Filed 8/10/26 In re A.M. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under B343677, B348076
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. 24CCJP03304A-B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ASHLEY M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler and Safaan K. Ahmed,
Judges. Dismissed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ashley M.
Shaylah Padget-Weibel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.H.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Mother Ashley M. and father C.H. appeal from the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring their
two children, A.M. and S.H, dependents of the court pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1 Mother and Father
contend there was insufficient evidence of harm or potential
harm to support the juvenile court’s findings that Father’s
mental health challenges justified dependency jurisdiction and
that Mother failed to protect the children from Father. While
their appeals were pending, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and returned custody of the children to the parents.2
Because we cannot grant the parents effective relief, we dismiss
their appeals as moot.
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. A.M. has Mother’s last name, and S.H. has
Father’s last name.
2 We grant the Department’s motions for judicial notice of
the termination orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Dependency Proceedings involving A.M.
A.M. was born in 2023. On September 5, 2024, law
enforcement responded to a report of a domestic dispute in the
family’s home. Mother told responding officers that Father had
been diagnosed with bipolar and schizoaffective disorders but
was not taking his medication. He had been acting erratically
and pushed her into the wall, causing her shoulder pain. A.M.
was present in the home during the altercation.
On October 17, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The petition
alleged Father suffered from mental health and emotional
disorders, including schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder,
as well as alcohol and substance abuse that rendered him
incapable of providing regular care and supervision of A.M. The
petition further alleged Father committed violent acts against
Mother, including pulling her hair, pushing her against a wall,
and threatening to harm her. The petition alleged Mother failed
to protect A.M. from Father because she did not enforce a
protective order she had obtained against Father and allowed
him to live in the family home with unlimited access to A.M.
A.M. was removed from Father’s custody and released to
Mother’s custody with the condition that Father move out of the
family home and Mother enforce the protective order against
Father.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report, the Department
stated the parents “have minimized the father’s untreated mental
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health, their domestic violence and father’s substance abuse,”
which the Department believed would cause emotional and
physical harm to a child as young as A.M., who was not yet two
years old. The Department reported Father was not taking his
medication or receiving regular mental health treatment. In
addition, Mother was granted an emergency protective order, but
she failed to enforce it by accepting Father’s calls from jail,
arranging for him to be bonded out, and driving him to the
hospital when he was released. The Department also set out
Father’s history of arrests and citations for driving under the
influence, battery, possession of drug paraphernalia, attempted
robbery, attempted theft, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct,
domestic violence, and criminal threats. It noted criminal
proceedings against Father involving domestic violence and
criminal threats against Mother were ongoing. Father’s deputy
public defender later reported he was granted mental health
diversion in those cases.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the parents’
attorneys and minor’s counsel all characterized the matter as
“chiefly a mental health case,” and the domestic violence and
substance abuse allegations as ancillary issues. Mother’s counsel
explained Mother called the police in an effort to get Father to
address his mental health challenges and take his medication;
she was not genuinely afraid he would hurt her or A.M. The
Department requested the court sustain the petition as alleged.
The juvenile court amended the petition to add specific
allegations of violence by Father against Mother to the section
300, subdivision (b), mental health allegations against Father,
and sustained that allegation as amended. The court also
sustained the allegation against Mother that stated she failed to
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protect A.M. from Father’s mental health challenges. The court
struck the section 300, subdivision (a) count, and it also struck
the domestic violence and substance abuse allegations. The court
ordered the Department provide family maintenance and
reunification services to the parents. A.M. remained with
Mother, and monitored visitation was granted to Father.
Mother and Father timely appealed.
B. Dependency Proceedings Involving S.H.
S.H. was born in 2025, shortly after the juvenile court
asserted jurisdiction over A.M. The Department filed a
dependency petition involving S.H. under subdivisions (b) and (j)
of section 300 when she was three months old. As to the
subdivision (b) allegation, the petition alleged Father’s history of
mental health and emotional challenges coupled with his failure
to participate in treatment or take his medication rendered him
unable to provide regular care for S.H. As to the subdivision (j)
allegations, the petition alleged A.M. was S.H.’s sibling, and he
was a current dependent of the juvenile court. The petition also
alleged Mother failed to protect S.H. from Father under
subdivisions (b) and (j). The court ordered S.H. removed from
Father and released to Mother.
On August 6, 2025, the juvenile court held a joint six-
month hearing pursuant to section 364 in A.M.’s case and the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing for S.H. The Department
urged the court to sustain the petition as to S.H., noting that
although the parents had complied with their case plans in A.M.’s
case, they continued to minimize the problems that led to the
assertion of jurisdiction and were only focused on “father
returning to the home and getting this case to close as soon as
5
possible.” The parents urged the court to dismiss the petition,
arguing they were compliant with the case plan in A.M.’s case
and there was no current or future risk to S.H. Minor’s counsel
requested the court sustain the section 300, subdivision (j), count
“given the long history of mental health by the father and the
severity of the incidents that led to D.C.F.S.’s involvement.” The
court asserted jurisdiction over S.H., amending the petition to
strike the failure to protect allegations against Mother and
sustaining only the allegations against Father. Mother and
Father appealed.
C. Post-appeal Proceedings
On February 4, 2026, while these appeals were pending,
the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and returned A.M. and
S.H. to the parents’ custody. The juvenile court found the
conditions justifying jurisdiction over the children no longer
existed. The parents did not appeal from the orders terminating
jurisdiction.
The Department moved to dismiss the appeals on mootness
grounds. Mother opposed both motions to dismiss. In A.M.’s
case, she argued the failure to protect findings “will continue to
prejudice [mother] in the future,” as they serve as a basis for her
inclusion in the CACI [California Child Abuse Central Index].”
She also argued the juvenile court’s errors justified a review on
the merits. Father’s appeal in A.M.’s case was dismissed after
his counsel filed a no merits brief under In re Phoenix H. (2009)
47 Cal.4th 835; he did not file an opposition to the motion to
dismiss.
In S.H.’s case, Mother acknowledged she was the
“nonoffending parent,” but argued that “[g]ranting the
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department’s motion to dismiss would have the negative effect of
insulating the erroneous rulings of the juvenile court, making
permanent the prejudice suffered by mother and her child, and
denying mother her day in court.” Father joined in Mother’s
arguments opposing the motion to dismiss in S.H.’s case, but he
did not make any separate arguments specific to his
circumstances.
DISCUSSION
A. Mootness and Dependency Appeals
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to
grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief
to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the
plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm
must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome
the plaintiff seeks.” In other words, “relief is effective when it
‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
legal status.’ [Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for
effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she
has suffered from a change in legal status.” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276-277 (D.P.).) “An order terminating juvenile
court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier
order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163
(Rashad D.).) “However, dismissal of a dependency appeal for
mootness following termination of jurisdiction ‘is not automatic,
but “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 163.)
Even when a case is moot, however, the reviewing court
has “ ‘inherent discretion’ ” to reach the merits of an appeal.
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(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The reviewing court may
exercise that discretion when a case involves an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy
between the parties may recur, or when a material question
remains for the court’s determination. (See ibid.) The California
Supreme Court in D.P. identified several other factors for courts
to consider in deciding whether discretionary review of a moot
case is appropriate. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, the court may
consider whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could impact
current or future dependency proceedings, for example, by
influencing a child protective agency’s decision to file a new
dependency petition or a juvenile court’s determination about
further reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court
may consider the allegations against the parent because “[t]he
more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the
parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot
because a parent promptly complied with his or her case plan.
(Ibid.)
B. Mother’s and Father’s Appeals Are Moot
1. The Appeals Are Moot Because the Juvenile Court
Terminated Jurisdiction
In A.M.’s case, only Mother’s appeal remains, and she
argues the evidence did not support a finding she failed to protect
A.M. Father’s counsel filed a no issues brief as to A.M., Father
filed no supplemental brief, and this court dismissed the appeal
pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 838. In
S.H.’s case, the parents argue the evidence did not support a
8
finding that S.H. suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm or illness.
We decline to address the issues raised by the parents
because their appeals are moot. The juvenile court’s termination
orders render it impossible to grant them any effective relief.
The children have now returned to the parents’ custody. Under
these circumstances, “the jurisdictional findings are not the basis
of any current order that is adverse to [them].” (In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61.) The appeals are also moot because
neither parent appealed from the termination orders. (See In re
Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 [“ ‘in most cases . . . for
this court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent must
appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition
order but also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and
modifying the parent’s prior custody status’ ”]; In re Rashad D.,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [“to the extent an appellant
argues, as here, that the challenged jurisdiction finding resulted
in an adverse juvenile custody order . . ., an appeal from the
orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is
necessary”].)3
3 Additionally, as to A.M., Mother states she “is only
challenging a portion of the jurisdictional findings . . . which refer
to her.” As stated, Father abandoned his appeal in A.M.’s case,
which means Mother’s appeal as to A.M. is moot because even if
we were to find in Mother’s favor the jurisdiction findings as to
Father remain unchallenged. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266,
283 [“where jurisdictional findings have been made as to both
parents but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may
be rendered moot”]; see also In re Ashley B. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“As long as there is one unassailable
9
2. No Exception to the Mootness Doctrine Applies
The parents argue exceptions to mootness apply. In A.M.’s
case, Mother argues her case is not moot because she could be
listed in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI; Pen. Code,
§ 11170) pursuant to the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act
(CANRA; Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.). In S.H.’s case, Mother
argues her appeal is not moot because the case presents an issue
of “continuing interest” and “the purported error is of such
magnitude as to infect the outcome of subsequent proceedings or
where the alleged defect undermines the juvenile court’s initial
jurisdictional finding.” Father joins in Mother’s arguments as to
S.H.
a. Mother’s appeal in A.M.’s case
Relying on In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042 (S.R.),
Mother argues her appeal in A.M.’s case is not moot because she
could be listed in the CACI. The California Supreme Court in
S.R. held that “a parent’s appeal from a juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding survives a mootness challenge where the
parent shows that an agency must report the allegation
underlying the court’s finding for inclusion in the CACI.” (S.R.,
at p. 1048.) S.R. stated that a case is not moot “where it is
undisputed that the allegations trigger a reporting
jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be
inappropriate.”]; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397
[“[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good
against both.”].)
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requirement.”4 (Id. at p. 1054.) In S.R., the Department
conceded it was required to report the mother’s physical abuse for
inclusion in the CACI. (Ibid.) S.R. contrasted its facts with those
in D.P., “where the agency represented that the allegations were
not reportable.” (S.R., at p. 1054.) D.P. found the father had “not
shown that the general neglect allegation against him was
reported for inclusion in the CACI, nor has he shown that this
type of allegation is reportable. These two layers of uncertainty
render Father’s CACI claim too speculative to survive a mootness
challenge.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 280.)
This court recently considered similar facts in In re
Landon M. (2026) ___ Cal.App.5th ____ (Landon M.). In
Landon M., the mother appealed from the jurisdiction findings
and disposition order declaring her children dependents of the
juvenile court. The court sustained allegations the father
brandished a weapon at a cashier while the mother and the
children were in the store and then led the police in a high-speed
chase with the younger child buckled into a car seat in the back
of the vehicle. The juvenile court sustained a failure to protect
allegation against the mother on the ground she knew the father
possessed guns but allowed him unlimited access to the children.
(Id. at *1.) While the mother’s appeal was pending, the juvenile
court terminated its jurisdiction and granted the mother sole
legal and physical custody. (Ibid.)
Applying S.R. and D.P., Landon M. held the mother’s
appeal was moot for two reasons: (1) neither the mother nor the
father appealed from the termination order, and (2) the
4 S.R. left open the question of whether an appeal is moot if
“a parent shows the conduct at issue is likely but not
indisputably reportable.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)
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challenged jurisdiction order did not form the basis for an order
that continued to impact the mother’s rights after termination.
(Landon M., supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. *4.) Like Mother in this
case, the mother in Landon M. argued her appeal was not moot
because the juvenile court’s findings “subject” her to inclusion in
the CACI. (Ibid.) Landon M. rejected that argument because
“[t]he facts in this case are more similar to those in D.P. than
S.R.” That is, the mother had not shown the Department
actually reported her for inclusion in the CACI. And if the
Department had done so, mother would have received a notice of
the report but the record did not contain any such notice. (Ibid.;
see Penal Code § 11169, subd. (c).) Additionally, the mother had
not shown her conduct constituted “child abuse” or “severe
neglect” as defined in CANRA. (Id. at p. *5.)
Here, the facts also more closely align with those in D.P.
rather than S.R. As in D.P., the Department does not assert it is
required to report Mother for inclusion in the CACI. Nor has
Mother met her burden to show her conduct either has been
reported or was required to be reported for inclusion in the CACI.
As in Landon M., the record does not contain a notice the
Department reported Mother for inclusion in the CACI. (See
Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (c) [when an agency forwards a report
of suspected child abuse or severe neglect to the California
Department of Justice, it “shall also notify in writing the known
or suspected child abuser that he or she has been reported to [the
CACI]”]; D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 279; Landon M., supra,
____Cal.App.5th at p. *5.) Nor did Mother state she received
such notice.
The failure to protect allegation against Mother did not
amount to “child abuse” or “severe neglect” that must be reported
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under CANRA. As explained in Landon M., “CANRA defines
‘ “child abuse” ’ as ‘physical injury or death inflicted by other than
accidental means upon a child.’ (Pen. Code, § 11165.6.) ‘ “Severe
neglect” ’ is defined as either (1) ‘the negligent failure . . . to
protect the child from severe malnutrition or medically diagnosed
nonorganic failure to thrive’ or (2) ‘those situations of neglect
where any person having the care or custody of a child willfully
causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in
a situation such that their person or health is endangered as
proscribed by [Penal Code] section 11165.3.’ (Id., § 11165.2,
subd. (a).) Penal Code section 11165.3, as relevant here,
similarly defines ‘ “the willful harming or injuring of a child or
the endangering of the person or health of a child” ’ to mean ‘a
situation in which any person . . . having the care or custody of
any child, [willfully causes or permits the person or health of the
child to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or
health is endangered.].’ [¶] In contrast, ‘ “[g]eneral neglect,” ’
which is not reportable in the CACI, is defined as ‘the negligent
failure of a person having the care or custody of a child to provide
adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision
where no physical injury to the child has occurred but the child is
at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.’
(Pen. Code, § 11165.2, subd. (b), italics added; see § 11169,
subd. (a) [agency ‘shall forward’ a report of every case of ‘known
or suspected child abuse or severe neglect that is determined to
be substantiated, other than cases coming within subdivision (b)
of Section 11165.2’ (italics added)].)” (Landon M., supra,
___Cal.App.5th at p. *5.)
Here, Mother’s failure to protect A.M. from Father’s
domestic violence and mental health challenges is arguably less
13
endangering than the mother’s failure to protect in Landon M.
Under these circumstances, Mother’s “CACI claim [is] too
speculative to demonstrate a specific legal consequence that a
favorable judgment could redress.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 282.)
b. Mother’s and Father’s appeals in S.H.’s case
Mother and Father raise no argument under S.R., and
instead argue their appeals in S.H.’s case are not moot because
the “alleged defect [i.e., the failure to dismiss the petition]
undermines the juvenile court’s initial jurisdictional finding.”
Even if the initial jurisdiction finding was erroneous, however,
neither parent has shown that error has resulted in ongoing
harm to them. The cases cited by the parents in support of their
argument are illustrative. In In re Joshua C. (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547 (Joshua C.), the appellant father
demonstrated ongoing harm where the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction with orders granting custody to the mother and
restricting the father’s visitation. Joshua C. held the father’s
appeal was not moot, and it explained that, “If the jurisdictional
basis for orders restricting appellant’s visitation with, and
custody of, Joshua is found by direct appeal to be faulty, the
orders would be invalid. Moreover, refusal to address such
jurisdictional errors on appeal by declaring the case moot has the
undesirable result of insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings
from review.” (Joshua C., at p. 1548.)
In In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605
(Kristin B.), the parents similarly demonstrated ongoing harm
because their parental rights were terminated. Kristin B. held
“that where a judgment terminating parental rights is challenged
14
on appeal, an earlier appeal arising out of a juvenile court
dependency proceeding is not moot if the purported error is of
such magnitude as to infect the outcome of the ensuing
termination action or where the alleged defect undermines the
juvenile court’s initial jurisdictional finding.” (Kristin B., at
p. 605.)
Here, by contrast, Mother and Father have not
demonstrated ongoing harm or that an appeal could provide them
with meaningful relief. There is no ongoing harm from which
this court could grant relief. Indeed, they have received the relief
they sought through their appeals, that is, the return of their
children.5
Finally, Mother’s and Father’s appeals do not present
circumstances that generally warrant discretionary review of a
moot case, such as an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur, the likelihood of a recurrence of the controversy between
the parties, or a material question that remains for the juvenile
court’s determination.
5 Additionally, unlike in this case, in both Joshua C. and
Kristin B., the parents appealed the orders terminating
jurisdiction. (See Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546;
Kristin B., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 604.)
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DISPOSITION
The appeals from the jurisdiction findings and disposition
orders filed by Mother on January 21, 2025, and August 6, 2025
are dismissed as moot. The appeal from the jurisdiction findings
and disposition order filed by Father on August 7, 2025 is also
dismissed as moot.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
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