Filed 11/5/26 In re B.L. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re B.L. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E088518
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J298624
& J298625)
v.
OPINION
ASHLEY T.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Conditionally reversed with directions.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Ashley T. (Mother) appeals from the termination of her parental rights to two of
her minor children, M.L. and B.L. (collectively, the children). She argues that the
juvenile court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception
under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (unlabeled
statutory references are to this code.) Mother also argues that San Bernardino County
Children and Family Services (CFS) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state
law. CFS concedes that the ICWA inquiry was either incomplete or insufficiently
documented. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the
children’s relationships with their Mother were not so beneficial that termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to them. But we agree with the parties that the
ICWA inquiry was deficient or insufficiently documented. We therefore conditionally
reverse the order terminating parental rights.
BACKGROUND
I. Referral and detention
In September 2023, CFS received a referral reporting that Mother’s eight-year-old
daughter, Sophia L., was exhibiting concerning behavior at school. (Sophia is not a
subject of this appeal.) Sophia had said “that she want[ed] to end it all,” and she
subsequently tried to stab herself. She reported that her stepfather, Michael L. (Father),
makes fun of her and does not listen to her. The reporting party was concerned because
Sophia had already tried to strangle one of her classmates and suffocate another
classmate with a pillow.
2
Three days later, a second referral alleged that Father took Sophia’s lunch money
and refused to give it back when Mother demanded it. The parents argued, and Mother
tried to force Father to leave. Father punched Mother in the back of the head five times
and twisted her arm. Mother called the police, and Father fled.
When law enforcement arrived, they told Mother to get a restraining order.
Mother told law enforcement that Sophia had said that she wanted to hurt herself or kill
herself because of how Father treated her and Mother.
CFS met with the mental health clinician at Sophia’s school. The clinician was
unsure whether Mother had sought services for Sophia’s aggressive behavior. The
clinician reported that this was the second time that Sophia had expressed suicidal
ideation during the school year.
CFS interviewed Sophia at her school, and she told the social workers that she did
not feel safe in her home, because of the domestic violence between the parents. She said
that the parents hit each other about twice per month. Sophia said that Mother was
holding her eight-month-old sister (B.L.) during some of the fights, and Mother fell while
holding her two-year-old sister (M.L.) during one of the incidents. Sophia responded by
yelling at Father, and he slapped her in the face. The fighting in the home made Sophia
feel sad and scared and was the reason she thought about “‘wanting to end it all.’”
Sophia had been the subject of two prior juvenile dependency cases. In 2015, the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services alleged that Sophia
suffered from Mother’s general neglect, substance abuse, and mental health issues. The
3
juvenile court adjudged Sophia a dependent, ordered family maintenance services, and
terminated jurisdiction in August 2017.
In 2018, CFS alleged that Sophia again suffered from Mother’s general neglect,
substance abuse, and mental health issues. CFS additionally alleged that Mother and
Father engaged in domestic violence. The juvenile court adjudged Sophia a dependent,
ordered family maintenance services, and terminated jurisdiction in 2020. The court
awarded Mother sole legal and sole physical custody of Sophia, with no visitation for her
biological father, J.L.
When CFS went to the family’s home to investigate the 2023 referrals, Mother
refused to allow the social worker to enter. She acknowledged that Sophia talked about
suicide, but Mother claimed that Sophia’s statements were something she had heard on
television. Mother admitted that Father “ma[de] fun of Sophia,” but Mother “minimized
the impact of his statements.” She said that Sophia had told Father how his comments
made her feel, but Mother did not see how his comments related to her mental health
issues. She denied that Sophia was aggressive at school, and she denied that there was
any domestic violence in their home. Mother accused the responding officer of being
under the influence of cocaine and said that was the “reason[] for him making up lies on
her.” She was dismissive of her history with CFS.
Father denied the allegations. He also denied being arrested for domestic
violence, but he admitted to “having ‘anger issues.’”
CFS obtained protective custody warrants for Sophia and the children. When the
social worker arrived at the home to execute the warrants, it was in deplorable condition.
4
It smelled of urine and body odor. There was no path to walk through the home because
of the garbage and “miscellaneous items” on the floor. The sink was full of dishes, and
the table and countertops were covered in clutter. The children had no beds, and they
were wearing urine-soaked diapers. They were covered in dirt, and their hair was matted.
M.L. had a rash covering her legs, arms, and face.
When the social worker told Mother about the detention hearing, Mother
minimized the domestic violence but said that she was a victim and wanted help. When
the social worker offered Mother services for a second time, Mother said that she was not
willing to seek a restraining order or call domestic violence shelters.
CFS assessed the parents’ family friend, L.S., for the children’s placement. CFS
concluded that L.S.’s home would be a safe and appropriate emergency placement.
In October 2023, CFS filed section 300 petitions as to Sophia and the children.
The petitions alleged that Mother had untreated mental health issues and a history of
substance abuse, the parents failed to provide adequate care and shelter for the children,
and the parents exposed the children to domestic violence. The petitions also alleged that
Father was verbally abusive to the children’s half-sibling, Sophia.
At the detention hearing, the court detained Sophia and the children from the
parents. The court ordered predispositional services for the parents. The court ordered
supervised visits for Mother once per week for two hours, but the court ordered no
visitation for Father, finding that visits would be detrimental.
5
II. Jurisdiction and disposition
CFS interviewed Mother for its jurisdiction and disposition report, and Mother
denied the mental health and substance abuse allegations. She denied ever being on a
psychiatric hold, but when interviewed in prior cases she had admitted being placed on
psychiatric holds and having suicidal ideation.
The parents denied the allegations about the condition of their home, and Mother
said that the domestic violence allegations were “both true and false.” She said that there
was an incident in September in which she pushed Father and he pushed her back,
causing her to trip and hurt her wrist. She said that Sophia’s disclosures were meant to
help Mother get Father out of the home and were untrue. Mother had a prior arrest for
spousal battery.
Mother said that the allegation that she failed to protect Sophia from emotional
abuse by Father was also “both true and false.” She admitted that Father “picks on
Sophia,” and Mother blamed herself for not making Father leave the home.
Father denied that the children were at risk of emotional abuse. He said that he
joked with Sophia and sometimes did not stop when she asked him to, and that led to her
suicidal thoughts. He said that he stopped when she said that it hurt her feelings. He
denied calling her names or taking her lunch money.
Father denied having any contact with Mother after the detention hearing, but the
social worker could hear Father in the background during phone calls with Mother.
Mother had also passed notes to Sophia at her school after the children were detained,
including notes saying that Father loved her.
6
During a FaceTime visit, Mother told the children that Father loved them. When
CFS reminded Mother that the court found the children’s contact with Father detrimental,
Mother became upset. She told the social worker that she knew the rules and to “‘take
the stick out of [her] ass,’” and she then hung up.
L.S. was following up on assessments for the children for speech delays, and she
was meeting the children’s needs.
According to an addendum report, Sophia reported that Father had “called her the
‘b’ word for talking back to him” but did not talk negatively to her otherwise. She said
that Mother and Father “‘never’ got angry at each other” and “living at home [was]
‘great.’”
CFS reported that Mother had unauthorized and unsupervised contact with Sophia
at her school. Following the unauthorized visit, Sophia reported that Mother had told her
that J.L. attacked Mother and Father when they were at court. Sophia also reported that
Mother told her to lie to the social workers.
Mother told the social worker that she would be completing therapy the following
week, and she was more than halfway through her parenting program. Mother said,
“‘therapy taught me nothing was wrong with me. The children were taken because of my
husband.’” She was participating in a domestic violence class, and she learned that “she
cannot stay in a domestic violence situation for others, and that if she leaves, it needs to
be for herself.”
L.S. reported that M.L.’s tantrums were improving and had decreased from two or
three 40-minute tantrums per day to two or three 10-minute tantrums per week.
7
In November 2023, Mother visited the children at CFS’s office and reported that
B.L. was bleeding “a lot” from a rash, but the social worker did not see any blood.
Mother’s next visit with the children was canceled because they were sick, and Mother
responded by texting L.S., “‘Please tell my children I love them. Maybe I’ll just be better
off dead. They clearly don’t need me.’” Mother later denied sending the message, but
L.S. provided a screenshot of it.
Because of Mother’s unauthorized access to Sophia and concerns that Mother was
coaching her, CFS suspended Mother’s visits in the week of November 20, 2023. Mother
became “verbally aggressive” and told the social worker to “‘shove it up your ass, you
stupid bitch. Fuck you, you don’t understand, you stupid bitch.’” Mother sent text
messages to the social worker that she was “‘going to not even try to get the girls back
anymore’” and that “‘the more [she] tr[ies] to do what [she is] supposed to do everyone
just keeps pushing [her] back down.’”
At a hearing in December 2023, the court found that Mother’s visits with Sophia
were detrimental. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearings in December 2023, the
court ordered that Mother’s visitation with the children be “strictly” supervised and occur
only at the CFS office. The court also authorized CFS to suspend Mother’s visits if she
violated the court’s visitation order. The court referred the case to mediation and
continued the matter.
Mother provided CFS with a certificate of completion for her domestic violence
program and a progress report for her individual therapy. She enrolled in additional
individual therapy, and she denied that there was any physical violence between herself
8
and Father. But she believed that there was emotional abuse in their relationship. She
was still married to Father but was not living with him. She had not yet completed her
parenting class.
Mother visited the children weekly without concerns. Father also visited weekly
without any concerns.
The mediation was successful, the court sustained the amended allegations to
which the parties had agreed. The court adjudged Sophia and the children dependents
and removed them from the parents’ custody. The court ordered family reunification
services and supervised visits (once per week for two hours) for both parents.
III. The reunification period
The parents moved back in together in March 2024 and also started couples
therapy at that time. But in July 2024, Mother told the social worker that she decided to
put reunification with her children first and would no longer be living with Father.
Mother and Father were still married and planned to live together again in the future, but
she claimed that he had moved out of their home.
In May 2024, CFS referred the children to services to address M.L.’s ongoing
tantrums and B.L.’s speech delay. L.S. later reported that M.L.’s speech was improving,
and B.L. continued with her speech therapy. They participated in play therapy. L.S. was
meeting the children’s medical, social, educational, and basic needs. According to CFS,
the children appeared comfortable with L.S., and they had developed a healthy
relationship with her.
9
Mother completed individual counseling in December 2023, and she completed
her domestic violence program in January 2024. She also completed two parenting
education courses.
Mother arrived on time to her visits, and she was visiting consistently. The visits
were appropriate, but Mother sometimes had difficulty accepting feedback about how to
redirect the children. She brought appropriate snacks and activities to the visits. L.S.
said that Mother loved the children and did the best that she could.
At the six-month review hearing in August 2024, the court ordered unsupervised
visits for both parents with the children once per week for four hours, and the court gave
CFS the authority to allow overnight and weekend visits. The court continued the
hearing to October for Mother’s contest.
CFS filed an “additional information to the court” (6.7 report) in September 2024.
CFS had assessed Mother’s home for overnight visits and determined that it was
“adequately kept and there were no safety hazards observed.” Mother had her first
overnight visit on September 20, 2024. She said that “it was a bit of an adjustment for
[the children] since they [were] used to having [L.S.] around all the time.” Mother
“plan[ned] to follow up with [L.S.] to gather more information on the children’s
likes/dislikes and appointments for a smoother transition home.”
On the continued hearing date, the court granted Mother’s request to start a 29-day
visit with the children, and the court continued the hearing to November 2024.
In an addendum report, CFS described several concerns that were reported during
Mother’s 29-day visit. Sophia arrived late to school two or three times, and Father was
10
photographed with Mother, Sophia, and the children in the community. Father was
taking the children to school. The home was found in poor condition, and it was
“cluttered[] and dirty.” CFS later learned that Father was hiding in the closet while the
social worker visited the home. CFS decided to end the visit early and return the children
to L.S. CFS reverted Mother’s visitation to once per week at CFS’s office. After
returning to L.S.’s home, B.L. screamed in fear whenever she heard a loud noise.
At the contested six-month review hearing, the court continued the parents’
reunification services. The court ordered that Mother’s visits with the children remain
supervised and once per week. The court calendared the 18-month review hearing for
April 2025.
Sophia was placed with J.L. in January 2025, and the children remained with L.S.
L.S. was meeting the children’s medical, social, and educational needs. The social
worker observed that the children were comfortable with L.S. and had developed a
healthy relationship with her.
In February 2025, Mother completed additional individual therapy and another
parenting class. She began couples counseling with Father.
During a child and family team meeting, the team agreed to increase Mother’s
visitation with the children to twice per week for two hours. At visits Mother was
affectionate and caring with the children. She kept them active, and she accepted
feedback about how to handle M.L.’s aggression and tantrums.
At the end of a visit in March 2025, Mother followed the children and L.S. to the
car while saying goodbye. CFS had previously told Mother not to do this, and when CFS
11
reminded her, she became loud and said “‘I know that! You don’t have to tell me that!’”
and “‘Shut the F--- up!’” L.S. reported that the children saw Mother’s behavior, and B.L.
cried and yelled all the way home. CFS subsequently decreased Mother’s visits to once
per week.
During a forensic interview in April 2025, Sophia disclosed that she had
repeatedly been sexually abused by Father. She said that it happened in the family’s old
apartment while Mother was not there. Sophia was in first and second grade when it
happened, and she did not tell Mother because she did not want the parents to fight. M.L.
denied being touched inappropriately, and B.L. was too young to be interviewed. Father
denied the allegations, and Mother said that she would leave Father only if the allegations
were proved. She believed that J.L. was coaching Sophia to accuse Father.
In a 6.7 report, CFS recommended that the court terminate family reunification
services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In May 2025, CFS filed section 342 petitions alleging that Father sexually abused
Sophia and that the children were at risk of similar abuse by Father.
Following a criminal investigation, law enforcement recommended that criminal
charges be filed against Father. Mother reported that she was separated from Father, but
CFS believed that the parents were still living together. J.L. filed for a restraining order
protecting Sophia. Mother later filed for dissolution of her marriage.
On August 5, 2025, the juvenile court conducted the contested 18-month review
hearing and the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings on the section 342
petitions. The court sustained the petitions’ allegations. The court terminated the
12
parents’ reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing and an ICWA notice
review hearing. The court ordered that Father have no visitation, and Mother’s visits
were reduced to once per month.
IV. Selection and implementation hearing
In December 2025, Mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court for
additional services and increased visitation.
CFS filed an addendum report in January 2026. CFS concluded that increased
visitation would be detrimental to the children. CFS reported that when the children had
weekly visits with Mother, they fought with each other and had “frequent and intense”
tantrums. At school, M.L. fought with other children, bit a classmate, and was aggressive
toward adults. When visits with Mother were reduced to once monthly, the children’s
behaviors improved. When Mother had additional visits during the holidays, the
children’s behavior worsened. The children had tantrums and difficulty following
directions, and they fought with each other. Following the holiday visits, L.S. reported
that it took several days to “redirect and stabilize the children.” L.S. reported that the
children did not ask for Mother between visits. And during a visit with Mother in
October 2025, the children asked to end the visit early. But they asked to see Sophia
more often. CFS also noted that the children had a strong bond with L.S., and she
ensured that all their needs were being met.
The children continued to receive services for behavioral issues, and L.S. saw
“immense” improvement. B.L. viewed L.S. as her parent, and the children sought out
13
L.S. when they were upset or sad. The children were too young to understand adoption,
but CFS observed that they had a parent-child relationship with L.S.
In February 2026, Mother completed a bonding study, which was conducted by
Elizabeth Stanton, Psy.D.
Stanton observed a visit and reported that Mother initiated affection and responded
to the children’s overtures, Mother responded supportively when the children needed help
or direction, and the children engaged in “healthy attachment behaviors” with her.
Stanton opined that the children welcomed Mother’s “touch and closeness” and were
relaxed and calm in her presence. Stanton observed that their interactions included
“laughter, and [their] conversations were endless.” When the visit ended, the children did
not engage negatively with Mother. Stanton opined that the interactions showed a
meaningful relationship and that severing contact could be detrimental.
At the selection and implementation hearing in April 2026, Mother called Stanton
as a witness. Stanton testified that the children interacted seamlessly with Mother. They
called her “‘Mommy’ and ‘Momma.’” Stanton said that Mother occupied a parental role.
Stanton testified that she wrote “could be detrimental” in her report because there was a
risk of detriment, but she could not say with certainty what would happen.
Mother testified that she disagreed with the recommendation to terminate parental
rights. She testified that she regularly visited, and she said that the children ran to see
her, called her “‘Momma,’” and said “‘Mommy, we miss you.’” They watched movies
together, and the children would tell her about their weeks. She brought games and food
to the visits. At one visit, B.L. could not control her bowels because of the medication
14
she was on, and Mother cleaned her up without hesitation. She also made sure that M.L.
knew that B.L. would be okay.
Mother’s counsel argued that Mother visited the children consistently and that it
would be detrimental for the children to “los[e] out on Mother.” The court found that
Mother failed to carry her burden of showing that it would be detrimental to the children
to end Mother’s contact with them, and it accordingly terminated parental rights.
V. ICWA-related background
In October 2023, the parents completed Parental Notice of Indian Status (ICWA-
020) forms, and they checked the boxes indicating that they did not have Indian
ancestry.1 The parents completed CFS’s Family Find and ICWA Inquiry form, and they
denied having Indian ancestry. In the section for additional family contact information,
Mother listed L.S. as a family friend, and she listed Father. Father also identified L.S. as
a family friend, and he listed Mother. The social worker reported that the parents gave no
reason to believe that the children might be Indian children.
At the detention hearing, the court asked the parents whether they had Indian
ancestry, and they responded that they did not. The court ordered that the parents
disclose the names, residences, and other known identifying information of maternal and
paternal relatives to CFS.
1 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we do as well “to reflect the statutory
language.” (Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect is
intended.
15
In its jurisdiction and disposition report, CFS reported that Mother “identified
maternal family members, including cousins, nieces, and aunts as part of her safety
network.” CFS also reported that Father “identified the paternal grandmother, [E.R.], as
part of his safety support network.” CFS subsequently reported that Father identified the
paternal uncle as a part of his safety network.
In October 2023, the court asked J.L. whether he had Indian ancestry, and he
responded that he did not. J.L.’s parents also denied having Indian ancestry.
CFS asked the parents and J.L. several times during the case whether they had
Indian ancestry, and each time they responded that they did not. The record does not
reflect that any other relatives were asked about Indian ancestry.
When the court terminated the parents’ reunification services, the court set an
ICWA notice review hearing for September 2025.
In August 2025, CFS sent a letter to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). CFS wrote that the family members were “reporting that
they have Indian Ancestry with Sioux Tribe,” and the letter was “being written to request
an inquiry about the maternal grandmother tribal qualification with Sioux Tribe.” It
included the children’s names and birth dates, Mother’s and Father’s names and birth
dates, the maternal grandmother’s name and birth date, and a maternal cousin’s name and
birth date. CFS filed a 6.7 report informing the court that CFS had received a letter from
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe stating that the children were not eligible for enrollment
in the tribe.
16
The ICWA notice review hearing was continued to allow time for the BIA to
respond. CFS continued to make efforts to contact the parents but could not reach them.
The record does not contain a response from the BIA.
At the contested section 366.26 hearing in April 2026, the court found that CFS
and the court discharged their duties of inquiry, there was no reason to believe or to know
that the children were Indian children, and ICWA did not apply.
DISCUSSION
I. Beneficial parental relationship exception
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by determining that the beneficial
parental relationship exception did not apply. We are not persuaded.
When the juvenile court finds that a dependent child is likely to be adopted, it
must terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds
that adoption would be detrimental to the child under one of several exceptions.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631 (Caden C.).) The
exceptions allow “‘the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option
other than the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., at p. 631.)
Under the beneficial parental relationship exception, the parent bears the burden of
proving three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.)
17
We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two elements for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child is a discretionary determination and hence is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) But we review any factual findings
underlying that decision for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
When “assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must
decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs
the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632; citing In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.).)
The parent must show that their relationship with the child “promotes the well-being of
the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a
permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., at p. 575.) “A showing the
child derives some benefit from the relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from
the statutory preference for adoption.” (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646,
disapproved on other grounds in Caden C., at pp. 637-638, fns. 6, 7.)
In determining whether the exception applies, “the court balances the strength and
quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security
and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural
parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional
attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is
overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Autumn H., supra, 27
Cal.App.4th at p. 575; see Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
18
We assume for the sake of argument that Mother carried her burden of proving
that she maintained consistent visitation with the children and had a substantial, positive
emotional attachment with them.
The third element is whether the children shared such a “substantial, positive
attachment” to Mother that the harm in severing the parental relationship would
“outweigh[] ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633, 636.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the children’s
connection with Mother was not of such a nature that termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the children. There is evidence in the record that Mother and the
children had positive visits. As of February 2024, Mother visited the children weekly,
and CFS had no concerns. She arrived on time to visits, and she brought snacks and
activities. She was affectionate and caring with the children.
But Mother must show more than loving and positive visits. (In re C.F. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) The evidence also showed that the children’s behavior
worsened when they saw Mother more frequently and improved when visitation
decreased. When the children had weekly visits with Mother, they fought with each other
and had “frequent and intense” tantrums. At school, M.L. fought with other children, bit
a classmate, and was aggressive toward adults. When visits with Mother were reduced to
once monthly, the children’s behaviors improved. But when Mother had additional visits
during the holidays, the children’s behavior worsened. The children had tantrums and
difficulty following directions, and they fought with each other. Following the holiday
19
visits, L.S. reported that it took several days to “redirect and stabilize the children.” And
L.S. reported that the children did not ask for Mother between visits. Mother’s argument
that the children’s negative behavior was “more likely from realizing after visits that they
would lose contact with [M]other” is not persuasive, because the children did not ask to
see Mother more often. In sum, the evidence shows that reduced contact with Mother
was actually beneficial to the children, not detrimental.
Moreover, M.L. was two years old when she was placed with L.S., and B.L. was
only nine months old. At the time of the selection and implementation hearing in April
2026, the children had been out of Mother’s care for approximately two and one-half
years, and they were thriving in L.S.’s care. M.L.’s tantrums improved in both duration
and frequency. In August 2024, CFS reported that the children appeared comfortable
with L.S., and they had a healthy relationship with her. By December 2025, CFS
reported that the children and L.S. had a parent-child relationship, they looked to L.S.
when they were sad or upset, and they were not asking to see Mother more frequently.
For all of these reasons, there was little if any evidence that termination of parental
rights would cause the children to suffer detriment, and there was ample evidence that the
children would benefit from adoption. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that Mother’s relationship with them did not promote their wellbeing to such
a degree as to outweigh the benefits of adoption.
20
II. ICWA inquiry
Mother argues that conditional reversal is required because the court and CFS
failed to comply with ICWA and related state law. CFS concedes that the ICWA inquiry
was either incomplete or inadequately documented. We agree.
To be an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA, a child must be either (1) a
member or citizen of a federally recognized Indian tribe or (2) eligible for membership or
citizenship in such a tribe and the biological child of a member or citizen. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4), (8); § 224.1, subds. (a)(4), (b)(1); In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
334, 338.) The child welfare department and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty
of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
671, 678 (Ricky R.), disapproved on another ground in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
1152, fn. 18.)
“The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.” (Ricky R.,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) The child welfare department’s duty to inquire begins
“when first contacted regarding a child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The department must
ask the “party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that
the child may be an Indian child,” and the department must also ask the child and the
child’s family members, including extended family members, upon first contact with
those individuals. (Ibid.) In addition, if the child is taken into the department’s
temporary custody under section 306, “or if they were initially taken into protective
21
custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340,” then the department must ask
“the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether
the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
The duty of further inquiry is triggered if there is “reason to believe that an Indian
child is involved.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Under subdivision (e) of section 224.2, there is
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved if the court or the social worker “has
information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or
citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(1).)
Further inquiry includes but is not limited to (1) interviewing extended family
members to gather the information required for formal ICWA notice; (2) contacting the
BIA for assistance in (i) “identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in
which the child may be a member or citizen, or eligible for membership” and (ii)
“contacting the tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have
information regarding the child’s membership status or eligibility”; and (3) contacting
“the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have
information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).) “Contact with a tribe shall include sharing information
identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or citizenship
eligibility determination, as well as information on the current status of the child and the
case.” (Ibid.)
22
The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings if it
finds “that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the
resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’
[citation] subject to a deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed
record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry
was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by
sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by California law [citation],
there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did
not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the other hand, if the inquiry
is inadequate, conditional reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and
thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (Id. at p. 1141.)
We agree that there is no evidence in the record that CFS ever asked certain
relatives identified by the parents about their ancestry. We also agree that the record does
not reveal why CFS contacted only one of several federally recognized Sioux tribes,
given that the only evidence in the record about the family’s Sioux ancestry is a statement
in the letter to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the BIA that family members reported
that they have “Indian Ancestry with Sioux Tribe.” Consequently, on this record we
23
must conclude that the court abused its discretion by finding that the ICWA inquiry was
adequate and proper. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the termination of parental
rights.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. On remand, the
juvenile court shall order CFS to comply with its duties of inquiry under ICWA and
related stated law and the documentation requirements of rule 5.481(a)(5) of the
California Rules of Court. If the court subsequently determines that CFS has complied
and that ICWA does not apply, then the court shall reinstate the order terminating
parental rights. If the court determines that ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in
conformity with ICWA and related state law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
RAPHAEL
Acting P. J.
LEE
J.
24