did not engage in any of her
reunification services; never visited C.C.; did not respond to any of the
Department’s many attempts to contact her by phone, mail, and in-person at
her address of record in Paradise, California; and the Department’s attempts
to contact her with the assistance of the Butte County social worker assigned
to the dependency case for the infant half-sister who had been born in that
county were also unsuccessful.
During this period, the Butte County social worker was able to locate
and speak to mother briefly—on September 30, 2025, nearly two months into
the reunification period. The social worker encountered mother outside her
home and informed her that the Solano County social worker in this case was
trying to contact her by phone and in person to discuss visitation, mother’s
progress with her case plan and any service referrals she might need.
Mother responded she was under the impression that C.C. was with her
maternal grandmother in Oklahoma. The Butte County social worker told
her C.C. was in foster care in Solano County and that she needed to contact
the Solano County social worker about this. Mother then replied, “Talk to my
conservator” and drove off.
On December 29, about five months into the review period and about
three months after that in-person contact, the Department learned from the
Butte County social worker that mother was incarcerated in Butte County
Jail. The Butte County social worker planned to meet with mother that day
in jail and agreed again to pass on the Solano County’s social worker’s
contact information and ask mother to make contact.
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On January 9, 2026, the Department filed a petition to terminate
mother’s reunification services on the basis of the facts stated in the six-
month report, which it also filed that day.
The Solano County social worker then met with mother in jail on
January 27, 2026. When the social worker explained she had repeatedly
been trying to reach mother by mail, in person and by phone since late
August 2025, mother gave no explanation for not communicating with the
Department. She simply looked at the floor and said, “Oh, okay.” She also
told the social worker she had not engaged in any of her case plan services to
date and also did not want to begin accessing any services while in jail, even
after the social worker told her services could be made available to her in jail
and encouraged her to access them. The only reason mother gave for not
participating in any of her reunification services was that she has difficulty
understanding the subject matter of the classes and needed her own mother
to assist her, and that she planned to move to Oklahoma to live with her
mother after getting released from jail and wanted to begin services there.
Mother also declined to visit with C.C. while in jail, and said she only wanted
to schedule visitation once she was released from custody and living in
Oklahoma.
Mother attended the contested six-month review hearing, which was
held over two days on February 23 and February 24, 2026. No witnesses
testified. By this point, mother had not visited C.C. since March 28, 2025,
nearly a full year. After hearing argument, the court terminated mother’s
reunification services. The court found that “[d]espite being aware in
August of 2025 and also in September of 2025 that . . . she was eligible and
services were ordered for her, at no time [did] mother express[] any curiosity,
any concern, any need for further explanation regarding” reunification
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services, visitation or how to get C.C. returned to her custody. It also found
that reasonable services were provided to mother and that “her inactions and
her failure to avail herself of those services” made the likelihood of
reunification “very low.” It entered orders terminating her reunification
services on two grounds: (1) it sustained the Department’s petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3883 to terminate her reunification
services on the ground that her inaction created a substantial likelihood that
reunification would not occur (§ 388, subd. (c)(1)(B)), and (2) it terminated
mother’s reunification services under section 366.21, subdivision (e).
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Mother asserts the order terminating her reunification services should
be reversed because there is no substantial evidence she was provided
reasonable reunification services, principally because she was mentally
incapacitated (as evidenced by the fact a guardian ad litem was appointed for
her) yet the Department unreasonably failed to tailor its efforts to assist her
in light of what she says are her intellectual limitations and the fact that
eventually she was incarcerated in jail. She does not address either of the
grounds upon which the court ruled, but we construe this argument as
directed at the court’s ruling under section 388.4 It is unnecessary to address
these arguments, because we affirm the order terminating her reunification
3All further references to statutes are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.
4 Under that provision, a juvenile court may terminate reunification
services early on the ground of a parent’s inaction only if it finds by a
preponderance of evidence that reasonable services have been offered or
provided. (See § 388, subd. (c)(3).)
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services on the basis of the alternative ground upon which the juvenile court
relied.
As the Department argues, the juvenile court properly terminated
mother’s reunification services under section 366.21, subdivision (e). That
provision authorizes the juvenile court to schedule a hearing under
section 366.26 at the six-month review hearing if “the parent has failed to
contact and visit the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(5).) Under this provision as
judicially construed, however, “reunification services must be continued if
there are extenuating circumstances excusing the failure to contact and visit
the children.” (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1017
(Sara M.).)
Here, it is undisputed that by the time of the six-month review hearing,
mother had not visited or spoken with C.C. in 11 months. Mother does not
address this in her opening brief. But, citing no legal authority, mother
asserts in her reply brief that her lack of contact and visitation was excused
for two reasons: because she thought C.C. was living in Oklahoma with the
maternal grandmother, and because the Department made no efforts to
initiate or offer her virtual visitation while she was incarcerated.
This argument amounts to a substantial evidence challenge to the
court’s ruling under section 366.21. (See Sara M., supra, 36 Cal.4th at
p. 1018.) In considering this issue, “[t]he appellate court ‘construe[s] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s findings regarding . . .
the reasonableness of [the social services department’s] efforts,’ ” including
the juvenile court’s implicit finding of no extenuating circumstances. (Ibid.)
Further, as stated in authority mother cites, substantial evidence review
requires us to “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
respondent. . . . If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our
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duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘[W]hen
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,’ either
deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and ‘a reviewing court is
without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’’ ’ ”
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
Here, the juvenile court was not required to believe mother thought
C.C. was out of state and reasonably could have found that that was a
falsehood offered as an excuse rather than a genuine belief. Mother gave no
indication to the Butte County social worker why she thought the child was
in Oklahoma when the two spoke in September 2025. Earlier, in
March 2025, mother had participated in supervised visitation in Solano
County. And there was ample evidence of the Department’s many efforts to
contact her to encourage her to visit her child and engage in services once
reunification services were ordered on August 5, 2025. For example, on
August 28, 2025, the social worker personally visited mother’s address of
record and, upon finding nobody there, left her business card and a letter
asking mother to contact her as soon as possible to discuss both her case plan
and visitation with C.C. There is no evidence mother did not receive that
letter, from which the court could reasonably infer she did in fact know C.C.
was available for visitation (or that she deliberately ignored the
Department’s correspondence, which is not an extenuating circumstance).
Further, at some point during the review period, the Department learned
from her landlord that mother was still living at the address where the social
worker had left the letter.
And even if mother was under the mistaken impression for a time that
C.C. was in Oklahoma, the juvenile court could reasonably find mother knew
at least for the last four months of the reunification period that C.C. was
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available for visitation in Solano County: the Butte County social worker
told her this on September 30, 2025, less than two months into her
reunification period, and mother expressed no misunderstanding about this
then or when the Solano County social worker visited her in jail four months
later in January 2026. The record shows that during that jail visit in
January, mother was offered both in-person visitation and virtual visitation
with C.C. while she was incarcerated but declined both.
Under these circumstances, we find no error in the court’s order
terminating her reunification services under section 366.21. (See, e.g.,
Sara M., supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 1017-1018 [no error to do so where mother
made no effort to visit children while free of drugs]; In re Monique S. (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 677, 683 [no error to do so in parental substance abuse case
where mother “refused all services, never asked to see [minor],” “failed to
attend all but one hearing” and “made absolutely no effort to reunify with her
child”].)
Although that is a sufficient basis to affirm the order, we have
considered mother’s arguments concerning the reunification services
provided to her and also find no error in the court’s determination that she
was offered and provided reasonable reunification services. Briefly, mother
cites no legal authority suggesting that the appointment of a guardian ad
litem in any way excuses her from complying with or engaging in her case
plan; there is substantial evidence the Department acted reasonably in
attempting to maintain contact with her; that her failure to engage in
services resulted from her own lack of initiative and failure to maintain
contact with the Department, not any failure on the part of the Department
(see, e.g., In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 698-699) or mother’s
inability to understand what was expected of her; and that mother
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understood the importance of engaging in services to regain custody of her
child and expressed a willingness to do so during the March 4, 2025 meeting
that took place shortly after the detention hearing (before a guardian ad
litem was appointed), but then she simply ceased all contact with the
Department, continued to engage in drug use and failed to engage in any
services or to visit with her child.
As the Department argues, social services agencies are not expected to,
and cannot, force unwilling parents to cooperate. “The requirement that
reunification services be made available to help a parent overcome those
problems which led to the dependency of his or her minor children is not a
requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him
or her to and through classes or counseling sessions. A parent whose
children have been adjudged dependents of the juvenile court is on notice of
the conduct requiring such state intervention. If such a parent in no way
seeks to correct his or her own behavior . . . the legislative purpose of
providing safe and stable environments for children is not served by forcing
the juvenile court to go ‘on hold’ while the parent makes another stab at
compliance.” (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.) That
observation applies here.
To the extent mother challenges the adequacy of the case plan itself (as
distinct from the Department’s efforts to assist her in complying with it), she
has forfeited such claims. The reunification plan was adopted as part of the
disposition order. But mother did not appeal the disposition order and
cannot challenge it in this appeal. “ ‘ “[A]n unappealed disposition or
postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an
appeal from a later appealable order.” ’ ” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1,
10; see Sara M., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1018 [“ ‘By failing to appeal, [mother]
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has waived any complaint she may have regarding the [reunification] plan as
ordered’ ”]; Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811 [parent
waived challenge to adequacy of reunification plan by failing to appeal from
disposition order].)
Finally, we offer a closing observation. As noted, mother did not
address or challenge in her opening brief the juvenile court’s early
termination of her reunification services under section 366.21 due to her lack
of contact with C.C. Her brief focuses solely on the reasonableness of
reunification services provided to her in light of what she contends are her
mental and/or intellectual limitations, arguments we have rejected for the
foregoing reasons. However, to the extent her opening brief arguments could
be construed as a contention that her mental and/or intellectual limitations
also constitute extenuating circumstances excusing her failure to regularly
contact or visit C.C. for 11 months, we would reject that argument, too. The
juvenile court made no finding that mother suffers from a mental or
intellectual impairment, much less one that interferes with her ability to
understand and appreciate the importance of maintaining regular contact
with C.C. (see footnote 2, ante, p. 2). Nonetheless, at mother’s counsel’s
request, it appointed a guardian ad litem for her and the guardian ad litem
attended all or virtually all of the hearings. There is no reason to believe the
guardian ad litem did not adequately communicate with mother’s counsel
and protect her interests in these proceedings. To the extent there were
questions about mother’s capacities or mental deficits, the Department
offered mother reunification services specifically tailored to address any such
questions: a requirement she undergo a psychological evaluation as well as a
counseling requirement. Yet, as explained, mother severed all contact with
the Department and was nonresponsive to its many attempts to engage her
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in those services. And finally, the Department’s social worker personally
encouraged mother to visit C.C.—both at the beginning of the case in the
March 4, 2025 meeting and later in January 2026 when she met with mother
in jail—and there is no indication on either occasion that mother did not
understand and appreciate the importance of doing so. Under these
circumstances, mother’s refusal to visit her child in 11 months cannot be
attributed to undiagnosed mental health issues the Department failed
adequately to address. Rather, the juvenile court could (and presumably did)
reasonably find it was due, unfortunately, to mother’s lack of initiative to
take any steps to address her chronic drug use.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother’s reunification services is affirmed.
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STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
In re C.C. (A175795)
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