Filed 11/13/26 In re B.B. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B354100
In re B.B., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25PSJP00068A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.
Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Sally Son, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
L.B. (father) appeals a juvenile custody order issued
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4.1 Father
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his
requests for joint legal custody and unmonitored visitation. We
find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Detention and Petition
Father and L.S. (mother) have one child together, B.B., who
was born in April 2019. When this case began, the parents had
been in a relationship for about 10 years and had lived together
for about six years. Father had one prior arrest for intimate
partner battery, but the matter was dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence after mother declined to press charges.
In May 2025, father went through mother’s phone while
she was asleep and concluded she had been talking to other men.
Father woke mother, attempted to strangle her with one hand,
and pinned her against a wall. He then picked mother up and
threw her outside the apartment, where she fell and hit her face
on the concrete. When mother tried to get up, six-year-old B.B.
ran towards mother, and father knocked them both to the
ground. Mother and B.B. both suffered lacerations. Neighbors
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
called the police and father was arrested. B.B. was treated for
facial abrasions and a lip laceration requiring sutures.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) in July 2025.
The petition alleged that father physically assaulted mother in
B.B.’s presence, injuring mother and B.B. In July 2025, the
juvenile court detained B.B. from father and released her to
mother. Father was permitted weekly monitored visits with B.B.
On July 17, 2025, father pled not guilty to misdemeanor
willful infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant and willful
injury to a child. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 273a, subd. (a).)
Pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, the criminal court issued a
criminal protective order pending trial, which provided as
follows:
● Father must not “harass, strike, threaten, assault
(sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy or
damage personal or real property, disturb the peace of, keep
under surveillance, annoy by phone or other electronic means
(including repeatedly contact), impersonate (on the internet,
electronically, or otherwise), or block movements of” mother and
B.B.
● Father must not “contact [mother and B.B.], directly
or indirectly, by any means, including by telephone, mail, email
or other electronic means, or through a third party.” However,
“[c]ontact through an attorney under reasonable restrictions
set by the court does not violate this order.”
● Exceptions: Father “may have peaceful contact with
[mother and B.B.], as an exception to the no-contact and stay-
away orders . . . only for the safe exchange of children and court-
3
ordered visitation as stated in [¶] [(a)] the family, juvenile, or
probate court order in (case number): 25PSPT00260, [and] [¶]
[(b)] any family, juvenile, or probate court order issued after the
date this order is signed.”2
On September 17, 2025, the court sustained the allegations
of the petition and ordered B.B. removed from father and placed
with mother under DCFS supervision. The court ordered mother
to enroll in individual counseling and a domestic violence support
group for victims, and ordered father to engage in individual
counseling and a 52-week batterer’s intervention program.
Father was permitted nine hours of monitored visits with B.B.
weekly.
Six-Month Review Hearing
In March 2026, DCFS reported that mother had completed
domestic violence and parenting classes and had begun
individual counseling. Father had begun monitored visits with
B.B. in November 2025, and visits reportedly were positive.
Father was attending domestic violence classes weekly, but had
not begun individual counseling. DCFS recommended that the
court terminate jurisdiction and order joint legal custody, sole
physical custody to mother, and monitored visits for father.
At the March 20, 2026 six-month review hearing, DCFS’s
counsel stated that DCFS was recommending joint legal custody.
Counsel noted, however, that the criminal protective order
remained in place pending the resolution of father’s criminal
case, so counsel “would anticipate an argument [that] it shouldn’t
be joint legal.” Counsel “submit[ted] that issue to the court.”
2 In June 2025, mother filed case No. 25PSPT00260 seeking
child custody and visitation orders.
4
Mother’s counsel asked that the court award mother sole
legal and sole physical custody based on the domestic violence
incident between the parents. Counsel noted that the criminal
case remained open, the criminal protective order remained in
place, and there were “power and control dynamics” that made
joint legal custody inappropriate.
The court interrupted mother’s counsel’s argument to note
that the criminal protective order allowed contact between father
and mother only “for the safe exchange of children.” Thus, the
court said, “I believe legally I have to order sole legal custody.
They can’t talk. Them talking about anything other than court-
ordered visitation is a violation of this criminal protective order.”
Father’s counsel asked the court to award joint legal
custody, asserting that although the criminal protective order did
not allow for direct contact between mother and father, “they can
communicate via [a] third party.” The court disagreed, stating
that under the criminal protective order, mother and father “can’t
communicate through a third party.” Father’s counsel responded
that father “will submit on the sole legal custody issue with
respect to mother as well as the sole physical custody.” Counsel
continued: “[Father] does understand there is a CPO in place. I
have advised him to . . . request to modify that in his criminal
court hearing in order to make further modifications to the
custody order.” Counsel then asked the court to permit father
unmonitored visits, noting that father “has been engaging in the
domestic violence program since this case has opened[,] . . . has
accepted responsibility for his actions, is working on being the
best version of himself, has learned how to remove himself from
risky . . . situations.”
5
Minor’s counsel submitted on “a family [law] order that
gives mother sole legal and physical custody based on all the
analysis that has been presented by the court.” Regarding visits,
counsel said B.B. loved her father and enjoyed visits with him,
but recommended that visits remain monitored.
The court awarded sole legal and physical custody to
mother “because of the criminal protective order.” It denied
father’s request for unmonitored visits and ordered father to
complete domestic violence classes and 12 individual counseling
sessions, noting the severity of the domestic violence, father’s
infrequent visitation, and father’s very recent enrollment in
individual counseling. The court advised father that he could ask
the family court for unmonitored visits and joint custody once
“[the] criminal protective order is modified” and father completed
his domestic violence program and individual counseling.
The juvenile court entered a final custody order on
March 20, 2026. Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
awarding mother sole legal custody and denying his request for
unmonitored visitation. We disagree.
I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Granting Mother Sole Legal Custody
“When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
dependent child, it is empowered to make ‘exit orders’ regarding
custody and visitation.” (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119,
1122, citing § 362.4; see also In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th
196, 203.) Such orders become part of any family court
proceeding concerning the same child “and will remain in effect
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until they are terminated or modified by the family court.” (In re
T.H., at p. 1123.)
The family law presumption favoring joint custody does not
apply to juvenile court custody orders entered upon termination
of jurisdiction. (In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206;
In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711–713.) Instead,
“ ‘[w]hen making a custody determination in any dependency
case, the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be
the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re Maya L. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102–103.) The juvenile court has broad
discretion to make orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25,
32; In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094), and we review
the juvenile court’s custody orders for an abuse of discretion (In
re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112–113). A court abuses its
discretion “if there is no reasonable basis on which it could
conclude that its decision advanced the best interests of the child”
or “if it applies improper criteria or makes incorrect legal
assumptions.” (In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
1487, 1497, italics omitted.)
Father concedes the juvenile court had discretion to award
mother sole legal custody if doing so was in B.B.’s best interests.
He urges, however, that the juvenile court never made a best
interests determination because it believed the criminal
protective order precluded an award of joint legal custody.
Father contends this was error because Penal Code section 136.2,
7
on which the criminal protective order was based, “expressly
preserves the juvenile court’s authority to make custody orders.”3
Initially, we note that father overstates the scope of the
juvenile court’s power under Penal Code section 136.2 to craft
custody orders. Under subdivision (e)(3) of that section, when a
defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, a
family or juvenile court may order custody and visitation between
the defendant and his children, but any custody or visitation
order “shall make reference to and . . . acknowledge the
precedence of enforcement of an appropriate criminal protective
order.” Under subdivision (f)(1), a juvenile or family court order
permitting contact between a restrained person and his children
“shall not contain language, either printed or handwritten, that
violates a ‘no-contact order’ issued by a criminal court.” (Italics
added.) Thus, while Penal Code section 136.2 allows a juvenile
court to enter a custody or visitation order that permits contact
between a criminal defendant and his children, any such order is
constrained by the terms of the criminal protective order—that
is, the juvenile court “shall not” order what the criminal
protective order forbids.4
3 On appeal, DCFS takes no position as to the legal custody
order.
4 In an appropriate case, a family or juvenile court judicial
officer may seek modification of a criminal protective order
pursuant to court communication protocols required by the
Penal Code and Rules of Court. (See Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (f);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.445; Super. Ct. L.A. County,
Local Rules, rule 2.30(d).) No modification was sought or
requested in this case.
8
We also reject father’s characterization of the basis for the
juvenile court’s order. Father argues the juvenile court believed
that criminal protective orders categorically prohibit joint legal
custody. But the juvenile court’s statements suggest otherwise.
While the juvenile court initially stated it “legally [had] to order
sole legal custody” because of the criminal protective order, it
immediately provided further explanation. Specifically, the court
observed that the criminal protective order entered in this case
limited the parents’ communication to that necessary for court-
ordered visitation. The court then noted—correctly—that the
parents “talking about anything other than court-ordered
visitation is a violation of this criminal protective order.” These
comments suggest the juvenile court concluded that joint legal
custody was inappropriate because the specific criminal
protective order entered in this case prohibited the parents from
communicating on topics other than the safe exchange of B.B.
and visitation—not because it believed that a parent subject to a
criminal protective order can never hold joint legal custody with a
protected party.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that joint legal custody was not appropriate in the
present case. “Joint legal custody” means that both parents
“shall share the right and the responsibility to make the decisions
relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.”
(Fam. Code, § 3003.) Joint custody does not necessarily require
the consent of both parents as to all decisions relating to a child’s
health, education, and welfare, but joint custody orders
commonly provide that parents “must discuss and consent in
making decisions on” a variety of matters, including choice of
school, starting or terminating mental health counseling or
9
therapy, participating in extracurricular activities, selecting
doctors, dentists, or other health professionals, participating in
religious activities, and out-of-country or out-of-state travel.
(Form FL-341(E) [joint custody attachment to custody order]; see
also Fam. Code, § 3083 [in awarding joint custody, court “shall
specify the circumstances under which the consent of both
parents is required to be obtained”].)
Requiring mother to consult with father about parenting
decisions pertaining to B.B. would deprive mother of the
protection afforded her by the criminal protective order—to have
no direct or indirect contact with father other than as necessary
“for the safe exchange of children and court-ordered visitation.”
The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that joint legal custody was not appropriate under the
circumstances of the present case.5
5 Lugo v. Corona (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 865, does not support
father’s arguments. There, a family court denied a wife’s request
for a civil domestic violence restraining order against her
husband on the ground that a criminal protective order was
already in place. (Id. at pp. 867, 869.) The Court of Appeal held
the family court erred because under the plain language of the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the Penal Code, “both
criminal and civil protective orders may coexist and address the
same parties.” (Lugo, at p. 869.) The issue in the present case,
however, is not whether a family or juvenile court has jurisdiction
to enter orders concerning parties that are also subject to or
protected by criminal protective orders—the juvenile court in the
present case recognized that it had such authority and exercised
it. Instead, we are concerned with the terms of coexisting
criminal protective and custody orders, and the juvenile court’s
efforts to ensure that the two would not conflict. Lugo did not
10
Father appears to contend on appeal that the juvenile court
should have considered crafting an order for joint legal custody
that would have, in practice, allowed each parent to effectively
make decisions about B.B.’s health, education, and welfare
without talking to each other, or issued an order that would
essentially remain unenforceable until the criminal protective
order was modified or terminated. Father forfeited any such
contention by failing to raise it below. The juvenile court
reasonably assessed the limitations the criminal protective order
would place on the parents’ ability to collaborate or inform each
other of decisions regarding B.B. It rejected DCFS’s
recommendation of joint legal custody on that basis. To the
extent father sought an order that would creatively avoid those
limitations, it was his burden to make such a request in the
juvenile court. He did not do so. Instead, his counsel suggested
only that the parents could communicate through the paternal
grandmother—and when the juvenile court noted otherwise,
counsel “submit[ted]” on the legal custody issue and told the
court she had advised father to seek a modification of the
criminal protective order at his next criminal court hearing.6 The
juvenile court was not required to explore the matter further.
(See, e.g., In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046 [“The
court does not err by failing to do that which it is not requested to
do.”]; In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 501 [by failing to
litigate relative placement preference issue or request a ruling
address this issue, nor did it hold that a criminal protective order
cannot constrain a juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
6 Father’s counsel did not suggest, as he does on appeal, that
the parties had the ability or willingness to use legal counsel as
their means of communication after the case closed.
11
from the juvenile court, father failed to preserve the issue on
appeal].)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Denying Father’s Request for Unmonitored
Visitation
When making a visitation order under section 362.4, the
juvenile court “must be guided by the totality of the
circumstances and issue orders that are in the child’s best
interests.” (In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; see also
In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 [under § 362.4, “ ‘the
court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best
interests of the child’ ”]; In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961,
973 [“[I]n making exit orders, the juvenile court must look at the
best interests of the child”].) We review visitation provisions of a
juvenile custody order for abuse of discretion. (In re Reyna R.
(2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 486, 493; In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
886, 902.)
Father does not suggest that the monitored visitation order
was not in B.B.’s best interests. Instead, he contends the juvenile
court relied on factors—father’s failure to visit B.B. consistently
and to engage in individual counseling—that “were substantially
of DCFS’s [own] making.” He therefore urges that the juvenile
court’s monitored visitation order was an abuse of discretion.
We disagree. At a six-month and 12-month review hearing
under section 366.21, a juvenile court may terminate
reunification services and set a hearing to terminate parental
rights only if it concludes by clear and convincing evidence that a
parent has received reasonable services. (§§ 361.5, 366.21,
subd. (e)(3), (g)(1), (2), (4); Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023)
14 Cal.5th 609, 620.) The applicable statutes do not require a
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similar determination when a juvenile court returns a child to
the parents and terminates dependency jurisdiction, however.
Instead, as noted above, the sole inquiry is the child’s best
interests. (See In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112; In re
T.S., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 513; In re John W., supra,
41 Cal.App.4th at p. 973.)
Father cites just one case for the proposition that “a
parent’s relationship with his child [may not] be adversely
affected by a visitation deficit attributable to the failure to
implement the court’s own visitation order,” but the case does not
apply in the present circumstances. In In re Hunter S. (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 1497, the Court of Appeal held that because a
mother had not received court-ordered visitation with her child,
the order terminating her parental rights was constitutionally
infirm. (Id. at pp. 1504–1505.) But we are aware of no authority,
and father cites none, for the proposition that a juvenile custody
order placing a child with one or more parents implicates
comparable due process concerns, or that an agency’s alleged
failure to provide appropriate enhancement services to a
noncustodial parent limits a juvenile court’s power to order
monitored visits in a juvenile custody order.
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DISPOSITION
The March 20, 2026 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
PÁNUCO, J.
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