Filed 9/23/26 In re A.M. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A173963
A.M.,
(Solano County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. JV24-00006)
Some two months before defendant and former minor A.M.’s
commitment to a secure youth treatment facility was set to end, the juvenile
court granted his request for a less restrictive placement. Shortly thereafter,
he allegedly violated the terms of his probation, and the juvenile court found
that he posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to the community and
ordered him returned to the facility with a one-year extension of his baseline
term. A.M. appeals, arguing that in doing so, the juvenile court applied the
wrong standard of proof. However, while his appeal was pending, the one-
year extension ended and A.M. was released from the facility. The Attorney
General argues that A.M.’s appeal is therefore moot. We agree, and we
therefore dismiss it.
1
BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2022, then-16-year-old A.M. was arrested in a stolen
vehicle that had collided with and damaged another vehicle in a parking lot.
On December 20, the Sacramento County District Attorney filed a
petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions1 Code section 602, subdivision
(a), alleging that A.M. unlawfully bought, received, or concealed a stolen
vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)).
On January 18, 2023, A.M. admitted to the charge as a misdemeanor,
and the juvenile court sustained the petition. At a dispositional hearing on
February 14, the juvenile court adjudged A.M. a ward of the court and placed
him under the care and custody of his mother, while allowing him to continue
to reside with his stepmother.
On August 30, A.M. was detained in juvenile hall after participating in
a “home invasion and high speed pursuit in a stolen vehicle” with three other
subjects armed with “AR-style rifles.” On August 31, a subsequent wardship
petition was filed, and on December 7, an amended subsequent petition,
charging A.M. with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),
and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(4)), and further alleging a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code,
§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) with respect to each count.
On December 18, A.M. admitted to the robbery count, with respect to
which the juvenile court struck the firearm enhancement.
In January 2024, the case was transferred to Solano County. On
February 14, the Solano County juvenile court held a dispositional hearing
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
and ordered A.M. placed in a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF), in
particular, “RISE—Reaching into Successful Endeavors,” with a two-year
baseline term.
On April 30, 2025, the juvenile court granted A.M.’s unopposed request
that he complete his baseline SYTF term—then set to end on June 30—at a
less restrictive placement, the “RISE-Up Less Restrictive Program.” A
probation discharge hearing remained set for June 30.
On June 12, A.M. was arrested, and the next day, the Solano County
Probation Office filed a notice of four violations of A.M.’s probation, including
allegations that he was “using and possessing illegal drugs” and “posting
gang-related content on social media.” On June 16, the juvenile court
ordered that A.M. complete the remainder of his baseline term in the RISE
program in juvenile hall.
On July 17, A.M.’s counsel filed a brief arguing that he was entitled to
be discharged to probation under section 875 unless the prosecution proved
that he posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to the community by clear
and convincing evidence, relying on Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418.
On July 21, a hearing was held on the probation violations alleged on
June 13, as well as the six-month progress review required by section 875,
subdivision (e)(1)(A). After hearing testimony from A.M.’s probation officer,
the juvenile court found that A.M. constituted “a substantial risk . . . of
imminent harm to others in the community if he is released” under section
875, subdivision (e)(3), and ordered him returned to his SYTF placement with
a one-year extension of his baseline term. The court set a six-month review
for December 29.
A.M. filed a notice of appeal.
3
DISCUSSION
Additional Background
A.M.’s opening brief—filed on April 7, 2026—begins by asserting that
the “record is confusing and contradictory” as to whether the court’s one-year
extension of his baseline term was based on section 875 or section 777,
governing probation violations in juvenile court. He goes on to argue that the
juvenile court could not have extended his SYTF commitment pursuant to
section 777, that clear and convincing evidence was required to obtain such
an extension pursuant to section 875, and that the evidence introduced at the
July 21 hearing did not satisfy that standard. His brief concludes by asking
that we “reverse the trial court’s findings and . . . remand his matter back to
the trial court for [his] release on probation.”
On July 24, the Attorney General filed his respondent’s brief, and with
it, an unopposed motion to augment the record with the minutes of a hearing
held on June 15, indicating that A.M. was “discharged from SYTF/RISE
commitment today.” We granted the motion, and A.M. did not file a reply
brief. The Attorney General argues that A.M.’s release from the SYTF
renders his appeal moot. We agree.
The Appeal Is Moot
In general, it is our duty to decide “ ‘ “actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case.” ’ ” (Eye Dog Foundation
v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) “[T]he
critical factor in considering whether a[n] . . . appeal is moot is whether the
appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In
re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
4
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing
harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by
the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276
(D.P.).)
“A court ordinarily will dismiss an appeal when it cannot grant
effective relief, but may instead ‘exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an
issue when there remain “material questions for the court’s determination”
[citation], where a “pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that
is likely to recur” [citation], or where “there is a likelihood of recurrence of
the controversy between the same parties or others.” ’ ” (In re David B.
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644; see D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282–287.)
Applying these principles here, we conclude that this appeal is moot.
The harm of which A.M. complains—his commitment to the SYTF based on
what he contends was the wrong standard of proof—is plainly no longer
“ongoing.” And because that commitment has ended, the harm cannot be
rectified by the remedy he seeks—reversal of the juvenile court’s order and
remand for the court to apply the correct standard. (See In re Sebastian C.
(2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1194 [challenge to denial of placement request
moot for minor in SYTF where court “ha[d] since issued two step-down orders
and [minor] is currently placed in a less restrictive program”]; see also In re
Miranda (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 757, 762 [habeas petition moot because
immediate release or new parole hearing “are no remedy at all to one who has
already been released from prison”].) As noted, A.M. did not file a reply brief,
and thus offers no argument regarding the mootness of his appeal, nor any
reason that we should exercise our inherent discretion to nevertheless
consider the issues it raises. We decline to exercise that discretion, and
accordingly we will dismiss the appeal.
5
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
6
RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A173963N)
7