Filed 6/25/26 In re A.J. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.J. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
HUMBOLDT COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, A174466
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Humboldt County
v. Super. Ct. Nos. JV2300090,
JV2300091, JV2300093)
C.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In May 2023, the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human
Services (department) filed juvenile dependency petitions with respect to four
children of appellant C.J. (mother), alleging that the children were at risk of
harm because of ongoing domestic violence between mother and Alvaro E.–R.
(father). After a physical altercation between the parents in March 2025,
mother sought a juvenile restraining order protecting her and the children
from father, and father sought a reciprocal restraining order protecting him
from mother. After an eight-day hearing, the juvenile court issued mutual
restraining orders, but denied mother’s request that her order include her
children as protected persons. Mother argues that such denial was error, and
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that the juvenile court failed to make sufficiently detailed factual findings in
support of its orders under Family Code section 6305. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant C.J. (mother) is the mother of four children with three
different fathers: two daughters, A.J. and V.J., whose biological father is
Alvaro E.–R. (father);1 and two sons, R.O. and O.J.
The Initial Petitions, Jurisdiction, and Detention
On May 18, 2023, the Humboldt County Department of Health and
Human Services (department) filed juvenile dependency petitions pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to
protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling) with respect to each of O.J., A.J., and V.J.
(then twelve, seven, and two years old, respectively).3 The petitions alleged
that in February 2023, A.J. “was present during [a] domestic violence
incident between the parents. During the incident, [A.J.]’s wrist was
fractured. The parent’s [sic] narrative of the incident does not match. The
father reports he does not know how the child’s wrist was broken.”
According to the detention report filed by the department the next day,
the petitions were prompted by a referral indicating that “[mother] was
trying to leave the house with [A.J.] and [father] grabbed the child’s arm and
fractured it. [Father] was arrested for domestic violence and felony child
endangerment. It is reported that [mother] sustained some injuries. It is not
1 The juvenile court elevated father to presumed status in July 2023.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3 The department also filed a petition with respect to R.O., but he turned
18 years old in November of 2024, and mother’s brief does not discuss him
further.
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known if [mother] or [father] were under the influence of any substances at
the time of the incident. [Father] was given an immediate move-out order
and [mother] was granted an emergency protective order (EPO) that expired
five (5) days after the EPO was signed. The child was taken to the hospital
by [mother].”
On May 19, the juvenile court ordered the children detained and placed
with their maternal grandmother. Both parents were granted supervised
visitation two times per week for a total of four hours each.
On October 18, a jurisdictional hearing was held at which the juvenile
court sustained the petitions and found their allegations true.
On December 6, a dispositional hearing was held and the department
filed a disposition report, dated October 4. The report noted that the
department had prepared “safety plans in response to concerns about the
parents’ domestic violence and the children being exposed to the parents’
violence,” but those plans “were not successful, as the parents continued to
engage in domestic violence behaviors.” With respect to visitation, the report
indicated that “father loves his children and has been consistent with
attending visits.” In particular, father had attended 14 visits since July 7,
2023, and “[t]here [were] no reported concerns for visits between the children
and their father,” although A.J. did refuse to attend two visits with her father
in September.
At the hearing, the juvenile court adjudged all three children
dependents and returned them to their mother’s custody under a plan of
family maintenance.
2024 In-Home Status Review
On May 24, 2024, with an in-home status review hearing then set for
June 11, the department filed a report recommending that jurisdiction be
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terminated because mother had “consistently demonstrated her ability to
safely and appropriately [parent] her children during this reporting. She has
completed her case plan goals and has provided a violence-free household for
herself and her children.”
The review hearing was continued several times, and on August 28,
before it had taken place, the department filed an “at issue memorandum,”
changing its recommendation that the dependencies be terminated, and
recommending instead that the case remain open for another six months.
The memorandum explained that it had come to the department’s attention
“that the parents have a complicated, co-dependent relationship, and due to
their history of domestic violence, it did not feel safe to close the case and
terminate dependency as was the initial recommendation,” and that there
were “issues regarding visitation” that the department wanted resolved first.
At the review hearing on September 30, the juvenile court followed the
department’s recommendation by maintaining the children as dependents
and continuing family maintenance services. A further family maintenance
review hearing was set for April 1, 2025.
February 2025 Supplemental Petitions
On February 10, 2025, the department filed supplemental petitions
pursuant to section 387 with respect to the children, alleging that “[t]he prior
disposition of placing the children in the care of mother, with the father not
to be in the home, has failed to protect the children from the negative effects
of ongoing interpartner violence . . . .” The petitions alleged that A.J. “reports
ongoing fighting between her parents that has caused her severe emotional
harm[,] including crying uncontrollably and vomiting,” that V.J. “has been
expelled from preschool and . . . [O.J.] has left the family home to escape the
toxic environment created by [mother and father],” concluding that “mother’s
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failure to acknowledge the effects the violence has on her children and the
father’s failure to follow court orders and continu[ing] to engage [in
interpartner violence] with . . . mother in front of the children places the
children at ongoing risk of harm.”
In its detention report filed the next day, the department indicated that
A.J. and V.J. had been taken into protective custody on February 5, after the
department received a referral “regarding the emotional abuse of [A.J.] by
her parents. . . . [A.J.] does not feel safe with her father being in the home.
[She] described having symptoms of anxiety manifested as vomiting and
feeling physically ill. [A.J.] reported in the last two weeks, her mother told
her not to tell anyone about her father being in the home or she would break
up her family and go into foster care. . . . [¶] . . . . [A.J.] hears her parents
arguing so loud that she cannot hear. . . . [¶] . . . . There were various
inciden[ts] where the father physically harmed the mother in the presence of
the children.” A.J. “had been hospitalized for mental health concerns due to
the impacts of the mother and father’s actions of violence,” and “has had past
suicidal ideations.” And O.J. was “so traumatized by the domestic violence in
the home he has moved himself to the home of the [maternal grandmother].”
At the February 11 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered A.J.
and V.J. detained and granted mother supervised visitation. And after a
jurisdictional hearing held on March 5 and 7, the court sustained the
allegations of the supplemental petitions.4
On April 29, the department prepared a disposition report with respect
to A.J. and V.J., a report that was followed by several addenda. With respect
to father’s visitation, it indicated he had “abruptly” stopped attending visits
with his daughters in November 2024. In February 2025, father told a social
4 The juvenile court later set a dispositional hearing for October 14.
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worker that he did not want to have supervised visitation, and as of the
writing of the report, had not participated in any visitation with his
daughters.5
On May 12, A.J. told a social worker that she did not want to have
visits with her father again, and that she does not “feel safe” around her
father “ ‘[b]ecause of all the things he does to my mom.’ ” She added that she
does not want V.J. to visit with her father without her, and “if [V.J.] has to
go, I will go to protect my sister.”
Although V.J. had “historically” enjoyed visits with her father, as part
of a behavioral health intake assessment in May, she “ ‘showed significant
fear’ ” of her father, “reported that her father has physically hurt her and
that he has hurt her mother ten times, and she slowly recalled each incident
as she counted on her fingers.” She said she was “afraid to see her dad
because she has seen him hurt her mom” and “wants him to stay away from
her family.”
The report’s fourth addendum, dated September 17, indicated that in
July 2025, A.J. had reported sexual abuse “between 5-10 times” by her
paternal half-brother to a social worker. She also disclosed that the same
half-brother had abused his older sister. A.J. continued to see her half-
brother after these events, as father often brought him to their visits, despite
a social worker telling father that A.J. did not want him present.
The report ultimately recommended that the court find the prior
disposition ineffective and set a six-month review hearing. And it
recommended that father’s visits with his daughters “be deemed
detrimental,” both because they “will be emotionally and mentally
5 At a dispositional hearing on May 1, O.J. was removed from mother’s
care and placed with his maternal grandmother, with a six-month review
hearing set for October 30, 2025.
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detrimental” to both children and because “there is reason to believe that the
father does not have the ability or desire to change nor understand his
daughters[’] concerns related to his visits.”
Mother’s Request for Restraining Order
Meanwhile, on March 19, mother filed a request for a juvenile
restraining order protecting herself and her children from father. Her
request explained: “On or about March 14, 2025, [father] came to my house.
He snapped and grabbed my arm hard, then choked me with his hands
around my neck. He punched me hard in the stomach, stepped on my face
and tried to suffocate me with a pillow. I asked him to leave my home and he
refused. . . . I led him downstairs and continued to ask him to leave. [Father]
said he’s sure the neighbors would call the police because I’m loud and
dramatic. I opened the front door (around 3 am) and I told him to call the
police himself. Finally, he did and I continued to keep telling him to leave my
house. While he was on the phone I was asking him to leave and get out. I
yelled the address for them and to please help me. Law enforcement arrived
and arrested him as soon as they saw me.”
On April 16, father filed his response: “I do not agree that there needs
to be a restraining order against me to protect my daughters. There is no
reason to protect them from me as [mother’s] accusations are unfounded and
untrue. [¶] I have visitation with my daughters through the child welfare
agency which can be supervised or unsupervised or they can be placed with
me. I have participated in visits with my daughters since this matter came
before the court. [¶] . . . [¶] I do not agree to a stay-away order for my two
daughters as I have visitation and a relationship with them. Child welfare
department is overseeing this case and my contact with my daughters. . . . [¶]
. . . [¶]
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“The actual events of that evening are as follows: [Mother] begged me
to come over to her house. I did and was asleep at approximately 2:00 a.m. I
was in bed in the bedroom on the third floor. She woke me up and began
asking me about someone I was seeing. She continued to ask questions and
then started yelling. She would not stop yelling and accusing me. I needed
to go to work in the morning, so I told her I was going to leave. I started to
get dressed and she followed me down the staircase. She grabbed the back of
my hooded sweatshirt and caused me to fall backwards. She continued to yell
and scream at me not to leave. Once I was down one staircase I was trying to
gather my things. She stood in front of me and pushed me backwards. She
continuously blocked me from leaving. She threw herself at me and on the
floor. She begged me not to leave. [¶] I made my way down another
staircase and while walking down the stairs, [mother] had a hold of my leg
and would not let go even as I walked down the stairs. She stood in front of
the door trying to block it. She pulled a large vase in front of the door and sat
in it to keep me from leaving. I turned to the other door, which is the garage
door to leave.”
Father’s Request for Restraining Order
On April 25, father filed a request for a juvenile restraining order
protecting him from mother. After recounting his version of the events of
March 14, as described above, his request continued: “I called the police
because [mother] was screaming and all of her neighbors could hear. . . .
When the police arrived, they spoke to me and to [mother]. [Mother] lied to
the police and told them I pushed her and tried to choke her with a plastic
bag and that I caused her lip to have blood on it. Her rendition is completely
false. [¶] [Mother] filed a temporary restraining order against me and since
that time has continued to call me (from blocked numbers, burner phones or
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other people’s phones) early in the morning and continuously. [¶] [Mother]
continuously texts, calls and follows me when I am out in public or parked at
my house. . . . She has always been extremely obsessive and jealous with me
and tries to control where I go and who I am friends with. She has caused
this kind of drama and police interaction in the past and there are police
reports that show this behavior. [¶] As seen in the attached Exhibits,
[mother] has been harassing, stalking, and otherwise interfering in my life
for well over the past year. The exhibits are only a portion of the texts and
phone calls I receive from her on a daily basis.” Attached were two exhibits;
the first showing many missed calls from mother on March 4, 7, and 11–13,
and the second including text messages father described as mother
“messaging [a friend to] get info on someone she suspected I was seeing.”
The Hearing on the Parents’ Mutual Requests
The juvenile court held a hearing on the parents’ requests over eight
days in August and September of 2025. The witnesses were father, mother,
three supervisors of father’s visits with his daughters, and father’s mother.
Father’s Testimony6
Father testified to his version of the events of March 13 and 14, as set
forth above, but denied causing mother any injuries. Mother was violent
with him a “handful” or “five” times, but the children were only present for
the incident in February 2023 when A.J. “got hurt when she got dragged out
of the house.”
Father and mother had “many” physical altercations, “[u]nfortunately,
sometimes” in front of the children, and that mother initiated them all. He
denied responsibility for A.J.’s wrist injury during the February 2023,
6 Father first testified when called by mother’s counsel pursuant to
Evidence Code section 776 and later as part of his own case. Our summary
includes both parts of his testimony.
9
altercation, claiming that he “didn’t touch my daughter at all that day” and
that mother had taken responsibility for the injury: “She had said that more
than likely it was from her dragging her. She’s like, ‘I’m pretty sure I
accidentally did that to her.’ ”
According to father, A.J. and V.J. were “very affectionate” and did not
express any fear of him during their visits.
Mother would call father “repeatedly, essentially harassing me,” which
was the “norm whenever I didn’t answer her.” When he blocked her number,
she called him from numbers with no caller ID, calls he estimated numbered
“in the thousands” and were anywhere from 50 to 300 times “back to back.”
Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified that on the night of March 13, father came to her home
“for no specific reason,” and that “he was coming over every single night since
the children were removed from me.” She “believe[d]” she made repeated
phone calls to father that evening because “if I didn’t check in with him and
he didn’t know where I was and how long it took me to get there, he would
get very upset,” and they had had “a million fights and arguments about
that.” Father said mother was “annoying” because of the phone calls, but she
responded, “how am I supposed to let you know where I’m at if you get upset
about not knowing where I am?” Mother would spend the “whole entire night
on FaceTime” with father “[w]henever we were talking at the moment, every
night he wasn’t with me.”
On the night of March 13, mother and father were discussing mother’s
work as a medical assistant and the conversation “got heated.” Mother went
upstairs, took a shower, and returned to find father “laying on the couch in
the same exact spot when I left him.” After asking father if he wanted to
come to bed, mother “nudged” him “a few more times” and he “snapped.” He
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“grabbed [mother’s] arm really hard,” “pu[t] his hands around [her] neck,”
and “punch[ed] [her] in the stomach really, really hard.” Father pulled a
plastic shopping bag “tight so it was straight line. Like, he used it kind of
like a rope to hold over my neck with one hand on each side while I was on
my back.” Eventually father called 911 and left. Mother estimated the
altercation went on for “[m]aybe an hour.”
Mother testified that father had “gotten physical” with her, “whether
it’s punching me or twisting my hands or my arms,” “probably over 2 to 300
times” over the court of their ten-year relationship. And she testified that
father was physically abusive with the children about “[o]nce every month,”
specifically by “spanking” them.
Visitation Supervisors’ Testimony
Three witnesses testified who had supervised father’s visits with his
daughters: Michelle Malcom-Looney, who did so from October 2023 to July or
August 2024; Elizabeth Stotzer, who supervised father’s visits during “most
of 2024”; and Emily Fryer, who supervised father’s visits “maybe . . . ten
times” in 2024.
Looney described father’s demeanor during visits as “fine and loving”
toward V.J. and “[h]appy, loving, positive, happy to see her” toward A.J. She
noted that he was “always happy to see his girls, from what I remember.
They were usually happy to see him, too” and there was “nothing that
seemed, you know, to raise suspicions or out of the ordinary.” V.J. was
affectionate with father, and “would seek him out for comfort, for hugs, for
kisses, to be, like, cuddled.” Although A.J. occasionally did not want to visit
with father, “once . . . the visits . . . settled in . . . she appeared happy to be
there and she would be smiling and hold his hand and give him a hug at the
end.”
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Stoltzer described father’s visits with the children as “[p]erfectly
fine . . . we had no safety concerns . . . I have . . . a five-point system when I’m
assessing a visit, and that is like if the parent during the visit is affectionate,
if they are interacting with their child, if they are monitoring their child
appropriately, if the engagement is positive. And he did all those things. So
he would always monitor appropriately. He was engaged. He interacted.
The interaction and the engagement were positive. He was safety minded.”
A.J. expressed affection toward father, and Stoltzer characterized his
interactions with the children as “overall positive.” At some point before July
of 2024, she recommended that father have unsupervised visits.
Fryer described father’s demeanor during the ten visits she supervised
as “[p]ositive. He would bring food, made sure that there were activities to
do. He was very engaged with his daughters.” Father expressed affection
toward his daughters through “[l]oving words” and hugs, and A.J. expressed
affection back with “loving words” and “laughter.” A.J. was “mostly
engaging” with father, played games and had snacks with him, and gave him
“[h]ugs good bye and hugs hello.” V.J.’s demeanor toward her father was
“[e]ngaging, loving, hugs, happy to see her dad.”
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
On September 29, after the hearing concluded, the juvenile court ruled
as follows:
“I have had time to read and consider all of the closing arguments, and
I am prepared to rule at this time. And I do agree with minor’s counsel, Ms.
Balden, that there is sufficient evidence for the Court to grant mutual
restraining orders for a period of three years, and those mutual restraining
orders will issue today. They will be very close to mirror images of each
other.
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“Also, by way of explanation, the Court does find there is clear evidence
of physical violence against mother by father, and there is clear evidence of
clear evidence of physical violence against mother by father, and there is
clear evidence of . . . harassment of father by mother, specifically mother has
made numerous, and for a period of time, continuous phone calls and texts to
father.
“The Court does find that the children will not be—the children will not
be protected persons under mother’s request as the Court finds there is
insufficient evidence indicating the children’s safety might be in jeopardy or
endangered without their inclusion of the restraining orders.
“So, as far as the restraining orders, mutual restraining orders.”
Mutual three-year restraining orders issued that same day, requiring
mother and father to stay at least 100 yards away from each other’s person,
home, job, and vehicle, until September 29, 2028.
Mother filed a notice of appeal.7
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err In Declining to Include the
Children on Mother’s Restraining Order
Applicable Law
Section 213.5, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part, “[a]fter a
petition has been filed pursuant to Section 311 to declare a child a dependent
child . . . the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue ex parte orders
(1) enjoining a person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
7 On February 2, 2026, in lieu of filing its own brief, the department filed
a joinder in all of mother’s opening brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.200(a)(5).) On April 13, father’s appointed counsel filed a respondent’s
brief.
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threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning . . . or
disturbing the peace of the child or any other child in the household . . . A
court may also issue an ex parte order enjoining a person from molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
harassing, telephoning . . . or disturbing the peace of any parent, legal
guardian, or current caretaker of the child, . . . upon application in the
manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure or, if related
to domestic violence, in the manner provided by Section 6300 of the Family
Code.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a).)
“Given the cross-reference in section 213.5 to Family Code section 6300,
courts have analogized the issuance of a section 213.5 restraining order to the
issuance of protective orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(DVPA), Family Code section 6200 et seq. [Citations.]” (In re A.P. (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 1137, 1143 (A.P.).) As under the analogous provision of the
DVPA, Family Code section 6340, issuance of a restraining order under
section 213.5 does not require evidence the person being restrained
“previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or
battered the child.” (In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 (B.S.); see
A.P., supra, p. 1143; In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671 (S.G.).)
Nevertheless, “[i]ssuance of the restraining order [is] not proper unless
failure to issue the order might jeopardize the safety of the children.” (In re
C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 365; In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460,
1467.)
Also relevant here is Family Code section 6305, which “permits trial
courts to issue mutual restraining orders, but limits them to specific
circumstances.” (K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 979.) In particular,
Family Code section 6305, subdivision (a) provides that the court “shall not”
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not issue a mutual restraining order unless “both” of the following apply: “(1)
Both parties personally appear and each party presents written evidence of
abuse or domestic violence in an application for relief . . . ,” and “(2) The court
makes detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted as a
primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in self-defense.”8
Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s decision whether to grant a restraining
order for abuse of discretion and the factual findings supporting that decision
for substantial evidence. (See A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142; S.G.,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 670–671.) When reviewing for substantial
evidence, “ ‘ “we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of
fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not
reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial
court. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could
8 Family Code section 6305, subdivision (b) further provides that, “[f]or
purposes of subdivision (a), in determining if both parties acted primarily as
aggressors, the court shall consider the provisions concerning dominant
aggressors set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of Section 836 of the
Penal Code.” These factors are “(A) the intent of the law to protect victims of
domestic violence from continuing abuse, (B) the threats creating fear of
physical injury, (C) the history of domestic violence between the persons
involved, and (D) whether either person involved acted in self-defense.” (Pen.
Code, § 836, subd. (c)(3).)
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find [that the order is appropriate].” ’ ” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773; A.P., p. 1142.)
But “[t]he party seeking a restraining order bears the burden of
establishing the circumstances justifying the order.” (Jan F. v. Natalie F.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593.) And “[t]he substantial evidence standard of
review takes on a unique formulation where, as here, ‘the trier of fact has
expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did
not carry the burden and that party appeals.’ (In re I.W. (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) ‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on
a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’
(In re I.W., supra, at p. 1528.) Specifically, we ask ‘whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding.” [Citation.]’ (Ibid.)” (S.G., supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 671; see A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142; In re
Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 550, 566–567 [noting that such
burden is “almost impossible” to carry].)
Mother’s Evidence Does Not Compel Inclusion of the Children
on Mother’s Restraining Order As a Matter of Law
Mother acknowledges the “almost impossible” burden she must carry to
establish error in the juvenile court’s decision not to include her children as
protected persons on her restraining order against father, but nevertheless
contends that “the evidence in the record compels a finding in her favor as a
matter of law.” We disagree.
In support, she first asserts that the initial petitions “expressly
reference[] an incident in February 2023, when father broke [A.J.]’s wrist,”
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noting that the allegations of the petitions were subsequently found true.
She next points to several statements the three children made to social
workers in February and May 2025, including that they were afraid of father
and did not feel safe with him in the home because of his abuse of their
mother.9 Mother discusses A.J.’s July 2025 disclosure that she had been
sexually abused by her paternal half-brother, noting that the department
questioned father’s judgment in bringing that half-brother to visits with A.J.
despite being “aware that his other daughter . . . had undergone a forensic
interview due to her disclosure of sexual abuse by” that same brother.
Finally, mother asserts that she “testified truthfully and contritely” at the
hearing on her restraining order request that father had been physically
abusive to the children by “spank[ing]” them, “about once a month” over the
course of their ten-year relationship.
To begin with, mother’s contention that the initial petitions alleged
that “father broke [A.J.]’s wrist” is not accurate. Rather, the petitions alleged
(under § 300, subd. (b)(1)) that “the parents were involved in a domestic
violence dispute that led to [A.J.]’s wrist being fractured”; and (under § 300,
subd. (j)) that the children were present “during [a] domestic violence
incident between the parents . . . [A.J.]’s wrist was fractured,” that the
parents’ “narrative[s] of the incident d[id] not match,” and father “report[ed]
he does not know how the child’s wrist was broken.” The juvenile court could
find these allegations true without determining whether it was mother or
9 In particular, in February 2023, O.J. told a social worker that he “he is
scared of what [father] and [father’s] son will do” to him. And in February
2025, O.J. stated that he “does not feel safe in the home when the father is
there,” A.J. stated “she does not feel safe with her father being in the home,”
and V.J. stated that “she is afraid to see her dad because she has seen him
hurt her mom.”
17
father who injured A.J.’s wrist; the alleged substantial risk of harm was “due
to . . . ongoing exposure to domestic violence between the parents.” (See
§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (j).)
In any event, even evidence conclusively establishing past physical
abuse does not compel the juvenile court to issue a restraining order. (See
A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1146–1147 [“[c]ourts have discretion to
issue a domestic violence restraining order based only on past abuse”]; In re
Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1499, fn. 8 [“the fact that a
trial court finds past abuse does not require that the court issue a restraining
order”]; Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 116.)
In arguing that the allegations of the petitions require the childrens’
inclusion on her restraining order, Mother relies on language from B.S.,
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 193, stating that “evidence that the restrained
person previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked or
battered the child is certainly sufficient” to support issuing such an order.
(Id. at p. 193.) Such reliance is unavailing. In B.S., the Court of Appeal
affirmed issuance of a restraining order protecting mother and B.S. from
B.S.’s father after an altercation in which the father “grabbed the mother and
‘threw her down on top of’ B.S.,” because the court “could reasonably infer,
from the father’s tendency to resort to violence as well as from his evident
lack of impulse control, that he might be a threat to B.S.’s safety.” (Id. at pp.
186–187, 194.) But the fact that evidence is sufficient to support issuance of
a restraining order plainly does not mean that same evidence compels the
juvenile court to issue such an order. B.S. acknowledged as much, noting
that “[e]ven assuming [the] opposite inference might be equally reasonable,
we are not authorized to second-guess the juvenile court on this point.” (Id.
at p. 194; see In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780 [“ ‘ “When
18
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court” ’ ”].)10
While we do not intend to minimize the troubling nature of the
evidence mother relies on, we must observe that it was not “uncontradicted.”
(S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 671.) As noted, father testified that he
“didn’t touch [A.J.] at all [the] day” her wrist was injured, and that mother
had subsequently told him she was “pretty sure” she was responsible for
A.J.’s injuries. He denied initiating any of his physical altercations with
mother. And although father’s visits with his daughters apparently ended in
November 2024, he testified that his daughters were “very affectionate” with
him during them, testimony that was corroborated by three supervisors of
that visitation. As mother’s brief acknowledges, there was no evidence that
father was aware of the alleged sexual abuse of A.J. by his son. Finally,
despite mother’s characterization of her own testimony as “truthful[],” the
question of her credibility and the weight to be afforded her testimony were
for the juvenile court to resolve, and we cannot revisit its answers on appeal.
(See, e.g., In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 [“In reviewing factual
determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts’ ”]; R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 780 [“[w]e
defer to the trial court’s credibility resolutions and do not reweigh the
evidence”].)
10 For the same reasons, mother’s further reliance on In re Bruno M.
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, which affirmed the juvenile court’s decision to
include children on a restraining order where they witnessed physical
altercations between their parents and “expressed fear and sadness”
afterwards, does not avail her. (Id. at pp. 997–998.)
19
In sum and in short—and even under ordinary principles of substantial
evidence review—the existence of evidence that would have supported
inclusion of the children on mother’s restraining order does not require
reversal. (See S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 672 [“merely conflicting
evidence” does not “support an insufficiency of the evidence claim . . . let
alone a claim that the evidence . . . compels resolution of Mother’s request in
her favor”]; Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [“The fact that
there was substantial evidence in the record to support a contrary finding
does not compel the conclusion that there was no substantial evidence to
support the judgment”]; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228
[substantial evidence review does not require reversal merely because “the
trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other
evidence”].)
Finally, mother’s reliance on K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114
(K.T.) is unavailing. There, K.T. sought a domestic violence restraining order
under the DVPA protecting her and her three daughters from her ex-partner
E.S. (K.T., p. 1119.) Her request explained with respect to the children that
E.S. had physically abused them, abused her in front of them, and had
abducted them from Texas to California told her “ ‘he would only return them
to me if I get back with him.’ ”11 (Id. at pp. 1119, 1122.)
11 As mother acknowledges, the facts of K.T. were much more “severe”
than those here. According to K.T.’s request, E.S. was a human trafficker
who had taken her from Honduras to Mexico when she was a minor, and she
was subsequently his “victim for over seven years, experiencing physical
injuries, rape, fear, anxiety, and trauma.” (K.T., p. 1119.) E.S. “switched
[K.T.’s birth control] pills for vitamins,” “viciously hit the children on
numerous occasions,” and “threatened to kill K.T. if she ever left.” (Id. at p.
1120.)
20
The trial court issued a permanent restraining order protecting K.T. from
E.S. without including the children, after inaccurately stating that “the
children were not listed as protected parties under [K.T.’s] current request”
and that “there has been no credible evidence . . . regarding any physical or
sexual abuse that has been sustained by the children . . . .” (K.T., supra, pp.
1125–1126.) The Court of Appeal reversed, both because “[t]he record
dispositively show[ed] the trial court was factually mistaken” as to whether
K.T. had included her children in her request (id. at pp. 1128–1129), and the
court misapplied the law by “incorrectly limit[ing] its inquiry to whether the
children were physically or sexually abused by E.S.” (id. at p. 1130) rather
than requiring only a “showing of ‘good cause’ ” under the language of Family
Code section 6320, subdivision (a). (K.T., supra, pp. 1125–1126.) Because
K.T.’s declaration and testimony provided “undisputed evidence that the
children were present and exposed” to domestic violence between their
parents, and the court’s comments at the hearing made clear it found that
evidence “credible and true,” K.T. found that good cause for their inclusion on
the restraining order and directed the trial court to so modify the order on
remand. (Id. at pp. 1131–1132.)
K.T. is distinguishable. Unlike K.T., mother makes no argument that
the juvenile court made any error of fact nor any error of law in denying her
request to list her children as protected persons. (K.T., supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 1128.) But more importantly, and as already discussed,
mother’s evidence here was not “undisputed,” nor is there any clear
indication the juvenile court found it “credible and true.” (Id. at p. 1131.)
Unlike K.T., this case thus presented conflicting factual narratives to be
resolved by the juvenile court, and that case is thus inapposite.
21
Mother Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice With Respect to
the Alleged Violation of Family Code Section 6305
Mother’s second argument is that Family Code section 6305 applied to
the juvenile court’s issuance of mutual restraining orders under section
213.5, and that the court failed to make sufficiently “detailed findings of fact
indicating that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither
party acted primarily in self-defense,” as required by that statute. (Fam.
Code, § 6305, subd. (a)(2).) In particular, mother argues that the juvenile
court’s oral explanation of its rulings—what she styles a “curtly
rendered . . . two-sentence opinion”—does not provide “ ‘detailed findings of
fact’ ” because it makes no mention of Family Code section 6305, nor of the
terms “primary aggressor, dominant aggressors, or self-defense.”
Although mother cites no authority so holding, we will assume without
deciding that the requirements of Family Code section 6305 apply to a
juvenile court’s issuance of mutual restraining orders under section 213.5 by
analogy to the DVPA. (See A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143.) But we
need not decide whether the juvenile court’s findings comply with Family
Code section 6305 because mother has not offered any argument that the
alleged error was prejudicial.12
Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution “precludes reversal
for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of
12 On reply, mother cites In re Marriage of Hoch (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th
80, decided after the filing of her opening brief: “ ‘If a court issues a mutual
restraining order without making the requisite findings under [Family Code]
section 6305, the order is voidable.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hoch, supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at p. 103; Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360,
368 [same].) But even voidable orders, i.e., “acts in excess of jurisdiction,”
“are subject to harmless error analysis, that is, they support a reversal of the
judgment only upon a showing of prejudice. (See People v. Williams (2006) 40
Cal.4th 287, 301.)” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862, 871.)
22
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that
the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (F.P. v.
Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108–1109; see also id. at p. 1108 [concluding
that “failing to issue a requested statement of decision is not reversible per
se, but is subject to harmless error review”].) “The burden is on the appellant
in every case to show that the claimed error is prejudicial; i.e., that it has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cucinella v. Weston Biscuit Co. (1954)
42 Cal.2d 71, 82; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106
[“[O]ur duty to examine the entire cause arises when and only when the
appellant has fulfilled his duty to tender a proper prejudice argument. . . .
[T]he appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the
error caused a miscarriage of justice”]; Santina v. General Petroleum Corp.
(1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 74, 77.)
Mother asks that we reverse and remand for the juvenile court to
conduct a “new hearing,” and argues that “remand and correction is
necessary to ensure the court complies with not only the letter of Family Code
[section] 6305, but the spirit of Family Code § 6305, too,” with citation to
Monterroso v. Moran (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 732. (See Monterroso v. Moran,
supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 736–738 [reversing mutual restraining orders
where trial court made “no findings of fact” and “exhort[ing] [trial courts] to
recognize that an improvidently issued mutual restraining order may
adversely impact victims of domestic violence and continue their
victimization”].) But she offers no argument whatsoever that the juvenile
court’s failure to issue more detailed findings of fact in this case resulted in a
“miscarriage of justice,” because there is a reasonable probability of a
different result absent the alleged error, or otherwise. (See People v. Watson
23
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) Even assuming error, mother has failed to carry
her burden to demonstrate prejudice requiring reversal.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
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RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A174466N)
25