Filed 8/24/26 In re A.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.M. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086857
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J303859
& J303860)
v.
OPINION
F.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Geraldine
Williams, Judge. Affirmed.
Panda Kroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The juvenile court found true plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County
Children and Family Services’ (the department) allegations in a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 3001 petition, removed A.M. and B.M. (minors) from defendant and
appellant F.M.’s (the guardian) custody, and terminated her legal guardianship. On
appeal, the guardian contends the order terminating her guardianship must be reversed
and the matter remanded for proper inquiry with respect to the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between February 3 and March 10, 2025, personnel from the department received
five referrals with respect to children in the guardian’s home. As to minors, the referrals
alleged physical abuse and general neglect. As to the other children in the home,
apparently minors’ cousins, the referrals alleged emotional abuse, general neglect, and
physical abuse.
It was alleged a court had removed minors from mother’s custody in Clark
County, Nevada, and granted the guardian, who was father’s stepsister, a legal
guardianship over minors eight years earlier after mother failed to reunify with minors.2
The guardian reported that father had been sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment.
The guardian informed the social worker she had no Indian ancestry. Mother
reported that the maternal grandmother, who was deceased, may have had Cherokee
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Neither parent is a party to the appeal.
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ancestry; however, the maternal grandmother was apparently adopted, so mother was
unsure.3
On March 5, 2025, the department took minors into protective custody pursuant to
a detention warrant. On March 7, 2025, the department filed section 300 juvenile
dependency petitions alleging that minors had suffered serious physical harm inflicted by
the guardian, her boyfriend, and another adult in the home (A-1 – A-3 & B-4 – B-6); that
mother and father had failed to protect minors (B-7 & B-8); and that father had failed to
support minors (G-9).
At the detention hearing on March 10, 2025, the court asked the paternal uncle
whether he was aware of any Native American ancestry in the family. The paternal uncle
responded that he was unaware of any such ancestry. The court asked the paternal uncle
if any family members had ever been members of an Indian tribe, applied to become
members, lived on an Indian reservation, participated in an Indian educational or health
program, or attended an Indian school. The paternal uncle responded, “I don’t know.”
Mother and the guardian had filed ICWA-020 forms that day, checking the box
reflecting, “None of the above apply.” The court asked mother and the guardian if the
forms were correct; they both responded that they were.
The court asked two, non-related family friends present in court whether they
knew if anyone in the family had Indian ancestry, had ever been a member of an Indian
tribe, applied to become a member, lived on an Indian reservation, participated in an
3 The pronoun usage in the report is vague; thus, it could be mother who was
adopted.
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Indian educational or health program, or attended an Indian school. They responded,
“No.” The court confirmed with the paternal grandmother and a stepmother on mother’s
side that they had submitted forms indicating they had no Indian ancestry. The court
detained minors from the guardian.
In the March 26, 2025, jurisdiction and disposition report, the social worker
included a spreadsheet reflecting all ICWA inquiries. The social worker had inquired
again of the guardian regarding Native American ancestry; the guardian denied any
knowledge of such ancestry. The social worker noted mother’s initial indication that her
grandmother may have had Cherokee ancestry; the social worker indicated, “Informal
inquiry letters will be sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Cherokee tribes.”
The social worker recommended the court find ICWA “does or may apply.”
The social worker had confirmed that father was incarcerated at Southern Desert
Correctional Center in Nevada; father’s expected release date was September 19, 2029.
The social worker mailed copies of the petitions, detention report, and an ICWA-020
form to father, requesting the latter be returned in the enclosed prepaid stamped envelope.
In an addendum report filed May 14, 2025, the social worker recommended the
court find that allegations in the petitions true, provide reunification services to mother
and the guardian, and deny father services. The social worker recommended the court
find minors did not come under ICWA. In the June 27, 2025, additional information for
the court, the social worker changed the recommendations to include an ICWA finding
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that minors “may” come under the provisions of ICWA, and that the court terminate the
guardian’s legal guardianship.
At the hearing on June 30, 2025, the court inquired of mother’s partner whether
she knew if anyone in the family had Indian ancestry, had ever been a member of an
Indian tribe, applied to become a member, lived on an Indian reservation, participated in
an Indian educational or health program, or attended an Indian school. She responded,
“No.” The court continued the matter.
At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on August 11, 2025, the
department requested the court find that minors may come under ICWA. The court found
the allegations in the petition true, removed minors from the custody of parents and the
guardian, bypassed reunification services to father, granted mother reunification services,
and terminated the guardian’s legal guardianship. The court found that minors may come
under the provisions of ICWA.
II. DISCUSSION
The guardian contends the juvenile court’s order terminating her guardianship
must be reversed and the matter remanded for proper inquiry with respect to ICWA.
Specifically, the guardian avers that the department failed to follow up ICWA inquiries
with father and did not send inquiry letters to BIA or any Cherokee tribes. Defendant
observes that “termination of the guardianship at disposition removed the only party [the
guardian] with both standing and a present incentive to seek review of the inquiry error.”
The guardian maintains that parents have no incentive to ensure ICWA compliance.
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The department responds that the guardian has no standing to raise the propriety of
ICWA compliance and that, regardless, the issue is not yet ripe. We hold that regardless
of whether the guardian has standing to raise the propriety of the ICWA inquiries, the
issue is not ripe.
A. General Law
“In 1978, Congress enacted [ICWA] to ‘formalize[] federal policy relating to the
placement of Indian children outside the family home.’ [Citation.] Under ICWA’s state
analogue statutes [the California Indian Child Welfare Act] (Cal-ICWA; [citation]), courts
and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in dependency cases. [Citation.]
Child welfare agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’
[Citation.]” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1124-1125 (Dezi C.), fn. omitted;
accord In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099.)
“ICWA gives ‘Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody
proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation.’ [Citation.] The tribe
also has the power to petition the court to invalidate any action taken in a custody
proceeding if the action violated ICWA. [Citations.] Thus, when ICWA applies, ‘the
Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point’ in a proceeding involving
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the removal of an Indian child from their family. [Citations.]” (Dezi C., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1129.)
“Agencies and juvenile courts have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every
dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child. [Citation.]” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1332.)
“[T]he duty to inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1132, fn. omitted; see In re Kenneth D., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1099, fn. 5.)
Reversal is not required where “every possible extended family member has not
been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry,” and the department is not required “‘to
“find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make
reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available
to help the agency with its investigation.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; see In
re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 553 [department failed its duty of inquiry where it
failed to locate and inquire of the minor’s biological parents “once the social worker
learned of a potentially viable lead to locate them”].)
B. Ripeness
While acknowledging case law that has found ICWA claims unripe at the
dispositional stage, the guardian asserts that this case is distinguishable because, unlike
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other cases, in this case minors will not remain “under ongoing court supervision with a
parent or caregiver who [will] remain a party throughout the dependency.” We disagree.
“Because this case is ongoing and the department and court are under a continuing
duty to inquire whether [minors] may be Indian children, [Father’s] claim of inadequate
inquiry isn’t ripe. [Citations.] As the case continues, the department will have the
opportunity to ask the maternal grandmother additional questions about the maternal
grandfather and interview the paternal cousin if she is ‘readily available.’ [Citation.]” (In
re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1154; accord, J.J. v. Superior Court (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 447, 461 [Declining to assess the adequacy of ICWA inquiry and noticing
process where the court made no ICWA finding and the case was still ongoing].)
“[A]ll we could order in resolving this appeal is that the Department and juvenile
court fulfill their inquiry and notice obligations under ICWA and related California law.
Because that is what the Department is already doing, and because we are not in a
position to micromanage that process in this appeal (detailing, for instance, all those who
must be interviewed, what they must be asked, and what must be included in any notice
to tribes that is required), there is no effective relief we can now provide. The juvenile
court must direct that process, at least in the first instance.” (In re Baby Girl M. (2022)
83 CalApp.5th 635, 638-639 [dismissing appeal as moot]; accord, In re S.H. (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 166, 179; In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 563, 567
[Reversing only the ICWA ruling where the court erred in finding ICWA did not apply];
In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 905 [Declining the father’s invitation to assess the
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adequacy of the ICWA noticing process on appeal from dispositional hearing where the
court found that ICWA may apply].)
First, the court expressly found that minors may come under the provisions of
ICWA.4 (Cf. In re M.R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 905 [Declining the father’s invitation
to assess the adequacy of the ICWA noticing process on appeal from dispositional hearing
where the court found that ICWA may apply]; with In re S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 179 [Vacating court’s finding that ICWA did not apply].)
Second, the court declared minors dependents of the court. Thus, “So long as
proceedings are ongoing and all parties recognize the continuing duty of ICWA inquiry,
both the [department] and the juvenile court [will] have an adequate opportunity to fulfill
those statutory duties. [Citation.]” (In re S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.)
Third, as the department acknowledges, mother and father were parties to the
proceedings below and will remain parties as the case continues. Mother consistently
visited with minors, and they were excited to see and interact with her on a daily basis.
Mother completed some services. The court granted mother reunification services.
Father was represented by counsel during the proceedings below, who objected to the
proposed findings and disposition. Neither parent’s paternal rights have been terminated.
Thus, contrary to the guardian’s assertion, minors will remain under the juvenile court’s
4 The department’s one-time recommendation that the court find minors did not
come under ICWA was probably a clerical mistake, which the department subsequently
corrected.
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ongoing supervision with parents who will remain parties throughout the dependency
proceedings, the latter who will be able to raise ICWA inquiry issues if any arise.
Fourth, even if we held that the issue was ripe for resolution and that the
department or court erred in their duty of inquiry, we would not reverse the order
terminating the guardianship. “ICWA inquiry and notice errors do not warrant reversal of
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the
ICWA finding itself.” (In re Dominick D., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 568.) Notably
here, the guardian does not assert that the court’s finding that ICWA may apply was
erroneous.
Fifth, the guardian fails to explain her contention that parents, who will remain
parties to the appeal, would have less incentive than she to assert future ICWA
obligations. Indeed, here, mother, not the guardian, made the only claim in this case to
Indian heritage. Should the court and the department fail to properly pursue their ICWA
obligations, parents, and mother particularly as she is the only one to have made an
ICWA claim and was granted reunification services, have every incentive to raise any
such failures because doing so could result in the preservation of their parental rights.
This is as opposed to the guardian, who no longer even has the guardianship to preserve.
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III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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