Filed 7/15/26 In re Aisley B. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re AISLEY B., a Person Coming B349561, B351047
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 25CCJP02338A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ALICIA T. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Sally Espinoza, Judge. Affirmed.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Alicia T.
Cheryl Spano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Shannon B.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Alicia T. and Shannon B. appeal from the jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders declaring their 11-year-old son,
Aisley B., a dependent child of the juvenile court. Alicia and
Shannon argue the juvenile court erred in ruling on their motion
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 355 to exclude
hearsay statements in reports submitted by the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services that they
contend were not sufficiently corroborated.1 They also argue
substantial evidence did not support the court’s jurisdiction
findings. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Department Investigates Allegations of Abuse
The Department’s investigation of Aisley and his family
began with the receipt of information from a caller and included
interviews with a counselor at Aisley’s school, the maternal
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
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grandparents, Alicia, Shannon, and Aisley. In support of its
jurisdiction findings the juvenile court relied primarily on
statements in the Department’s reports by a school counselor and
the maternal grandmother.
The caller reported witnessing Alicia threaten Aisley, make
a fist, and lunge at him. Aisley told the caller that Alicia
“‘bopped’ him in the nose’” and that Alicia hit him “frequently.”
The caller stated Aisley demonstrated how Alicia hit him “with a
closed fist” and said “sometimes it leaves bruises or draws blood.”
The caller also observed Alicia on another occasion become angry
with Aisley and say to him, “‘I’m gonna kick your ass’” and “‘I’m
gonna knock you out.’”
Christina Quijada, a pupil service attendance counselor at
Aisley’s school, told a Department social worker that Aisley told
her that Alicia hit him on the nose with a closed fist, that it hurt,
and that it had happened before. Quijada said Aisley told her
that Alicia “has hit him in the arm, shoulder, legs, head with a
closed fist” and that “‘it kind of happens all the time.’” Quijada
added that Alicia arrived at the school one time appearing angry,
agitated, and with “‘wide eyes.’” Quijada heard Alicia yell at
Aisley and say to him, “‘Say one more word and I will kick your
ass,’” “‘Boy I will knock you out,’” and “‘Wait till I get you in the
car.’”
The maternal grandmother told the social worker: “‘I think
there is mental health she (mother) has not dealt with, I don’t
know if it is malice, I think it’s more mental, yelling and
threatening.’” She stated that Alicia’s behavior was “‘very
belligerent and extremely defensive for no reason’” and that
Alicia had anger management issues. The maternal
grandmother added, referring to Alicia and Aisley: “‘I know she
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has hit him before, but I do not know when was the last time she
hit him.’” The maternal grandmother also said: “‘I know she has
put her hands on him, but I don’t know if it is ongoing.’” The
maternal grandmother, however, did not know how often Alicia
put her “hands on” Aisley and had not seen Alicia hit Aisley. The
maternal grandmother reported that Aisley had told her that
Alicia hit him, but that he did not give any details about the
incident. The maternal grandfather said that Alicia had anger
issues and that he could no longer speak with her.
The social worker spoke with Alicia and asked for her side
of the story. Alicia denied the allegations and said that “‘there is
no side to my story because there is nothing to say’” and that
“‘there is nothing to tell here, someone is just calling to say
things. There isn’t a story.’” Alicia stated that the allegations
were “‘hearsay’” and that she did not want the social worker to
interview Aisley. Alicia told the social worker: “‘I discipline my
son, and it is not abusive, simple as that, I trust myself to
discipline my son without your approval or permission.’” Alicia
said she disciplined Aisley by taking away his tablet or not
letting him watch television. Shannon told the social worker that
he had not seen any marks or bruises on Aisley and that Aisley
never said Alicia hit or abused him.
Alicia refused to cooperate with the Department or allow
the social worker to speak with Aisley outside of her presence.
When asked again by the social worker how she disciplined
Aisley, Alicia stated: “‘I don’t have to sit here and discuss with
you and I don’t feel like discussing with you on how I discipline
my child. I may be older than you and I don’t feel it is
appropriate to discuss with you on how I discipline my child or
what I am dealing with, a world you have nothing to do with.’”
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Alicia added: “‘[T]his is degrading to have a situation and flip it,
to have me here and discuss to you how I do, to see if you approve
of it. I discipline my son a safe way that I feel comfortable with,
that do fit him, simple as that.’”
The case social worker also spoke “with a close relative who
requested to remain anonymous,” who had concerns Alicia
abused drugs. The relative stated Alicia was “often difficult to
interact with as she is defensive,” but the relative was “unable to
provide further details as to the drug abuse” and could not say
whether the drug abuse affected Alicia’s parenting.
Finally, when the social worker met with Alicia and Aisley,
Aisley denied saying his mother hit him on the nose. He said,
“‘the only thing I have is acne on my face.’” When asked if his
mother had hit him the day of the incident, Aisley stated: “‘If
I get into a fight because I defended myself, I don’t get in trouble,
but if I get in trouble, I will get my [tablet] taken away.’”
The Department filed a petition under section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b). The Department alleged Alicia
physically abused Aisley by striking him with her fists, which
endangered his physical health and placed him at risk of serious
physical harm and danger.
B. The Juvenile Court Denies Alicia’s Motion Under
Section 355 and Sustains the Petition
Alicia filed a motion under section 355, which authorizes
the juvenile court to consider hearsay evidence in a child
protective agency’s report, but allows a party to object to that
evidence. Alicia objected (by page and paragraph number) to
specific hearsay statements by the caller, Quijada, and the close
relative (but not to statements by the maternal grandmother).
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Alicia argued the statements by Quijada in the Department’s
reports “are largely not based upon firsthand knowledge and are
uncorroborated except by an anonymous reporting party. Both
this anonymous reporting party and the ‘close relative’
interviewed in the [Department’s] report are unknown and
unavailable for cross-examination. These parties’ statements
included in [the Department’s] reports are hearsay, are without
exception and, as such, cannot be admissible to support a
jurisdictional finding or any ultimate fact upon which a
dispositional finding is based.” Alicia asked the court to exclude
the statements. The trial court granted the motion regarding the
hearsay statements in the Department’s reports by the
anonymous relative, but denied the motion regarding the hearsay
statements by Quijada and the caller.
The juvenile court sustained the count under section 300,
subdivision (b), alleging Alicia physically abused Aisley.2 The
court found that in May 2025 Alicia struck Aisley’s nose with her
fist and that on “numerous prior occasions” she hit him on his
“nose, head, shoulder, legs and arm.” The court found Alicia’s
abuse of Aisley caused him “unreasonable pain and suffering,”
2 The court did not rule on the count under section 300,
subdivision (a). The court’s minute orders states “Count A-1 is
dismissed,” but the court did not dismiss (or sustain) that count.
We again ask the juvenile court (or the clerk) to cease the
practice of entering orders not made at hearings. (See In re R.O.
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 586, 594 [“Courtroom clerks must
faithfully reflect in the minutes what actually happened and
nothing more.”] (conc. opn. of Robie, J.); In re T.G. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298, fn. 20 [discouraging the practice of
entering minute orders that are inconsistent with the juvenile
court’s findings].)
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created a “detrimental home environment,” and placed him at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. The court
cited the statements by Quijada and the maternal grandmother
to the social worker, as the Department’s reports described those
statements. The juvenile court found Aisley was a child
described by section 300, subdivision (b), and released him to his
parents. Alicia and Shannon timely appealed.3
DISCUSSION
A. The School Counselor’s Statements Were Sufficiently
Corroborated
Shannon and Alicia argue the juvenile court erred in
denying Alicia’s motion under section 355 and in ruling the
statements by the maternal grandmother sufficiently
corroborated the statements by Quijada. The court did not err.
“Subdivision (a) of section 355 . . . provides: ‘[a]ny legally
admissible evidence that is relevant to the circumstances or acts
that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence.’
Subdivision (b) adds: ‘A social study prepared by the petitioning
agency, and hearsay evidence contained in it, is admissible and
constitutes competent evidence upon which a finding of
3 At a review hearing under section 364 in April 2026 the
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction with an order giving
Alicia and Shannon joint legal and physical custody, with Alicia
having primary physical custody. Under the Supreme Court’s
decision in In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042 the appeal is not
moot because Alicia and Shannon challenge sustained allegations
of physical child abuse reportable for inclusion in the CACI.
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jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based, to the extent
allowed by subdivisions (c) and (d).’ Finally, subdivision (c)(1) of
section 355 provides: ‘If a party to the jurisdictional hearing
raises a timely objection to the admission of specific hearsay
evidence contained in a social study, the specific hearsay evidence
shall not be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding
or any ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based,
unless the petitioner establishes one or more of the exceptions’”
in section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(C). (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th
869, 885, fn. omitted; see In re B.D. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 975,
983.)
Section 355 is not a rule of admissibility, but of
corroboration; it “does not bar hearsay evidence at a
jurisdictional hearing but, if a timely objection is made and no
hearsay exception applies, the evidence must be corroborated.”
(In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280.) A proper
objection to hearsay statements in a child protective agency’s
report does “not render those statements inadmissible,” but
rather means that, if “uncorroborated, the hearsay statements
[do] not constitute substantial evidence and [cannot] be used as
the exclusive basis for finding jurisdiction under section 300.”
(In re B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.)
The standard for corroboration is not high. “The quantum
of corroboration necessary to support a jurisdictional finding is
‘somewhat analogous to the rule in criminal law requiring
independent corroborative proof of accomplice testimony,’ that is,
direct or circumstantial evidence, even if slight, is sufficient if it
tends to connect the accused with the act.” (In re R.R., supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1280-1281.) “[C]orroborating evidence is
that which supports a logical and reasonable inference that the
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act described in the hearsay statement occurred.” (In re B.D.,
supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) “Thus with respect to
dependency jurisdictional findings, corroborative evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, (1) is sufficient if it tends to
connect the allegedly offending parent with the alleged negligent
act even though it is slight and entitled, when standing by itself,
to but little consideration, nor does it need to establish the
precise facts in the hearsay statements; (2) is sufficient if it tends
to connect the allegedly offending parent with the alleged
negligent act and the parent’s own statements and admissions,
made in connection with other testimony, may afford
corroboratory proof sufficient to find jurisdiction; (3) need not go
so far as to establish by itself, and without the aid of the
testimony of [the hearsay declarant], that the [allegedly offending
parent] committed the [negligent act] charged[;] (4) may include
the allegedly offending parent’s own testimony and inferences
therefrom, as well as the inferences from the circumstances
surrounding the entire transaction[;] and (5) may consist of
[f]alse or misleading statements to authorities . . . or as part of
circumstances supportive of corroboration. [W]hether the
corroborating evidence is as compatible with innocence as it is
with guilt is a question of weight for the trier of fact.” (In re
Christian P. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 437, 448, internal quotation
marks and citations omitted, disapproved on another ground in
In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628.)
The Department submitted reports containing statements
by Quijada, who reported (according to Aisley) Alicia hit Aisley in
the face, head, arm, shoulder, and legs “all the time.” The
Department’s reports also contained Quijada’s statements Alicia
yelled at Aisley, made a fist, and threatened to physically abuse
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him. These hearsay statements were admissible under
section 355, subdivision (b). (See In re Lucero L. (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1227, 1243 [“‘legally admissible evidence’” under
section 355, subdivision (a), “includes ‘hearsay evidence contained
in’ a ‘social study’”].) But were they sufficiently corroborated?
They were. The maternal grandmother (whose statements,
as mentioned, were not subject to the motion under section 355)
reported that Alicia had put her hands on (meaning physically
assaulted) Aisley and that Aisley said Alicia hit him. The
maternal grandmother’s statement that she did not know when
Alicia last hit Aisley supported the reasonable inference that
Alicia hit Aisley on more than one occasion. That evidence was
enough to support a logical and reasonable inference the acts
Quijada described in her hearsay statements occurred. (See In re
B.D., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) This is true even if the
statements had slight evidentiary value, were entitled to “little
consideration,” did not necessarily establish the precise facts of
Quijada’s statements, and did not directly prove Alicia hit Aisley.
(See In re Christian P., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 448; B.D., at
p. 984.) Quijada said Alicia hit Aisley; the maternal grandmother
said the same. That was corroboration enough.
Shannon argues the maternal grandmother’s statements
were “vague” and “lacked specificity.” Shannon is not wrong:
They were not as specific and detailed as Quijada’s statements.
But as discussed, though vague and nonspecific statements may
not “‘“establish the precise facts”’ in the hearsay statements” or
be “sufficient to find jurisdiction” (In re Christian P., supra,
208 Cal.App.4th at p. 448), they may still sufficiently corroborate
other statements. To corroborate Quijada’s statements, the
maternal grandmother’s statements only needed to slightly
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connect, directly or circumstantially, Alicia with the acts
described by Quijada, which the maternal grandmother’s
statements did. Shannon and Alicia do not argue Quijada’s
statements were vague or lacking in specificity, and the maternal
grandmother’s statements, though perhaps thin on detail,
sufficiently corroborated Quijada’s account of the abuse.
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Jurisdiction Findings
Shannon, joined by Alicia, argues Quijada’s statements did
not support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings. He argues
that Aisley’s statements “discredited” the statements by Quijada
and the maternal grandmother and that none of the “witnesses
(including Ms. Quijada and [the maternal grandmother])
observed marks, bruises, injuries or evidence of child abuse.” It
was the for the juvenile court, however, to weigh the evidence
and determine the witnesses’ credibility. (See In re M.V. (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 486, 509 [“It is the juvenile court’s role as trier of
fact to weigh the evidence.”]; In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
1183, 1194 [“[i]t is for the juvenile court, not this court, to assess
credibility and weigh the evidence”].) We do not second guess the
juvenile court’s credibility determinations or reweigh the
evidence. (See In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1225
[“When we review a juvenile court’s findings for substantial
evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.”]; In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 135 [“We may
not resolve conflicts in the evidence, reweigh the evidence, or
second guess the juvenile court’s express or implied
determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.”].)
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Shannon (again joined by Alicia) argues that, “even if the
statements of Ms. Quijada were to be taken as true, that [Alicia]
hit him in the nose, arm, shoulder, legs, head with a closed fist,
there was no evidence that any of these events caused [Aisley] to
suffer serious physical harm or illness or placed . . . him at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” Shannon
points out that, in “the six months of investigation and over
twelve interviews, no individual observed marks or bruises” on
Aisley and that the juvenile court did not remove him from Alicia.
The court, however, need not wait until Alicia’s physical abuse of
Aisley caused him serious physical injury or visible bruising.
(See In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 [“‘The court need not
wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’”];
In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602 [same].) Given the
evidence that Alicia hit Aisley more than once and that she had
issues controlling her anger with Aisley, substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s finding Aisley was at serious risk
of physical harm or illness. (See In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
1214, 1220 [substantial evidence supported the finding the child
was at substantial risk of harm, where the parent “had not yet
addressed his serious anger management issues”].)
Finally, Shannon argues that the juvenile court’s dismissal
of the count under section 300, subdivision (a), made the count
under section 300, subdivision (b), “unsustainable” because, if
“the court found the evidence lacking for the [subdivision (a)]
count, it is not logically possible to find other evidence that would
sustain the [subdivision (b)] count.” As noted, however, the
juvenile court did not dismiss the count under section 300,
subdivision (a). In any event, the same evidence may support
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jurisdiction under one subdivision of section 300 and not another,
and one basis for jurisdiction is sufficient. (See In re Mia Z.
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 883, 894 [“Only one jurisdictional finding
is required for the dependency court to assert jurisdiction over a
child.”].)4
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction findings and disposition orders are
affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
4 Alicia and Shannon argue that, because substantial
evidence did not support the jurisdiction findings, we should
reverse the disposition orders along with the jurisdiction
findings. Because we affirm the jurisdiction findings, we affirm
the disposition orders as well.
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