Filed 8/13/26 In re A.V. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re A.V. et al., Persons Coming Under B350009
the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. Nos.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 23CCJP02501A,
FAMILY SERVICES, 23CCJP02501B
Plaintiff and Respondent, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
v.
L.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on August 12, 2026 be
modified as follows:
On page 1, the first sentence under the case title is deleted
and the following is inserted in its place: “APPEAL from orders of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile
Court Referee, and Debra L. Losnick, Judge.”
There is no change in the judgment.
_________________________________________________________________
EGERTON, Acting P.J. HANASONO, J. KARNOW, J.
Retired Judge of the San Francisco County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
Filed 8/12/26 In re A.V. CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re A.V. et al., Persons B350009
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 23CCJP02501A,
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 23CCJP02501B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
_________________________
Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s (1) order partially
granting the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services’ (DCFS) petition under Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 388 to end mother’s unmonitored, overnight
weekend visits, and (2) juvenile custody “exit” order giving
mother reasonable unmonitored visits “as arranged by the
parties,” with father to have “tie-breaking authority.” Mother
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ending her
overnight visits with the children under sections 388 and 362.4,
and “improperly delegated too much visitation authority” to
father in its exit order. We affirm the court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Events leading to sustaining of petition
On July 26, 2023, mother was in a hit-and-run car accident
while driving drunk with her two sons A.V. (then age eight) and
T.V. (then age four) in the car. Mother’s blood alcohol level was
.25 percent. The children weren’t injured. Mother was arrested
for felony child endangerment, felony DUI, and assault on a
police officer. (Mother had bitten her lip and spat blood in the
face of one of the responding officers.) She also had been driving
with a suspended license. DCFS was called to the scene and
took the children into protective custody.
In an interview from jail, mother said she regretted
drinking and driving without a license. She told the social
worker she had been angry because her partner Adriana
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
had left.2 Mother said they had a history of domestic violence.
(DCFS had received earlier referrals involving domestic violence
between mother and Adriana.) On the day of the accident,
mother had bought “three shot bottles of alcohol.” With the boys
in the car, she drove to a parking lot—drinking on the way—
parked the car, and continued to drink. When mother drove
out of the parking lot, she hit a parked car. She kept driving
“ ‘out of fear, but . . . later pulled over.’ ” Mother was remorseful
that she had put her children “in a dangerous situation.”
Mother admitted she had a history of alcohol abuse
but said she now was a social drinker and had been sober “for
a couple of months.” She also admitted she smoked marijuana
“socially.” She said she had a medical marijuana card. (Mother
later said she used edible marijuana for pain.) Mother wanted
to move on from her relationship with Adriana and planned to
move in with maternal grandmother.
On July 28, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging
mother had a history of substance abuse, including alcohol
and marijuana, and had endangered the children by driving
under the influence while the children were passengers in
the car. At the July 31 detention hearing, the court removed
the children from parental custody and placed them with
maternal grandmother in San Bernardino. Mother was “allowed
reasonable monitored visits with the children” at a minimum
of twice a week for two hours each visit. DCFS had discretion
2 Mother and father had separated in 2018, and mother met
Adriana in 2019. The children hadn’t had contact with father
“in years.” Mother and maternal grandmother said father had
committed domestic violence against mother.
3
to liberalize the visits. The court ordered Adriana not to join
mother at any of her visits with the children. (Later, Adriana
was permitted to join in mother’s visits.)
Maternal grandmother had been monitoring mother’s visits
with the children on the weekends. The children enjoyed seeing
mother. Mother had maintained her relationship with Adriana
and continued to live with her. Mother had tested positive for
marijuana at each of her weekly drug tests.
In September, father appeared in court and asked for
visitation. The court granted father reasonable, monitored
visitation at a minimum of three visits a week. In October,
he began visiting the children on Sundays, monitored by
maternal grandparents.3
At the December 5, 2023 combined jurisdiction/disposition
hearing, the court sustained the petition and removed the
children from parents. Parents were granted reasonable
monitored visits at a minimum of two visits a week for two hours
each visit. DCFS had discretion to liberalize the parents’ visits
with the children. The court ordered mother to participate
in a six-month, full drug and alcohol program with aftercare
and weekly random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing,
a domestic violence support group for victims, a parenting
program, and individual counseling to address case issues.
The court ordered father to participate in weekly drug and
alcohol testing, a 12-step drug and alcohol program, a parenting
program, and individual counseling.
3 We refer to maternal grandmother and step-maternal
grandfather as “maternal grandparents.”
4
2. Mother’s progress with her case plan
Mother had enrolled in an outpatient treatment program
through Southern California Alcohol and Drug Program Inc.
(SCADP) on August 21, 2023. She had attended individual and
group sessions, individual therapy sessions and joint sessions
with Adriana, parenting classes, and online AA meetings.
Mother tested positive each week for marijuana, however. She
stopped testing and attending in-person services for her program
in May 2024. Mother continued to test weekly for DCFS—
she tested positive for marijuana from May 22 through July 8.
On July 25, mother was discharged from the SCADP treatment
program due to her continued use of marijuana. The court
repeatedly had admonished mother she could not test positive
for any substances, including alcohol and marijuana.
As of September 19, 2024—the date of DCFS’s 12-month
status review report—mother continued to test positive for
marijuana, but her levels had begun to decrease. Mother told
the social worker she was taking “detox” pills. She said she used
marijuana for sleep and body pain. Mother again said she had
a medical marijuana card but didn’t give the social worker any
medical documentation. On September 26, mother re-enrolled
in SCADP’s outpatient treatment program.
As of January 2025, mother was in partial compliance with
her case plan. Mother had participated in individual counseling
through SCADP and had completed her parenting program
as of July 29, 2024. Mother also had started a domestic violence
program on October 4, 2024, and had completed half the sessions.
Mother’s last positive test for marijuana was on November 7,
at a low level. Mother tested negative for marijuana for the
rest of the case.
5
On December 12, 2024, mother was convicted of DUI
and endangering the children. The court sentenced mother to
four years of probation and required her to enroll in a nine-month
DUI program, complete a 52-hour parenting program, and
complete five days of community service. Mother also was
served with a three-year criminal protective order protecting
the children. The order allowed mother to have “peaceful
contact” with the children “only for the safe exchange of children
and court-ordered visitation as stated in” the juvenile court’s
order issued in “August 2023.”4
3. Visitation during six- and 12-month review periods
Mother was not visiting the children in-person each week.
She didn’t have a car to drive to maternal grandmother’s home
in San Bernardino and, although maternal grandmother
encouraged her, she wouldn’t take the train, bus, or an Uber
to San Bernardino. Accordingly, mother had visits with the
children only when maternal grandmother or step-grandfather
could drive them to the Los Angeles area. The children were
“very happy and excited” when they saw mother. Mother had
daily video calls with the children before school in the morning
and “before bedtime to say prayers.” Father was visiting the
children once a week on the weekends—monitored by maternal
grandparents—at maternal grandparents’ backyard or “out
to eat.” The visits were going well.
4 The juvenile court made no visitation orders in August
2023. On July 31, 2023—the detention hearing—the court
ordered mother’s visits were to be monitored and gave DCFS
discretion to liberalize her visits.
6
A.V. told the social worker he missed mother and asked
every month about when he could return home to live with her.
He also said he “love[d] visiting with his father.” T.V. also missed
mother but said he wanted to continue living with maternal
grandparents—he was happy and it was “fun” living there.
Father wanted custody of the children. Mother didn’t want
father “ ‘anywhere near’ ” the children; she wanted the children
back.
On July 30, the juvenile court continued reunification
services for parents. The court ordered mother’s visits remain
monitored and gave DCFS discretion to liberalize them.
The court modified father’s visits to unmonitored day visits.
Father began unmonitored visits with the children. He drove to
maternal grandparents’ home in San Bernardino most Saturdays
and also was to begin picking the children up after school one
day a week. The children enjoyed their visits with him. A.V.
wanted those visits to continue no matter where he lived. He
was “worried” he wouldn’t be able to visit father if he returned
to live with mother.
As of August 28, 2024, mother hadn’t seen the children
because maternal grandparents hadn’t driven out to her area.
According to DCFS, mother had not tried to visit the children
in San Bernardino—she “continue[d] to make excuses” about
transportation. On September 1, she had a visit with the
children at maternal great-grandmother’s home in the
Los Angeles area. She also had a visit on September 20 at a
restaurant. The visit went well, but the children had to miss
school for it. A.V. said “he would love to visit with his mother
just like he does with his father” (meaning, unmonitored visits).
A.V. wanted to return to live with his mother and his “second
7
mother Adriana.” He missed them both. T.V. said he missed his
mother and liked visiting his father, but he wanted to continue
living with maternal grandparents.
For the September 30, 2024 12-month review hearing,
DCFS recommended father’s unmonitored visits be liberalized
to include overnights. At the review hearing, the court found
mother’s progress remained “partial.” Mother’s visits were
to remain monitored, but the court gave DCFS discretion to
liberalize them. The court continued reunification services
to the 18-month date.
4. 18-month review period
On October 5, 2024, and January 3 and 4, 2025, mother
had visits with the children when maternal grandmother drove
them to the Los Angeles area. On November 3, 2024, mother and
Adriana went to visit the children at maternal grandmother’s
home in San Bernardino, and they attended an event at the
children’s school on November 27. Mother had no visits
in December: maternal grandmother hadn’t traveled to
Los Angeles, and mother hadn’t traveled to San Bernardino.
During this time, father had four overnight visits with the boys
and three day visits. A.V. wanted to live with both parents,
whom he missed. He said if he didn’t have a choice to return
to living with mother, then he would like to live with father.
T.V. wanted to continue to live with maternal grandparents.
He liked visiting father, but did not want to live with him.
At the January 29, 2025 hearing, father’s counsel told
the court father wanted the children to be released to him, but
agreed they should stay with maternal grandparents until
8
the end of the school year.5 Mother’s counsel wanted to set
the hearing for contest for the return of the children to her
custody or the liberalization of her visits. The court set the
contested hearing for March 5, 2025.
In February 2025, the social worker separately met
with father, mother, and maternal grandparents. Father told
the social worker he would like custody of the children, “with
an appropriate plan of the children remaining” in maternal
grandparents’ care so they could finish the school year and
complete summer school. He was in the process of looking for
a new home. Maternal grandparents agreed with the plan.
Mother also was “fine” with the plan—she “just want[ed] the
children to do well and continue seeing their father.” She was
looking for a new home closer to her family.
On February 27, father’s apartment burned and his
belongings were stolen. He told DCFS he now wanted to move
forward with the children remaining with maternal grandparents
under a legal guardianship to give him time to find “a stable
and suitable home.”
At the March 5 hearing, however, father’s counsel asked
for a continuance and asserted father still agreed with the plan
of taking custody of the children, but having them remain with
maternal grandparents. The court continued the hearing to
March 26. The court and attorneys discussed the criminal
protective order. The court said the peaceful contact exclusion
5 DCFS reported that, on January 28, 2025, father said he
wanted them to remain in maternal grandparents’ care where
they were doing so well but did not want to give up his parental
rights.
9
in the protective order would allow mother to have unmonitored
visits with the children should DCFS liberalize her visits. The
court’s minute order, however, stated DCFS had “discretion to
liberalize [mother’s visits] to unmonitored although noting that
a Criminal Restraining Order may be in effect prohibiting the
mother’s contact [with] the children.”
On March 17, the social worker consulted with a
Los Angeles county deputy district attorney (DDA) who told her
mother would not violate her probation if the court granted
her unmonitored visits. He noted the protective order could be
modified, but it stated mother “may have peaceful contact for
her visits.”
As of March 24, mother was ready to begin her program’s
aftercare services. She also had completed a domestic violence
program. Earlier in March, mother had celebrated T.V.’s
birthday in an unmonitored visit at a “jumping place” in a mall.
Mother’s attorney had called maternal grandmother after
the March 5 hearing and told her that mother could start
unmonitored visits. The social worker told maternal
grandmother and mother the visits should continue to be
monitored until DCFS had completed its assessment.
Father picked up the children from school to celebrate
T.V.’s birthday but returned them that evening. He hadn’t been
having overnight visits because he still was looking for a home in
San Bernardino to be near the children. Until then, he planned
to live with paternal grandmother and his minor brother. DCFS
recommended the court release the children to father with the
appropriate plan that they stay with maternal grandparents
and that mother start unmonitored visits with the children.
10
At the March 26 continued 18-month review hearing,
minors’ counsel said the children wanted her to tell the court
that they wished to stay with their grandparents. Minors’
counsel had no safety concerns as to father and agreed with the
recommendation and the appropriate plan. Counsel also agreed
with unmonitored visits for mother. Mother’s counsel asked
the court to release the children to mother or, alternatively, for
unmonitored visits with discretion to liberalize. DCFS’s counsel
said DCFS was “actively working with mother” on unmonitored
visitation and was “very hopeful about her starting overnights
soon.” The court made a home of parent father order and ordered
mother to continue with her programs. The court granted DCFS
discretion to liberalize mother’s visits from unmonitored to
overnights. The court set a progress hearing for June 11 to see
how parents were doing and to assess a home of parent mother
order.
5. Post-18-month review hearing
The children were doing well under father’s and maternal
grandparents’ care. Father was picking up the children on
Sunday and returning them to maternal grandparents’ home on
Wednesday or Thursday. A.V. said he would like to live with his
father or grandparents. He didn’t want to live with mother and
Adriana because they were “strict.” T.V. was fine living with
father.
Mother had three visits with the children during April—
on April 11, 25, and 26. In May, mother consistently visited the
children every Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. Mother wanted
to begin overnight weekend visits and to regain custody of the
children. A.V. said he liked visiting with mother, but he did not
want to visit with her on two weekends because he wanted to
11
stay with father. T.V. also liked visiting with mother. Mother
was doing well in SCADP’s aftercare program. She was
attending one group class weekly and continued to test negative.
She also was participating in individual parenting sessions.
On June 20, 2025, mother filed a section 388 petition
asking the juvenile court to return the children to her custody,
allow her an extended visit during summer break, or order
overnight visits. The court set the petition for hearing on
August 4, 2025. The court ordered DCFS had discretion to
liberalize mother’s visits with the children and “to assist in the
possible shared custody arrangement of the children between
the father and the mother.”
DCFS filed its response to the petition on July 24. During
June, mother consistently visited the children every Friday,
Saturday, and Sunday. From July 6 to 16, the children stayed
at maternal great-grandmother’s home. While there, mother
picked the children up for two-hour visits in the morning before
she went to work. Mother said she picked the children up
on Fridays from summer school and took them to her home in
Los Angeles for their visit. She dropped them off in the evening
at maternal great-grandmother’s home and picked them up
the next morning for breakfast and engaged in activities with
them throughout the day.
On July 16, the social worker observed a visit at mother’s
home. Mother and Adriana were appropriate with the children.
The social worker reviewed a visitation plan with mother,
effective July 18: mother was to have unmonitored visits on
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday and return the children to father
on Sunday afternoon.
12
Mother was doing well in her aftercare program and
would complete the program in September. DCFS recommended
the court grant mother’s petition for overnight visits and deny
her request for return of the children. On August 4, the court
granted mother’s petition in part by allowing her to have
unmonitored overnight and weekend visits. DCFS had discretion
to liberalize mother’s visits further, including “a possible home
of parents recommendation if it’s appropriate.”
On September 2, DCFS filed an ex parte application asking
the court “to revert” mother’s unmonitored visits to monitored
day visits and to terminate her overnight visits. On August 13,
2025, DCFS had “conducted a routine CLETS search on the
family” and learned Adriana had been arrested on January 26,
2025 for DUI. She hit a parked car, pushing it into another car.
Adriana had “a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath
and person” and was uncooperative with the responding officer.
Adriana’s blood alcohol level was .20 percent or more. On
July 23, 2025, she pleaded not guilty to DUI and another count.
Her pretrial hearing was set for October 14, 2025.
On August 14, the social worker had called mother about
why she hadn’t informed DCFS about Adriana’s DUI arrest.
Mother said, “ ‘I was not there. I don’t know very much and
don’t know details. Adriana was with her family.’ ” The social
worker told mother Adriana no longer could drive the children
until it obtained more information, including whether she had
a valid driver’s license. The social worker also asked Adriana
about the status of her case, as she had been driving the children
for visits. Adriana said she wasn’t driving the children at the
time of the incident. On August 21, the social worker asked
Adriana about the status of her license. She said, “ ‘I will get
13
it to you as soon as I can.’ ” Adriana had not given DCFS the
information as of the date of the application.
DCFS was concerned about the children’s safety because
mother had withheld from DCFS Adriana’s DUI arrest and
“willingly and knowingly allowed” Adriana to drive the children
from San Bernardino to the Los Angeles area. DCFS noted the
similarities between mother’s and Adriana’s cases: they both
were charged with DUI after getting into car accidents due
to driving under the influence, were uncooperative with law
enforcement, and had put the children at risk and/or jeopardized
their safety. DCFS would not have recommended unmonitored
visits had it known of Adriana’s DUI arrest. It believed mother’s
“lack of insight and cooperation, continue[d] to endanger the
children’s physical health and safety and place[d] the children
at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.”
DCFS simultaneously filed a section 388 petition asking
the court to order mother’s visits to be monitored based on its
ex parte application. On September 4, the court ordered mother
could continue her unmonitored day and overnight visits with
the children until the matter could be heard on September 10,
but only father or the maternal grandmother could drive the
children for mother’s visits.6 Meanwhile, on September 8,
DCFS learned Adriana’s driver’s license had been suspended or
revoked on February 25, 2025, for excessive blood alcohol level.
6 As DCFS notes, the court’s minute order—apparently
in error—stated mother also could drive the children. At the
next two hearings, mother’s attorney stated the order did
not permit mother or Adriana to drive the children. At the
October 17 hearing, the court also said the order prevented
mother and Adriana from driving the children.
14
On September 10, the court continued the hearing on DCFS’s
section 388 petition to September 24. DCFS filed a status review
report on September 16. On August 25, the social worker again
had asked the DDA about the criminal protective order. He said
that, due to the full stay away order, mother could not be granted
custody of the children. She would have to return to the criminal
court to have the order modified.
The children had been doing well in father’s care. He now
was renting a home in San Bernardino. A.V. wanted to continue
living with father. T.V. said he wanted to live with mother
because there were pets, more toys, and he could play outside.
(Father’s yard didn’t have a fence.) Father was in compliance
with his court-ordered programs. Father wanted the case to
close with the children in his care and for them to visit mother
on the weekends. He said he would continue to communicate
with mother and “co-parent to the best of his ability” for the
children’s “wellbeing.”
Mother wanted primary custody of the children. She stated
she had “made a big mistake” by driving intoxicated and putting
the children’s safety at risk. Mother was in compliance with
her court-ordered programs and continued to test negative at
her weekly drug tests. She had completed her substance abuse
treatment program on August 25, 2025. According to the report,
however, mother had “gained no insight as to the issues that led
her family to the attention of [DCFS] by evidence of the recent
DUI arrest for” Adriana, and mother having “knowingly allowed”
Adriana to drive the children. In DCFS’s assessment, the
risk level to the children if returned to mother was “high.”
(Boldface omitted.) DCFS recommended the court terminate
its jurisdiction and enter a custody order granting parents
15
joint legal custody, sole physical custody to father, and monitored
visits for mother.
In a last minute information report (LMI) filed
September 18, DCFS updated the court—as it had requested—
on who the children said had been driving them while in mother’s
custody. On May 9, mother and Adriana had picked the children
up from school and driven them to Los Angeles for a day visit.
In July, mother told the social worker she had picked the
children up from maternal grandmother’s on July 6 and July 16
and returned them in the afternoon. Father told the social
worker that, on June 12, Adriana had given him a ride with
mother and the children in the car. He didn’t know her license
had been suspended. He said mother had allowed Adriana to
drive the children for “several months.” The section 388 hearing
was continued to October 17.
DCFS filed an LMI for the court on October 14. On
September 18, the DDA said he would not recommend removing
the full criminal protective order as mother “has not learned from
her DUI case as she allowed . . . Adriana . . . to drive the children
with a revoked driver’s license.” As of September 16, mother
had completed 36 of 52 parenting classes in her criminal case
and still had to complete a nine-month licensed DUI program.
She remained on probation.
On October 16, DCFS filed another LMI. On October 15,
father told the social worker that, on Friday, October 10, mother
and Adriana had picked the children up from school and driven
them to maternal grandparents’ home to drop off A.V., who
had a football game on Saturday. T.V. at first said maternal
grandparents had driven him but then admitted it was mother
16
and Adriana. DCFS believed T.V. was not being honest about his
visits with mother to protect her and Adriana.
On October 17, the court heard DCFS’s section 388 petition
and the section 364 review hearing. Mother’s counsel asked the
court to deny the petition and keep mother’s visits unmonitored
with overnights. Counsel argued mother “did not deliberately
hide information” from DCFS—she wasn’t living with Adriana
in January when Adriana was arrested. Mother’s visits also
were monitored at that time. Counsel argued there was no
information that mother had actual knowledge that Adriana’s
license had been suspended. Counsel asserted neither mother
nor Adriana had driven the children since the court made its
orders when DCFS filed its petition. Minors’ counsel joined with
mother’s counsel. Counsel said the children told her maternal
grandmother had driven them, and maternal grandmother
confirmed that. Counsel noted the children had been having
overnight visits with mother—they loved spending time with
mother and Adriana. Mother also had been their custodial
parent before her DUI arrest. Minors’ counsel did not think
it would be in the children’s best interests to change mother’s
visits to monitored.
DCFS’s counsel argued “that mother was clueless about
her partner’s situation with a DUI [since January] strains
credibility.” Counsel noted that, when confronted with the
information, mother was not cooperative with DCFS, telling
the social worker she didn’t know anything and to ask Adriana.
Mother had let Adriana drive the children after Adriana’s DUI
despite the case having begun due to mother’s own DUI. Counsel
argued mother’s conduct “suggest[ed] a complete . . . lack of
insight.” Counsel also noted mother had not gone to the criminal
17
court to change the criminal protective order, which didn’t expire
until 2027. Counsel argued it was appropriate for the court to
revert mother’s visits to monitored in light of her dishonesty
about her partner’s violation of the criminal court orders, and
“when mother is able to change her criminal protective order,
she can go back and she can fight for 50/50 custody.”
After hearing argument, the juvenile court stated, “I’m
very concerned. This mother just lied outright. There is just no
question. She knew exactly what her partner was doing. She
knew that—because she was also ordered not to drive. . . . It just
belies any possibility of her not knowing. [¶] Further, she’s got
a DUI. That she hasn’t even tried to go to court and modify it.
And she can’t have . . . custody of these children unless and until
that [criminal protective order] has been modified or changed or
. . . stricken.” The court partially granted the section 388 petition
by terminating mother’s overnight visits but allowed mother
unmonitored day visits.
The court then made the following orders, over DCFS’s
objection: joint legal custody to the parents and sole physical
custody to father; mother’s visits “to be reasonable unmonitored
visits as arranged between the parties,” and “father to have
tie-breaking authority”; mother and Adriana are not allowed
to transport the children without a valid driver’s license and
insurance; and mother was to comply with the criminal court
orders. The court explained mother would have to go to criminal
court and have the protective order modified—and probably
would have to go to family court—in order for the children to
be placed with her. Mother’s counsel objected to father having
tie-breaking authority. The court terminated its jurisdiction,
stayed pending receipt of the juvenile custody order. The court
18
received and issued the juvenile court custody order on
October 22, 2025 and terminated its jurisdiction.
The custody order stated:
“Father and mother have joint legal custody
of the children. Father has sole physical
and primary custody of the children. Father
has tie[-]breaking authority. Mother has
reasonable unmonitored visits, as arranged
by the parties. [¶] Mother and her significant
other are not to transport the children without
a valid license and insurance. [¶] Mother to
comply with criminal court orders. Mother
needs to modify the criminal protective order
before making any changes to this custody
order in the family court.”
The visitation order attachment in turn stated:
“Father and Mother have joint legal custody
of the children. Father has sole physical
and primary custody of the children. Father
has tie[-]breaking authority. Mother has
reasonable unmonitored visits, as arranged
by the parties.”
Mother appealed from both orders.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not abuse its discretion in ending
mother’s overnight visits with the children
a. Applicable law and standard of review
The juvenile court has the power to regulate visitation
between dependent children and their parents. (In re Jennifer G.
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 (Jennifer G.).) “Thus, the court
19
must define the rights of the parties to visitation. The definition
of such a right necessarily involves a balancing of the interests
of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child.
In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its
judicial discretion should determine whether there should be
any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of
visitation. The court may, of course, impose any other conditions
or requirements to further define the right to visitation in light
of the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (Id. at
p. 757.) Although parental visitation must be “as frequent
as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child,” “[n]o
visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(A) & (B).)
Section 388 provides for the change or modification of the
juvenile court’s orders on a showing of new evidence or a change
of circumstances and that the proposed change or modification is
in the best interests of the child. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1) & (h).) The petitioner—here, DCFS—
bears the burden of proving (1) there is new evidence or a change
of circumstances, and (2) the proposed change or modification
is in the child’s best interests. (In re Matthew M. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194 (Matthew M.).)
“We review the court’s best interest determination, the
second step, for abuse of discretion and may disturb the exercise
of that discretion only in the rare case when the court has made
an arbitrary or irrational determination. [Citations.] We do not
inquire whether substantial evidence would have supported a
different order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the juvenile court. [Citation.] We ask
only whether the juvenile court abused its discretion with respect
20
to the order it made.” (Matthew M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1194–1195; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
318–319 [“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision
for that of the trial court.” ’ ”].)
“Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation upon
terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child.” (In re J.M.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112 (J.M.), citing § 362.4, subd. (a);
In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203 (Chantal S.).) “Such
orders become part of any family court proceeding concerning the
same child and will remain in effect until they are terminated or
modified by the family court.” (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
1119, 1123 (T.H.); § 362.4, subd. (b).)
“When making a custody [or visitation] determination
under section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration
must always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re T.S.
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513; accord, J.M., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) “The court must be guided by the totality
of the circumstances” to determine what orders are “in the
child’s best interests.” (J.M., at p. 112, citing Chantal S., supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 201.) “ ‘[T]he juvenile court, which has been
intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best situated
to make custody [and visitation] determinations based on the
best interests of the child without any preferences or
presumptions.’ ” (J.M., at p. 112; see also Chantal S., at p. 204
[recognizing “there are situations in which a juvenile court may
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reasonably determine that continued supervision of the minor
as a dependent child is not necessary for the child’s protection,
and at the same time conclude that conditions on visitation are
necessary to minimize, if not eliminate, the danger that visits
subject the minor to the same risk of physical abuse or emotional
harm that previously led to the dependency adjudication”].)
“[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
[and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case.” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251,
265, fn. 4.) We also review the juvenile court’s exit orders issued
under section 362.4 for an abuse of discretion. (J.M., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)
b. The court did not abuse its discretion under either
section 388 or 362.4 in limiting mother’s unmonitored
visits
Mother essentially concedes DCFS submitted new evidence
—that mother’s partner had been arrested for a DUI and her
license suspended. Mother contends DCFS failed to prove the
discontinuance of her overnight visits was in the children’s best
interests. She similarly contends the court erred in providing
mother only unmonitored day visits in the exit order. In so
arguing, mother focuses on the positive overnight visits she
and her boys had enjoyed since August 4, 2025—when the
court liberalized her unmonitored visits to include overnights—
and ignores the effect the new evidence had on the children’s
best interests.
DCFS did not dispute that mother’s visits with the
children—both day and overnight—had been going well. The
children wanted to visit mother and enjoyed their visits with
her and Adriana. The social worker found the visits were
22
appropriate. Mother also had completed her substance abuse
treatment program and had tested negative for marijuana since
November 2024.7
Despite this progress, mother allowed her live-in partner
Adriana to drive the children, knowing—as the trial court found
—she had been charged with DUI. Mother again was putting her
children’s safety at risk while at the same time acknowledging
she had made a “big mistake” by driving drunk and endangering
the children. DCFS stated it would not have recommended
unmonitored visits at all—much less overnight visits—had it
known about Adriana’s accident and DUI arrest and that mother
nevertheless allowed her to drive the children.
Adriana’s license was suspended on February 25, 2025,
and—as of September 3—remained suspended. Mother claimed
she had no knowledge of Adriana’s DUI or her suspended license
because they weren’t living together when Adriana was arrested
in January. Critically, the court found mother “lied outright”—
she knew what her partner was doing and that Adriana’s license
would have been suspended because mother lost her own driving
privileges after her DUI. We will not second guess the court’s
credibility finding or reweigh the evidence.
In any event, even if mother were unaware in January
about Adriana’s DUI arrest, the court reasonably could conclude
mother knew Adriana was arraigned and charged with DUI
in July, as the couple lived together. Moreover, even after the
social worker asked mother in August about Adriana’s DUI and
told her Adriana was not allowed to drive the children, mother let
7 Mother had not, however, completed her nine-month
DUI program ordered by the criminal court.
23
her do so. As of September 2025, mother also had not “presented
a valid driver’s license” to DCFS, yet drove the children.
Indeed, mother did not seem to understand the seriousness
of the situation—how allowing Adriana to drive the children
placed them at risk. Nor did mother appreciate the similarities
between Adriana’s accident and DUI arrest and mother’s own
that led to her children’s removal. The juvenile court was “very
concerned.” We can infer the court found mother no longer
could be trusted with the children for overnight/weekend visits.
We thus reject mother’s contention that DCFS did not
prove terminating mother’s overnight visits was in the children’s
best interests, and the court abused its discretion by doing so.
As DCFS asserts, a finding that continuing the overnight
visitation order would be detrimental to the children was
equivalent to finding ending overnight visits would be in their
best interests. (See In re Randalynne G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
1156, 1169 [explaining best interests and detriment standards
—in context of court refusing to increase parent’s visitation—
“are basically two sides of the same coin”; “[w]hat is in the
best interests of the child is essentially the same as that which
is not detrimental to the child”], superseded on another ground
by statute as stated in In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1294–
1296.) Although mother’s visits had gone well, the court’s
safety concerns for the children leading it to terminate mother’s
overnight visits were valid and reasonable.
Moreover, the record demonstrates the court did consider
the best interests of the children. The court denied DCFS’s
petition in part, allowing mother to continue her unmonitored
day visits with the children. We thus can infer the court
recognized the children benefited from spending unmonitored
24
time with mother and fashioned an order that balanced that
benefit with the court’s concerns for their safety and well-being.
(J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112 [court must consider the
totality of the circumstances].) We find no abuse of discretion.
For the same reasons, it was not unreasonable for the court
to grant mother unmonitored day visits, but not overnight visits,
in the custody order. The court made the custody order on the
same day it terminated mother’s overnight visits. The court thus
did not abuse its discretion in implicitly finding the children’s
interests would best be served by day-only unmonitored visits
with mother at the termination of its jurisdiction.
Moreover, mother wanted the children returned to her
custody, but as the court noted, she never tried to have the
criminal protective order modified to allow for that possibility.
Mother contends the court “may have misinterpreted” the
criminal court’s protective order in finding it prevented her from
being granted custody of the children. We disagree. The court
earlier had found the peaceful contact exception to the stay away
order would allow mother to have unmonitored visits as ordered
by the court. Although the court contemplated the possibility
of returning the children to both parents, that was before DCFS
learned mother let Adriana drive the children after her DUI
arrest. It also was before the DDA advised DCFS that the
full stay away order prevented mother from obtaining custody,
although it did allow unmonitored visits if ordered by the court.
The court also never found the peaceful contact exception would
allow mother to have custody.
Mother argues the protective order was ambiguous and
the court was required to consult with the criminal court. We
disagree. The order allowed peaceful contact for visits as ordered
25
by the juvenile court in August 2023. As the parties note, the
court issued no visitation orders in August but did on July 31,
2023. The court reasonably could find the date was a
typographical error. The juvenile court’s July 31 order granted
mother monitored visits and gave DCFS discretion to liberalize
those visits, i.e., to unmonitored. Reasonably, an order allowing
mother to have unmonitored visits would not violate the criminal
protective order, but an order returning the children to mother’s
custody—which would have been much broader than overnight
visits—would.8 The court also reasonably could rely on the
DDA’s interpretation of the criminal protective order, as stated
in DCFS’s reports—a DDA was present at mother’s December 12,
2024 hearing when the protective order was served. Accordingly,
the criminal protective order was sufficiently clear.
In any event, even if the protective order would have
allowed mother to have custody of the children, it is not
reasonably probable the court would have granted mother
custody in its exit orders, having just terminated mother’s
overnight visits in response to DCFS’s section 388 petition.
Any purported error by the juvenile court in not “reach[ing] out
to the criminal court to clarify the protective order[ ]”—as mother
argues was required—thus was not prejudicial. (In re Celine R.
8 Mother’s trial counsel seems to have agreed with this
interpretation. At the March 5, 2025 hearing, during the court’s
discussion with counsel about the criminal protective order,
mother’s counsel said she understood—as did mother’s criminal
attorney—that under the protective order’s exception, whatever
visitation orders the juvenile court made would not require
modification of the protective order “unless we were promised
a returning back to the mother.” (Italics added.)
26
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 780, 800–802.)
2. The court did not impermissibly delegate mother’s
right to visitation to father
“The power to determine the right and extent of visitation
by a noncustodial parent in a dependency case resides with
the court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or
private parties. [Citation.] This rule of nondelegation applies
to exit orders issued when dependency jurisdiction is terminated.
[Citations.]” (T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.)
A visitation order may properly delegate responsibility for
managing the details of visits, including their time, place and
manner, however. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367,
1374 (Moriah T.).) “Only when the court delegates the discretion
to determine whether any visitation will occur does the court
improperly delegate its authority.” (In re Christopher H. (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009 (Christopher H).)
Mother contends the juvenile court improperly delegated
“most of the visitation decision” to father by giving him “tie-
breaking authority.” DCFS contends “[t]he grant of tie-breaking
authority to father had nothing to do with visitation. . . . [T]he
visitation order was, ‘mother has reasonable unmonitored visits,
as arranged by the parties’ ” and that order “did not give father
the authority to deny mother visits.” Within the same paragraph
under “[o]ther findings and orders,” the custody order states:
“Father and mother have joint legal custody of the children.
Father has sole physical and primary custody of the children.
Father has tie[-]breaking authority. Mother has reasonable
unmonitored visits, as arranged by the parties.” The visitation
order attached to the custody order (form JV-205) states mother
27
will have the children with her “as follows:” and then repeats
the above paragraph.
We agree with DCFS that the court’s order granting
mother “reasonable unmonitored visits, as arranged by the
parties,” did not give father authority to deny mother visits.
Mother relies on T.H. There, the court ordered the father was
to have supervised visitation “ ‘to be determined by the parents.’ ”
(T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) The appellate court
described the visitation order as “provid[ing] that supervised
visitation would occur, but only upon the ‘agreement of the
parents.’ ” (Ibid.) The court concluded the juvenile court
“abused its discretion by framing its order in a way that gave
mother an effective veto power over” father’s right to supervised
visitation. (Id. at p. 1124.) The court’s order here is not the
same. It ordered mother had a right to reasonable unmonitored
visits with the children, with parents to arrange the details of
the visits. It didn’t order mother’s visits would occur only if
parents agreed, as the court found in T.H. (Cf. also In re S.H.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 319 [child’s wishes could not be
“sole factor in determining whether any visitation takes place”].)
The court here did not “ ‘mandate [a] minimum number
of monitored visits per month’ ” (T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1124), but mother’s visits weren’t monitored. No monitor
had to be arranged for visits to occur. Instead, the court gave
parents the flexibility to arrange between themselves the timing
of mother’s unmonitored visits with the children. In other words,
how parents arranged the visits—i.e., the “time, place and
manner of visitation”—did not affect mother’s right to visit
the children. (Jennifer G., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 757;
Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 [“frequency and
28
length of visits are simply aspects of the time, place and manner
of visitation”].) The court thus did not improperly delegate the
power to determine whether mother could visit the children
at all. (See Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005–
1006, 1009 [holding “ ‘bare bones’ ” visitation order issued during
reunification period ordering incarcerated parent was to have
“ ‘reasonable supervised visits’ ” was “a determination that
visitation . . . should occur,” not a delegation of the juvenile
court’s discretion to determine visitation to the social services
agency, noting agency’s role was subject to the court’s
supervision].) In any event, mother never objected to the order’s
lack of specification of the number of visits she was to have
and their duration. To the extent she now argues the order
should have specified the frequency and duration of her visits,
she has forfeited that claim of error. (In re Anthony Q. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 336, 345 [failure to object to an order on a specific
ground generally forfeits appeal of the issue]; In re Dakota H.
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [forfeiture doctrine “applies
in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent
a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the
proceedings”].)
At the hearing, mother did object to father having tie-
breaking authority. It isn’t clear from the custody order whether
father’s tie-breaking authority was limited to decisions parents—
as joint holders of legal custody—would have to make on behalf
of the children, as DCFS argues, or if it also applied to parents’
arranging of mother’s unmonitored visits. Even if father’s “tie-
breaking authority” applied to mother’s visits, we do not find
father had a veto power over mother’s ability to visit the children,
as mother argues. (See In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796,
29
799–800 [juvenile custody order providing for parents to agree on
the monitor for mother’s supervised visits, and if unable to agree,
custodial parent would choose the monitor, “did not constitute
an impermissible delegation of authority to determine whether
visitation would occur”].) Rather, we construe the trial court’s
order granting tie-breaking authority to father as applicable
only to the time, place, and manner of mother’s visitation.
Moreover, father did not object to mother visiting the
children, as the mother in T.H. had. (See T.H., supra, 190
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1123–1124 [mother objected to father having
any visitation at all, and minor’s counsel was concerned about
parents having joint legal custody because she didn’t believe
parents could work together to make decisions for the children].)
In January 2025, father was concerned mother wasn’t visiting
the children enough—he knew the children missed her. In
September 2025, father told the social worker he wanted custody
of the children, and he wanted them to visit mother on the
weekends, as she had been. He wanted to co-parent with mother
for the children’s well-being. Mother refers to father’s past
domestic violence and absence. Nothing in the record compels
us to conclude father would prevent mother from visiting the
children at all.
As construed, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
exit orders.
30
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
KARNOW, J.*
* Retired Judge of the San Francisco County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
31