Filed 9/18/26 In re B.B.G. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re B.B.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES F091442
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 25JP-00071-A
Plaintiff and Respondent, & 25JP-00071-B)
v.
S.G. et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, S.G.
Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, R.H.
Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Henna F. Brar, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
S.G. (mother) and R.H. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26) as to their minor twin daughters B.G.G.-A
and B.G.G.-B (collectively, the children).
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i))
as to her. Father joins in her argument. He raises no arguments unique to him but
contends that if we reverse the termination order as to mother, we should reverse it as to
him as well.2
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2025, the Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) received a
report that mother had given birth to the children, who were born premature and were
being treated in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). Mother admitted to
methamphetamine use during her pregnancy, and the children’s umbilical cords tested
positive for methamphetamines and fentanyl. Mother had a long history of
methamphetamine abuse. Four of the children’s siblings had been subjects of
dependency proceedings due to both parents’ substance abuse, and the parents’
reunification services and parental rights had been terminated as to those children.
Hospital staff reported to the agency that the parents had not been visiting the children
consistently.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Because both parents’ challenges are based on mother’s relationship with the
children, we focus our recitation of the facts on mother and limit facts pertaining to
father.
2.
The agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the children alleging
they came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1)
(failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of siblings).
At the detention hearing conducted on June 11, 2025, the juvenile court declared
father the children’s presumed father and heard testimony from mother contesting
detention of the children. After hearing argument from the parties, the court ordered the
children detained from the parents. The court ordered that the parents “have visitation
rights set up as soon as possible” subject to hospital rules. The court’s written order after
hearing provided for a minimum of weekly supervised visitation, with the social worker
having discretion to expand visitation to third-party supervised or unsupervised.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the agency recommended the court take
jurisdiction over the children and bypass both parents for services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b), paragraphs (10) (reunification services terminated for sibling and parent
has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat problems leading to removal) and
(11) (parental rights terminated for sibling and parent has not subsequently made a
reasonable effort to treat problems leading to removal). The report indicated that upon
the children’s release from the NICU, they were placed into foster care. Father was
incarcerated and had not visited with the children. Mother was scheduled to have weekly
supervised visitation. The first visit went well; mother was observed to be attentive to the
children’s needs, provided stuffed animals, and fed and burped the children, but at one
point was observed to not properly support one of the children’s heads. No other
concerns were noted.
On September 9, 2025, the juvenile court conducted an uncontested jurisdiction
hearing and found the children fell within section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The
court continued the matter for disposition. The court ordered the agency to make
arrangements for “reasonable visitation” before the next hearing.
3.
A contested disposition hearing was conducted on October 14, 2025. After
hearing testimony and argument, the juvenile court adjudged the children dependents of
the court, removed them from the parents’ custody, denied them reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and set a section 366.26 hearing.3
The written order after hearing provided for a minimum of monthly supervised visitation.
The agency prepared a section 366.26 report dated January 29, 2026. The agency
recommended termination of parental rights and adoption as the children’s permanent
plan. The children’s care provider wished to adopt them. The report indicated the
children had been with the care provider since July 2025 and appeared to have healthy
and positive bonds with the care provider. The children were healthy and deemed to be
both “generally” and “specifically” adoptable.
The report included summaries of 10 visits between mother and the children that
occurred between July 2025 and December 2025. It also included four instances when
mother either cancelled a visit or did not attend without giving notice in August 2025,
October 2025, December 2025, and January 2026. During the visits mother attended, she
was affectionate toward the children, changed their diapers, fed them, and attempted to
soothe them when they cried. It was consistently reported there were “no issues” at the
time of separation at the end of visits.
The report contained the social worker’s opinion that there were no statutory
exceptions precluding adoption, and the children “lack a strong significant relationship”
with the parents. The report noted that mother had attended visits but “the quality of
visits did not demonstrate a mother-child relationship and did not lead to a parent-child
relationship.” The children were comfortable with mother but did not show any signs of
3 Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. Because she did not file a
petition, the action was dismissed. (S.G. v. Superior Court (F090611, Nov. 19, 2025).)
4.
distress at the end of the visits and displayed excitement and contentment when returned
to the care provider.
A contested section 366.26 hearing was conducted on March 17, 2026. At the
agency’s request the juvenile court took judicial notice of the previous reports filed in the
case and the files in the parents’ previous dependency cases. The agency submitted the
matter on the section 366.26 report.
Mother cross-examined one of the social workers assigned to the case. The social
worker testified that according to another social worker, who was not present at the
hearing but who supervised the most recent visit between mother and the children, the
visit was appropriate, and there were no concerns. The children had no issues going to
mother at the beginning of the visit and showed no response at the end of the visit.
According to the report, mother and the children did not appear to have a bond as
evidenced by the lack of distress shown by the children at the end of visits. Since the
beginning of the case, mother had attended 10 or 11 visits and father had attended two or
three visits. During cross-examination by father’s attorney, the social worker testified
that visits between father and the children were appropriate.
Mother testified on her behalf. She testified at her most recent visit with the
children, which occurred a couple of weeks prior to the hearing, the children were happy
to see her and father. The children looked like they had tears in their eyes because it had
been a long time since they had seen the parents at the last monthly visit. The parents fed
the children and changed their diapers. It was their first time feeding the children
because they had just started eating baby food. The family had a good time spending
time together. Father took photos of one of the children with mother, which were
received into evidence. Mother described the child as smiling and looking happy and
affectionate with mother. On cross-examination by minors’ counsel, mother testified that
she had spent a total of about 12 hours with the children.
5.
Mother’s attorney argued that the children had a strong bond with mother and
asked the juvenile court to “consider that and deny the [a]gency’s request to terminate her
parental rights.” Minors’ counsel argued the children were adoptable and mother had not
established that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied and asked the
court to follow the recommendation. Father’s attorney stated she was “unable to offer
any evidence on behalf of [father] that would negate the evidence presented as far as a
bond being established that would be detrimental to his children if they were terminated”
and submitted the matter.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court began its ruling by stating, “Okay. I
would note that in the social workers report they do note a very strong bond between the
caregivers and the children.” The court went on to state it had read and considered the
report and the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing. The court noted it had
previously denied reunification services, found by clear and convincing evidence that it
was likely the children would be adopted, and ordered termination of parental rights and
adoption as the children’s permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
I. General Legal Principles
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, and that services had been either appropriately provided
or denied in compliance with the law, it is generally required to terminate parental rights
and order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).)
One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
6.
A parent seeking to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
applies has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence three elements to
justify its application: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into
account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “that terminating that attachment would
be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632‒633, 636‒637
(Caden C.).)
The second element focuses on the child and may involve considering factors such
as “ ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs,’ ” as well as “how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk
about their parents.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) A parent’s submission of
an opinion of an expert psychologist who has observed the child and parent together and
can synthesize others’ observations can serve as a valuable source of information for the
juvenile court in determining whether the second element has been met. (Id. at pp. 632–
633.)
The third element involves determining “how the child would be affected by
losing the parental relationship” by considering factors such as whether the child will
experience effects such as “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out,
difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression,” as well as how a “new, stable
home may alleviate the emotional instability and preoccupation leading to such problems,
providing a new source of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on
balance, detrimental.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The question for the
juvenile court is “does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the
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harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional
relationship with [the parent?]’ ” (Ibid.)
II. Analysis
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Misapply the Law
Mother contends the juvenile court failed to conduct a proper analysis of the
parent-child relationship under Caden C. Mother has not established reversible error.
We presume the juvenile court knows and follows the law (see Wilson v. Sunshine
Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563), and we imply all findings necessary to
support the judgment where no statement of decision is requested (Acquire II, Ltd. v.
Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970).
Here, the juvenile court did not engage in any on-the-record analysis on the
elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship and did not make any express findings
regarding the exception. The court made a single comment prior to reciting its formal
findings and orders: “Okay. I would note that in the social workers report they do note a
very strong bond between the caregivers and the children.” The court went on to say it
had considered the agency’s reports and the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, found the children were adoptable, that reunification services had been denied,
and ordered termination of parental rights. Applying the above principles, we conclude,
despite the court’s limited commentary, that it appropriately concluded the parents had
not carried their burden of showing the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
applied. We find no deficiencies or legal error in the court’s ruling.
First, contrary to mother’s assertions, the juvenile court was not required to make
express findings on each of the elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception in concluding that terminating parental rights would not be detrimental. (See
In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)
Next, we are not persuaded by mother’s assertion that the juvenile court’s
comment on the children’s bond with the care provider was an indication it was somehow
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misapplying any guidance from Caden C. We accept mother’s statement that a close
connection between the care provider and the children does not preclude a finding that
the children had a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to mother. We reject,
however, her argument that the juvenile court’s comment was an inappropriate analysis
with regard to the second element.
It is not clear to us that, as mother asserts, the juvenile court’s comment was
intended to serve as a reason for not applying the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception rather than simply an observation about the evidence. If the comment was a
justification for declining to apply the exception, however, in applying the above
presumptions, we do not find it was an inappropriate comment. The children’s bond with
the care provider could be appropriately relevant to the third element of the exception,
that is the court’s determination of whether the child would suffer if their attachment to
their parent was broken by the termination of parental rights. (See In re A.L., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1137, 1149 [child being adopted would suffer a loss but one she
“ ‘would be able to adjust to,’ ” given her stable loving placement with prospective
adoptive parents for approximately half her life].)
We do not find the juvenile court’s ruling legally deficient nor that the record
indicates it misapplied the law. Because we reject mother’s premise that the court made
an error of law, we also reject her argument, to which she devotes most of her briefing,
that the alleged error is not harmless and remand is necessary.4
4 Even if we were to find error, the cases mother cites to support her assertion that
remand is necessary—including In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, In re J.D. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 833, In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, and In re Dy.P. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 153—are not persuasive. Mother’s reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In those cases, the parents appealed from orders terminating parental rights made before
Caden C. was decided, and the appellate courts remanded the matters to ensure the
juvenile courts did not rely on factors the Caden C. court deemed improper. In the
present case, the juvenile court and parties were presumably well aware of the Caden C.
decision, as it was decided almost five years prior to the section 366.26 hearing.
9.
B. Mother Has Not Otherwise Established Error
Having concluded mother has not established that the juvenile court misapplied
the law, we further conclude she has not established that the juvenile court otherwise
erred by concluding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception does not apply.
We review the juvenile court’s factual findings with regard to the first two
elements for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) We note that
because the parents bore the burden of proof, we look to whether the evidence compels a
finding in her favor as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528
[“where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a
reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law”].)
We review the juvenile court’s ultimate determination with regard to the third
element of whether, in weighing competing interests, the facts constitute a compelling
reason for determining termination would be detrimental to the child for abuse of
discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “A court abuses its discretion only
Notably, though the agency does not do so, it could be argued that mother’s claim
is forfeited. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 531, fn. 3 [where § 366.26
hearing took place six months after Caden C. was decided and the parent did not cite it,
address it, or argue the juvenile court should apply it, “it was incumbent upon [the parent]
to [raise the issue of the agency urging the juvenile court to apply the wrong legal
standard] to avert the very problem she now says occurred”].)
Even if mother’s claim of legal error had merit, for the reasons we set forth in the
next section of this opinion, any error would be harmless. “[W]hen … the proper legal
standard is already established and a party has had a full and fair opportunity to present
all of their evidence on a contested issue, and yet in the end there is simply no evidence
that could support a favorable finding for them, then any legal error in the court’s
reasoning or basis for its decision quite obviously is harmless.” (In re J.R., supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 533; see id. at p. 531 [harmless error where record in the case
“would not support a finding in mother’s favor on the parental benefit exception even if
her evidence were credited”].)
10.
when ‘ “ ‘[it] has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
First, as to the first element—regular and consistent visitation—the parents have
not established that the evidence compelled the juvenile court to find visitation was
regular and consistent. Over the approximately nine months that the children were out of
the parents’ care, mother visited a total of 10 or 11 times, and father visited two or three
times. The record shows that, according to hospital staff, the parents were inconsistent
with visiting the children after their birth, and mother was entitled to weekly visits from
approximately the time of detention to the time of disposition, and to monthly visits
thereafter. With these limited opportunities to visit, it was documented that mother
missed four scheduled visits, and by our count may have missed more. Even if we find
the parents established regular and consistent visitation, however, this would not affect
our ultimate conclusion that the court did not err. As we explain, we conclude the parents
have not established that the juvenile court was compelled to find a beneficial
relationship existed nor that the court’s ultimate determination was an abuse of
discretion.
As to the second element—whether the children had a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment—we acknowledge mother was loving and affectionate toward the
children, and the children were happy to see mother. However, the parents have not
shown the evidence compelled the juvenile court to find that they had established the
second element. The children never lived with the parents, as they were newborns when
they were removed. Mother acknowledged that she spent only about 12 hours with them
in their nine months of life.
Finally, even if the court concluded there was a beneficial relationship between the
children and mother, as to the third element—whether the children would suffer
detriment when weighed against the benefit of being adopted—the juvenile court
reasonably concluded based on the evidence that any detriment the children would have
11.
suffered was outweighed by the benefits of adoption. The parents presented no evidence
that the children would suffer any harm by losing the parent-child relationship. To the
contrary, the evidence showed the children displayed no reaction when leaving visits and
were bonded and stable with their care provider, who wished to adopt them. Moreover,
the agency and minors’ counsel argued for adoption to be selected as the children’s
permanent plan. The court’s determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
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