Filed 11/10/26 In re A.K. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re A.K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, F091788
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 24JP-00090-A,
24JP-00090-B)
v.
ANNA K., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT *
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.
Anna K., in pro. per.; Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., DeSantos, J. and Guerra, J.
INTRODUCTION
In this juvenile dependency case, Anna K. (mother) appeals from the order
terminating her parental rights as to her minor children, A.K. and M.K. (collectively, the
children) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 366.26).
After reviewing the record, mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed
this court that she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court
granted mother leave to file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable
issue of reversible error exists, informing her if she was unable to do so, the appeal would
be dismissed. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Mother filed a letter asserting arguable issues exist and asking for an extension of
time to further expound on her assertion. We conclude mother has failed to make a
showing of good cause justifying this appeal to proceed and deny her request for an
extension of time.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This court is very familiar with the facts and circumstances of the underlying
juvenile dependency case. Mother, other parties, and relatives have brought multiple
challenges to findings and orders made at various stages of the children’s dependency. 2
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 For mother’s part, she appealed from unspecified orders made on November 4,
2025. After her appointed attorney filed a no-issue brief, she attempted to raise untimely
issues regarding already final orders made at an earlier hearing where the section 366.26
hearing was set as to M.K. We dismissed the appeal. (In re M.K. (May 7, 2026,
F090821) [nonpub. opn.].)
Mother also sought an extraordinary writ, in propria persona, from orders made at
the hearing where the section 366.26 hearing was set as to A.K. Finding mother had not
established reversible error, we denied her petition. (Anna K. v. Superior Court (Feb. 19,
2026, F090767) [nonpub. opn.], review denied March 2, 2026, S295445.)
2.
We provide a relatively brief background to provide context for the section 366.26
findings and orders at issue in the present appeal.
In August 2024, the Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) filed a
juvenile dependency petition on behalf of then four-year-old A.K. and then newborn
M.K. The petition alleged that A.K. came within the court’s jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivisions (a) (nonaccidental physical harm perpetrated by a parent),
(b)(1) (failure to protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), and (g) (no provision for
support). The petition alleged M.K. came within the court’s jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). The allegations pertaining to mother included
that she put the children at risk due to the physical abuse of A.K., exposing the children
to aggressive behavior and domestic violence, substance abuse, and untreated mental
health issues. M.S. was identified as A.K.’s alleged father, and he remained alleged for
the duration of the proceedings. J.M. was identified as M.K.’s alleged father. He was
later determined to be her biological father but was never elevated to presumed status.
No other possible fathers were identified over the course of the proceedings.
The juvenile court found the children came within its jurisdiction, adjudged them
dependents, and removed them from the parents’ custody. Mother was denied
reunification services because her whereabouts were unknown, and they remained so
throughout the reunification period. (§§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1); see 361.5, subd. (d).)
Neither father was granted reunification services. (See § 361.5, subd. (a) [only presumed
fathers are entitled to services; court may grant biological father services upon finding it
would benefit the child].) As to A.K., her then-guardian and maternal grandmother,
Ma.K., 3 was granted reunification services, and her services and guardianship were
3 As an aside, Ma.K.’s role in the underlying dependency proceedings was
substantial. We omit facts pertaining to her to the extent they are not relevant to the
present appeal, but Ma.K. is a familiar litigant to this court, as she has filed multiple
challenges to orders made during the underlying dependency proceedings. (See M.K. v.
3.
eventually terminated. After all reunification efforts ceased, section 366.26 hearings
were set.
The agency prepared a section 366.26 report on behalf of each child. The
agency’s recommendation for both children was for termination of parental rights and
selection of adoption as their permanent plan. The children were placed together with
A.K.’s relative, who wished to adopt both children. Additionally, M.K. was considered
generally adoptable based on her age and the fact she was physically, socially,
emotionally, and mentally healthy.
A.K. expressed being happy in her current placement. She said she was having
fun and felt loved and cared for. She wanted to remain in her current placement and did
not want to move again. She understood the concept of adoption and expressed
excitement at the idea.
The reports indicated there were no factors precluding termination of parental
rights as to either child, and none of the parents had maintained consistent or frequent
visitation. A.K.’s alleged father had not had any visits with her, as he was incarcerated
out of state. M.K.’s biological father only visited with her three times over the course of
the dependency. Mother did not visit the children until she requested visits in November
2025, over a year after the dependency proceedings were initiated. She did not attend the
first scheduled visit due to illness.
Superior Court (Feb. 19, 2026, F090734) [nonpub. opn.], review denied March 4, 2026,
S295475 [writ from setting order as to A.K.]; In re A.K. et al. (Feb. 19, 2026, F089297)
[nonpub. opn.] [appeal from dispositional orders as to both children]; In re A.K. et al.
(Oct. 1, 2026, F091151) [nonpub. opn.] [appeal from orders terminating Ma.K.’s
visitation with the children, declaring her a vexatious litigant, and permitting her retained
counsel to withdraw].)
Facts pertaining to Ma.K.’s participation in the underlying case are set forth in
detail in our prior opinions addressing her claims.
4.
Mother attended her first visit in December 2025. At the start of the visit, A.K.
ran to mother and hugged her; they embraced for an extended period in silence and when
they separated, mother appeared tearful. Mother was subsequently observed throughout
the visit, however, to present with a “flat [a]ffect.” She “made minimal facial
expressions, displayed limited engagement, and did not verbally interact with either
child.”
Mother attended another visit in January 2026. She “presented with a flat [a]ffect
and a disassociated quality.” She was observed to be not “fully oriented to the child’s
needs or the environment,” requiring A.K. to step into a “parentified role.” A.K. set up
food on the table and picked M.K. up to place her in the high chair. Mother “stared
blankly at the children, did not intervene to help, and remained seated on the couch,
requiring social worker intervention.” A.K. opened the food and dipped everyone’s,
including mother’s, chicken nuggets into dipping sauce and handed nuggets to each
person. A.K. also had to lead most conversations. At one point, A.K. asked mother if
anyone at home had asked about her, and mother did not answer. A.K. “asked two more
times in a more urgent, desperate tone, and [mother] stared away blankly.”
Mother did not make herself available to the agency to provide a statement
regarding the permanent plan as to either child. A.K.’s father agreed with the
recommendation of adoption with the current care provider. He indicated that he loved
A.K. and felt she would receive the best love and care with her care provider. M.K.’s
father objected to any permanent plan for M.K., as he believed she should be in his care.
Mother, through counsel, set the section 366.26 hearings for contest. Mother was
personally present in court when the date for the contested hearing was set and was
ordered to appear. She was also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) at her attorney’s
request. Mother was subsequently mailed written notice of the hearing, indicating in part
that the juvenile court would proceed with or without mother’s presence.
5.
The section 366.26 hearing was conducted on April 21, 2026. Mother was not
present because she was reportedly ill, but was represented by counsel, and her GAL was
present.
The agency’s attorney asked the juvenile court to take judicial notice of all of the
agency’s previous reports and submitted on the section 366.26 reports.
Minors’ counsel submitted without comment.
Mother’s attorney stated she had no evidence to present, as mother was not there
to testify. She noted that mother did not want her parental rights terminated and wanted
to be able to “move forward with services” and submitted on those comments. Mother’s
GAL expressed agreement.
A.K.’s father’s attorney waived A.K.’s father’s appearance and submitted without
comment.
M.K.’s father’s attorney indicated she had no evidence to present but that M.K.’s
father, who was present in court, was in agreement with mother’s attorney.
The juvenile court admitted the section 366.26 reports into evidence and took
judicial notice of all prior findings, orders, and judgments, including its orders denying or
terminating reunification services as to each parent. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that both children were adoptable, terminated all parental rights, and
ordered adoption as both children’s permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
When a parent appeals from a juvenile court order affecting parental rights, and
their appointed counsel files a brief raising no issues, the reviewing court may dismiss the
appeal. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) It is not required to independently
review the record for error (id. at pp. 981–982) and is not required to allow the parent to
personally file an additional brief absent a showing of good cause that an arguable issue
does, in fact, exist (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 844, 846).
6.
Here, in accordance with the above principles, after mother’s appointed appellate
counsel filed a no-issue brief, this court informed appellant that the appeal may be
dismissed unless she could make a good cause showing that an arguable issue of
reversible error existed.
In the letter mother personally filed in response to our order, she asserts that there
are arguable issues including “whether material findings and orders of the juvenile court
were supported by sufficient evidence and whether [she] was afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present [her] position and evidence before orders affecting parental and
family rights were made.” She also asks this court “to consider whether the juvenile
court properly considered the evidence before it, whether the procedures and protections
required in the dependency proceedings were followed, and whether any error or
combination of errors was prejudicial to the outcome.” She does not support her
contentions with citations to the record or legal authority.
We conclude mother has not made a good cause showing that an arguable issue
exists. We have reviewed mother’s assertions and the record, and we note the following.
First, the juvenile court’s findings at the section 366.26 hearing were amply supported by
sufficient evidence. The uncontroverted evidence before the court established the
children were clearly adoptable and that reunification services were denied and/or
terminated in accordance with the law. No party asserted an exception to termination of
parental rights applied, nor did the evidence before the court support such an assertion.
Next, mother was provided with adequate notice and opportunity to be heard in
accordance with due process. She was given proper notice of the hearing (see § 294,
subd. (f)(1)). Though she was not personally present, she was represented by counsel,
who notably did not move for a continuance, and her GAL. Both were given the
opportunity to and did speak on mother’s behalf. Neither sought to present or were
prevented from presenting any evidence.
7.
Finally, mother has not pointed to any support in the record for her suggestion that
the juvenile court did not consider the evidence before it, specified a procedural
protection that was not afforded her, nor explained how any alleged error affected the
outcome of the proceedings. We presume the judgment is correct and that the court
knows and follows the law, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; Wilson v. Sunshine
Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563.) We reemphasize we are not required to
conduct an independent review for reversible error.
Mother also requests a 14-day extension of time to file a supplemental response to
our order “identifying the arguable issues with greater specificity,” because she had
initially misplaced this court’s order and needed more time to respond to it.
We deny mother’s request for an extension of time. Her assertion she misplaced
the order does not establish good cause to further delay these proceedings. Mother was
appointed an experienced juvenile dependency appellate attorney, who reviewed the
record and indicated there were no arguable issues. (See In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th
at p. 990 [chance of erroneous resolution of appeal when appointed counsel files a no-
issue brief is “negligible”; appointed counsel “faithfully conduct themselves as active
advocates [on] behalf of indigent parents” and are “enabled, and indeed encouraged, to
effectively represent their clients”].) Pursuant to Phoenix H., mother was given the
opportunity personally to make a good cause showing as to why she should be able to file
a supplemental opening brief asserting arguable issues her attorney failed to raise, and as
we have explained, the issues she identified as arguable can be readily determined to be
meritless.
Mother has been afforded all the protections to which she is entitled in this
proceeding to ensure any reversible error affecting her parental rights is identified, and
we are assured that allowing mother to submit any additional filings would only
8.
unnecessarily further delay the stability and permanence for the children. (See Phoenix
H., supra, 47 Cal.4th 835 [“ ‘ “There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound
development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current ‘home,’ …
especially when such uncertainty is prolonged.” ’ ” Dependency proceedings “ ‘ “must
be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with fairness.” ’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
9.