Filed 8/19/26 In re C.B. CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re C.B., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, A173046
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Del Norte County Super. Ct.
v. No. JDSQ 23-6097)
C.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In this juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602, the juvenile court found that C.B. committed the offenses of
battery with injury on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)), battery
on a (second) peace officer (id., § 243, subd. (b)), and resisting an executive
officer (as to both) (id., § 69). C.B. appeals, contending that insufficient
evidence supports the findings. She also contends that the juvenile court
improperly excluded evidence that a third officer induced her cooperation
without using force. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
In 2021, when C.B. was 12 years old, the Del Norte County Juvenile
Court asserted dependency jurisdiction over her, sustaining allegations of
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physical and sexual abuse by her father. In 2023, the juvenile court declared
C.B. a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) After initially detaining
her from both parents, the court returned C.B. to her mother’s home for about
six months, until her mother became too ill to care for her. Thereafter she
lived in foster homes, a short-term residential therapeutic program, for a
short time back with her mother, and juvenile halls.
C.B. struggled with mental health. A psychologist diagnosed her with
depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and unspecified alcohol- and cannabis-related disorder.
C.B. also struggled with behavior. The record discloses physical and
verbal aggression toward, and resistance to directions from, probation and
other officers; physical and verbal aggression toward social workers; physical
and verbal aggression toward peers and staff at school and in residences; and
vandalism at school, residences, and county offices.
In one example, C.B. admitted battering a staff member at a residential
program. She head-butted the staff member; punched, pinched, and kicked
her legs; punched her face and back; threw kitchen items at her; and threw a
three-foot plywood sign at her face.
In another example, C.B. admitted battering and resisting a juvenile
corrections officer, and resisting two other officers. She yelled, used foul
language, and talked over people during a courtroom hearing. At the
hearing’s end, she did not follow directions to exit. Two bailiffs attempted to
guide her out verbally and physically. When the bailiffs placed her in control
holds to compel her compliance, she dead-weighted her legs, causing the
bailiffs to lower her to the floor. A probation officer and a juvenile corrections
officer attempted to physically assist while also telling C.B. to stop resisting
and kicking at them. She kicked one of the officers in the groin.
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II.
In 2024, when she was 15 years old, C.B. resided in custody in Shasta
County Juvenile Hall. The Del Norte County Juvenile Court retained
jurisdiction over her, and the Del Norte County Probation Department
retained lead agency responsibility for her placement and care.
C.B. asked the juvenile court to allow her to visit her mother’s
Del Norte County home. The proposed visit was unusual; the probation
department generally did not take wards in custody to unsecured locations
for family visits. But the juvenile court granted the request, presumably
because the mother’s illness prevented her from leaving her bed.
The chief probation officer arranged for a 30-minute visit on a day that
C.B. would be in Del Norte County for a court appearance. He directed that
the visit was subject to C.B.’s behavior and to safety and security concerns.
He also directed that C.B. be restrained because she was in custody, and
because of her history of assaulting officers, the unsecured location, and an
attempt she had made to escape during transport. The escape attempt had
involved C.B. slipping her hand out of her cuffs, reaching through a partially
open car window while the car was moving, and opening the car door from
the outside.
III.
On the day of the visit, C.B. traveled from Shasta County to the
Del Norte County Youth Opportunity Center (Youth Center). Multiple staff
advised her that the visit with her mother would be supervised and that she
would remain in restraints. Officer Robert Arriola drove her from the Youth
Center to her mother’s house, which was three minutes away. Before they
left, she used the bathroom.
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On the visit, she wore handcuffs, a belly chain, and leg shackles. The
restraints limited how far she could move her arms from side to side, so that
she could not grab things. The leg shackles were loose enough to allow her to
walk.
Supervising Deputy Probation Officer Kory Rosentrater oversaw the
visit. Arriola remained on site because the chief probation officer was
concerned about how C.B. might behave. The two officers wore body
cameras.
About five minutes into the visit, C.B. asked Rosentrater to seek
permission from the chief probation officer to remove her handcuffs. When
he declined, she asked, “You want me to stay in handcuffs?” He told her,
“You know this—we’ve already discussed it. Handcuffs stay on.” She asked,
“What if I have to go to the bathroom?” Rosentrater told her that she would
need to wait until they returned to the Youth Center because there was no
female officer present. C.B. insisted that she needed to use the bathroom and
argued when Rosentrater refused. Rosentrater tried to redirect her attention
toward the visit. C.B. became increasingly agitated. Ultimately, she
clenched her fist and yelled, “I need to really pee or I’m gonna literally pee
myself.”
At that point, Rosentrater decided to return C.B. to the Youth Center.
He said to Arriola, “Let’s take her back . . . .” To C.B. he said “move” and
“[l]et’s go.” The officers put their hands by the back of her elbows and walked
her out the front door toward the car in the driveway.
IV.
When they were within a few feet of the car, C.B. started yelling and
resisted further progress by dropping her weight toward the ground. She dug
in her heels, straightened and stiffened her legs, and pushed her weight
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backwards. The officers transitioned to a control hold to prevent her from
falling or bringing the officers down. They were able to move her to the car’s
back passenger door.
There, she dropped all the way to the ground and kicked and flailed her
legs. Rosentrater testified that one of her kicks connected with his shin. He
directed her to stand up. Rosentrater determined that he could not
maneuver her into a standing position without harming her. Instead he used
a pressure point technique with both hands for a few seconds to cause her to
stand by her own power. The technique hurt her while he used it. But there
is no evidence that C.B. continued to experience pain after Rosentrater
stopped or that he continued to use the technique after she stood. There is
also no evidence that it injured her.
C.B. continued to struggle, and Rosentrater continued to tell her to
stop. The officers moved her part way into the car, but Rosentrater lost his
grip. C.B. slid from partially lying on her back on the backseat to a seated
position on the ground just outside the door. Rosentrater directed her to
stand up, turn around, and get in the car. She did not. As Rosentrater tried
to lift her, he perceived that she was trying to bite his hand. He yanked his
hand back, and she kicked him in the leg. She obstructed the officers’ efforts
to grip her and used abusive language. The officers told her several times to
stand up or they would use pepper spray. Rosentrater told her, “You just
tried to bite me and you kicked me. Stand up.”
She partially stood, but then she dropped down again and “turtl[ed].”
Turtling means compressing low to the ground and locking in a position.
Rosentrater testified that probation officers “see it a lot with individuals
trying to prevent [officers from] gaining control of their hands or feet.”
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Rosentrater looked for a way to get his hands under C.B.’s arms, but he
did not see one. So with one hand he used his thumb on a pressure point
near her ear. He gave half a push in, causing her right arm to pop out and
allowing him to get his hand under her armpit. The officers pulled C.B. to a
standing position facing the car seat and attempted to move her in. C.B. was
bent forward toward the seat.
According to C.B., Rosentrater at that point had two hands on her neck
and again used his thumbs on pressure points. Rosentrater’s version differs.
He did not testify to using the pressure point technique while C.B. was
standing. Instead, he maintained that he had his left hand on the back of her
sweatshirt while his right arm slid forward to push her in the vehicle, and his
right hand came near enough to her mouth that she was able to reach down
to bite it.
C.B. bit Rosentrater’s right ring finger above the first knuckle,
clenching her jaws and grinding her teeth. He screamed. He believed he
would sustain serious or permanent injury. Using his free left hand, he hit
her repeatedly with a hammer fist on the trapezius area of her shoulder and
neck. The hammer fist technique uses the flat side of the fist, as opposed the
knuckle bones, to strike a target. It is department approved. He stopped as
soon as she released his finger.
Rosentrater identified other options for freeing his finger, but they
would have involved more force. Had he used his baton in a downward
strike, he testified, it would have injured C.B. He also feasibly could have
used a knee strike, an elbow strike, or his firearm. He could not have
reached his pepper spray and, in any event, he was too close to use it
effectively.
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Rosentrater described the severity of the bite as 9 out of 10. It caused
pain, bruising, swelling, three months of numbness, and scarring. He lost his
fingernail.
After C.B. released his finger, Rosentrater tried to push her into the car
onto her stomach, while Arriola went to the other side of the car and tried to
pull her across. Once on her stomach, C.B. repeatedly kicked Rosentrater in
the chest, groin, and lower legs. Both officers instructed her to stop, but she
did not. She bit Arriola’s left hand, causing bruising and swelling.
When the officers nearly had C.B. contained in the car lying on her
stomach lengthwise across the backseat, Rosentrater grabbed the chain
connecting the cuffs around her ankles and pulled her backwards toward him
so that Arriola could shut the door on his side of the car without smashing
her head. C.B. then locked her leg in a straight position such that
Rosentrater could not put it fully in the car and shut the door. He
manipulated her legs into a “figure-four leg lock” to keep them within the car.
But when he tried to shut the door, she kicked her legs out, and her foot got
caught between the door and the doorframe. Rosentrater pushed against the
resistance, thinking that she was pushing on the interior of the door with her
feet. When he realized her foot was caught, he repositioned her legs so that
they were inside the car, and he successfully closed the door. Her ankle
sustained swelling and a large bruise.
Inside the car, C.B. kicked the windows and the doors, yelled, and
swore. When Arriola drove her back to the Youth Center, she yelled that she
would fight the officers when she got out and that she should have bitten
Rosentrater’s finger off.
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V.
The district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that
C.B. committed the following offenses: battery with injury against a peace
officer (Rosentrater) (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)); battery against a peace
officer (Arriola) (id., § 243, subd. (b)); and two counts of resisting an executive
officer (Rosentrater and Arriola, respectively) with the use of force or violence
(id., § 69).
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing at which the
fact witnesses included Rosentrater, Arriola, C.B., and the chief probation
officer.
Dr. Salma Kahn testified as an expert on C.B.’s behalf. Kahn was a
licensed psychiatrist who had worked in California prisons since 2010. She
had observed use-of-force scenarios and was part of a use-of-force team at
San Quentin. The juvenile court accepted her as an expert in psychiatry and
in psychological de-escalation techniques to avoid use of force.
In Kahn’s view, the probation department should have arranged and
managed the visit differently. She would have expected a clear behavioral
plan for an oppositional juvenile with mental health challenges known to be
resistant to authority. The plan should have included guidelines
communicated to C.B. about when she would be fed and when she could use a
bathroom. The mother’s female caregiver should have stayed on site and
C.B.’s female rape counselor also should have been present. Rosentrater
should not have stood so close to C.B. and her mother during the visit and
should not have spoken as much as he did.
Kahn testified that even under the actual visit conditions, the officers
could have avoided using force. They could have allowed a “cooling down
period” followed by negotiation and incentives. She did not see an emergency
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situation requiring the officers to force C.B. into the car. In her view,
threatening, manhandling, and punching were not reasonable responses to
C.B.’s bathroom request. The officers should have stopped to ask C.B. if she
was hurting and to provide some measure of care and comfort.
The juvenile court found true that C.B. committed each alleged offense.
As relates to the use of excessive force, the court concluded that it was
lawful for the officers to use force to overcome C.B.’s resistance; the video
disclosed no excessive force; there was no evidence that Rosentrater’s use of
the pressure point technique amounted to excessive force; C.B.’s testimony
about the events lacked credibility because it did not match the video; the
video contradicted C.B.’s claim that Rosentrater had two hands on her neck
when she bit him; C.B., not the officers, escalated the physical nature of the
conflict; and the force that the officers used was reasonable.
As relates to C.B.’s claim of self-defense, the court found that C.B.
initiated the physical altercation by kicking when the officers first tried to
put her in the car; she did not try to stop the fighting either by word or by
conduct, such as by saying she would comply or by complying; neither officer
used deadly force against her that would justify her own continued use of
force; and when C.B. bit Rosentrater’s finger she may have been feeling pain
but she was not under threat of life.
The court also found credible Kahn’s opinion that C.B. was emotionally
disturbed.
DISCUSSION
I.
C.B. contends that insufficient evidence supports both the juvenile
court’s finding that the officers used reasonable force and its finding that C.B.
did not act in self-defense. We disagree.
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We review these contentions as we would in an adult criminal case,
examining “ ‘the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a
reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653.) Substantial means reasonable,
credible, and of solid value. (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)
We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. (People v.
Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106.)
A.
Each of the alleged offenses requires that the officer was performing his
or her duty when the incident occurred. (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subds. (b), (c)(2),
69, subd. (a).) When an officer uses excessive or unreasonable force, the
officer is not acting lawfully and therefore is not performing his or her duty.
(People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46; see also In re Manuel G.
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815 [resisting an officer]; In re Joseph F. (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 [battery on an officer].) A finding that an officer
used excessive force thus defeats all charges at issue.
A custodial officer may use reasonable force to restrain a person or to
overcome resistance. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 524–
525.) To assess whether force rises to the impermissible level of “excessive,”
courts ask “ ‘whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting them.’ ” (Lombardo v. City of
St. Louis, Missouri (2021) 594 U.S. 464, 466–467.) Relevant considerations
may include, for example, whether the person actively resisted, the
relationship between the need for force and the amount used, the officer’s
effort to temper the amount of force used, and the extent of the person’s
injury. (Kingsley v. Hendrickson (2015) 576 U.S. 389, 397.)
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Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the
officers’ use of force was reasonable. The officers attempted to use verbal
commands throughout the incident, but C.B. did not comply with them. The
officers testified, in accord with the video evidence, that she actively resisted
their efforts to escort her into the car. Rosentrater testified that he chose to
use low levels of force compared to alternatives available and stopped using
force when he achieved his goals of causing C.B. to stand, to move her arm
out of her “turtle” position, and to release his finger. Rosentrater further
testified, consistent with the video evidence, that he pulled on C.B.’s leg
shackles in order to prevent her head from getting smashed by Arriola closing
the car door. Evidence also supports a conclusion that Rosentrater did not
intend to close the car door on C.B.’s foot. He had tried to secure her legs in
the car, but C.B. had kicked them out. Under these circumstances, C.B.’s
bruised and swollen ankle does not undermine the juvenile court’s
determination that the officers acted reasonably.
C.B. contends that the juvenile court impermissibly parsed the
encounter into intervals instead of assessing the totality of the
circumstances. (See Barnes v. Felix (2025) 605 U.S. 73, 76.) We are not
persuaded. First, we disagree with C.B.’s characterization of the court’s
method. We note that the court made wide-view observations in discussing
its findings. In addition, we presume that the court correctly applied the law.
(Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152.)
Second, our own review of the five-minute sequence as a whole convinces us
that substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusions as discussed above.
We also disagree with C.B.’s contention that the options suggested by
Kahn show that the officers used unreasonable force. Kahn’s alternative
options fall into two categories.
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The first category includes suggestions aimed at making it less likely
that C.B.’s behavior would cause a need for force in the first place—such as
having neutral women present and presenting C.B. with clear guidelines at
the outset. C.B. may be correct that such measures could have averted her
resistance and thus the officers’ use of force. But she cites no authority for
the proposition that the probation department or the officers had an
affirmative duty to provide circumstances that would make C.B.’s cooperation
more likely. Nor has she identified any authority for the proposition that
whether the officers made such efforts is legally relevant to whether they
used excessive force when they encountered resistance.
The second category of Kahn’s alternatives includes options for
responding to the resistance that did, in fact, occur. Kahn suggests that the
officers could have waited C.B. out, negotiated, and offered incentives. In
other words, C.B. suggests that the officers’ decision to use any force at all,
without first trying these strategies, was itself excessive. But C.B. cites no
authority for the proposition that officers must employ alternative strategies
before using force to overcome resistance. Indeed, the proposition is at odds
with the rule that a custodial officer may use reasonable force to restrain a
person, to overcome resistance, or in self-defense. (See People v. Gutierrez,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 521–522, 524–525.) It is also at odds with the
rule that “reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force
that is necessary in a particular situation.” (Graham v. Connor (1989)
490 U.S. 386, 396–397.) In this case, substantial evidence supported a
finding that the officers’ decision to use force was reasonable under the
circumstances. C.B. was in custody, she physically resisted the officers’
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instructions, and Rosentrater testified that he did not think sitting down and
talking was a viable option given her resistance and the unsecure setting.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
neither officer used excessive force.
B.
C.B. also contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that she did
not act in self-defense. On this issue, the prosecution bore the burden of
proof. (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 571.) If the
prosecution failed to carry its burden, the juvenile court could not find true
that she committed the alleged offenses. (See People v. Adrian (1982)
135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340 [self-defense negates culpability for assaultive
offenses].)
Generally, a claim of self-defense is not available to a person who
initiated a physical altercation unless they tried to withdraw from the fight
by words or conduct. (People v. Hernandez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 582, 587–
589.) C.B. does not contest that this rule applies to a juvenile in custody who
physically resists or assaults a custodial officer, and she does not argue that
she tried to withdraw from the fight. She argues only that she did not
initiate the altercation.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that she did.
Rosentrater testified, and the video does not contradict, that C.B. kicked her
legs, connecting with his shin, before he used the pressure point technique for
the first time. The court reasonably could conclude that C.B. initiated a
physical altercation at this point.
We disagree with C.B.’s contention that Rosentrater’s testimony
suggests that the kick to his shin came after his use of the pressure point
technique. When asked if he had been kicked beforehand, he answered, “She
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had kicked backwards. She connected with my shin.” He also testified that
C.B. kicked him after he used the technique. To the extent the two
statements created an ambiguity, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude
that he was testifying about two separate kicks—one before he used the
technique and one after. In any event, Rosentrater testified that C.B. was
kicking her legs before he applied the pressure technique. This evidence also
supports the juvenile court’s finding.
We are also unpersuaded by C.B.’s argument that the officers initiated
the physical aggression by putting their hands on her elbows and escorting
her out of the house toward the car. The juvenile court reasonably could find
that those acts did not constitute the start of a physical fight.
Accordingly, C.B.’s self-defense claim fails. As a result, we need not
and do not reach C.B.’s other self-defense arguments that she had reasonable
beliefs that she was in imminent danger of suffering a battery and that the
immediate use of force was necessary, and that she used no more force than
reasonably appeared necessary to defend herself.
II.
C.B. contends that the juvenile court erred by excluding evidence that a
third probation officer—back at the Youth Center, after the incident—had
calmed C.B. down by talking to her and helping her out of the car. We
disagree.
We generally review a ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) C.B. asserts
that we review issues de novo when they raise constitutional concerns. But
she does not explain the constitutional concern at issue or cite authority
supporting application of the de novo standard in this context. We therefore
apply the abuse of discretion standard, under which we uphold the juvenile
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court’s ruling unless it was arbitrary or capricious. (People v. Hovarter (2008)
44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.)
“ ‘[A] trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the
relevance of evidence . . . .’ ” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 904.)
Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
(Evid. Code, § 210.)
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the evidence
was not relevant. The third probation officer acted in a context that differed
significantly from that in which Rosentrater and Arriola acted. Time had
passed since the confrontation. C.B. no longer faced the officers who had
refused to let her use the restroom at her mother’s house and who had
overcome her resistance to force her into a car. The juvenile court could
conclude that how the third officer approached C.B. in this different context
had no bearing on whether Rosentrater and Arriola acted reasonably in the
circumstances they faced.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, Acting P. J.
GORDON, J. *
*Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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