Filed 8/11/26 In re B.S. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re B.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G066662
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 18DP0929A)
v.
OPINION
S.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Daphne Grace Sykes, Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
In this child welfare proceeding, S.S. (Mother) raises two issues
with respect to the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights
over her eight-year-old daughter, B.S. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1
Although Mother does not challenge the termination order directly, she
contends the order must be reversed because the court (1) erroneously denied
her petition for modification; and (2) failed to ensure respondent, Orange
County Social Services Agency (the Agency), complied with its duties under
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
the California Indian Child Welfare Act. (§ 224 et seq.) We affirm.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
MOTHER’S PRIOR APPEAL
This is the second opinion we have written in this case. The first,
which we incorporate by reference, covered the 18-month period from the
time B.S. was detained in the fall of 2023 until the juvenile court terminated
Mother’s reunification services and set a permanent placement hearing for
B.S. in the spring of 2025. (See S.S. v. Superior Court of Orange County (June
18, 2025, G065284) [nonpub. opn.].)
During that period, B.S. was removed from Mother’s care and
placed in a private foster home because Mother’s mental health issues and
drug use posed a substantial danger to B.S.’s physical and emotional well-
being. As part of the case plan, Mother started individual counseling, but her
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
B.S.’s alleged father is in prison and has waived his right to
participate in the proceedings. He is not a party to this appeal.
2
behavior remained erratic, and B.S. was afraid and reluctant to visit her.
Although some visitation did occur—mostly through monitored video calls—
progress toward reunification was modest, and in March 2025, the juvenile
court entered an order setting a hearing to determine a permanent placement
plan for B.S., then age six. Mother challenged that order by way of writ,
claiming she should have been provided additional visitation. We denied her
petition, concluding Mother received reasonable reunification services. (S.S.
v. Superior Court of Orange County, supra, G065284.)
II.
MOTHER’S CURRENT APPEAL
A. The Post-Reunification Period: March 2025 to March 2026
Following Mother’s unsuccessful writ petition, the Agency
reported B.S. was thriving in the care of her foster family and her foster
mother wanted to adopt her. B.S.’s visitation with Mother, which was still
occurring primarily through monitored video calls, was also going well for the
most part. In fact, there were times when B.S. expressed her love for Mother
and stated she did not want the visits to end. But on other occasions, B.S.
was reluctant to visit Mother or hid off camera because Mother peppered her
with questions and raised inappropriate topics, such as when B.S. would be
coming home.
Although Mother’s reunification services had been terminated,
she continued to receive services through various providers. However, in a
July 2025 report, the social worker reported Mother was not managing her
mental health, as evidenced by the fact she was continuing to have
hallucinations and delusions. Mother had also moved into residential care
housing due to her inability to live independently, and she had tested positive
for methamphetamine in April 2025.
3
Over the next several months, the permanent placement hearing
was continued numerous times and the juvenile court ordered a bonding
study to be conducted. During that period, Mother was terminated from her
individual counseling for failing to develop appropriate coping skills and
increase her ability to care for B.S. Her outgoing counselor reported that
although Mother has consistently expressed her desire to reunify with B.S.,
she still faces significant challenges due to her serious chronic mental health
issues.
In speaking with the social worker, Mother attributed her mental
health problems to B.S. being removed from her care. Mother also made
paranoid statements about B.S. being brainwashed and refused to accept a
recent diagnosis revealing B.S. has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Visitation remained generally positive, but Mother still made inappropriate
comments and promises to B.S. at times, and she displayed little insight into
her own problems. B.S. reported she would feel sad if she had to live with
Mother and expressed a strong a desire to live with her foster mother, who
she referred to as “mom.”
On November 25, 2025, Mother filed a petition for modification
pursuant to section 388. Alleging changed circumstances, Mother asked the
juvenile court to either return B.S. to her custody or provide her additional
reunification services. In her supporting declaration, Mother stated she had
been approved to move into her own apartment, was testing negative for
drugs, and had just finished a group therapy program. She also alleged she
had restarted individual therapy and was taking medication prescribed by
her psychiatrist. In addition, Mother claimed her mental health had
stabilized, she was receiving support from her extended family, and she was
in a better place, emotionally and mentally, than in the past.
4
Mother also provided documentation that, within the previous
nine months, she had completed a parenting class, as well as anger
management and life skills courses that were part of a diversion program in a
criminal case that had been pending against her.3 Mother claimed that, in
light of these achievements and her strong bond with B.S., it would be in
B.S.’s best interests to return her to Mother’s care.
However, in January 2026, just five weeks after she filed her
modification petition, Mother reported to the social worker that she was
feeling stressed and agitated because her psychiatrist kept changing her
medications, leading Mother to suspect he might be trying to poison her.
Mother also reported she had not yet moved into her apartment, and her
extended family was questioning her ability to take care of herself. The social
worker urged Mother to see her therapist, but Mother was reluctant to do so
for fear he might advise her to go to the hospital.
The results of the bonding study were not promising for Mother
either. As reflected in the social worker’s report of January 14, 2026, the
study found no clear evidence that B.S. was emotionally attached to Mother
or was benefiting from their relationship. To the contrary, the study found
Mother’s mental health issues were having a negative effect on B.S.’s attitude
and B.S.’s ability to accurately understand and interpret events.
In addition, the study found Mother “‘is still not able to separate
out her own negative reactions versus weighing objective information she is
3
The criminal case stemmed from a 2023 incident at B.S.’s school
during which Mother assaulted and threatened the principal and then later
resisted police efforts to take her into custody. That incident was the impetus
for B.S.’s detention in the current proceedings. (See S.S. v. Superior Court of
Orange County, supra, G065284.)
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provided as to [B.S.] that is essential for parental decision-making. She
projects her own fear and loneliness on to [B.S. and she] misinterprets [B.S.’s]
reactions to her.’” Even with an additional six to twelve months of
reunification services, Mother was not expected to achieve a level of
functioning where reunification with B.S. would likely be feasible.
In January 2026, Mother was also hospitalized twice due to
recurring mental health problems. During the second time, on January 26,
Mother called the social worker and reported she had been “shot with an
insect,” something in the water was making her ill, and she was being
harmed by “‘Persian gangsters.’” The following month, Mother failed to
attend four of her scheduled visits with B.S. and falsely reported to the police
that B.S. was being sexually abused. Mother also missed one of her drug tests
around this time.
B.S.’s permanent placement hearing took place on March 5, 2026.
Mother was given personal notice of the hearing but did not attend.
Regarding Mother’s petition for modification, the juvenile court determined
that, at best, Mother had presented evidence of changing, not changed,
circumstances. Moreover, given Mother’s “significant mental illness issues,” a
modification to the case plan would not be in B.S.’s best interests. Therefore,
the court summarily denied Mother’s petition for failure to state a prima facie
case for relief.
The juvenile court then turned to the issue of B.S.’s permanent
placement. After finding the parental-benefit exception to termination did not
apply (see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), the court terminated Mother’s and the
alleged father’s parental rights over B.S., freeing her for adoption. In so
doing, the court also found ICWA did not apply.
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DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights must be reversed because the court erroneously denied her
petition for modification and failed to ensure the Agency complied with its
ICWA duties. We find no basis to disturb the court’s order.
I.
THE MODIFICATION PETITION
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying
her petition for modification without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
A parent petitioning to modify a previous child welfare order
must show there has been a material change of circumstances and the
proposed modification promotes the best interests of the children involved.
(§ 388, subd. (a); In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.) To justify an
evidentiary hearing on the petition, a parent need not demonstrate a
probability of success on the merits. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
424, 432.) However, the parent must at least make out a prima facie case for
relief. (Ibid.) More than general conclusory allegations are required. (In re
Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.)
“In determining whether the petition makes the necessary
showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of
the case.” (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.) “If the liberally
construed allegations of the petition do not show changed circumstances such
that the child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of
order, the dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony W.
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1).) This is
a discretionary decision to which we afford considerable deference on appeal.
(In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.)
7
No abuse of discretion appears here. As the Agency concedes,
Mother has made efforts to better herself by seeking treatment and
completing various skill-building classes. We applaud those efforts. But
despite Mother’s claim that her mental health has stabilized, the record
shows otherwise. After she filed her petition for modification alleging she was
able to care for B.S., Mother showed signs of delusional and paranoid
thinking, falsely reported B.S. was being sexually abused, and expressed
distrust of her mental health providers. Mother was also hospitalized on two
occasions due to mental health issues, underscoring concerns about her
ability to cope on her own, let alone provide a safe and nurturing home for
B.S. Rather than showing a stabilization of Mother’s mental health problems,
these circumstances only confirmed the bonding study’s finding that, even
with additional reunification services, it is unlikely Mother would reach a
degree of parental functioning that would make reunification with B.S.
feasible.
The bonding study also revealed Mother’s mental health
problems have had a negative effect on B.S.’s own mental health. There is
nothing to suggest it would be in B.S.’s best interests to live with Mother, as
opposed to her current foster home, where B.S. has consistently expressed a
preference to live. Although a child’s living preferences are not determinative
of their best interests, they are “powerful demonstrative evidence” of such.
(In re Aljamie D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 432; In re Michael D. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087.)
For all these reasons, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by summarily denying Mother’s modification petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
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II.
ICWA
By finding ICWA did not apply in this case, the juvenile court
impliedly determined the Agency complied with its duties under the act.
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885,
disapproved on other grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152,
fn. 18.) Although Mother disputes that determination, we find no error in the
court’s ICWA ruling.
ICWA was enacted to “‘formalize[ ] federal policy relating to the
placement of Indian children outside the family home.’ [Citation.] Under
ICWA’s state analogue statutes, [the California Indian Child Welfare Act],
courts and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in
dependency cases. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).) Child welfare
agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2 subd. (b).)” (In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1124–1125, fn. omitted.)
“A juvenile court’s finding that a social service agency conducted
an adequate initial inquiry into whether a dependent child is an ‘Indian child’
within the meaning of ICWA is affirmed if it is supported by substantial
evidence, ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest
in the child.’ [Citation.] We review the juvenile court’s finding regarding the
adequacy of the inquiry and ICWA’s applicability with deference. [Citation.]
The juvenile court’s fact-specific determination is a quintessentially
9
discretionary function. [Citation.] On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent.” (In re K.L. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989,
995.)
Mother does not dispute that the Agency made an adequate
ICWA inquiry into the available relatives on her side of the family. Indeed,
the record shows that, throughout the proceedings, the Agency made
repeated inquiries of Mother, the maternal aunt, and the maternal
grandmother, all of whom denied having any Indian ancestry. Nevertheless,
Mother contends the Agency’s ICWA inquiry was insufficient with respect to
B.S.’s alleged father and B.S.’s foster mother.
As noted above, B.S.’s alleged father is in prison. (See supra, p. 2,
fn. 2.) When the social worker met with him there, he waived his right to
participate in the proceedings. And when the Agency subsequently mailed
him a certified ICWA letter inquiring of possible Indian ancestry in his
family, he did not respond. Mother contends the Agency should have made
further inquiry of the alleged father into this issue, but he never attempted to
elevate his parental status above that of an alleged father. Because a child
cannot claim Indian ancestry through an alleged father (In re E.G. (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533), the Agency was not required to make additional
ICWA inquiry of B.S.’s alleged father. (Ibid. [until an alleged father’s
biological paternity is established, “neither the court nor the social worker
knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved”]; see also In re
Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 707–709 [alleged father lacked
standing to raise ICWA issue on appeal].)
As for B.S.’s foster mother, nothing in the record suggests she
had any information regarding any possible tribal affiliation of B.S. Although
10
the foster mother certainly has an interest in the proceedings as a
prospective adoptive parent, that interest would not give her access to
information bearing on whether B.S. is an Indian child. Therefore, even
though the Agency did not ask the foster mother about that issue, the
juvenile court was within its discretion to find ICWA was satisfied in this
case. (Cf. In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1005–1006 [although
extended relatives generally must be contacted to determine possible Indian
ancestry of a dependent child, that is not the case when the circumstances
cast doubt on the usefulness of doing so], disapproved on other grounds in In
re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18.)
In sum, the record shows that, despite Mother’s best efforts to
reunify with B.S., the juvenile court properly denied Mother’s modification
petition and found ICWA was satisfied. No cause for reversal has been
shown.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights is
affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
11