Filed 7/29/26 In re Ariana H. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re ARIANA H., a Person B350914
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 23LJJP00133)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANGELINA H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Debra L. Gonzales, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie and
Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
____________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS or the agency) filed a petition concerning
then-16-year-old Ariana H., alleging dependency jurisdiction
under Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) based on her mother’s failure to manage
adequately Ariana’s diabetes.3 The juvenile court sustained the
petition and removed Ariana from mother’s custody pursuant to
section 361, subdivision (c)(1). On appeal, mother contests the
court’s jurisdictional finding and its removal order.
We affirm the juvenile court’s assumption of dependency
jurisdiction because it is supported by substantial evidence that
mother was unable to handle adequately Ariana H.’s diabetes.
We reverse the removal order because DCFS did not undertake
reasonable efforts to ensure there existed no reasonable means to
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . .” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3 Ariana’s father is not a party to this appeal. DCFS
reported to the juvenile court that Ariana’s father is deceased.
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protect Ariana short of removing her from mother’s care.
Specifically, the agency failed to evaluate whether an individual
trained in diabetes management could provide care for Ariana in
the home. Upon remand, the court shall reassess custody in light
of our decision and any new relevant circumstances.
A. Procedural Background4
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.
In August 2023, the juvenile court sustained an amended
dependency petition concerning Ariana H., who was born in
January 2009. In sustaining the amended petition, the court
found, inter alia, that mother’s male companion (R.S.) had
assaulted Ariana, and mother and R.S. had a history of engaging
in violent altercations in Ariana’s presence. The court removed
Ariana from mother’s home and ordered mother to participate in
certain services, including individual counseling and a domestic
violence support group.
Ultimately, at a January 3, 2025 progress hearing, the
juvenile court found mother made substantial progress toward
alleviating or mitigating the circumstances that had led to
Ariana’s removal, returned Ariana to mother’s custody, ordered
4 In describing the procedural history and evidence
relevant to this appeal, we rely in part on admissions made by
the parties in their appellate briefing and assertions made by
DCFS that mother does not dispute in her reply. (See Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs) [employing this approach].)
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DCFS to provide family maintenance services to mother and
Ariana, and retained dependency jurisdiction.
On July 8, 2025, DCFS filed a subsequent petition
pursuant to section 342.5 In the petition, the agency asserted
dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)
based on allegations that Ariana’s Type 1 diabetes was “out of
control and . . . considered at high risk for potentially life-
threatening complications,” and that mother failed to manage
adequately Ariana’s medical condition. On August 27, 2025, the
juvenile court sustained the section 342 petition, removed Ariana
from mother’s custody, and ordered mother to comply with a case
plan. Mother timely appealed from the court’s August 27, 2025
rulings.
On March 18, 2026, the juvenile court terminated
reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for
July 13, 2026.6 On July 13, 2026, the court granted a petition
mother had filed under section 388, adopted a case plan, found
that returning Ariana to mother’s custody would create a
5 Section 342, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part:
“In any case in which a minor has been found to be a person
described by Section 300 and the petitioner alleges new facts or
circumstances, other than those under which the original petition
was sustained, sufficient to state that the minor is a person
described in Section 300, the petitioner shall file a subsequent
petition.” (§ 342, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) states: “Unless
otherwise provided by law, all procedures and hearings required
for an original petition are applicable to a subsequent petition
filed under this section.” (Id., subd. (b).)
6 (See In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 758 [noting
the juvenile court may terminate parental rights at a § 366.26
hearing].)
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substantial risk of detriment to the child, ordered Ariana to
remain in her current placement, scheduled an appearance
progress hearing for October 16, 2026 and a permanency
planning review hearing for January 14, 2027, and took the
section 366.26 hearing off calendar in light of the court’s ruling
on mother’s section 388 petition.7
B. Applicable Law
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes dependency
jurisdiction if: “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as
a result of any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of
the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the
child. [¶] . . . [¶] (C) The willful or negligent failure of the
parent . . . to provide the child with adequate . . . medical
treatment.” (See § 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(C).)
Section 361, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part: “A
dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of
their parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the
petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and
convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances listed
in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (c).)
Subdivision (c)(1) in turn applies if “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the
minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
7 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s
March 18 and July 13, 2026 orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459.)
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minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (See id.,
subd. (c)(1).) Subdivision (e) requires the court to “make a
determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from their
home . . . .” (See id., subd. (e).)
C. Mother Fails To Demonstrate the Juvenile Court
Erred In Asserting Dependency Jurisdiction Over
Ariana H.
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings [of the juvenile
court,] . . . we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination,
we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the findings and orders of the [juvenile] court[ and] we review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations. . . .” [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘[I]t is appellant’s burden to affirmatively
show error.’ [Citations.]” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70,
79.)
Mother seems to acknowledge that evidence in the record of
“[Ariana H.’s] elevated A1C,[8] hypoglycemic episodes, emergency
medical intervention, . . . dietary concerns, mother’s prior
diabetes training, and mother’s failure to consistently implement
what she had been taught” regarding diabetes “may”
demonstrate that “returning [Ariana] to mother’s custody would
8 It is undisputed that “ ‘[a]n A1C test result shows the
average blood sugar level over the past 2 to 3 months[,]’ ” and
that “[t]he higher the A1C level is, the poorer the blood sugar
management.’ ”
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create a substantial danger to [Ariana’s] physical health . . . .” In
particular, mother observes that in a last minute information
report filed in July 2025, DCFS reported that Ariana had “a June
2025 hypoglycemic episode that resulted in ambulance
transport,” and that Ariana’s school reported the child had
“experienced a low blood glucose level of 29.” In addition, mother
acknowledges in her appellate briefing that in a report dated July
2, 2025 from Dr. Edward A. Bloch, the medical director of
Children’s Medical Services at the Los Angeles County
Department of Public Health, the doctor opined Ariana’s
“diabetes was ‘out of control’[;] . . . described multiple recent
hypoglycemic episodes requiring emergency intervention, which
he characterized as life-threatening”; and “reported that, despite
repeated education and support, mother had been unable to
consistently manage [Ariana’s] condition . . . .” Furthermore,
according to DCFS’s last minute information for the court report
filed on August 18, 2025, although Ariana needs to have “healthy
food options” to ensure her “glucose levels [do not] spik[e],” one of
Ariana’s caretakers reported that mother brought “Ariana
homemade pizza[ ] and some Lays” potato chips during a
July 18, 2025 visit.
Notwithstanding this evidence, mother argues dependency
jurisdiction was not proper because DCFS did not “demonstrate[ ]
a substantial, non-speculative risk of serious physical harm
attributable to mother’s inability to supervise or protect” Ariana.
She claims that Dr. Bloch “identified [in his reports dated
April 16, 2025 and July 2, 2025, respectively,] several external
barriers that interfered with [Ariana’s] medical care, including
lapses in Medi-Cal coverage, cancelled appointments, . . .
problems with the Dexcom monitoring system that limited
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effective supervision,” “transportation limitations affecting access
to appointments,” “changes in the family’s living situation[,] and
the loss of prior caregiving support.” Further, according to
mother, although Dr. Bloch suggested in his July 2025 report
that certain hypoglycemic episodes “were most likely related to
improper insulin administration,” he “acknowledged uncertainty
regarding their cause.”
We reject mother’s apparent claim the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from Dr. Bloch’s reports is that mother
did not present a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness to Ariana. Dr. Bloch stated in the April report that
“mother has allowed Medi-Cal to lapse on numerous occasions,
resulting in last-minute cancelation of Ariana’s crucial medical
visits.” (Italics added.) Furthermore, although the doctor
reported that Ariana’s “Dexcom continuous glucose monitoring
system . . . ha[d] been poorly functioning or nonfunctional
since . . . November,” he indicated that an impediment to
“hav[ing] a functioning Dexcom monitor” was mother’s failure to
ensure “Ariana’s . . . Medi-Cal coverage [was] current . . . .”
Additionally, Dr. Bloch stated in the April report, “[I]n
spite of multiple efforts, by multiple providers and expert teams,
to train mother and Ariana in diabetes management, mother
continues to demonstrate difficulties in grasping key concepts,
and, most importantly, she demonstrates a persistent inability to
show that Ariana’s blood glucose and hemoglobin A1c can be
brought down to a more reasonable target range.” Similarly, in
the July report, Dr. Bloch remarked, “Even if my theory [that
mother caused Ariana’s hypoglycemic episodes by giving the child
too much insulin] is incorrect[,] . . . mother has proven herself to
be resistant to diabetes training/education after repeated efforts
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by . . . Special Care Center educators, and Ariana’s autism (and
other mental health issues) have proven to be barriers to her
becoming her own independent caregiver.”
In sum, there was substantial evidence that mother
exposed Ariana to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or
illness for the purpose of section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
D. We Reverse the Order Removing Ariana H. From
Mother’s Custody
We may uphold the juvenile court’s order removing
Ariana H. from mother’s custody only if there was evidence from
which the juvenile court reasonably could have inferred it was
highly probable that (1) returning the child home would expose
her to substantial danger, and (2) there existed no reasonable
means to protect the child’s health short of removing her from
mother’s custody. (See In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208,
1230 (L.G.), citing, inter alia, § 361, subd. (c)(1).) Further, we
review for substantial evidence whether DCFS made reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. (See L.G., at
p. 1235.)
Mother does not argue DCFS failed to present sufficient
evidence establishing section 361, subdivision (c)(1)’s first prong.
Instead, mother contests the evidentiary sufficiency of the second
prong, that is, whether there existed no reasonable means to
protect Ariana without removing her from mother’s custody.
Relatedly, mother argues DCFS did not show it made reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal for the
purpose of subdivision (e) of section 361. We agree.
If, as is the case here, a parent’s inability to care properly
for a child gives rise to a substantial danger to the child’s health,
then securing “a second caregiver” for the child may be a viable
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alternative to removal. (See L.G., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1231–1232.) Here, Dr. Bloch recommended that alternative
in his April 2025 report. After observing that Ariana H.’s
“mother’s (and other caregivers’) difficulties in attaining better
understanding of [Ariana’s] medical problems and of the care she
requires ha[d] led to a worsening of her diabetes,” Dr. Bloch
“strongly recommend[ed] that mother be given as much extra
support (e.g., a well trained in-home supportive services worker
and/or a nurse, etc.) as she needs to improve Ariana’s diabetic
management and to help teach Ariana her own self-care skills, to
help bring her diabetes into much better control . . . .” Likewise,
Dr. Bloch stated the following in his July 2025 report: “My only
possible recommendation is for Ariana to have full time support
by someone who has a record of caring for patients with type I
(insulin dependent) diabetes mellitus[,] beyond her mother and
grandmother, or I fear that her life will remain in danger.”
Mother argues that despite Dr. Bloch’s recommendation,
DCFS did not show that “medically grounded alternatives [to
removal from mother’s care], including enhanced in-home support
and trained supervision[,] . . . . were evaluated and found
insufficient.”
Indeed, although the agency noted in the detention report
filed on July 8, 2025 that “[m]other appears overwhelmed by the
degree and extent to which Ariana’s diabetes requires
supervision and active attention,” the sections of the report titled
“the need (if any) for continued detention,” “reasonable efforts
and/or prior intervention/services offered,” and “available
services/referral methods which could prevent the need for
further detention and/or facilitate future return of the child(ren)
to parents/legal guardians” do not show that DCFS considered
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whether securing a full-time in-home caregiver for Ariana’s
diabetes was a reasonable alternative to removal.
(Capitalization, underscoring, & boldface omitted from the last
three quotations.) The “reasonable efforts” and
“assessment/evaluation” sections of the jurisdiction/disposition
report filed on August 11, 2025 also do not show that the agency
evaluated whether Ariana could remain in mother’s care with the
assistance of full-time care for her diabetes. (Boldface,
underscoring, & capitalization omitted.) Instead, the agency
utilized the following bullet-point list to identify its “reasonable
efforts”: “Prior open case which included Family Reunification
Services and Family Maintenance Services. [¶] . . . Counseling
[¶] . . . Case Management [¶] . . . Parent Training [¶] . . . Public
Assistance Services [¶] . . . Family Preservation referral which
includes Teaching and Demonstration Homemaker,
Transportation, Other Services.” (Boldface, underscoring, &
capitalization omitted from first quotation.)
In its appellate brief, DCFS does not claim to have
examined whether Dr. Bloch’s recommendation constituted a
reasonable means of protecting Ariana without removing her
from mother. Instead, the agency maintains, “[A]lthough
[mother had been] educated concerning Ariana’s condition,
[mother] . . . failed to provide proper nutrition and guidance to
her daughter to avoid both low and high sugar levels.” It
surmises that mother’s failure to manage properly Ariana’s
diabetes establishes that “removal from [m]other was the only
way to ensure the child’s safety.” We infer from the agency’s
position that it did not assess whether providing in-home support
for Ariana’s diabetes was a reasonable alternative to removal.
(See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,
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94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 787, fn. 19, 802 [noting that the respondent
has a duty to aid the appellate court in sustaining the judgment,
and that we are not “obligate[d] . . . to scour the record” to search
for evidence “support[ing] . . . the judgment”].)9
Furthermore, it is not apparent to us that conducting
further inquiry regarding Dr. Bloch’s recommendation would
have been an exercise in futility. In the absence of evidence
regarding the feasibility of “a well trained in-home supportive
services worker and/or a nurse,” we cannot infer to a high degree
of probability this was not a reasonable means of protecting
Ariana’s health in mother’s home.
In addition, in a last minute information report the agency
filed on August 18, 2025, DCFS informed the juvenile court it had
placed Ariana with two of her nonrelated extended family
members on July 4, 2025. In the report, the agency stated,
“[S]ince Ariana’s [placement with these caregivers,] Ariana . . .
lost 6 pounds and . . . remained medically stable and free of
emergencies.” The fact that nonrelative extended family
9 The agency notes in passing that Dr. Bloch stated the
following in his July 2025 report: “ ‘[A] recent DCFS visit [to
Ariana’s grandmother’s senior housing unit at which Ariana,
mother, and Ariana’s grandmother were residing] reportedly
found the conditions to have been unsanitary, roach infested, and
lacking electricity.’ ” Yet, DCFS does not argue the conditions of
Ariana’s grandmother’s senior housing unit gave rise to a
substantial danger to Ariana or that there existed no reasonable
means to protect Ariana from those conditions short of removing
her from mother’s custody. We decline to reach these issues
sua sponte. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 792 [“ ‘We do not serve as “backup
appellate counsel,” or make the parties’ arguments for them.’ ”].)
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members were apparently able to manage adequately Ariana’s
diabetes suggests that even if a full-time nurse or service worker
were unavailable, the agency could have assessed whether a
responsible adult with adequate knowledge of diabetes
management could provide in-home support for Ariana.
Because DCFS did not evaluate whether providing
full-time in-home support services for Ariana H.’s diabetes
management was a reasonable means of permitting her to live
safely in mother’s home, we conclude the record lacks substantial
evidence that the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal. By failing to investigate that
option, the agency did not develop the record adequately to allow
a rational factfinder to find it highly probable there existed no
reasonable means to protect Ariana without removing her from
mother. Accordingly, we reverse the removal order. (Cf. L.G.,
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1231–1233, 1235 [rejecting a
“ ‘reasonable efforts’ ” finding under § 361, subd. (e) and a “ ‘no
reasonable means’ ” without removal finding under § 361,
subd. (c) in part because there was no evidence the child welfare
agency assessed the maternal aunt as a “second caregiver” after
she expressed her intention to live with the parent from whom
the child was removed].)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency
jurisdiction over Ariana H., reverse the court’s removal of the
child from Angelina H.’s custody, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the court
shall make its custody decision in light of our decision and any
new relevant factual developments. (In re L.G. (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1212, 1235.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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