In re A.M. CA1/1

Filed 9/24/26 In re A.M. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re A.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A173575
A.M.,
(San Mateo County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 24-JW-0368)

A.M. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward of the
court and placing him on probation after a contested jurisdictional hearing.
He claims the findings that he committed two driving-related felonies cannot
be sustained because there was insufficient evidence supporting the court’s
determination that he was the driver of a stolen car. The evidence
supporting this determination consisted of a dashcam recording and
testimony of the two sheriff’s deputies present at the scene that was based
solely on their review of that recording. A careful examination of the
recording, however, reveals that it does not support the deputies’
interpretation of it. We therefore agree with A.M. that there was insufficient
evidence that he was the driver, and we reverse.1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. The Car Chase and Crash
Around 3:30 a.m. on June 20, 2024, two Santa Clara County sheriff’s
deputies responded to a report of several people breaking into vehicles on a
San Jose street. The first deputy to arrive observed a car with its headlights
on “in the middle of the road,” facing him. The car had tinted windows and
was later identified as an Infiniti Q50, a four-door sedan.
The first deputy turned on his patrol car’s takedown lights, which were
bright white, and saw a person run from a driveway and get into the Infiniti’s
back seat. The deputy “could see inside the [other] vehicle perfectly” through
its front window, and he testified that “[i]ncluding the person who just ran
into the car, there [were] four [male] individuals sitting in the car all wearing
black face masks.”
The Infiniti drove past the first deputy, and he activated his patrol
car’s lights and sirens and followed it. The Infiniti “fled at a high rate of
speed” toward an intersection where the second deputy was waiting. As the
Infiniti passed by, the second deputy activated his patrol car’s lights and
sirens and pulled out behind it as the lead vehicle in the pursuit.
The second deputy’s dashcam recording of the ensuing chase and crash
was introduced into evidence. The deputies testified, and the footage
corroborated, that the Infiniti engaged in several moving violations, including
reaching speeds at least 40 miles per hour over the speed limit, drifting into

1 As a result, we need not reach A.M.’s remaining claims, which relate

to victim restitution and his probation conditions.

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other lanes and unsafe turning, and running stop signs. The Infiniti also had
its headlights off throughout the chase, although its brake lights lit up at
various points, and the second deputy testified that the brake lights appeared
to work properly.
The dashcam recording showed that less than two minutes after the
second deputy started pursuing the Infiniti, it made a fast, too-wide right
turn through a red light onto a street with two lanes running in that
direction. The Infiniti hit a curb along the lefthand lane and spun to the
right, and its brake lights were illuminated before it came to a stop across the
righthand lane. The second deputy also made a righthand turn and parked
his patrol car in the correct direction, facing the Infiniti’s passenger side.
B. Evidence Related to the Infiniti Driver’s Identity
The second deputy testified that after the Infiniti stopped, he saw the
car’s doors fly open and four males flee from the vehicle. According to the
deputy, the first suspect out of the car exited from the rear passenger-side
door and fled south; the second suspect exited from the front passenger-side
door and fled north; and the last two suspects exited from the rear driver-side
door and also fled north. The deputy confirmed that he did not see anyone
exit from the driver’s door, even though it was opened along with the other
three doors.
The second deputy testified, and the dashcam recording confirms, that
the last suspect to exit the Infiniti, the second one out of the rear driver-side
door, was wearing a distinctive black hoodie with white lettering on the back.
It is undisputed that this person was A.M., who was wearing a black hoodie
with white lettering on the back when he was apprehended a few minutes
later. At the time, A.M. was 14 years old and five feet, six inches tall.

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The second deputy testified that he “had an unobstructed clear view . . .
directly to the driver seat from the [open] rear passenger door” and could see
A.M. “making his way like towards the rear of the back[]seat.” In response to
a question from the juvenile court, the deputy confirmed that this suspect
“was next to the center console and . . . climbed over the center console to get
to the back[]seat” before exiting from the rear of the car, although the deputy
never “[saw] him driving.” On cross-examination, the deputy clarified that he
observed A.M. climb from the driver’s seat to the back seat only upon
reviewing the dashcam recording, not in real time, as “[i]t happened fast. It’s
just doors open up and four occupants started running.”
The first deputy did not personally witness the crash or the suspects’
exit from the Infiniti, but he testified that he also determined A.M. was the
car’s driver based on the dashcam recording. The deputy explained, “[I]n the
video, all the doors opened and the first person I saw and another person
r[a]n from the passenger side and they leave the doors open and through the
rear passenger[-side] door, you could see [A.M.], wearing a black sweater with
the white letters, sitting in the driver seat attempting to get out of the driver
door but he’s unable, so then he has to get out through the rear passenger
door on the left-hand side, on the driver’s side.” The deputy testified that he
saw four people in total exit the Infiniti, and he did not see anyone exit from
the driver’s door.
C. The Aftermath
The first deputy, who soon arrived at the crash scene, and the second
deputy chased the suspects. The deputies quickly detained A.M. and one
other suspect who had exited from the back of the Infiniti. No other suspects
were located.

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Airbags deployed from the Infiniti’s front and rear driver-side doors,
but not on the vehicle’s passenger side.2 The second deputy testified that the
side airbag in the front “took up more space” than the one in the back
“because [in] the front seat you also have the steering wheel. You have less
room in general because you have the steering wheel there; compared to the
back[]seat, you don’t.” But he confirmed there was still sufficient space for
someone to exit through the driver’s door.
Law enforcement later learned that the Infiniti belonged to a
Livermore woman. She testified that she left the vehicle parked in her
carport on the night of June 13, 2024, and it was gone the following morning.
She did not know A.M. and did not give him or anyone else permission to
take the Infiniti.
D. Procedural History
The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), seeking to have
A.M. declared a ward of the court. The petition alleged two felony counts,
reckless driving while attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer and
taking a vehicle without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of
possession.3

2 The deputies provided conflicting testimony on whether the airbag in

the steering column deployed. After reviewing footage from the first deputy’s
body camera that showed the post-crash search of the Infiniti, both deputies
testified that that airbag did not deploy. Likewise, our review of that footage
shows no airbag by the steering column. The first deputy later testified,
however, that it did deploy because he remembered another deputy “cut it out
for DNA evidence.”
3 The allegations were made under Vehicle Code sections 2800.2,

subdivision (a) (reckless driving), and 10851, subdivision (a) (taking vehicle).

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A contested jurisdictional hearing was held at which the prosecution
presented the evidence discussed above, including testimony from both
deputies and the dashcam recording. A.M. did not present evidence.
After the prosecution rested, A.M. moved for dismissal under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 701.1 on the ground that there was insufficient
proof that he was the Infiniti’s driver. Emphasizing that the deputies’
testimony about the suspects’ exit from the Infiniti was based only on their
viewing the dashcam recording, A.M. argued that the recording did not show
anyone climbing from the driver’s seat to the back seat. The prosecutor
disagreed, contending that the recording showed someone “who’s initially in
the area of the driver seat . . . exit through the rear passenger driver’s side
door.” The prosecutor also argued that there was circumstantial evidence of
A.M.’s identity as the driver: The deputies’ testimony established there were
only four people in the Infiniti, the airbag and steering wheel impeded exit
through the driver’s door, and A.M. was the last of the four to exit.4
The Santa Clara County juvenile court denied A.M.’s motion to dismiss,
finding the prosecution made a prima facie showing that A.M. committed the
crimes. The parties then presented further argument. The prosecutor
reiterated that an exit from the driver’s door was impeded and the dashcam
recording showed “an individual wearing a black sweatshirt with white

4 The prosecutor cited the fact that the Infiniti’s driver’s seat was

reclined as further evidence the driver had room to climb to the back seat.
But while the footage from the first deputy’s body camera during the vehicle
search showed the driver’s seat reclined, the first deputy testified that he
moved both the driver’s seat and the front passenger’s seat to conduct the
search and could not say how either seat was positioned immediately after
the crash. The second deputy testified that he “believe[d]” the driver’s seat
was upright when he first looked at the Infiniti after the crash.

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lettering in the driver’s seat initially and then exit through the back
passenger seat.”
A.M. responded that it was “unreasonable” to believe he was the
Infiniti’s driver. He argued that the driver was not prevented from exiting
through the driver’s door, as that door was “wide open,” a vehicle
manufacturer would not design side airbags to trap people, and the steering
wheel itself did not impede exit. And even if the driver’s door had been
blocked, it would have made more sense to exit through one of the passenger-
side doors, not through the other door where a side airbag was also deployed.
In addition, A.M. argued that the prosecution’s theory of the driver’s
movement was “physically impossible” in light of the dashcam recording
itself. There would have been insufficient time between when the brake
lights went off and when A.M. was first seen on camera for a person of his
height to take his foot off the brake pedal and climb into the back. Moreover,
the front of A.M.’s body was never seen on the recording, meaning he would
have had to crawl backward over the center console.
As an “alternative explanation,” A.M. contended that the dashcam
recording actually showed a fifth person—whom the deputies missed when
they reviewed the recording—exit from the driver’s door. “[I]t took a while
for the defense to [see] it,” but the recording showed “a light-colored figure”
who “pop[ped] up and down very quickly” by that door. The prosecutor
disagreed that the recording showed a fifth person, emphasizing that the
deputies testified that there were only four people in the Infiniti.
The Santa Clara County juvenile court sustained the petition’s
allegations. The court found that A.M. was the driver, explaining, “After
viewing the dash[]cam video, it appears to me that he . . . is moving out of the

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front seat into the rear of the car and exited on the rear door of the driver
side. [¶] I do not believe that [the] defense’s alternative theory is reasonable.”
The case was transferred to San Mateo County, A.M.’s home county, for
disposition. In September 2024, the San Mateo County juvenile court
declared A.M. a ward of the court and placed him on probation, with an order
to serve 60 days on electronic monitoring.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
To evaluate A.M.’s claim, we review the record for “substantial evidence
to support the [juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings]—i.e., evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find . . . beyond a reasonable doubt” that the minor committed the
crimes. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; In re Z.A. (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1424.) “In applying this test, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the [trier of fact] could reasonably have
deduced from the evidence.” (Zamudio, at p. 357.) “ ‘ “ ‘If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing
court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” (In re
George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 631.)
In determining whether findings are supported by substantial evidence,
we “ ‘resolve[] neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]
Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive
province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is
physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness

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is sufficient to support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Demolle (2026) 19 Cal.5th
1117, 1176.)
B. Insufficient Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings.
A.M. claims that both jurisdictional findings must be reversed because
there was insufficient evidence that he drove the Infiniti. The Attorney
General agrees that “the prosecution bore the burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that [A.M.] was the driver.” Thus, we need not discuss the
charged crimes’ elements and address only whether there was substantial
evidence of identity.
Having carefully reviewed the dashcam recording—both at normal and
delayed speed—we conclude there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that A.M. was the Infiniti’s driver. Once
the Infiniti crashed, less than a second passed between when the brake lights
went off and when the back of A.M.’s sweatshirt could be seen through the
now opened rear passenger-side door. And his subsequent movement makes
clear that he was already in the back seat at this point, not moving into it.
A.M. simply could not have taken his foot off the brake pedal and climbed
fully into the back seat in such a short time. Thus, even if it would otherwise
be reasonable to infer that the driver moved to the back seat to exit because
the driver’s door was obstructed, the recording definitively establishes that
A.M. was not in the driver’s seat when the car crashed.
Moreover, the dashcam recording—played at a delayed speed—
supports the defense’s theory that there was a fifth suspect who was the
Infiniti’s driver. Between the time that the first suspect exited from the rear
passenger-side door and the second suspect the deputies observed exited from
the front passenger-side door, there was a light-colored flash and movement
on the driver-side of the car that could reasonably be interpreted as a person.

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We recognize that the deputies testified there were only four people, and the
recording is not of high enough quality to establish definitively the presence
of a fifth person. Nonetheless, this evidence buttresses our conclusion that
there was insufficient evidence upon which the juvenile court could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that A.M. was the driver.
In arguing that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
findings, the Attorney General primarily focuses on the second deputy’s
testimony that the deputy “had an unobstructed clear view” of the driver’s
seat and saw A.M. climb over the center console into the back seat. But as
we have said, the second deputy clarified that this testimony was based on
his later viewing of the dashcam recording, not his independent observation.
And the recording undermines the conclusion that A.M. was in the driver’s
seat when the car crashed. Thus, regardless of the basis for the second
deputy’s testimony, it was insufficient evidence of A.M.’s identity. (See
People v. Demolle, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1176.) Likewise, we may disregard
the first deputy’s testimony that the recording showed A.M. “sitting in the
driver[’s] seat attempting to get out of the driver door but he’s unable”
because that testimony simply cannot be reconciled with the recording.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.

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_________________________
Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

In re A.M. A173575

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