Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re Baby Boy R. CA2/2

Filed 10/16/26 In re Baby Boy R. CA2/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/16/26 In re Baby Boy R. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Baby Boy R., a Person B349338
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP02254A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Sally Espinoza, Judge. Affirmed.
Catrina Griffin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, J.R. (mother)
challenges the juvenile court’s disposition order removing her
infant son (son) from her custody and care. In particular, mother
argues the court erred both in failing to make factual findings
supporting its decision and in finding the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) made
reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of son. As discussed
below, we find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. Events Preceding Petition
Son was born with several drugs in his system, specifically
fentanyl, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and opiates. At
birth, he struggled to breathe and was jittery and shaking. He
experienced “severe withdrawals” and eventually was placed on a
ventilator. He remained hospitalized for the first month of his
life. During that time, the juvenile court authorized a “hospital
hold” and removal of son from both mother and his father E.M.
(father).
While in the hospital after giving birth, mother admitted
she used Fentanyl three to four times a week and smoked
marijuana and cigarettes while pregnant with son. Days before
son was born, mother used speed and Subutex. Father knew

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mother used fentanyl during pregnancy but said he could do
nothing about it.
Mother was 28 years old and homeless. Father also was
homeless. Son was mother’s and father’s first child. Father said
he and mother were not in a relationship, but mother said they
were. Neither mother nor father had a plan or supplies for their
infant son. Father had no family or friends who could care for
son. Although mother had not spoken with her father, S.R.
(maternal grandfather), in years, she indicated he was a support
for her. When mother was two years old, her biological mother
was killed in a car accident. She was raised by her father and
stepmother, G.R. (maternal grandmother).
2. Petition
In July 2025, while son remained hospitalized, the
Department filed a two-count Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300 petition on behalf of son (petition).1 The petition
alleged son was at risk due to mother’s history of and current
substance abuse as well as father’s failure to protect son from
mother’s substance abuse. At the initial hearing on the petition,
the juvenile court detained son from mother and father.
Upon discharge from the hospital, son was placed with
maternal grandparents. At that time, son was eating and
breathing on his own.
3. September 15 Report
On September 15, 2025, the Department filed its
“Jurisdiction/Disposition Report” (September 15 report). A
Department social worker had interviewed maternal grandfather,
who said he was mother’s “biggest supporter” but was concerned

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

3
for her and her ability to care for son. He wanted to know mother
could “keep [son] safe by proving she can stay clean, in housing,
and keep a job.” Maternal grandfather stated mother began
using drugs (in particular, methamphetamine) in high school and
“around Covid” she started using fentanyl. He was open to
providing permanency for son as well as facilitating visits for
mother.
The Department also reported mother had entered an
inpatient treatment program. A Department social worker had
scheduled an interview with mother. Before the interview,
however, mother transferred to an all-female residential
substance abuse program and her interview had to be
rescheduled. The new program was considered “a better fit”
because “it would allow [mother] more time to meet with CSWs
and participate in regular visits with her child.” The Department
noted mother had not visited consistently with son because of his
extended hospitalization as well as mother’s involvement with
her substance abuse program. Once mother transferred to the
new inpatient program and son was discharged from the hospital,
it was anticipated regular visitation could occur. At the time of
the September 15 report, the Department had been unable to
interview mother but noted, “Any interview with mother will be
forwarded to Court upon completion.”
In its September 15 report, the Department stated the
concerns that brought the family to its attention had not been
mitigated. To ensure son’s safety, the Department believed
removal from mother and father was necessary. Under the
heading, “Reasonable Efforts,” the Department listed a social
worker’s face to face contact with mother and son, case
management services, and referrals. The Department noted a

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social worker had made multiple attempts to interview mother
and father.
At a September 19, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court
granted mother monitored visits with son.
4. September 23 Report
On September 23, 2025, the Department filed an
“Addendum Report” (September 23 report), which detailed the
Department social worker’s rescheduled interview with mother at
her new inpatient treatment facility. Mother told the social
worker she gave birth to son at a friend’s home. She said son was
“ ‘kinda blue’ ” when he was born and “father ‘brought him back
to life.’ ” They called 911 and son was taken to the hospital.
Mother said she smoked Fentanyl “on a daily basis” while
pregnant and, the week before son’s birth, she used
methamphetamine while trying to “detox.” She told the social
worker she started using methamphetamine when she was 18
years old.
Mother acknowledged and took accountability for her
actions. She said she loved son and did not want to harm him.
She understood her “choices, when pregnant, were wrong and
unfair to my baby” and was “doing everything I can to not do
drugs.” She said she wanted “to ‘get my baby back’ and to work
her program.” Mother reported she had been moved to the new
inpatient program because it “allowed children, would be better
for visitation, and had better classes for the mother.”
The Department further reported that, through both of her
inpatient treatment programs, mother had been participating in
parenting classes, life skills classes, mental health/psychiatric
support, and substance abuse services. She also had been drug
testing, the results of which had been negative other than the

5
test she took upon entry into the first treatment program.
Mother’s counselor at her new inpatient program reported
mother was in the “orientation phase” of the program and had
been attending “Core Groups” such as “Relapse Prevention” and
“Nurturing Parenting.” Her counselor stated mother would be
attending weekly individual substance abuse counseling, 12-step
activities, and weekly mental health therapy, as well as
submitting to random urinalysis tests at least twice monthly. It
was also reported that mother’s discharge letter from her first
inpatient program stated mother had been “administratively
discharged” due to her “fraternization with a male patient who
she was placed on a no-communication status with.”
Mother had her first two visits with son in mid-September.
Maternal grandfather monitored the visits, which took place at
mother’s new inpatient facility. The Department was working on
a visitation schedule to provide mother more time with son.
Mother’s counselor reported the inpatient program would allow
mother to have overnight visits with son as well as to have son in
her care while at the facility.
In its September 23 report, the Department assessed “that
overnight visits and/or the release of the baby to the mother’s
care at her inpatient drug treatment program . . . is premature.”
The Department highlighted mother’s “long and extensive history
of substance abuse,” her use of multiple drugs while pregnant,
her “inability to follow program rules” at her first treatment
facility, and the fact that she only recently had begun working on
sobriety and was still in the “adjustment/orientation phase” of
her program. Additionally, the Department noted, to date,
mother had only two monitored visits with son, who was still an
infant and vulnerable. Before moving mother to unmonitored or

6
overnight visits with son, the Department wanted more time to
assess mother’s adjustment to and progress in her substance
abuse treatment program.
5. Adjudication and Disposition
A combined adjudication and disposition hearing was held
on September 29, 2025. In a last minute report filed the same
day, the Department reported son’s “polysubstance exposure” had
caused son to be dysregulated and unable “to reach a calm state
[or] achieve regular sleep needed to thrive.” At the hearing,
mother filed a handwritten letter with the court. In her letter,
mother took responsibility for her actions while pregnant with
son. She expressed her love for son and detailed the steps she
was taking in recovery to “become a better, stronger, healthier
individual, and mother.” Her “end goal” was to remain sober and
get son back. At the time, mother had been in treatment for two
months.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court amended the
petition to state mother was a “recent user”—instead of a
“current abuser”—of substances. The court sustained the
petition as amended, finding mother admitted both to a long
history of substance abuse and to using drugs during her
pregnancy and son tested positive for multiple drugs at birth.
As to disposition, counsel for the Department argued clear
and convincing evidence supported the removal of son from both
mother and father. Counsel for son agreed with the Department
and highlighted son’s young age and vulnerability as well as the
fact mother was “in the very, very early stages” of her recovery.
Counsel for mother, on the other hand, argued the court should
return son to mother’s care “on the condition that mother remain
at the program and is compliant with treatment and following all

7
program rules.” Counsel noted mother had been in treatment for
two months and her current program allowed mother to have son
in her care. In the alternative, mother’s counsel asked the court
to grant mother overnight visits with son at her treatment
facility. Counsel for father also argued son should be returned to
mother’s care at her inpatient program. No one addressed
whether the Department had made “reasonable efforts.”
The juvenile court declared son a dependent of the court
and, finding clear and convincing evidence, removed him from
mother and father. Son remained placed with maternal
grandparents. The court stated mother had “made a lot of
progress in a very short amount of time, but that is balanced
against the—there is a pretty significant history of substance
abuse.” The court commended mother for her progress but noted
it was “recent progress.”
At the hearing, the court also found the Department “made
reasonable efforts to prevent removal. Continuance in the home
of the parents is contrary to the child’s welfare.” The court’s
minute order from the hearing similarly stated the Department
had “made reasonable efforts to prevent removal but there are no
services available to prevent further detention.” The court also
found mother had made “substantial” progress toward alleviating
or mitigating the causes that necessitated son’s placement. The
court found father’s progress was “unsubstantial.”
The court ordered mother to complete a full drug and
alcohol treatment program, submit to weekly drug testing,
participate in a 12-step program, complete a parenting program,
and enroll in individual counseling. The court also ordered the
Department “to assess providing mother credit for the work she
has done so far.” The court ordered monitored visitation and

8
granted the Department authorization to liberalize the visits “at
the earliest opportunity given the progress that [mother] has
made.”
6. Appeal
Mother appealed the juvenile court’s September 29, 2025,
orders.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts to avoid the continued
removal of son from his parents. Mother argues the Department
failed to make reasonable efforts and the court failed to make
specific findings as to the Department’s purported reasonable
efforts. Mother asks us to reverse the juvenile court’s order
removing son from her custody.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a child has been adjudged a dependent child within
the meaning of section 300, the juvenile court “may limit the
control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent” if
necessary to protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) Section 361,
subdivision (c)(1) permits the juvenile court to order a child
removed from his or her parent if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is, or would be, at substantial
risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means
by which the child can be protected without removal. “ ‘ “The
parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been
actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.” ’ ” (In re A.S. (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 237, 247, disapproved on another ground by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7 (O.B.).)
In making its determination, the juvenile court may consider the

9
parent’s past conduct, present circumstances, and “the parent’s
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.)
Subdivision (e) of section 361 requires the juvenile court to
“make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were
made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor
from their home.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) The court must also “state
the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.”
(Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s removal order under the
substantial evidence standard of review, bearing in mind the
heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. (In
re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155; O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 1011–1012.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been
proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., supra, 9
Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.)
2. No Error
Mother’s position is factually incorrect. First, mother
asserts the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to
prevent son’s removal. In doing so, however, mother relies on the

10
September 15 report and ignores the later September 23 report.2
While the earlier report did not address mother’s progress in her
inpatient treatment programs or whether she could safely care
for son (because the Department had been unable to interview
mother), the later report did. The September 23 report detailed
the Department’s contacts with mother and her inpatient
treatment program counselor as well as the Department’s
assessment of mother’s progress and whether she could safely
care for son. The Department noted, for example, that while
mother was attending classes, participating in therapy, and drug
testing, her counselor had described mother as being in the
“orientation phase of the program” and still “adjusting to the
program.” The September 23 report also explained mother’s
inpatient treatment program allowed mother to have overnight
visits with son and to have son in her care while in the program.
Nonetheless, the Department assessed it was premature to
release son to mother’s care given her extensive history of
substance abuse, her being in the early stage of recovery (two
months split between two different treatment programs), and
son’s young age and vulnerability. Mother was moving in the
right direction but, as the Department states, “just needed more
time.”
Second, mother asserts the juvenile court failed to make
required factual findings to support its removal order. To the
contrary, however, the court made factual findings on the record.

2 In her reply brief, in response to the Department’s
position that she failed to address the September 23 report,
mother asserts she addressed the September 23 report
sufficiently because she “acknowledged [it] in her [opening] brief
via the arguments made at trial.”

11
Initially, the court incorporated its jurisdictional factual findings,
which found mother had used drugs while pregnant, son was
born suffering the consequences of her drug use, and son
remained at risk. The court then recognized mother had “made a
lot of progress in a very short amount of time” and “balanced
[that] against” mother’s “pretty significant history of substance
abuse.” The court commended mother for her progress but noted
it was “recent progress.” The court also encouraged the
Department to liberalize mother’s visits “at the earliest
opportunity” given mother’s progress.
Even assuming the juvenile court erred in not reciting
sufficient factual support for its removal order, any such error
would not be reversible error. “[A] bedrock rule of appellate law
is that we will not reverse an order unless we conclude it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (In
re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) Here, the record amply
supports the court’s removal order. After a long history of serious
drug abuse, mother was at the beginning of her recovery process.
Son was an infant who had suffered severe withdrawals as a
result of mother’s drug use and only very recently had been
discharged from the hospital and placed in maternal
grandparents’ care, where he continued to display symptoms
related to his in-utero drug exposure. Finally, by the time of the
disposition hearing, mother had only two monitored visits with
son. On this record, “it is not reasonably probable that the
juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion if it
stated [additional] facts it relied upon.” (Ibid.)
In any event, as the Department points out, mother
forfeited this argument. At the disposition hearing below, no one

12
including mother objected to the juvenile court’s alleged failure to
make required findings on the record. As such, mother’s
argument is forfeited. (In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495,
1508–1509.)
Finally, for the reasons stated by the Department, mother’s
reliance on In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803 is
misplaced and unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s September 29, 2025 removal order is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

GOORVITCH, J.

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