Filed 9/29/26 In re B.L. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B350086
In re B.L., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00190A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Eden Oxford, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In this appeal, M.O. (mother) challenges the juvenile
court’s order terminating dependency jurisdiction over minor B.L.
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 364 and the juvenile
custody order limiting mother to monitored visits.1 Mother
argues that since B.L. and E.L. (father) were uncooperative with
the court’s visitation orders while the case was pending, a
custody order awarding mother visitation after the case closed
was “illusory,” and the court should not have terminated
dependency jurisdiction. Mother also contends that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by indicating on the juvenile custody
order that mother was to have only monitored visits due to her
“lack of insight.” We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Investigation
In April 2023, the Orange County Social Services Agency
(SSA) received a referral concerning eight-year-old B.L. and her
five-month-old maternal half sibling M.D. B.L. was living in
Tustin with mother, M.D., and M.D.’s father. The reporting
party stated B.L. had disclosed that mother hit her “repeatedly,
almost daily”; mother “drinks a lot and acts weird”; and mother
and M.D.’s father frequently fought in front of B.L.
A social worker visited the home to interview the family.
B.L. said mother frequently hit her. Mother hit her with a sandal
or belt and pulled her hair if she did not finish her chores on
time, did not complete her homework, or “for minimal things,”
like misplacing a jacket or, once, for vomiting on her bed when
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
she was sick. On at least one occasion, mother hit B.L. so hard
she bled. Mother told B.L. not to tell anyone that mother hit her.
B.L. also witnessed domestic violence between mother and M.D.’s
father. Mother gave B.L. “a lot of chores,” which prevented her
from completing her homework, and B.L. often took care of M.D.
B.L. was afraid of mother and believed mother “hate[d]” her.
Mother denied the claims of physical abuse, domestic
violence, and substance abuse. She initially claimed she
accidentally caused B.L.’s injuries but also complained that B.L.
had behavioral problems. Mother eventually admitted hitting
B.L. with a belt because B.L. overslept and did not go to school.
Mother said she could not handle B.L.’s behavior and “asked
what would happen if she just sent [B.L.] to Guatemala to
eliminate the problems.” B.L. was present in the home during
mother’s interview with the social worker. She overheard
mother’s negative remarks about her.
Father had not seen B.L. in about a year because mother
became “ ‘very aggressive’ ” with him during visitation exchanges.
B.L. told father that mother hit her and she asked to stay with
him, but father did not believe mother was actually hitting B.L.
because he did not see any marks or bruises on her.
Mother was arrested for felony child abuse. SSA placed
B.L. temporarily at Orangewood Children and Family Center.
Petition and Detention
SSA filed a dependency petition on behalf of B.L. and M.D.2
The petition alleged that mother physically abused B.L.,
emotionally abused B.L., and engaged in domestic violence with
M.D.’s father in B.L.’s presence. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b)(1).) The
2 M.D. is not a subject of this appeal. We summarize only
the allegations and proceedings concerning B.L.
3
petition also alleged that father failed to protect B.L. by leaving
her in mother’s sole care despite being aware of mother’s
aggressive behavior and being told by B.L. that mother hit her.
The juvenile court detained B.L. and ordered monitored
visits for the parents. Mother agreed to participate in individual
counseling, anger management classes, a parenting education
program, and random substance use testing. Father agreed to
participate in individual counseling and a parenting education
program.
Mother visited B.L. twice at Orangewood. The social
worker observed that their interactions during the first visit were
positive. During the second visit, mother told B.L. that since B.L.
left, the house was cleaner, they had more food, and mother no
longer had to scold her. Mother told B.L. that she had “ ‘left the
home disorganized ’ ” and had “ ‘left a bunch of dirty clothes.’ ”
B.L. told a social worker that mother was nice to her during
their visits, and she was confused by the change in mother’s
behavior toward her. Although she expressed wanting to live
with both parents, she said she felt safe in father’s care, but “not
really” in mother’s care. Nevertheless, she thought mother had
changed and “ ‘wanted to give her a second chance.’ ”
Jurisdiction Hearing
At a May 2023 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court
sustained an amended petition based on mother’s failure to
protect and inability to provide regular care for B.L. (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1)). The sustained amended petition included
allegations that mother had subjected B.L. to physical abuse and
caused her serious emotional damage (id., subd. (c)).3 The court
3 On SSA’s motion, the juvenile court dismissed the
allegations of physical harm under section 300, subdivision (a).
4
also sustained allegations that father failed to protect B.L. from
mother’s abusive behavior.
The court released B.L. to father’s custody pending the
disposition hearing. SSA was ordered to evaluate mother for
supervised visits.
In the following weeks, father regularly failed to respond to
SSA’s attempts to contact him to schedule mother’s visits, and he
canceled or failed to transport B.L. for visits. The social worker
facilitated two virtual visits and one telephonic visit for mother
and B.L between May and July 2023. SSA expressed concerns
about father’s “ability to co-parent effectively” with mother. SSA
submitted “an ex parte” regarding visitation.
During this period, B.L. reported that she was doing well.
She felt safe and “ ‘love[d] being with’ ” father. However, she
sometimes had difficulty sleeping when she remembered things
that happened when she was living with mother.
In June 2023, B.L. told a social worker that she wanted to
visit mother and see M.D. But, the following month, B.L. said
she did not want to visit mother in person and was only
comfortable having telephonic visits. She explained that mother
sometimes became “ ‘crazy’ ” and would tell her about things she
was missing out on since she left, which made B.L. cry after the
calls ended.
Disposition Hearing and Review Period
In July 2023, the juvenile court declared B.L. a dependent
of the court and ordered that custody remain with father. The
court ordered family maintenance services for father and
enhancement services for mother. The court further ordered
telephonic visitation between mother and B.L. in the evenings on
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and directed SSA to submit an
5
update in 30 days regarding father’s cooperation with the
schedule.
Throughout the review period, SSA informed the court that
father did not facilitate B.L.’s visitation with mother and did not
respond to the social worker’s attempts to arrange visitation. In
submissions to the court, SSA stated that throughout July 2023,
father facilitated only one visit via Zoom between B.L. and
mother. He declined to make B.L. available for the second visit,
and he did not respond to the social worker’s text messages
scheduling the remaining visits or ensure B.L. logged into Zoom
at the times set by the social worker. Father told a social worker
that he did not want B.L. to have contact with mother after he
learned from B.L. how mother had treated her. He also stated
that he could not facilitate visits because of his work schedule,
and no one else in his family would be able to do so. In
September 2023, after SSA facilitated a telephonic visit between
mother and B.L. at B.L.’s school, father “became hostile” and
accused SSA of “forcing” B.L. to speak with mother and
interfering in his family’s life. The social worker stated that as a
result of father’s noncooperation, she could not assess whether it
was appropriate to liberalize mother’s visits with B.L.
Initially, in response to SSA’s concerns, the court ordered
SSA “to make best efforts” to facilitate telephonic visits on
Sundays at noon and virtual visits after school on Wednesdays
“at a neutral location.” After SSA’s interim updates indicated
father continued to be noncooperative, the court encouraged
father to comply with its orders and stated that it would “review
the file and consider an appropriate remedy or sanction.”
In early November 2023, the court held a hearing and
provided a tentative ruling “regarding contempt and visitation.”
6
The court ordered “sibling visitation 1 time per week without
mother being present” and set a show cause hearing for
November. SSA was directed to prepare a report “as to at least 1
sibling visit” and “1 virtual visit for minor and mother.” The
court further ordered SSA “to speak with father and minor if
minor refuses visits and includ[e] information in next report.”
According to the next report, father stated B.L. did not want to
visit mother, and B.L. was apprehensive about visiting M.D. and
declined to go to his baptism. The court subsequently withdrew
the show cause order regarding father’s compliance and ordered
visitation orders to remain in effect.
Meanwhile, B.L. repeatedly refused visits with mother.
She said she did not feel safe with mother. She was afraid of
mother and did not feel comfortable being alone with her.
Mother made her feel bad by talking about things she and M.D.
were doing without B.L. Mother told B.L. she was missing out
because she was not with them. B.L. said that mother had “ ‘hurt
[her] a lot.’ ”
Despite father’s recalcitrance about visits and B.L.’s
refusals, social workers continued to contact B.L. to attempt to
facilitate visits with mother. In September 2023, social workers
arranged a call between B.L. and mother at B.L.’s school.
Subsequently, however, B.L. declined further calls with mother.
Eventually, B.L. grew frustrated with the social worker’s
inquiries about visitation with mother and the social worker’s
continued attempts to schedule visits despite B.L.’s wishes. She
stopped accepting gifts from mother and maintained that she
would speak to mother when she felt ready.
During this time, SSA consistently reported that B.L. was
safe and happy in father’s care. There were no threats to her
7
safety and father provided for her basic needs. In June 2024,
B.L. began consistently receiving therapy. By July 2024, B.L.’s
therapist reported that B.L. had “made significant progress” and
displayed “a range of positive emotions and a joyful demeanor.”
She had “a strong and affectionate relationship with her father,
frequently expressing her love for him.” B.L. reported “a positive
improvement” in her well-being due to her new living
arrangements. The therapist stated that B.L. “ha[d] chosen not
to engage with her mother at this time, a decision not influenced
by the father.”
SSA informed the court of its concern that B.L. might
“become a victim of a contentious custody dispute between the
parents, potentially causing emotional distress.” However, B.L.
“consistently communicated her desire to remain in [father’s]
care.” SSA reported “no concerns regarding the child being in the
father’s care, and despite the father not having completed any
services, the Agency believes the child is safe with him.” On this
basis, SSA recommended termination of jurisdiction.4
4 In August 2024, SSA received a child abuse report from the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS). The report indicated that a relative of the stepmother
molested B.L. and her stepsister at home. The ensuing
investigation substantiated the allegation. Citing the sexual
abuse report, father’s noncompliance with court orders, and a
third party report that B.L. was mistreated by her stepfamily,
mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to modify its
orders and place B.L. with maternal relatives. The court denied
the request.
8
Transfer to Los Angeles County
In January 2025, the juvenile court transferred the case to
Los Angeles County, where B.L. and father had moved.5 At a
March 2025 progress hearing, mother’s counsel requested that
DCFS assess the case for closure. He stated that B.L. expressed
to mother that she wanted to “put this behind her,” and mother
was supportive of B.L.’s wishes. Counsel also stated that mother
was “happy with phone visits” in the hope that they would lead to
in-person visits. The court set a section 364 review hearing date
for July 2025 and ordered DCFS to assess the matter for closure.
In March 2025, a social worker from DCFS spoke with B.L.
about visitation with mother. B.L. “immediately refused to have
any visits with mother. Minor stated her mother had hurt her
and although she held no grudges, she was not ready to have any
contact with her, especially after the last time mother showed up
and tried to manipulate her to return. Minor stated that she did
not want to have any contact with mother for the moment
because she was sure mother had not changed as she had
demonstrated it.” The social worker discussed visitation with
B.L. “on a monthly basis” and B.L.’s response was the same.
In a report submitted for the July 2025 hearing, DCFS
identified no threats to B.L.’s safety in father’s custody and
recommended closing the case. B.L. was “thriving” and
“appear[ed] comfortable and confident in the home.” DCFS
5 At the stipulation of the parties, the Orange County
juvenile court had continued the six-month review hearing
several times to allow the agency to provide updates on B.L.’s
progress in therapy, for completion of the child abuse
investigation, and for consideration of mother’s section 388
petition.
9
observed a “strong bond” between B.L. and father and noted that
“she seeks comfort and guidance from him.” Father did not
report any behavioral issues. B.L. stated that father was
supportive and patient. DCFS observed that father “has
ensure[d] that minor feels the security and love that he has for
her and that she understands that she has a voice and choice in
the home. That is something that the minor has embraced in a
positive manner and that is why for the moment, she does not
want visits with mother because she feels that mother still wants
to have control [over] her.” B.L. continued to express discomfort
with visiting mother “due to mother trying to manipulate her.”
The social worker noted that from February to June 2025, B.L.’s
response about visitation with mother was consistent every
month: “She will request visits with mother when she feels
ready.”
At the July hearing, minor’s counsel asked for a brief
continuance because father had not brought B.L. to court.
Mother’s counsel expressed concern that father had not brought
B.L. to the hearing and indicated she would contest the
recommendation to close the case due to father’s “pattern” of
refusing to cooperate.
Section 364 Hearing and Juvenile Custody Order
In August 2025, the juvenile court held the continued
section 364 hearing. B.L.’s counsel stated that B.L. had been
very clear that she did not want visits with mother. B.L. found
court-ordered visitation “very stressful.” Mother’s counsel
objected to closing the case due to father’s past noncooperation
with court orders. Counsel further argued that if the court was
inclined to close the case, it should order that mother be provided
with B.L.’s address. Mother was concerned father would “cut her
10
out of [B.L.’s] life” if the case was closed and she was not provided
that information.
The court found the conditions justifying jurisdiction no
longer existed and terminated jurisdiction. The court awarded
the parents joint legal custody and ordered father to have sole
physical custody of B.L. The court further ordered monitored
visits for mother once a month for two hours. The order
permitted the parents to mutually agree upon a monitor. In the
absence of agreement, the order authorized father to select a
professional monitor at mother’s expense.
Mother’s counsel objected, arguing that visitation “should
be more frequent than that and treated as an opportunity for
visits in the event [B.L.] has a change of heart.” The court
overruled the objection. The court considered mother’s “severe
physical abuse” of B.L. and how “her mental health issues and
lack of anger management had emotionally damaged” B.L. The
court explained that “even though [mother] has checked all the
boxes that has completed her case plan, she has not gained any
insight, and she continues to manipulate [B.L.] to return to
her. . . . I have no doubt that [B.L.] was truthful in her
statements that the mother has not changed at all, and she is
being manipulative.” The court believed the order for monthly
visits was appropriate because “[B.L.] is not emotionally ready to
visit with the mother. And that is because of mother’s
manipulation, and that the mother has not changed; and also due
to the severe physical abuse and emotional harm that [B.L.]
suffered when this case was opened.”6
6 At the hearing, father testified that mother always had his
contact information and knew his whereabouts. B.L. did not
11
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating
dependency jurisdiction and abused its discretion in limiting
mother to monitored visits based on a purported lack of insight.
We disagree.
I. Termination of Jurisdiction
“Section 364 governs review hearings for dependent
children who have not been removed from one or both parents.”
(In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459, 469.) When a child
remains in at least one parent’s physical custody, the court must
review the matter within six months of the disposition hearing,
and every six months after. Under section 364, subdivision (c), at
the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court must terminate
dependency jurisdiction unless the child welfare agency
“establishes by a preponderance of [the] evidence that the
conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of
jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely
to exist if supervision is withdrawn.”
testify but directly addressed the court after it had announced its
ruling and mother objected. B.L. said she was “tired of this case
already” and father was not telling her what to say; instead “it’s
by me, my own words.” B.L. explained: “[M]other started saying I
wasn’t behaving good and that I always told her stuff and that
she never hit me and stuff. And she is saying that she never told
me anything. She never said she wished she never had me, but
she does say that. And when she said that, I was . . . like, I had a
little hate for her because I was – but I never did nothing to her.
She is the one who did everything, and I don’t know why she
saying she isn’t saying nothing or she wants my address. I don’t
want her to know nothing about me, and I don’t want to know
nothing about her.”
12
“Thus, ‘[w]here, as here, the social services agency
recommends termination of jurisdiction, termination will be the
“default result” unless either the parent, the guardian, or the
child objects and establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that conditions justifying retention of jurisdiction exist or are
likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.’ [Citation.]” (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 110–111 (J.M.).) Mother did not
meet this burden below. “We therefore review ‘whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law,’ by examining ‘whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 111.)
Mother has not demonstrated that the evidence compels a
finding in her favor as to the termination of jurisdiction. It was
undisputed that B.L. was safe and thriving in father’s care.
Although B.L. expressed a continuing unwillingness to have
visits with mother and father did not encourage visitation,
mother does not offer any authority to suggest that these would
have been bases for the assumption of jurisdiction under
section 300, or proper grounds to continue dependency
jurisdiction.
“When proceeding under section 364, because the child is in
placement with a parent, the court is not concerned with
reunification, but with determining whether continued
supervision is necessary in the family home. (§ 364, subd. (c).)”
(In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Mother does
not argue that circumstances continued to exist that placed B.L.
at substantial risk of suffering serious physical or emotional
13
harm or were likely to exist if supervision was withdrawn. That
B.L. and father might fail to comply with court-ordered visitation
after the termination of jurisdiction was not a valid basis to
continue juvenile court and DCFS supervision over the family.
To support her argument on appeal, mother relies on cases
considering visitation in other dependency contexts. These cases
are inapposite. In In re Ethan J. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 654, the
child was removed from both parents and the juvenile court
selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan. Under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), the juvenile court was thus
required to issue a visitation order unless it found that visitation
would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of
the child. (Ethan J., at p. 661.) The child refused to visit the
mother, but the juvenile court nonetheless ordered a legal
guardianship and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The
appellate court reversed, finding that the child’s refusal of
visitation was an exceptional circumstance warranting continued
judicial oversight under section 366.3. (Ethan J., at p. 660.) The
court noted that by terminating jurisdiction without a finding
that visitation would be detrimental, and while recognizing a
visitation order would not be honored, “the juvenile court
virtually guaranteed that visitation would not occur” and
impermissibly delegated its authority over visitation to the
minor. (Id. at p. 661; see id. at p. 662.)
Here, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction under
section 364, not section 366.3. “[S]ection 362.4 governs the
court’s authority to issue exit orders determining custody and
visitation of a child when terminating jurisdiction at a
section 364 hearing.” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)
“Unlike section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), which mandates
14
visitation between child and parents when legal guardianship
has been ordered, absent a finding that visitation would be
detrimental to the child, when dependency jurisdiction is
terminated with the child in the custody of one of his or her
parents, section 362.4, subdivision (a), commits to the sound
discretion of the juvenile court the authority to make an order
determining a noncustodial parent’s visitation.” (In re C.S.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 638 (C.S.).) The reasoning of the
Ethan J. court is inapplicable here.
In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310 (S.H.), is equally
inapt. S.H. concerned a mother’s right to visitation as a
component of a reunification plan. The appellate court concluded
that a visitation order providing that the children would not be
forced to visit the parents “grant[ed] the child de facto veto power
to ensure no visitation will occur absent the child’s consent.” (Id.
at p. 318.) The order did not set forth a minimum number of
visits. The S.H. court therefore reasoned that the “the [juvenile]
court’s abstract recognition of [mother’s] right to visitation is
illusory, transforming the children’s ability to refuse ‘a visit’ into
the practical ability to forestall any visits at all.” (Id. at pp. 318–
319.)
Here, mother was not receiving reunification services and
the juvenile court’s order was not abstract. The court concretely
preserved mother’s right to visitation with B.L. by establishing
the frequency and length of visitation, and it did not make
visitation conditional on the cooperation or consent of B.L. or
anyone else. There was no impermissible delegation. (See In re
A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799–800 [order that father
choose monitor for visitation if parents could not agree was not
15
delegation to father of right to determine whether visitation
would occur].)
“Under these circumstances, with [B.L.] safe in the care
and custody of her father, terminating dependency jurisdiction
was entirely appropriate. Any future issues regarding visitation
can be addressed by the family court, which has ongoing
jurisdiction over custody and visitation now that dependency
jurisdiction has been terminated.” (C.S., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at p. 638.) Under section 364, B.L.’s refusal to visit mother and
father’s previous failures to facilitate mother’s visits were not
grounds for continued dependency jurisdiction. (J.M., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–112; C.S., at p. 638; In re Alexandria M.
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096 [when child safety issues are
resolved, family court is the proper forum for adjudicating
custody and visitation disputes].)
II. The Juvenile Custody Order Limiting Mother to
Monitored Visits
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
limiting mother to monitored visits on the ground that she
“lacked insight.” We find no abuse of discretion.
When “the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile
court . . . the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an
order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.”
(§ 362.4, subd. (a).) “[T]he court must define the rights of the
parties to visitation. The definition of such a right necessarily
involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation
with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests,
the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should
determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if
16
so, the frequency and length of visitation. The court may, of
course, impose any other conditions or requirements to further
define the right to visitation in light of the particular
circumstances of the case before it.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221
Cal.App.3d 752, 756, 757.)
“We will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision ‘ “ ‘unless
the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 113; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356
(Brittany C.).)
As we understand mother’s argument, she appears to
contend that the order’s reference to mother’s “lack of insight” as
a reason for monitored visits was an abuse of discretion because
it was “not true.” Mother argues that she had little contact with
B.L. during the case, therefore the charge that she continued to
attempt to manipulate B.L. must be false. Mother notes that she
completed her case plan and “the issue was that [B.L.] did not
want to visit her.” Mother thus asserts it will be difficult for her
to demonstrate a change of circumstances in family court.
The juvenile court could reasonably credit B.L.’s
statements to the social workers in determining whether
monitored visitation was appropriate. The juvenile court has the
discretion to believe information in DCFS reports, including a
minor’s statements. (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81,
10; see In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1095 [court
may credit minor’s out-of-court statements about abuse without
live testimony].) “As a reviewing court, we have no power to
revisit the credibility of witness[es] or reweigh the evidence.”
(Maya L., at p. 104, fn. 6.)
17
The record indicates that mother completed court-ordered
services in or around October 2023. However, DCFS reports
suggested that during the review period, mother had tried to
manipulate B.L. by telling her what she was missing while living
with father. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude based
on the evidence that mother’s physical and emotional abuse
deeply affected B.L.; during the time they were communicating,
mother failed to acknowledge the abuse and engaged in behavior
that made B.L. unwilling to have any contact with her; and,
under these circumstances, only monitored visits were
appropriate. (See In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204
[juvenile court may reasonably determine that continued
supervision is not necessary but monitored visitation is needed to
eliminate risk of physical abuse or emotional harm].)
The court’s decision to order limited visitation on this basis
was not “an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.” (Brittany C., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356;
see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319 [when
two or more reasonable inferences are deducible from facts,
reviewing court cannot substitute trial court’s conclusion for its
own].)
18
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
19