Filed 8/20/26 In re Brianna V. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re BRIANNA V. et al., B350160
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
_____________________________
Super. Ct. Nos.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 25CCJP00915A-C)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MANUEL G.,
Defendant and Appellant;
ADRIANA V.,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed and Dismissed.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Manuel G.
Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Adriana V.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Minor Brianna V.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Minors Ev.G. and Ez.G.
******
In this juvenile dependency matter, the juvenile court
asserted jurisdiction over Manuel G.’s (father’s) nine-year-old
daughter and two-year-old son based on findings that father
sexually abused their 17-year-old half-sister. Father challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdiction, while the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(the Department) appeals the court’s initial dispositional order
releasing the children to the parents’ home. Substantial evidence
supports the court’s order exerting jurisdiction. Because the
juvenile court has issued a subsequent dispositional order based
2
on subsequent events, the Department’s appeal of the initial
dispositional order is dismissed as moot.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Adriana V. (mother) has three children—Brianna V. (born
2008), Ev.G. (born 2017), and Ez.G. (born 2024). C.G. is
Brianna’s father, while father is the father of Ev.G. and Ez.G.
B. Actions giving rise to dependency jurisdiction
In early March 2025, then-16-year-old Brianna was
hospitalized and placed on a psychiatric hold after attempting to
overdose on Xanax. While hospitalized, she reported that father
had sexually abused her twice—once in November 2023, and a
second time in January 2024. In each instance, Brianna reported
that father entered the bedroom Brianna shared with Ev.G.,
covered Ev.G. with a blanket, placed a blanket over Brianna’s
face, and exposed and then rubbed her vaginal area; during the
January 2024 incident, father also inserted his finger into her
vagina. Each incident of abuse lasted about an hour. Ev.G.
denied that father had ever entered their bedroom.
Brianna did not disclose either incident to mother,
although in the midst of an argument they had in mid-2024,
Brianna asked, “‘do you know [father] likes to touch little girls
when they’re [a]sleep?’”
Father denied any inappropriate touching. He stated that
he had known Brianna since she was six years old, regarded her
as his own child, and viewed her as his daughter. Father
recounted that he and Brianna had a positive relationship until
Ev.G. was born, at which point Brianna began making comments
such as, “you’re not my dad.”
3
II. Procedural Background
A. Initiation of dependency proceedings
On March 28, 2025, the Department filed a petition asking
the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over Brianna,
Ev.G., and Ez.G., based on the two incidents of sexual abuse
against Brianna, which the petition alleged “endangers . . .
Brianna’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home
environment and places [Brianna] and [Ev.G. and Ez.G.] at risk .
. . of serious physical harm, damage, danger and sexual abuse,”
rendering jurisdiction appropriate under subdivisions (b), (d), and
(j) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1
On April 14, 2025, the juvenile court detained the children
from father2 and released them into mother’s custody. The court
ordered that father’s visitation be monitored and specified that
mother could serve as the monitor for father’s visits with Ev.G.
and Ez.G.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department investigated
Brianna’s allegations of sexual abuse. Brianna responded that
she did not want to press charges. No Sexual Assault Response
Team (SART) examination was conducted because it had been
more than a year since the most recent incident. Father was not
interviewed, and the investigation was closed.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 The court detained the children from their “fathers” but
C.G. is not a party to this appeal, and we do not discuss him
further.
4
Mother stated she did not believe the allegations against
father, and the Department was concerned that Brianna was
being coached.
B. First amended petition and other proceedings
On May 30, 2025, the Department filed a first amended
petition. In addition to retaining the allegations from the initial
petition, the amended petition further alleged that (1) mother
had failed to protect Brianna from sexual abuse by not believing
Brianna, not reporting abuse to law enforcement and not evicting
father from the home after Brianna mentioned father liked
touching sleeping little girls, which the amended petition alleged
places Ev.G. and Ez.G. at risk of harm, rendering jurisdiction
appropriate under section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j); and
(2) mother had failed to take Brianna to a scheduled forensic
interview and not allowed Ev.G. and Ez.G. to be interviewed in
private, rendering jurisdiction appropriate under section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (j).3
C. Exertion of dependency jurisdiction, removal,
and reunification efforts
On September 29, 2025, the juvenile court held a
jurisdictional hearing. Brianna did not attend and was not
available to testify. The court dismissed the counts newly added
in the amended petition, which alleged that mother failed to
protect Brianna, failed to take her to a forensic interview, and
refused to permit Ev.G. and Ez.G. to be interviewed. After
finding Brianna’s reports of sexual abuse to be credible (based
upon “sufficient corroborating evidence,” such as Brianna’s
3 The juvenile court dismissed the original petition and set
the adjudication and disposition hearing on the amended
petition.
5
disclosure of that abuse to a close friend and a close relative, the
timing of that disclosure, Brianna’s “behavior” that is “indicative
of someone suffering emotional trauma,” and Brianna’s failure to
recant, the court sustained the allegations that father sexually
abused Brianna and that such conduct placed Ev.G. and Ez.G. at
risk. The court ordered all three children released to mother’s
home and directed the Department to assist mother and father in
enrolling in sexual abuse and awareness programs for victims
and perpetrators, respectively. The court continued the
disposition hearing.
On October 31, 2025, the juvenile court held the disposition
hearing. During argument, counsel for the minors, mother, and
father each urged the court to release the minors to both parents.
The Department opposed, arguing that father’s recent enrollment
in sexual abuse awareness counseling did not sufficiently
mitigate the risk of harm he posed to the children, but suggesting
that “perhaps we can come back to court” to revisit custody after
father has been “doing those services.” Over the Department’s
objection, the court ordered the minors released to both parents
under Department supervision and under certain conditions—
namely, that (1) father not be left alone in the home with
Brianna, Ev.G., or Ez.G.; (2) the Department conduct
unannounced home visits; and (3) mother make the minors
available to social workers.
D. Appeals
Both the Department and father filed timely appeals.
E. Post-appeal events
On November 5, 2025, the Department filed a petition for a
writ of supersedeas seeking to stay the juvenile court’s
disposition order. On November 14, 2025, we granted an
6
immediate stay of the order releasing Ev.G. and Ez.G. to father
and set the matter for a hearing on the writ of supersedeas.
On November 17, 2025, and in response to our order, the
juvenile court ordered that Ev.G. and Ez.G. could have
unmonitored visits with father inside and outside the home, but
reiterated its prior order that inside the home father was not to
be alone with the children.
On November 19, 2025, the Department filed a notice of
appeal from the juvenile court’s November 17, 2025, order.
On November 21, 2025, the Department filed a petition for
a writ of supersedeas seeking to stay the juvenile court’s
November 17, 2025, order. On November 21, 2025, we granted a
stay of the order and set the matter for a hearing.4
On January 8, 2026, we granted the Department’s petitions
for writ of supersedeas. We stayed the juvenile court’s October
31, 2025, order releasing Ev.G. and Ez.G. to father as well as its
November 17, 2025, order permitting father unmonitored
visitation with Ev.G. and Ez.G. pending resolution of these
appeals. We further noted that, during the pendency of the
appeals, the parties could seek new or modified custody orders in
the juvenile court pursuant to section 388.
On January 28, 2026, father filed a motion under section
388 asking the court to release Ev.G. and Ez.G. “to both parent[s]
without restriction.”
On March 2, 2026, the juvenile court granted father’s
section 388 petition conditioned on both parents continuing to
“engage in all services ordered and recommended” and “to
4 Oral argument on both of the Department’s petitions for
writ of supersedeas, filed November 5, 2025, and November 21,
2025, was heard on December 10, 2025.
7
continue with family preservation services” unless recommended
otherwise.5
F. Termination of jurisdiction
On May 6, 2026, the juvenile court held a six-month review
hearing pursuant to section 364, and terminated dependency
jurisdiction over Ev.G. and Ez.G., finding that the conditions
justifying jurisdiction no longer existed.
DISCUSSION
I. Father’s Appeal
Father argues there is insufficient evidence to support the
juvenile court’s exertion of dependency jurisdiction over Ev.G.
and Ez.G.
A. Mootness
Although the juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction in
this case, father’s challenge to the court’s initial jurisdictional
findings is not rendered moot because the sustained counts rest
on conduct constituting “sexual abuse” that is reportable to the
California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI). (Pen. Code, §§
11165.6 [defining reportable “abuse” to include “sexual abuse”],
11165.1 [defining “sexual abuse”]; In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th
1042, 1048 [appeal of jurisdiction based on conduct reportable to
CACI “survives a mootness challenge”].)
B. Jurisdictional findings
The juvenile court’s exercise of dependency jurisdiction in
this case rested on three statutory grounds—namely,
subdivisions (b), (d) and (j) of section 300. Subdivision
(j) empowers a juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over a child
5 On our own motion we take judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s January 28, 2026, March 2, 2026, and May 6, 2026,
minute orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
8
when (1) his or her sibling has been abused or neglected, and (2)
there is a substantial risk that the child will also be abused or
neglected. (§ 300, subd. (j); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774
(I.J.).) “[I]n determining whether there is a substantial risk to
the child” under subdivision (j), the juvenile court is to examine
“‘the totality of the circumstances,’” including (1) “the
circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling,”
(2) “the age and gender of each child,” (3) “the nature of the abuse
or neglect of the sibling,” (4) “the mental condition of the parent,”
and (5) “any other factors the court considers probative.” (§ 300,
subd. (j); I.J., at pp. 774, 779.)
We review jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence,
meaning evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value,
from which a reasonable trier of fact could reach the challenged
findings. (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) Under that
deferential standard, we cannot reweigh the evidence, assess
witness credibility, or resolve conflicts in the record. (In re Caden
C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) Here, father bears the burden of
demonstrating that the record contains no evidence of sufficiently
substantial character to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
Substantial evidence supports the execution of
dependency jurisdiction over Ev.G. and Ez.G. under subdivision
(j) of section 300. There is substantial evidence that a sibling
(Brianna) was abused: She reported that father on two occasions
entered the bedroom she shared with Ev.G. and, while Ev.G. was
purportedly asleep, fondled Brianna’s vaginal area and digitally
penetrated her. There is also substantial evidence that Ev.G.
and Ez.G. are at “substantial risk” of abuse or neglect. That is
because a parent’s “‘“aberrant sexual behavior’”” toward one child
9
‘““places [the victim-child’s] siblings who remain in the home at
risk of [further] aberrant sexual behavior’”” by that parent. (Los
Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior
Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 969; accord, I.J., supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 778 [father’s “serious and prolonged” sexual abuse of
daughter supported finding of substantial risk as to all other
children].) Such conduct poses a risk to all siblings because it
constitutes a ‘“fundamental betrayal of the appropriate
relationship between the generations.’” (I.J., at p. 778; In re
Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 76-77 [“When a parent abuses his
or her own child, . . . the parent also abandons and contravenes
the parental role”].) Father’s sexual abuse of Brianna constitutes
“aberrant sexual behavior” and an abandonment of his parental
role that places all the children in the household—including
Ev.G. and Ez.G.—at substantial risk of abuse and neglect. As
our Supreme Court noted in I.J., the “very uncertainty” of
whether a parent’s sexual abuse of one child “is likely” to result
in future sexual abuse of another child “‘makes it virtually
incumbent upon the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over the
[child’s] siblings.’” (I.J., at p. 779.)
Father resists this conclusion with three arguments.
First, father argues that there is no risk of abuse to Ev.G.
or Ez.G. merely because Brianna was sexually abused because
Brianna is not his biological child. We reject this argument
because the existence or non-existence of biological ties are not
controlling. Father admits he acted in a parental role toward
Brianna from the time she was six years old and regarded her as
his daughter and “his own” child. In light of that admission, it is
entirely reasonable to infer that his willingness to abuse a child
10
he viewed as his own creates a risk of similar abuse to the
children who are his own.
Second, father argues that if the juvenile court truly
believed the children were at substantial risk of serious harm, it
would not have released them to his custody with unmonitored
contact. We also reject this argument. At bottom, father is
arguing that a juvenile court’s failure to remove a child
invalidates the court’s underlying exercise of dependency
jurisdiction. Father is wrong. Jurisdiction turns on whether the
children faced a substantial risk of harm at the time of
adjudication (§ 300), while disposition addresses whether, by
clear and convincing evidence, leaving a child in a parent’s
custody poses a substantial danger to the child that cannot be
mitigated by reasonable means (§ 361). That a court ultimately
determines that the risk to a child can be mitigated if the child
remains in parent’s home does not undermine its precursor
finding that the risk is real. A subsequent home placement
reflects only the court’s determination that the risk could be
managed without removal; it does not negate the basis for
jurisdiction.
Third and lastly, father argues that precedent favors his
position. He cites I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th 766, asserting that the
danger that siblings of a sexually abused child might themselves
face a risk of abuse turns on the severity of the sexual abuse—
and here, father’s abuse of Brianna was not particularly severe
because it only happened twice, was of a stepchild, and did not
involve penetration by his penis. (I.J., at p. 778 [“the more severe
the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the
child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a
substantial risk of abuse or neglect”].) We disagree with father’s
11
characterization of his sexual abuse of Brianna. That abuse—
while not as egregious as the sexual abuse of the child in I.J.
itself—was still “severe” in its particulars, occurred in the
presence of Ev.G., and was committed against a child whom
father regarded as his daughter. Father also cites In re
S.R. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 44. That case is also inapt. There,
the court found that a 15-year-old boy was not at risk of sexual
abuse where the parent had begun abusing his younger sister
when she was eight; the court reasoned that the boy’s age (15)
rendered him more capable of resisting any sexual abuse and
hence was at less risk. (Id. at pp. 53-54.) This case is different:
Ev.G. was young and vulnerable, and Ez.G. was preverbal.
Moreover, the abuse of Brianna occurred in the family home, in
the same room where Ev.G. slept—circumstances not present
in S.R.
II. The Department’s Appeal
In its appeal, the Department contends the juvenile court
erred when it issued its initial order at the disposition hearing
that released Ev.G. and Ez.G. to the home of parents. The
Department’s challenge to that order was rendered moot by the
juvenile court’s subsequent order granting father’s section 388
motion to return the children to his custody (after we stayed the
initial removal order). An appeal of an order becomes moot when
we lack the power to grant effective relief. (In re M.F. (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 86, 110.) Even if we were to agree with the
Department that the juvenile court erred in issuing the initial
home of parent order back in October 2025, that conclusion would
not grant the Department any effective relief because the juvenile
court’s subsequent March 2026 order granting father’s section
388 motion, which was based on additional evidence of father’s
12
compliance with programming, supersedes the October 2025
initial dispositional order (as well as our order staying that initial
dispositional order) and would thus still be in effect.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is affirmed. The
Department’s appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
13