Filed 10/20/26 In re A.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E087356
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. DPRI2400054)
v. OPINION
K.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed.
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, K.G. (the Guardian) appeals the juvenile court’s orders
terminating her guardianship over A.M. and removing A.M. from her custody. We
affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Guardian is A.M.’s paternal grandmother. She was named A.M.’s guardian in
October 2019, when A.M. was about three months old.
About two months prior, A.M.’s father, D.M.G. (Father), was convicted of
violating Penal Code section 288.2 for sending “harmful matter” to a minor with the
intent or purpose of seducing the minor. Father sent pictures of his penis to a 14-year-old
girl and asked her to send him nude pictures of herself. Father was also charged for
having sexual intercourse with the minor, but the charge was dismissed. As part of his
sentence, Father was required to register as a sex offender.
In June 2020, the Guardian filed for a domestic violence restraining order against
Father. The Guardian requested the order because of Father’s arguments with his
brother. The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution by the Guardian.
Father continued to live in the Guardian’s home, along with A.M. In February
2023, plaintiff and respondent, the Riverside County Department of Social Services
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(DPSS) expressed concern to the Guardian that Father lived in the home. She “agreed to
be protective.”
In January 2024, the Guardian filed for a no-contact restraining order against
Father because of his alcohol problems and violent behavior, such as hitting walls and
kicking in a television. The Guardian asked that the order cover herself, A.M., and C.G.
(the paternal grandfather). The case was dismissed for the Guardian’s lack of
prosecution.
About a month later, DPSS filed a petition on A.M.’s behalf under Welfare and
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Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged the Guardian
neglected A.M. and domestic violence in the home put A.M. at risk. The juvenile court
sustained the petition and ordered services for the Guardian, which she successfully
completed. In September 2024, the case was terminated.
During the 2024 dependency case, DPSS believed Father did not live at the
Guardian’s home. DPSS informed the Guardian “monthly” of the risks to A.M. if Father
lived in the home because he is a registered sex offender and had committed sexual
offenses against a minor girl. Before terminating the dependency, DPSS reminded the
Guardian and the paternal grandfather of the serious “safety concerns” as to A.M. if
Father lived in the home. DPSS thus encouraged the Guardian and the paternal
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Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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grandfather not to allow Father to live in the home, and they claimed “they had no plans
to allow the [F]ather in the home.”
On July 10, 2025, DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect and sexual
abuse of A.M. The referral claimed that A.M. lived with two registered sex offenders,
Father and the paternal grandfather.
When investigating, DPSS learned that Father was still on parole for his 2019
Penal Code section 288.2 conviction. Father’s parole officer reported that Father had
lived in the Guardian’s home since his release from prison in July 2023. Father reported
the same. During an interview with the Guardian, she stated she thought Father was
allowed to live in the home so long as she or the paternal grandfather were present, and
that one of them always was. Father and the paternal grandfather also stated that they
thought Father was allowed to live in the home. A.M. told a social worker that Father
had lived in the home for the past “‘two to three years.’”
DPSS sought and obtained a warrant a few days later to remove A.M. from the
Guardian’s home. After A.M. had been removed, she told a DPSS social worker that she
had been left alone with Father “several times” when he would take her on a walk to the
liquor store.
On July 16, 2025, the Guardian filed for a restraining order against Father, who
came to the home intoxicated, began “banging on doors,” and tried to “‘fight with
people.’” In August 2025, the court granted the Guardian a three-year restraining order
against Father.
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On July 17, 2025, DPSS filed a petition on A.M.’s behalf under section 300,
subdivision (b). The sole jurisdictional allegation (b-1) states that the Guardian
“demonstrates a limited ability to properly care for and protect the child, in that she lacks
insight surrounding the risk factors related to allowing the child’s father to reside in the
family home, which places the child at serious risk of injury, neglect, and/or abuse.” The
juvenile court ordered A.M. detained, ordered reunification services for the Guardian,
and set the matter for a jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
DPSS interviewed A.M. shortly after filing the petition. A.M. again confirmed
that Father lived at the Guardian’s home. A.M. denied that Father ever inappropriately
touched her. But she often spent time alone with him, including when she showered,
when he tucked her in to bed, and when playing video games together in his room.
Also on July 17, 2025, Father was arrested. Father solicited a sex worker, Ms. G.,
on Facebook and made multiple incriminating requests and statements concerning minor
girls. Father asked Ms. G. if she would “‘act young for [him] like a little girl,’” and if she
knew any “‘little girls.’” He claimed he had paid his ex-girlfriend to sexually abuse her
seven-year-old daughter. He told Ms. G. that he planned to “touch” the girl and asked
Ms. G. if she would watch. He said he had just picked up his daughter, then offered to
get a motel room “so all of them could be in one room.” Father sent Ms. G. a picture of
his “stepdaughter” and asked, “‘[u] think she cute?’” He then offered Ms. G. more
money and asked if she would “‘[w]atch me f—k her’” (the “stepdaughter”).
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When law enforcement search Father’s cellphone after his arrest, they “located age
difficult nude photographs of females who appeared very young” and discovered that
Father “had been messaging females asking them to send pictures of themselves when
they were children.” Father admitted to law enforcement that he masturbated to the
pictures.
On July 31, 2025, DPSS spoke with the Guardian, who claimed she did not know
about Father’s recent arrest. The Guardian, however, reported that she had filed for a 10-
year restraining order against Father and had a court date the following day. She also
said she would not allow Father to live in the home or have contact with A.M.
DPSS again spoke with the Guardian and the paternal grandfather a few weeks
later later. Both of them “reported no concerns as to the [F]ather.” The paternal
grandfather did not believe the allegations from the recent incident with Ms. G. The
Guardian “minimized” Father’s section 288.2 conviction, claiming that the victim lied
about her age.
Because of DPSS’s concerns about the Guardian’s ability to protect A.M., DPSS
filed a motion in September 2025 asking the court to terminate the guardianship. The
thrust of the motion was that the Guardian “has shown time and again that she will not be
protective of [A.M.] in allowing the Father to have unsupervised contact with [A.M.].”
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing in November
2025. Before the hearing began, DPSS filed a first amended petition on A.M.’s behalf,
which added allegations under section 300, subdivision (b) and (g). The (b-1) allegation
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remained the same as in the original petition. The second (b) allegation states that Father
“is a registered sex offender and continues to engage in deviant sexual behavior . . .
involv[ing] a child.” (the Ms. G. incident). The third (b) allegation pertains to the
parents’ prior dependency history in which their parental rights to A.M.’s older sibling
were terminated. The (g) allegations claim that the parents cannot care for and support
A.M.
After hearing testimony from the Guardian and the paternal grandfather and
argument from counsel, the juvenile court sustained the (b-1) allegation, declared A.M. a
dependent of the court, and ordered her removed from the Guardian’s care and custody.
The court then terminated the Guardian’s guardianship over A.M. and ordered visitation
for her and the paternal grandfather. The Guardian timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
The Guardian first argues DPSS filing the first amended petition on the same day
of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing violated her due process rights. She next claims
the juvenile court erred by (1) sustaining the (b-1) allegation and asserting jurisdiction
over A.M., (2) removing A.M. from her care, (3) terminating the guardianship, and (4)
not ordering family reunification services for her. We reject the Guardian’s contentions
and affirm the findings and orders of the juvenile court.
As to the Guardian’s first argument, she never objected to the filing of first
amended petition at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Instead, her attorney stated he
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had received the amended petition, denied its allegations, and was prepared to contest
them at the hearing. By failing to object, the Guardian forfeited her argument that the
filing of the first amended petition on the day of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing
violated her due process rights. (See In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330,
1338.)
The juvenile court properly sustained the (b-1) allegation. The “‘three elements’”
for jurisdiction under section, subdivision (b) are “‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent
[or guardian] in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm
or illness” to the minor, or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’” (In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628, italics omitted.) “‘The court need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect
the child.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In
re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) In making that determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings and review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s findings. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the
evidence or exercise independent judgment but merely determine if the evidence is
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings. (Ibid.) We must uphold a juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports it.
(Ibid.) The Guardian has the burden of showing substantial evidence does not support
the jurisdictional findings. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
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The Guardian cannot make that showing on this record. As the juvenile court
correctly noted, Father has put A.M. (and, at times, the Guardian) at risk multiple times
since at least 2020, when the Guardian sought a restraining order against him because of
violence between him and his brother. The Guardian sought another restraining order
against Father in 2024. Father’s substance abuse issues and domestic violence issues
have put A.M. at the risk of harm on several occasions.
But what is more concerning is Father’s criminal history with minor girls, his sex
offender status, and his ongoing pedophilic tendencies, as evidenced by his arrest around
the same time this case was filed. During the 2024 dependency, DPSS made clear that
Father living in the home with A.M. put her at risk, and the Guardian apparently agreed,
claiming that Father did not live there and would not live there in the future.
Nonetheless, and without informing DPSS, Father continued to live there. During that
time, he had frequent unsupervised contact with A.M., including while bathing her and
taking her on walks to the liquor store.
The juvenile court thus reasonably found that the Guardian’s neglectful failure to
protect A.M. from the Father put her at a substantial risk of serious harm. The court
therefore properly sustained the (b-1) allegation.
The juvenile court also properly removed A.G. from the Guardian’s care.
To order a child removed from a guardian’s physical custody, the juvenile court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there “would be a substantial danger
to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the
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children in the guardian’s home, and (2) “there are no reasonable means by which the
[children’s] physical health can be protected without” removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
Thus, “[a] removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) [the guardian’s] inability
to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she
remains with the [guardian].” (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) We
review the juvenile court’s removal order for substantial evidence. (In re R.T., supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 633.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that A.M. would be at a
substantial risk of harm if left in the Guardian’s home. The Guardian emphasizes that
Father was no longer living in the home, his whereabouts were unknown, and the
Guardian had obtained a permanent restraining order against him. She argues there were
several protective measures that could have protected A.G. from Father, including (1)
requiring a relative to be at home at all times, (2) ordering frequent and unannounced
visits by DPSS, (3) providing in-home support services, and (4) ordering in-home visits
by a nurse.
But, as the juvenile court rightly noted, Father’s problems had been ongoing since
at least 2018, when he was convicted of sex offenses with a minor girl and ordered to
register as a sex offender. Those problems persisted through at least July 2025, just after
this case began, when he was arrested for soliciting Ms. G. and asking her if she would
watch him have sex with a seven-year-old girl. After his arrest, law enforcement
discovered what appeared to be child pornography on his phone and messages from
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Father asking women to send them pictures of themselves as children, which he admitted
to masturbating to. His alcohol problems and domestic violence issues likewise persisted
over the years, causing the Guardian to seek restraining orders against him in 2020 and
2024.
Despite the obvious and recurring danger Father posed to A.M., the Guardian
continued to let Father live in the home, even after telling DPSS during A.M.’s 2024
dependency case that he was not living there and would not be allowed to in the future.
More concerning, the Guardian frequently allowed Father to be alone with A.M.—
including while bathing her—even though DPSS repeatedly made clear that he should not
be left with her unsupervised. As late as August 2025, the Guardian minimized Father’s
criminal behavior and did not appear concerned about the risks he posed to A.M.
Given all of this, the juvenile court reasonably found that removing A.M. from the
Guardian’s care was the only reasonable option to ensure A.M.’s safety. Substantial
evidence thus supports its removal order.
For similar reasons, we conclude the juvenile court properly terminated the
Guardian’s guardianship over A.M. The juvenile court has authority to terminate a
Probate Code guardianship, such as A.M.’s, at any time during a dependency proceeding.
(In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 253.) The court may terminate a
guardianship if doing so is in the best interests of the child. (In re Kaylee H. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 92, 103; see also Guardianship of L.V. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 481, 491
[“[T]he best interest of the child is the sole criterion for termination of a guardianship.”].)
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We review the juvenile court’s terminating a guardianship for an abuse of discretion. (In
re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087; A.H. v. Superior Court (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 1379, 1392; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
By letting Father live in the home (often without DPSS’s knowledge) and letting
him be unsupervised with A.M. on multiple occasions, the Guardian placed A.M. at a
serious risk of substantial harm. Those risks were posed by Father’s persistent alcohol
abuse and violent behavior, his sex offenses against a minor girl and resulting sex
offender status, and his ongoing pedophilic interest in minor girls.
Given that the Guardian consistently failed to act to adequately protect A.M. from
Father, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that terminating the
guardianship was in A.M.’s best interests. The juvenile court thus did not err in
terminating the guardianship.
And because the guardianship was terminated, the Guardian was not entitled to
reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); A.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 219
Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) As a result, the juvenile court properly terminated the
guardianship without offering reunification services to the Guardian. (See In re Merrick
V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 253 [a “guardianship may legally be terminated before
reunification services are offered to the guardian.”]; accord, In re Xavier R. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1398, 1415.)
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders terminating the Guardian’s guardianship over A.M.
and removing A.M. from her custody and care are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J.
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