Filed 7/31/26 In re A.S. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
In re A.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile C104371
Court Law.
(Super. Ct. Nos.
A COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 25JV3304801, 25JV3304901,
AGENCY, 25JV3305001, 25JV3305101,
Plaintiff and Respondent, 25JV3305201, &
25JV3305401)
v.
C.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant C.S. is father of the minors and appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction and disposition orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 395.)1 In light of the
juvenile court’s termination of dependency jurisdiction as to all minors at father’s
request, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
This family includes father, mother, and seven minors who were M. (age 4), J.
(age 8), W. (age 10), H. (age 10), F. (age 14), A.S. (age 16), and K. (age 17) at the
beginning of dependency proceedings in April 2025. This family was well known to the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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Shasta County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) due to prior child welfare
involvement as far back as 2013. K. turned 18 during the pendency of the proceedings
and in June 2025, the juvenile court dismissed the petition as to K.
In April 2025, the Agency filed a non-detaining petition on behalf of the seven
minors pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (as to F. only), (b), (c), and (j) (as to all
the minors). The petition was filed following an investigation into a video that surfaced
of F. being hit and choked by father and in which F. can be heard yelling, “Stop hitting
me,” “Stop choking me,” and “I’ll be covered in bruises.” Father can be heard saying,
“[F.], I will fuck you up” and “want to fuck around and find out.” Other minors can be
heard screaming and crying saying, “Stop it.” The petition alleged father had anger
issues and physically disciplined the minors, who were suffering serious emotional abuse
due to hearing and witnessing their sibling’s abuse, and taking place in front of mother,
who did nothing to intervene or attempt to protect the minors. It was also alleged that
another adoptive sibling, B., had been detained in December 2024 after suffering similar
abuse and neglect by the parents.
The next day, the juvenile court ordered that the minors remain in the parents’
custody under a program of family maintenance. The Agency’s May and June 2025
reports supported continuance of that order.
Following a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court
found the allegations in the petition true on July 7, 2025. As to disposition, the court
declared the minors dependents of the court and ordered them to remain in the physical
custody of the parents with family maintenance services.
Father appealed from the juvenile court’s July 7, 2025 orders. Thereafter, father
filed a request to dismiss dependency jurisdiction, and the Agency agreed with the
request. On November 5, 2025, the juvenile court granted the request and terminated
dependency jurisdiction as to all minors without issuing any order that continued to
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impact father. We granted father’s request for judicial notice of the court’s November 5,
2025 order.
We directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether this appeal
is moot in light of the court’s termination of dependency jurisdiction, which order is now
final. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.); In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042,
1051 (S.R.)). We conclude the appeal is moot.
DISCUSSION
Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders
are not supported by substantial evidence.
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “ ‘render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.’ ” ’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘ “effective,” ’ two requirements must be met. First, the
plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 276; S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1051 [parent must demonstrate a
specific legal or practical consequence that will be avoided by reversal].) “This rule
applies in the dependency context.” (Ibid.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a case-
by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case
moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“[R]elief is effective when it ‘ “can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status.” [Citation.]’ It follows that, to show a need for effective
relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in
legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of
a child is generally stigmatizing, complaining of ‘ “stigma” ’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect on the plaintiff's legal
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status that is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision. [Citation.]” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.)
Although jurisdiction has been terminated, father cites S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 1054, claiming the appeal is not moot because the sustained allegations of physical
abuse and severe emotional damage are “reportable for inclusion in the CACI,”2 the
Agency is required to forward reports of child abuse to the California Department of
Justice (DOJ) for inclusion in the CACI (Pen. Code, §§ 11169, subd. (a), 11165.9), and
the Agency has made no representation that it has not and does not intend to file a report
with the DOJ for inclusion in the CACI. We are not persuaded.
First, we begin with a brief summary of the two key cases relied on by the parties -
- D.P. and S.R. – and which inform our decision.
In D.P., the father appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding of
“ ‘deliberate, unreasonable, and neglectful acts’ ” by the parents toward the minor. D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.) The court ordered the minor remain in the parents’ care.
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 275.) While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot and declined to
exercise discretionary review on the ground that the parents “ ‘failed to identify a specific
legal or practical negative consequence resulting from the jurisdictional finding.’ ” (D.P.,
at pp. 275-276.) The high court stated the father did not assert he had actually been
reported for inclusion in the CACI or that he would be reported, noting he did not claim
2 “California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) is a database comprised of
substantiated reports of ‘child abuse or severe neglect.’ (Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a);
see [Pen. Code] § 11170.) Certain state agencies are required to forward qualifying
reports to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for inclusion in the CACI. (See [Pen. Code,]
§§ 11165.9, 11169, subd. (a).) ‘[I]nformation included in the CACI is available to a wide
variety of state agencies, employers, and law enforcement,’ and inclusion of a parent’s
conduct in the CACI carries significant consequences for the parent. [Citation.]” (In re
S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1048.)
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to have received written notice of such report from the agency as required by Penal Code
section 11169, subdivision (c) [a person whose conduct was reported to the CACI must
be provided with written notice from the agency]. (D.P., at p. 280.) The Supreme Court
granted the father’s petition for review and concluded that because the father had not
shown that the general neglect allegation was reportable or that it had been reported by
the agency for inclusion in the CACI, the father’s CACI claim was “too speculative to
survive a mootness challenge.” (Id. at pp. 279-280.) Regarding the father’s argument
that his potential inclusion in CACI was sufficient to avoid mootness given the
requirement that the agency forward the report for inclusion therein, the Supreme Court
found the possibility of reporting also too speculative for purposes of avoiding mootness.
(Id. at 280.) Rejecting the court of appeal’s conclusion that it had discretion to consider a
moot appeal only if the father presented specific legal or practice negative consequences,
however, the high court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of whether
discretionary review was warranted. (Id. at p. 287.)
In S.R., the mother challenged the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding of the
mother’s physical violence against her daughters, and the dispositional orders for
removal, counseling, and monitored visitation. (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1050.) The
court subsequently returned the minors to the mother and terminated dependency
jurisdiction. (Ibid.) When the court of appeal invited supplemental briefing on whether
the appeal should be dismissed as moot, the mother argued the allegation underlying the
jurisdictional finding was reportable for inclusion in the CACI and urged the appellate
court to conduct a merits review. (Ibid.) The court of appeal dismissed the mother’s
appeal as moot and declined to exercise its discretion to review the merits. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court in S.R. granted review “to decide whether a parent’s appeal
from a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding survives a mootness challenge where the
parent shows that the allegation underlying the court’s finding is reportable for inclusion
in the CACI.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1050.) The Supreme Court concluded the
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mother demonstrated the sustained allegation of child abuse “has been or will be included
in the CACI” since the agency acknowledged it was required to report the allegations to
the DOJ for inclusion in the CACI, and there was no genuine dispute that the mother
would suffer harm from such inclusion. (S.R., at p. 1053) Thus, the case was not moot,
as the mother demonstrated the specific consequence could be rectified or avoided if she
prevailed in her challenge of the allegation on appeal. (Ibid.)
Here, father argues reportable child abuse or neglect includes physical injury or
death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child, sexual abuse (Pen. Code,
§ 11165.1), neglect (Pen. Code, § 11165.2), willful harming or injuring of a child or
endangering the person or health of a child (Pen. Code, § 11165.3), and unlawful corporal
punishment or injury (Pen. Code, § 11165.4). He asserts that “the conduct described in
the sustained [section 300, subdivisions (a) and (c)] allegations fit[s] the definition of
reportable child abuse” and is therefore “reportable for inclusion in the CACI.”
Unlike S.R., where the parties did not dispute the allegation was reportable, here
the Agency does not concede the point. On the other hand, like D.P., father has not
shown the allegations were legally reportable, does not assert he has actually been
reported for inclusion in the CACI, does not establish that he will actually be reported,
has not submitted any documentation from the Agency or the DOJ establishing that he is
in fact listed in the CACI, and did not claim to have received the required written notice
of such reporting from the Agency (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 279-280), nor does he
otherwise assert having suffered any consequence that could be addressed upon reversal.
We are thus not persuaded that father has been or will be reported to the CACI. Father’s
CACI claim is therefore “too speculative to survive a mootness challenge.” (D.C., at
p. 280.)
Father urges that, even if we find his case moot, we should exercise our discretion
to address the merits of his appeal. “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
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p. 282.) He argues that like the father in D.P., he promptly ameliorated the issues giving
rise to the Agency’s concerns and he should not be prevented from challenging
jurisdictional findings that were not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 286
[“Principles of fairness may thus favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot by
the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent challenging the
jurisdictional finding on appeal”].) However, while the record demonstrates father made
progress in “multiple services and classes in the community to improve his family system
and gain additional parenting skills,” the Agency recommended that he complete the
remainder of those he had yet to finish. Additionally, father participating in services and
showing progress in his case plan and the court terminating dependency jurisdiction does
not have any bearing on whether the allegations were supported by sufficient evidence or
the court had jurisdiction in the first instance. Indeed, the goal of the dependency system
is “to safeguard the welfare of California’s children.” (D.P., at p. 286.) As aptly noted
by the Agency, father’s compliance means “the dependency proceedings achieved their
protective purpose and [] the court’s intervention was no longer necessary.”
Father further argues that failure to address the merits of his appeal will result in
an affirmance of the underlying judgment (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413; In
re Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 724) that will negatively impact him beyond
these proceedings in his ability to continue as a foster parent, in his current employment,
and in any future employment. But father has not shown how he has been or will be
prejudiced by the sustained allegations here when nearly identical allegations were made,
addressed, and upheld on appeal in a related matter involving the minor’s adoptive
sibling B. arising out of the same facts and circumstances.3
3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our files in Shasta County Health and
Human Services Agency v. C.S. (C103652) [father’s appeal from jurisdiction/disposition
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
orders dismissed pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835] and C.S. v.
Superior Court of Shasta County (C105876) [father’s challenge to denial of his section
388 petition regarding jurisdictional findings denied]. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) We
note that a reviewing court may give the parties to an appeal an opportunity to comment
on the propriety of judicial notice taken on the reviewing court’s own motion, if the
matter is of substantial consequence to the appellate opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd.
(d) [judicial notice of court records], 459, subd. (c) [reviewing court may take judicial
notice but must give parties the opportunity to comment under Evid. Code, § 455 if the
matter is of substantial consequence].) The validity of taking judicial notice of these
matters is clear. However, if the parties are aggrieved by this judicial notice, we will
entertain a motion for rehearing to give them an opportunity to address the matter before
the decision becomes final. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (d).)
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