Filed 7/15/26 In re A.R. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re A.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D087506
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521671)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LEILANI R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Office of County Counsel, Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M.
Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Leilani R. (Mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court removing her
14-year-old daughter, A.R. (Child), from Mother’s custody. She claims there
was insufficient evidence of substantial danger to the Child if she remained
with Mother, that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal, or
that there were reasonable means to prevent removal. We find the trial
court’s orders were supported by substantial evidence that Mother and her
partner (Stepfather) created an unsafe environment for Child due to
alcoholism and domestic abuse and had not taken significant steps to
remediate those conditions at the time of the hearing. We therefore affirm.1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Child contacted law enforcement at 3:30 a.m. on August 4, 2025, to
report that Mother was injured. Child did not witness the injury, but
suspected Stepfather had hit Mother with a vase of roses. According to the
responding officer, Mother was “highly intoxicated and bleeding profusely
from the back of her head.” The officer said she had slurred speech and he
“could smell the presence of an alcoholic beverage coming from her person.”
He “asked her multiple times about the why she was bleeding,” and Mother
would not answer. Stepfather said “that she hit her own head.” Mother was
“very uncooperative and . . . tried to force [Child] into the room as to keep her
from talking to Officers.” Mother “was yelling at [Child] and pointing her
finger in her face to not speak to police.”
Child told police that Stepfather and Mother had been arguing, so she
decided to go to bed. Stepfather woke her up because Mother was bleeding
1 Mother’s late-filed reply brief has been accepted for filing and
considered in connection with this opinion.
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and refused to go to the emergency room. Child said that Mother had been
drinking that day. She reported witnessing daily arguments between Mother
and Stepfather and said, “physical violence is common [in] the house.”
The matter was referred to the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency), which began an investigation. The assigned social
worker attempted to visit the home twice on the day of the incident, but no
one answered the door, so a police officer was sent on a welfare check. The
officer said that Mother “looked intoxicated” and that “[h]er demeanor was
aggressive and was not cooperative. Mother told the officer that Child was at
her grandmother’s house and called Child so the officer could confirm she was
okay. She refused to share the grandmother’s address or phone number and
“slammed the door.”
The next day, a social worker made an unannounced visit to the
apartment. She observed that Stepfather had a black eye, and mother had a
large bruise on her arm. The social worker “detected a strong smell of alcohol
on the mother’s breath” and noted Mother’s “overall appearance evidenced
poor self-care.” Mother “denied any domestic violence or alcohol use.”
Mother was not cooperative during further visits. When the social
worker wanted to interview Child, Mother became “highly upset” and only
allowed them to speak briefly and outside of the apartment. When the social
worker “discussed the creation of a safety plan such as [Child] temporarily
staying at her paternal grandmother’s,” Mother “energetically declined.”
Mother also rejected the social worker’s proposal that Stepfather leave the
home temporarily.
Child’s paternal grandmother (Grandmother) “described the mother as
‘very sick with alcohol use’ ” and “reported ‘constant domestic violence’ in the
home.” Mother’s downstairs neighbor said Mother and Stepfather have “
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‘altercations every week,’ ” and that “she frequently hears the mother and
stepfather ‘talking in a strange way, as if they are drunk.’ ”
The Agency also obtained police reports documenting a significant
history of alcohol use and domestic violence in the home. In May 2022,
Mother and Stepfather argued after he had been drinking. Stepfather threw
items around the house before pushing Mother to the ground, taking her keys
and leaving to sleep in the car. The next morning, when Stepfather returned,
he pushed Mother to the ground again. Mother suffered a one-inch head
laceration that required treatment at the hospital.
In March 2023, Mother dropped Child off at school and got back home
around 8:00 a.m. When she got home, she and Stepfather got into an
extended argument, during which Stepfather drank “an entire bottle of
whiskey and a bottle of absinthe” and broke their television and a mirror. He
then demanded that Mother take him to the liquor store. When she said no,
“ ‘he found a bottle of red wine and proceeded to chug half the bottle and pour
the rest of it on [Mother] and the couch.’ ” He then went to lie down in
Child’s room. When Mother discovered him there, she told him he needed to
get out, “so he got up and busted [Child’s television], then came after
[Mother], grabbed [her] hand and bit [her], then grabbed [her] shoulders and
head-butted [her] causing [her] to fall backwards into [Child’s] easel breaking
it and hitting [her] head on the wall.” Mother also said Stepfather spat on
her and “punched the walls in several different places throughout the
apartment.” Mother indicated she was “not sure at this time if she wishes to
assist with prosecution.”
In a March 2025 altercation, Stepfather “grabbed [Mother] from the
back [of] her neck,” “slapped her . . . on the right side of her head once,” and
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spat on her several times. Mother said she was unsure if she wanted to press
charges.
Mother and Stepfather married in May 2025. The next month, they
again got into an argument after Stepfather had been drinking, and he hit
her. It appeared to responding police that Mother was also intoxicated. She
refused to provide Stepfather’s name or cooperate with the officers.
When the social worker asked Mother about these prior incidents, she
“denied any domestic violence has taken place, and insisted those were
misunderstandings, and that Police officers are being fired for
‘misrepresenting’ things.” When asked about the most recent incident,
Mother denied Stepfather hit her, claiming instead that Stepfather “was
giving her flowers and she had” fallen and hit her head. She denied she was
intoxicated that night.
Based on its investigation, the Agency filed a petition under Welfare
and Institutions Code2 section 300, recommending that Child be removed
from Mother’s care. The Agency’s report notes that proposed alternative
safety plans, short of removal, were declined by Mother. These included
Stepfather leaving “the home while the investigation is conducted and the
course of action determined,” and Child temporarily staying with
Grandmother. The report noted:
At 14 years old, [Child] is at a critical stage of emotional, social,
and cognitive development. Witnessing her mother being
physically assaulted, living with constant conflict, and observing
heavy alcohol use, normalizes unsafe and unhealthy relationship
dynamics. Such experiences can [cause] chronic[ ] anxiety, fear,
and emotional distress, impair her academic and social
performance, damage her trust in caregivers, increase her risk of
2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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depression an[d/]or future involvement in abusive relationships.
The repeated exposure to violence and intoxication also places
[Child] at risk of direct physical harm, either by being caught in
the middle of an altercation or through the neglect and violence
that often follows substance abuse.
On August 15, the Court agreed with the Agency’s recommendations
and detained Child with Grandmother, ordering liberal supervised visitation
and voluntary services for Mother and Stepfather. The court set a
jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
On December 22, 2025, after Mother requested several postponements,
the court held the hearing. Mother called a representative from her
substance abuse program, who testified that Mother was enrolled in “two
groups a week,” although she could not recall which ones, and “is considered
in poor compliance due to attendance concerns.”
Mother testified that she had fallen on a step and injured herself in
May 2025. She claimed that her head injury resulted in “post-concussion
syndrome,” which manifests in memory loss, impaired motor function, and
slurred speech. She also said she was prescribed a muscle relaxant for back
pain and agreed that it could “also contribute to slurred speech.”
Mother claimed that on August 4, she “was baking in the kitchen, and
due to [her] vertigo, loss of balance, loss of depth of field, [she] spun around
too quickly and hit [her] head on the back of the hinge on the door, and it was
very pretty severe.” She said that Stepfather was helping her attend to her
wound, and “after a few minutes, when [they] could not stop the bleeding,”
they asked Child to call for an ambulance. She denied that she had been
intoxicated that night, stating she had been sober since July 27.
Mother said she had completed a parenting program and was
participating in substance abuse and domestic violence programming. She
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testified domestic violence was not present in her life “on a regular basis,”
and said there had been one incident over a year earlier.
The court found “there has been ongoing domestic violence in the home
between the mother and [Stepfather]. There is evidence that domestic
violence has taken place from 2022 to as recently as August of 2025.” With
respect to Mother’s claim about medication or her concussion making it
appear as though she is intoxicated, the court found “other indications of
alcohol use by [Mother], for example, observations by law enforcement as well
as the social worker.” The court found Mother’s testimony not credible as to
the August 4 incident, noting conflicting evidence was “documented close in
time to the event itself” and that those statements “appear to corroborate one
another.”
While the court noted the parents had made some “progress in
voluntary services to address these protective issues,” the court found “that
there is a defined risk of harm that still exists here.” The court noted that
the parents had “not yet acknowledged the extent and impact of their
domestic violence” and “do not appear to possess the necessary insight into
that protective issue.” In particular, Mother “appear[ed] to deny that
domestic violence is part of her current situation” despite evidence to the
contrary. The court also found that Mother was “struggling to engage more
fully in her substance use program,” and while “consider[ing] the challenges
that [Mother] has faced,” “her lack of ability to more meaningfully engage in
those programs reflects on the state of the protective issues here.”
Based on these facts, the court found “the Agency has met its burden by
a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations in the petition are true,”
and “by clear and convincing evidence that removal of [Child] from the
parents is appropriate at this time.” The court found “[r]easonable efforts
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were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal” and that “there are
no reasonable means by which [Child’s] health can be protected without
removal.”
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence of Danger to Child
Mother first argues there was insufficient evidence of substantial
danger to Child to support removal. A child cannot be removed from the
physical custody of their parents “unless the juvenile court finds clear and
convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
minor if the minor were returned home.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “On appeal
from a dispositional order removing a child from a parent we apply the
substantial evidence standard of review, keeping in mind that the trial court
was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and
convincing evidence.” (In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809
(Ashly).)
Mother appears to claim that, because “the court’s comments
[concerning the evidence] were about the jurisdictional finding,” the court
failed to make factual findings in support of removal under the clear and
convincing standard. We do not think this is a reasonable reading of the
court’s statements. After summarizing the pertinent evidence, the court
explained, “The information that I have already highlighted and other
information in the reports supports a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that removal of [Child] from the parents is appropriate at this time.”
This demonstrates that the court applied the appropriate standard to its
dispositional findings.
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In her brief, Mother does not dispute that there were serious issues of
alcohol abuse and domestic violence in the home. Rather, Mother argues “the
circumstances of the family in December showed that Mother had progressed
since August such that there was not clear and convincing evidence of a risk
of substantial danger if [Child] returned home.” Mother fails to point to any
significant progress that would mitigate the risks to Child’s “physical health,
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
Mother suggests her medical issues made it more difficult to participate
in her substance abuse counseling and domestic violence classes. The court
expressly considered that Mother had “challenges . . . regarding her ability to
more fully engage,” but nonetheless stated, “I also need to consider how her
lack of ability to more meaningfully engage in [these] programs reflects on
the state of the protective issues here.” In other words, whatever the reason,
Mother failed to participate in programming, the court found that she had
not made significant progress in working on her substance use and domestic
violence problems.
Mother also suggests she was confused about the need to participate in
domestic violence programming. She claims that in November 2025, she
“expressed frustration and stated that she did not understand why the
Agency continued to reference domestic violence, as she felt that it was no
longer part of her current situation.” She also “shared concerns about
continuing in the domestic violence program if it might negatively affect her
case.” But this supports the court’s findings, as it demonstrates that Mother
continued to deny or minimize the evidence of continual domestic violence in
her relationship. “One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”
(In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.) In any event, the court
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was entitled to consider Mother’s failure to progress in her programming,
regardless of the reasons.
Mother also points to an “Intimate Partner Violence Victim Treatment
Quarterly Progress Report” dated November 23, 2025, highlighting that she
had admitted to drinking and arguing with Stepfather, and “said that the
couple’s aggressive communication style was not acceptable and she wanted
to do ‘better’ as a parent.” This report supports, rather than undermines, the
juvenile court’s findings. In it, Mother received generally low scores on her
participation metrics. The report noted Mother had only attended 8 out of a
minimum 26 sessions, and she had not acknowledged domestic violence in
her relationship or the impact of the domestic violence on Child. According to
the therapist’s notes, Mother told the group that the August 4 incident was a
“misunderstanding,” and Stepfather had “surprised her with flowers from
behind, and when she turned around, she accidentally tripped and fell,
causing her to hit her head and bleed profusely.” The report concludes,
“Therapist believes that [Mother] needs more time to show definite progress
in most areas.” In context of the broader report, Mother’s acknowledgment
that she and Stepfather drank and argued does not show significant insight
into these problems, let alone progress in addressing them.
In sum, Mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile court’s
substantial danger finding lacked sufficient evidentiary support.
B. Substantial Evidence of Reasonable Means and Efforts to
Prevent Removal
Mother next argues that the court did not consider reasonable means to
prevent removal and improperly found that the Agency made reasonable
efforts to prevent the need for removal. In addition to finding a substantial
danger to Child, the juvenile court was required to find by clear and
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convincing evidence that “there are no reasonable means by which [Child’s]
physical health can be protected without removing [Child] from the [Child’s]
parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Separately, the court was
required to “make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were
made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of [Child] from their
home.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) We review these findings for substantial evidence.
(Ashly, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.)
Mother claims there is insufficient evidence that the Agency made
reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for Child’s removal after the initial
detention report in August. In fact, the Agency’s disposition report indicates
that its continued efforts included referrals to parenting and domestic
violence classes for both parents. The Agency found that “mother has
consistently minimized or denied the severity” of the alcohol abuse and
domestic violence in the home and “has not taken meaningful steps to
protect” Child. The Agency concluded that “mother’s ongoing pattern of
behavior—remaining in violent relationships, failing to seek medical care for
her own injuries, and continuing to abuse alcohol—creates an unstable and
unsafe environment. This exposes [Child] not only to the trauma of
witnessing violence but also to the risk of direct physical harm.” The Agency
further noted that “[C]hild’s recent act of contacting law enforcement
highlights both the immediacy of the danger and [her] lack of confidence in
her mother’s ability to protect her.” Subsequent addendum reports commend
the parents for engaging in services but note that “concerns remain at this
time regarding the child’s overall safety if returned to the home.”
Mother does not dispute that the Agency documented adequate efforts
to prevent removal in its detention report. Subsequent reports document
that the Agency tried to get Mother to engage in services that would help her
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prevent further harm to Child. Instead, Mother continued to deny the
existence of the protective issues and failed to participate fully in available
support services. We therefore find substantial evidence supporting the trial
court’s determination that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent
removal.
With respect to reasonable alternative means by which Child’s physical
health could be protected, as noted above, the record supports the juvenile
court’s finding that Mother failed to make significant progress in her
domestic violence or substance abuse programming. The court reasonably
concluded that Mother’s failure to meaningfully address the risks to Child in
the home meant there was “a defined risk of harm that still exists.” Thus,
there was a sufficient basis for the court’s finding that there were no
reasonable means by which Child could be protected absent continued
removal.
Mother claims this case is similar to Ashly, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 803.
We disagree. In Ashly, children were removed from parents following
physical abuse by their mother. (Id. at p. 806.) The father opposed the
physical abuse when he learned of it, telling mother he would leave her if it
happened again. (Ibid.) The social services agency detention “report did not
mention any reasonable alternatives to removal from the home that had been
tried and failed or that had been considered and rejected.” (Id. at p. 807.)
The disposition report similarly did not mention any reasonable alternatives
to removal. (Ibid.) The mother moved out of the family home after the
incident and, although she moved back in before the disposition hearing, she
testified she had only done so because the children were not there. (Id. at
p. 808.) The mother “admitted [to] losing her temper and using physical
discipline,” and she expressed remorse. (Id. at pp. 807–808.)
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The court of appeal found there was “[n]o discussion of reasonable
efforts” to prevent the children’s removal in the record or in the juvenile
court’s order. (Ashly, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 809–810.) The court
further found that the juvenile court had not considered whether removing
the offending parent from the home was a reasonable way to protect the
children, which was notable given that mother had removed herself from the
home after the detention hearing. (Id. at p. 810.) Finally, the court noted
that these errors were prejudicial because “[m]other had expressed remorse
for the injuries she inflicted on [her child] and was enrolled in a parenting
class ‘to learn other ways to discipline [her] children’ ”; the father “had
already completed a parenting class”; and the agency should have considered
“unannounced visits,” “public health nursing services, in-home counseling
services,” and removing mother from the home. (Ibid.)
Here, unlike in Ashly, the Agency’s detention report did discuss
reasonable alternatives to removal—including Stepfather moving out—which
Mother “energetically declined.” The Agency’s disposition report then noted
that the Agency had offered services to avoid continued removal, but Mother
had not made significant progress and “ha[d] not taken meaningful steps to
protect” Child. Unlike the mother in Ashly, who admitted her conduct and
expressed remorse, Mother has continued to deny that there is domestic
violence in her relationship and minimize her evident history of alcohol
abuse. And here, unlike in Ashly, there is no non-offending parent to care for
Child.
Mother claims “there are in-home services and the Agency could make
unannounced visits” to protect Child. Mother fails to explain what kind of in-
home services would mitigate the risks to Child, and we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that unannounced visits were
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inadequate considering the long and serious history of domestic abuse and
alcohol use. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion by implicitly
finding these were inadequate means to protect Child if she remained in the
home.
Mother also argues Child “has proven mature enough to recognize if
she suspected domestic violence and alcohol consumption.” She claims,
“There is no evidence to suggest [Child] could not follow a safety plan that
involved calling law enforcement, reporting to the Agency and contacting her
paternal grandparents if she thought she was no longer safe in the family
home after return.” As the Agency noted in its detention report, “[a]t 14
years old, [Child] should not be placed in the position of seeking outside
intervention for her own safety. This indicates a serious breakdown in the
parent-child relationship and in overall family protective capacity.”
Moreover, Mother has tried to prevent Child from speaking to law
enforcement and Agency representatives. We cannot find that relying on
Child to identify risk factors and seek outside assistance, potentially over
Mother’s objections, is a reasonable alternative plan to protect Child.
Finally, Mother briefly argues that the trial court failed to “state the
facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based,” as required by
section 361, subdivision (e). Mother has forfeited this argument by failing to
present it under an appropriate heading. (Bitner v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065 [“ ‘Failure to
provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but
are not clearly identified by a heading.’ ”].) In any event, if we were to reach
the issue, we would find that the trial court’s stated findings were adequate.
As discussed above, the evidence discussed on the record amply supports the
court’s conclusion that removal was necessary.
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DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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