Filed 10/6/26 In re B.W. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re B.W., a Person Coming B352315
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ Los Angeles County Superior
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Court No. 24CCJP02240A
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
A mother of a seven-year-old argues the juvenile court
abused its discretion in continuing the 18-month review hearing.
We affirm. Statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
The case began in the summer of 2024. The mother
admitted substance abuse and mental health issues. She was
placed on a section 5150 hold that year, and her child was placed
with the maternal grandparents. The child’s father is out of the
picture.
The court assumed jurisdiction over the child and entered a
case plan for the mother involving drug tests, drug treatment,
and mental health counseling, among other things.
The juvenile court issued restraining orders against the
mother protecting the child and the maternal grandparents.
The child has special needs. In his grandmother’s care, he
was receiving services and attending school, made “significant
developmental progress,” and was thriving.
Over the review period at issue—from August 2025 to
January 2026—the mother was not compliant with court-ordered
programs. She missed Child and Family Team meetings and
drug tests. She tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamines. She admitted relapsing. And she was asked to
leave her sober living facility.
The mother’s care coordinator recommended she enter a
residential treatment program, but the mother declined.
There were visitation issues as well: the mother struggled
to connect with her child and address his needs during visits.
The maternal grandmother reported strange behaviors by the
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mother at one visit, including paranoia, facial twitching, and
tongue clicking.
The court ordered monitored visitation in October 2025.
The mother’s situation improved after this point, although
she remained inconsistent in completing drug tests. The mother
reengaged in mental health services. She was more consistent
with her medications. She was attentive to her son during visits
and began forming a bond with him, and the court permitted
unmonitored visitation.
The mother moved into a new sober living facility. This one
would not permit overnight visitors, however, so there was no
possibility of the child staying overnight.
The Department’s status review report for the section
366.22 review hearing recommended continuing the matter.
The hearing went forward on January 15, 2026. After
addressing exhibits, the court noted the child had been diagnosed
with autism and was doing well in his grandparents’ care. The
court observed the mother had experienced some setbacks over
the review period and listed some on the record. It highlighted
her recent improvement and stated she was in substantial
compliance with her case plan.
The Department similarly commented on the mother’s
“positive trajectory.” It reported the maternal grandparents were
“not in agreement with” overnight visits at their house. The
Department sought a continuance of the hearing under section
352, explaining that returning the child to the mother “may be
possible if she continues in this positive manner and if she does
get housing fixed and can find housing that accepts the child.”
The mother’s counsel did not address the continuance
request. She argued for returning the child to the mother’s care
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while he continued to reside with the maternal grandmother.
Counsel sought the Department’s assistance in facilitating
overnight visits and in securing housing where the mother could
reside with her child.
The child’s counsel submitted on the continuance
recommendation and opposed releasing the child to the mother.
Counsel wanted to see how overnight visits went first.
The court commended the mother on her progress and said
the “main issue” now was housing. But it also noted overnight
visits had yet to happen and ultimately concluded it would be
detrimental to the child to return to his mother’s custody at that
time. The court found it would be in the child’s best interest to
continue reunification services. Then it found good cause to
grant a continuance, set a progress hearing six weeks out, set a
new permanency review hearing three months out, and ordered
the Department to provide an updated report and visitation
assistance.
The record continues beyond this hearing. It shows the
mother admitted relapsing again just two days after the January
review hearing and had been discharged from her sober living
facility due to noncompliance with testing.
The Department asks us to take judicial notice of later
orders resurrecting monitored visitation and further asks us to
dismiss this appeal as moot. We grant the former request and
proceed to the merits.
The mother claims the juvenile court abused its discretion
in continuing the permanency review hearing because the court
improperly based this continuance, and the detriment finding,
solely on her housing predicament. She argues there was
insufficient evidence of detriment and no extraordinary
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circumstances justifying a continuance. The mother repeatedly
emphasizes a statement the court made near the end of the
hearing, after concluding a continuance was appropriate: that
“the only impediment to returning the child home is a lack of
adequate housing in which the family can live.”
The mother mistakenly reads this statement in isolation
and ignores the balance of the hearing.
At the outset, the court addressed the mother’s relapse,
positive drug tests, and missed drug tests within the review
period. The court frequently raised overnight visits. It
recognized these visits might not happen at the grandparents’
home and wanted to see how they went before returning the child
to the mother’s care. The court stated it had read the evidence,
including the report prepared for this hearing, and it concluded
conditions that justified jurisdiction still existed.
The record thus shows the court felt it was not yet safe to
release the child to the mother. This fact distinguishes this case
from In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, on which the
mother relies, where there were “no other protective issues to
warrant continued out-of-home-placement” beyond the mother’s
less-than-ideal living arrangement. (See id. at pp. 1401–1402,
1404.)
Substantial evidence, recounted above and documented in
the Department’s reports, supports the court’s detriment finding.
(See § 366.22, subd. (a)(1) [“the court shall order the return of the
child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian
unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the return of the child to their parent or legal guardian would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child”]; In re D.N. (2020)
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56 Cal.App.5th 741, 764 (D.N.) [appellate court reviews
detriment finding for substantial evidence].)
The finding was apt, given the mother’s long history of
mental health and substance abuse issues, her recent relapse,
her short-lived compliance with services and medications, and
her circumscribed visitation with her special needs child.
Separately, there was good cause to continue the hearing.
The court did not abuse its discretion. (See Michael G. v.
Superior Ct. (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 609, 637 [“whether to grant a
continuance is a decision reviewed for abuse of discretion, a
deferential standard”].)
Section 352 permits continuances that are consistent with
the minor’s interests and are supported by good cause. (See
§ 352, subd. (a).) “In considering the minor’s interests, the court
shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt
resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide
children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of
prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) A
parent’s failure to object is “deemed a consent to the
continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (c).)
In continuing this hearing, the juvenile court appropriately
reasoned the mother faced extraordinary circumstances beyond
her control (her housing situation) and the statutory
considerations favored a continuance. (See § 352, subd. (a)(1);
D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 762–764 [father’s lack of
adequate housing was extraordinary circumstance constituting
good cause for continuing permanency review hearing and
reunification services].) The child was doing well residing with
his grandmother and visiting his mother, and there was no
pressing need to change the child’s placement.
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The Department sought a continuance because the mother
had “stepped things up,” to give her time to find a home that
could accommodate her son. The mother did not object to a
continuance. Her housing indeed was the “impediment” to
returning the child “home,” as the mother’s group recovery home
did not allow overnight guests.
The mother says she offered an appropriate plan for the
child: he could return to her custody and continue residing with
the maternal grandmother while she looked for other housing. It
was not an abuse of discretion to reject this plan, given the
mother’s turbulent history with the maternal grandmother.
Indeed, the Department’s pertinent report showed the mother
hoped to “reconnect” with her mother. Comity, then, did not yet
exist.
Continuing the review hearing to help the mother find a
home that could accommodate her child and to assess overnight
visits while she maintained her positive trajectory was not
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (See D.N., supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 756.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the challenged order.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J. SCHERB, J.
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