Filed 10/1/26 In re A.K. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re A.K. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES F091151
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 24JP-00090-A,
Plaintiff and Respondent, 24JP-00090-B)
v.
M.K.,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.
Law Offices of Thomas F. Camp, Thomas F. Camp, for Defendant and Appellant.
Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Ann Hanson, Deputy County Counsel;
Gordon-Creed, Kelley, Holl & Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman and Anne H. Nguyen, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Minor children, A.K. and M.K. (collectively, the children), are the subjects of the
underlying juvenile dependency proceedings. Appellant, Ma.K., is the maternal
grandmother of both children and the former legal guardian of A.K. This is, by our
count, the fourth matter brought by appellant in this court concerning the underlying
dependency proceedings, and there is a fifth matter pending before us in case
No. F090822.
In the present case, appellant appeals from the juvenile court’s post-dispositional
orders: (1) granting the Merced County Human Services Agency (agency)’s Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3881 petition requesting visitation between appellant and the
children be terminated; (2) declaring appellant a vexatious litigant and requiring her to
obtain prefiling permission pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7; and
(3) granting appellant’s retained attorney’s motion to withdraw as her counsel of record.
We reverse the juvenile court’s order declaring appellant a vexatious litigant and
its prefiling order. We direct the court to cause appellant’s name to be removed from the
Judicial Council’s vexatious litigant list. We affirm all other findings and orders from
which appellant appeals.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, except
where otherwise indicated.
2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
General Background of the Children’s Dependency2
The underlying dependency proceedings were initiated in August 2024. A.K. was
four years old and residing with her and M.K.’s mother, An.K. (mother); M.K.’s alleged
father, J.M.; and appellant. Appellant was A.K.’s legal guardian, as established by the
probate court in November 2020. A.K.’s alleged father was M.S., whose whereabouts
were unknown. M.K. had just been born. After the children’s initial detention, the
juvenile court ordered supervised visitation to occur between appellant and the children.
As to A.K., the juvenile court took dependency jurisdiction over her under
section 300, subdivisions (a) (nonaccidental serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to
protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), and (g) (no provision for support). A.K. was
adjudged a dependent of the court and removed from appellant’s and her parents’
custody. Appellant, as A.K.’s legal guardian, was ordered to participate in reunification
services, and mother and M.S. were bypassed for reunification services.
As for M.K., the juvenile court took jurisdiction over her under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). M.K. was adjudged a dependent of the court and removed from the
custody of her parents. Both of M.K.’s parents were bypassed for reunification services.
Appellant was never a party to M.K.’s case.
2 As we have stated, this is one of several appeals and writs involving A.K. and
M.K.’s dependency proceedings, and it involves post-dispositional orders made regarding
appellant’s participation in the case. In the interest of relative brevity, and to limit the
exposure of sensitive information pertaining to the children, we have limited our
recitation of the facts to a broad overview of the proceedings and those necessary to
understand the stage of the proceedings during which the appealed from orders were
made.
In sum, at the time the appealed-from orders were made in January 2026, appellant
was no longer recognized as a party in A.K.’s case, as her reunification services and her
guardianship were terminated in November 2025, and both children were awaiting
section 366.26 hearings.
3.
Ultimately, appellant failed to reunify with A.K., and her guardianship was
terminated on November 4, 2025.3 The juvenile court set section 366.26 hearings for
both children. The orders challenged in the present appeal were made after the
reunification period had ended and while the children’s section 366.26 hearings were
pending.
Appellant’s Attorney’s Filing of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
On November 25, 2025, appellant’s privately retained attorney filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, along with a supporting memorandum of points and authorities and
declaration. The motion indicated that it was “based on the grounds that an actual
conflict has arisen between attorney and client which is subject to the attorney-client
privilege, irreparably impairing the attorney client relationship and rendering it
impossibly difficult for [her attorney] or anyone from his firm to effectively or ethically
represent [appellant].” The motion further stated that “based upon an irremediable
breakdown in communication between [appellant] and [counsel] and the members of his
firm, representation has become unreasonably difficult.” The matter was calendared for
January 8, 2026.
The proof of service indicated appellant was served with the notice of motion and
motion, and supporting memorandum of points and authorities and declaration by mail
and email. The motion contained a notice addressed to appellant, advising her that if she
opposed the motion, she should be present at the hearing.
3 This court denied appellant’s petition for extraordinary writ from the juvenile
court’s order terminating her guardianship, wherein she asserted she was not provided
proper notice in violation of her due process rights. (M.K. v. Superior Court (Feb. 19,
2026, F090734) [nonpub. opn.].)
4.
January 5, 2026 Orders Granting the Agency’s Section 388 Petition to Terminate
Appellant’s Visitation and Declaring Appellant a Vexatious Litigant
On December 23, 2025, the agency filed a section 388 petition requesting the
juvenile court terminate the previously ordered monthly visits between the children and
appellant. The petition alleged that appellant had “engaged in ongoing and escalating
verbally abusive and confrontational behavior towards staff during visits in front of the
children,” which had resulted in stress for the children.
Specifically, it was alleged that during the most recent visit, appellant refused to
comply with time limits, argued with staff about court paperwork, entered their personal
space, and repeatedly followed them into the hallway yelling and accusing them of
“ ‘kidnapping’ ” the children. She physically interfered with staff’s ability to safely
remove the children at the conclusion of the visit by pulling M.K. away, withholding
A.K.’s sweater, and requiring multiple requests and additional staff assistance to
complete the transition. It was reported that after this visit, A.K. exhibited atypical
behaviors including trying to damage household items and emotional dysregulation.
According to the petition, this was not the first time appellant had engaged in this
type of behavior, and during past visits she had engaged in inappropriate communication
with the staff in front of the children and called an ambulance over a minor injury. The
children’s resource parent reportedly feared that appellant would attempt to follow her
home to determine where she lived and had to resort to taking alternate routes home
following visits due to these concerns.
The juvenile court ordered a hearing on the agency’s petition for January 5, 2026.
Appellant was served a copy of the request as well as notice of the hearing. No party
filed a written opposition to the petition nor requested a contested hearing.
At the hearing, appellant was present though did not appear to be accompanied by
counsel. Counsel for the agency submitted on the filed petition. Minors’ counsel joined
in the agency’s request. Mother’s attorney stated that mother would like appellant to
5.
continue visiting because “[s]he thinks it benefits the kids.” Appellant personally entered
an objection on the record, to which the juvenile court replied the objection was “noted
and overruled.”
The juvenile court granted the agency’s petition and terminated visitation for
appellant.
The juvenile court immediately added: “I’m going to go ahead and make a
finding today that [appellant] is a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
[s]ection 391, subdivision (b)(3).” The court explained that appellant had been
“repeatedly filing unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other documents intended solely
to obstruct or delay.” The court went on:
“I will also find that she signed documents under penalty of perjury
that she is a parent or guardian and submitted those to the Court. That’s a
felony. I’m going to refer the matter once again to the Sheriff’s Office for
investigation and forward it to the District Attorney for false personation.
Number one, I believe she’s filing things under other people’s names and
under penalty of perjury, so she is committing felonious conduct, here, in
the courtroom. I’ll refer the matter, once again, to the Sheriff’s Office for
investigation and referral to the District Attorney.”
January 8, 2026 Order Granting Appellant’s Attorney’s Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel
A hearing on appellant’s attorney’s November 25, 2025 motion to withdraw was
conducted on January 8, 2026. Appellant was present. The juvenile court granted the
motion and relieved counsel over appellant’s objection.
Prefiling Order
On January 14, 2026, the juvenile court filed a “PREFILING ORDER—
VEXATIOUS LITIGANT” on Judicial Council Form VL-100. The order indicated that
appellant, “unless represented by an attorney, [is] prohibited from filing any new
litigation in the courts of California without approval of the presiding justice or presiding
6.
judge of the court in which the action is to be filed.” The order indicated a copy was to
be forwarded to the Judicial Council of California.4
Order Not to Release Minute Orders
On January 27, 2026, minors’ counsel informed the juvenile court that counsel for
all parties in both A.K. and M.K.’s case reached a stipulation and were requesting the
court issue an order in each case indicating that the clerk’s office was not to release any
minute orders to anyone except county counsel without prior court approval, to which the
court agreed. Minors’ counsel prepared orders to that effect, and the orders were
approved as to form by county counsel, mother’s attorney, and the children’s respective
fathers’ attorneys. The court signed the orders, and they were filed on January 30, 2026.
Appellant’s Notices of Appeal
On January 26, 2026, appellant filed notices of appeal with the Merced County
Superior Court to initiate the present case, indicating she was appealing from “[o]rders
[t]erminating [her] visitation, declaring [her] a vexatious litigant, [i]mposing filing
restrictions, and all related orders on 1/5/26 [and] 1/8/26.” On February 2, 2026,
appellant filed a “Request to File New Litigation by Vexatious Litigant” regarding the
notices of appeal (Judicial Council Form VL-110, unnecessary capitalization and
boldface omitted), which was granted by the superior court on February 9, 2025.
Appellant’s notices of appeal were filed with this court on February 11, 2026.
4 We have confirmed, and on our own motion take judicial notice of (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subds. (c), (h)), the fact that appellant’s name appears on the Judicial Council’s
vexatious litigant list. (See Vexatious Litigant List at <https://courts.ca.gov/news-
reference/reports-publications/vexatious-litigant-list> [as of Sept. 28, 2026].)
7.
DISCUSSION
I. Order Granting the Agency’s Section 388 Petition
“Any parent or other person having in interest in a child who is a dependent child
of the juvenile court … may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence,
petition the court … for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court
previously made .…” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The petitioner bears the burden of
establishing a legitimate change of circumstances and that undoing the prior order would
be in the best interest of the child. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.)
For the request made here, the burden is preponderance of the evidence. (See Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).)
Ruling on a section 388 petition is “ ‘committed to the sound discretion of the
juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an
abuse of discretion is clearly established.’ ” (In re A.R. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1102,
1116‒1117.) We look to whether the juvenile court “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason.
When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing
court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318‒319.)
Appellant contends she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that
the juvenile court’s denial “overrode mother’s stated position that the visits benefited the
children.” She contends the denial “directly affect[ed] [her] rights without adequate
procedural protection.” Appellant has not established error.
First, we note appellant does not support her contentions with legal authority. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793
[“ ‘Every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points
made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and
8.
pass it without consideration’ ”].)5 If we were to excuse that deficiency, however, in any
event, appellant’s contentions are meritless.
Contrary to her argument that she was denied procedural protection, appellant was
granted more than was required. We acknowledge that appellant, as A.K.’s legal
guardian, was recognized as a party to the proceedings at their outset. At the time the
agency brought their section 388 petition, however, reunification efforts and her
guardianship had been terminated. As a grandparent to the children, appellant did not
have a constitutionally protected interest in her relationship with the children, and she did
not have an “absolute right to visit” the children, only the statutory right to have the
juvenile court consider whether visitation should occur. (In re R.M. (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 119, 130–131.) Nor was she entitled to notice that the juvenile court would
modify a relative visitation order. (Id. at p. 133, fn. 5.) This is true even though there
was already an order in place permitting visitation between appellant and the children,
contrary to appellant’s argument otherwise.
Appellant was nonetheless given notice of the hearing and nature of the request,
was present for the hearing, and was permitted to place an objection on the record.
Appellant points out that the juvenile court’s ruling was terse, but there is no evidence on
the record that appellant sought to nor was expressly prevented from making further
argument or offering evidence on her behalf.
5 Appellant cites one case—In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310—in her opening
brief to support her assertion that “[v]isitation is a necessary and integral component of
the dependency proceeding, and the court’s power to determine whether visitation occurs
must be exercised with adequate procedural protection for the affected party.”
In re S.H. does not support appellant’s position she was entitled to procedural
protection in connection with the agency’s request. That case addresses a visitation order
between children and their parent and the issue of whether the order constituted an
invalid delegation of judicial authority by allowing the children to determine whether
visitation occurred.
9.
Further, the juvenile court’s order granting the petition was substantively
appropriate and did not exceed the bounds of reason. “The juvenile court can suspend or
deny visitation with any relative whose conduct is detrimental to the minor’s emotional
and/or physical well-being.” (In re R.M., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) The agency
alleged in detail that appellant’s negative behavior during visitation was causing the
children distress. Family reunification efforts had ended, and the children were on track
to receiving permanency. The petition established a change in circumstances and a
sufficient basis for the request that continued visitation was not in the children’s best
interest and should be terminated.
We reject appellant’s argument that the juvenile court erred by not
“acknowledg[ing], weigh[ing], or explain[ing] why” it was “overriding” mother’s
position. Appellant has not established that the court was required to give reasons on the
record for its decision, nor that it erroneously failed to consider mother’s position; we
presume the court simply concluded mother’s position was outweighed by considerations
derived from the history of the proceedings, the evidence submitted by the agency, and
the positions of the other parties. (See Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970 [reviewing court implies all findings necessary to
support the judgment where no statement of decision is requested].) Even if the court
were required to state its reasons on the record, we would conclude any error was
harmless, as appellant has not established that doing so would have had any effect on the
outcome of the proceedings.
Mother’s participation in the case was very limited; she did not participate in
reunification services, attended few hearings, and her whereabouts were unknown for
most of the proceedings. At the time of the hearing on the petition, she had only attended
a single visit with the children, during which she was described as having a “flat effect,”
(sic) where she “made minimal facial expressions, displayed limited engagement, and did
not verbally interact with either child.” Mother’s wishes were not strong or compelling
10.
evidence of what was in the children’s best interest. On the other hand, the children’s
attorney expressed support for the petition. (See § 317, subd. (c)(2) [“[a] primary
responsibility” of minors’ counsel “shall be to advocate for the protection, safety, and
physical and emotional well-being of the child”].)
For these reasons, we conclude the juvenile court’s order granting the agency’s
petition did not violate any of appellant’s constitutional or statutory rights and was not an
abuse of discretion.
II. Order Declaring Appellant a Vexatious Litigant
Appellant contends that the vexatious litigant finding was not supported by the
evidence, specifically because at the time it was made, she was still represented by
counsel and thus did not fall within the applicable statutory definition. She also contends
she was erroneously deprived of a noticed motion and oral evidentiary hearing. We do
not reach whether the evidence supported the finding because we agree with appellant
that the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing or otherwise allow her to
present any defense or evidence and reverse on that ground.
A. Additional Background
Even though, as we explain, we conclude the juvenile court erred by failing to
provide appellant a noticed hearing on its vexatious litigant finding, we deem it
appropriate to provide some context for the court’s comments in connection with its
finding.
Appellant was represented by privately retained counsel from September 2024
until he was relieved in January 2026. During that period, appellant filed copious
documents in propria persona to try to obtain the case files of both A.K. and M.K. Most
prevalent of these filings was Judicial Council Form MSC-JC-002, entitled
“DECLARATION FOR ACCESS TO JUVENILE CASE FILE IN POSSESSION OF
JUVENILE COURT.” (Boldface omitted.) Appellant filed this document, by our count,
approximately nine times over the period from November 2024 through November 2025.
11.
Notably, on the declarations related to M.K.’s case, she attested under penalty of perjury
that she was M.K.’s “parent or guardian.” On two declarations filed on November 4,
2025, one where she was seeking access to M.K.’s case file, and one where she was
seeking access to A.K.’s case file, she attested under penalty of perjury that she was “[a]n
attorney for the parent or guardian of the minor who is actively participating in criminal
or juvenile proceedings involving the minor.” Next to the title line next to her signature
on each declaration, she wrote “Guardian.” She continued to file declarations for access
attesting she was both children’s “parent or guardian,” even after her guardianship as to
A.K. was terminated.
On December 8, 2025, she filed a notice of petition and petition for access to the
juvenile case file in A.K.’s case (Judicial Council Forms JV-571 and JV-570), declaring
under penalty of perjury that she was A.K.’s legal guardian, which, at the time, was false.
On December 23, 2025, the juvenile court issued a denial of appellant’s request,
indicating appellant had “no standing and is committing perjury.”
Additionally, the agency points out that throughout the proceedings, the juvenile
court received information from the parties and independently observed what they refer
to as “improper, obstructive, and deceptive conduct.” (Capitalization and boldface
omitted.) The parties have frequently suspected appellant of behavior including
withholding information about mother’s whereabouts, interfering in mother’s and M.K.’s
father’s ability to participate in the case, sending text messages to mother’s counsel while
posing as mother, and writing and sending emails to the agency posing as M.K.’s father.6
6 We note that in case No. F090767, the agency urged a differently-constituted
panel of this court to consider this type of evidence to infer that appellant had filed a
notice of intent on behalf of mother without mother’s authorization. We declined to do
so. (A.K. v. Superior Court (Feb. 19, 2026, F090767) [nonpub. opn.].)
12.
B. Analysis
1. Appellant Was Entitled to a Noticed Motion and Hearing with an
Opportunity to Be Heard and Present Evidence on the Issue of Whether She Was a
Vexatious Litigant
“The vexatious litigant statutes ([Code Civ. Proc.,] §§ 391–391.7) are designed to
curb misuse of the court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who,
repeatedly litigating the same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and
resources of the court system and other litigants.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1164, 1169.)
The vexatious litigant statutes contain “two distinct and complementary sets of
remedies.” (Shalant v. Girardi, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) The first remedy, not at
issue here, but necessary to mention for context, arises out of Code of Civil Procedure
sections 391.1 through 391.6, where during pending litigation, a defendant may file a
noticed motion to have the plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant, and if the plaintiff has
no reasonable probability of prevailing, ordered to furnish security. Upon making the
requisite findings, the court orders the plaintiff to give security, to compensate for the
reasonable costs and attorney fees of defending the suit. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391.1,
391.3) Upon failure to post security, the action is dismissed. (Id., § 391.4.)
The second remedy, set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 and utilized
by the juvenile court here, authorizes the court “on its own motion or the motion of any
party, [to] enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new
litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the
presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be
filed.” This remedy places an “ ‘extra burden upon the vexatious litigant,’ ” as the court
has “ ‘taken a second step in addressing the vexatious litigant problem and has
determined that no court or adverse party should be burdened by the particular plaintiff’s
meaningless litigation.’ ” (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 221 (Bravo).)
13.
To implement either of these remedies, the trial court first must find the litigant to
be vexatious.7 As relevant here, Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3)
defines a “ ‘[v]exatious litigant’ ” as a person who “[i]n any litigation while acting in
propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers,
conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay.”
If the first remedy is sought, Code of Civil Procedure section 391.2 entitles the
alleged vexatious litigant to a hearing at which they may present “evidence, written or
oral, by witnesses or affidavit.” If the second remedy is sought, and the person has not
already been found to be a vexatious litigant, they are entitled to the protections of Code
of Civil Procedure section 391.2—a noticed motion and hearing, which includes the right
to oral argument and the presentation of evidence. (Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at
p. 225.)
“A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious
litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court’s ruling if it is supported by substantial
evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is
correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Bravo, supra, 99
Cal.App.4th at p. 219.) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (In re
Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1346.)
Here, the following facts and circumstances are apparent from the record and
appear to be undisputed: (1) there is no evidence that there was any finding prior to
7 There is a question, as a different panel of this court has suggested in dicta, as to
whether the court has statutory authority to declare a litigant vexatious on its own motion.
(People v. Harrison (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 780, 787 [“While a court may enter a
prefiling order on its own motion, the statutes do not appear to envision that a court may,
on its own motion, find a plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant in the first instance.”].)
We need not, and are not in a position to, as no party has raised this issue, address
this issue here.
14.
January 5, 2026, that appellant was a vexatious litigant; (2) the juvenile court made both
the order declaring appellant a vexatious litigant and the prefiling order on its own
motion; (3) no notice was provided to appellant; (4) no hearing on either the vexatious
litigant finding or prefiling order was conducted; and (5) appellant was not given any
opportunity to argue or present evidence.8 Applying the above legal principles to these
undisputed facts, we conclude the finding appellant was a vexatious litigant and related
prefiling order under the circumstances here was error.
The agency tacitly concedes the juvenile court did not follow the notice and
hearing requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 391 et seq. and Bravo prior to
declaring appellant a vexatious litigant. The agency does not argue that appellant was not
entitled to notice or a hearing under the vexatious litigant statutes nor that the error was
harmless but instead asserts that the court’s actions fell within its inherent authority to
control the dependency proceedings. The agency compares the present case to In re M.B.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1057, where the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 injunction preventing a parent from harassing
social services agency employees. The appellate court rejected the parent’s argument
8 The agency’s respondent’s brief and the record contain some reference to an order
to show cause issued to appellant close in time to the vexatious litigant finding. The
agency asserts that on December 15, 2025, the juvenile court issued an order to show
cause and “set a hearing to address the false statements contained in the multiple
documents filed by [appellant].” The page in the record cited by the agency does refer to
a notice of hearing “Re: Order to Show Cause” set for January 8, 2026, but it does not
contain any substantive details. (Boldface omitted.) On January 5, 2026, before the court
took up the agency’s section 388 petition, the courtroom clerk noted, “[W]e do have a
date of January 8th for motions to withdraw the attorney from legal guardian, why
sanctions should not be imposed re [appellant],” to which the court responded, “That’s a
different matter.” The minute orders for January 5, 2026, indicate the court vacated the
“previously set Order to Show Cause” on January 8, 2026, and confirmed counsel’s
motion to withdraw for that date.
The agency does not assert, nor do we find, that this sequence of events constitutes
any type of meaningful notice for the juvenile court’s vexatious litigant finding.
15.
that Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 did not apply but noted that even if it did not
apply, “the juvenile court would still have inherent power to issue an injunction like the
one in this case.” (In re M.B., at p. 1064.)
We decline to extend the reasoning in In re M.B. to the circumstances here, where
the procedure used impacted some of appellant’s important rights and had implications
that extend far beyond the dependency proceedings.
We acknowledge that courts have regularly held vexatious litigant statutes to be
constitutional, but the statute expressly contemplates the alleged vexatious litigant
receiving notice and a hearing where they are entitled to present evidence. In upholding
the constitutionality of the vexatious litigant statute, the court in Wolfgram v. Wells
Fargo Bank (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 43 started “ ‘with the premise that the rights to
assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress of grievances are among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.’ ” (Id. at p. 55.) The
Wolfgram court ultimately concluded the statute “does not impermissibly ‘chill’
litigants,” but that was due in part to the fact that “sufficient safeguards are contained
within the statute.” (Id. at p. 50.) One of those safeguards is the requirement of a noticed
motion and an opportunity to be heard.
The order declaring appellant a vexatious litigant and the prefiling order impact
appellant’s access to the courts indefinitely and place the burden on her to vacate the
orders. (See Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221–222, 225 [noting that while Code
Civ. Proc., § 391.7 does not deny a litigant access to the courts, it certainly implicates
that access]; Code Civ. Proc., § 391.8 [setting forth application procedure for vexatious
litigants to vacate prefiling order]; see also Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp. (9th Cir.
2007) 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 [federal courts should enter prefiling orders “only after a
cautious review of the pertinent circumstances” because those orders “can tread on a
litigant’s due process right of access to the courts”].)
16.
Another potential effect on appellant could occur if she were engaged in unrelated
litigation as a plaintiff where the defendant sought an order for her to furnish security
based on the juvenile court’s order declaring her a vexatious litigant. (See Bravo, supra,
99 Cal.App.4th at p. 225 [“[w]here a plaintiff has already been declared vexatious and
previously received the benefit of a noticed motion and oral hearing, a defendant moving
under [a vexatious litigant statute] need not again establish the plaintiff’s status”].)
Accordingly, the vexatious litigant finding against appellant has the potential future effect
of potentially depriving her of property in the form of an order to furnish security without
a hearing in violation of due process. (See Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14
Cal.3d 448, 454, 458.)
The agency has not cited any legal authority or made any argument which
persuades us that the juvenile court was within its authority to circumvent the procedural
safeguards affecting these important principles.
2. The Error Was Not Harmless
We cannot say the error was harmless. Bravo is instructive. In Bravo, the court
concluded the plaintiff received a fair hearing on whether he was a vexatious litigant—
and therefore declined to treat the error as reversible per se—because the plaintiff “had
the full opportunity to file [an] opposition to defendants’ motion to declare him a
vexatious litigant, including declarations, affidavits and other relevant evidence, and
... the court considered [the plaintiff’s] opposition papers before granting the motion.”
(Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 226.) Here, appellant received no hearing nor any
opportunity to present any opposition. The Bravo court suggested in dicta that the
complete denial of a hearing on the vexatious litigant issue was reversible per se. (Id. at
pp. 225–226.)
We need not determine whether the error here was reversible per se because we
believe the record demonstrates adequate prejudice. (See In re James Q. (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 255, 268 [denial of contested review hearing in dependency case resulted in
17.
miscarriage of justice].) Appellant’s attorney was not present at the hearing, and
appellant had no opportunity to consult with him or, in the alternative, as it appears
communication between her and her attorney had broken down at the time the vexatious
litigant finding was made, seek other counsel’s advice or present her own defense. While
we recognize appellant’s behavior throughout the proceedings has been problematic, we
cannot say that the evidence supporting the vexatious litigant finding was so
overwhelming that there were no legal or factual arguments appellant could make that
would warrant consideration by the juvenile court. In this appeal, appellant has raised a
question as to whether she met the statutory definition of “vexatious litigant,” and we
acknowledge there are potentially other questions as to the applicability of the vexatious
litigant statutes in these circumstances though we make no comment on the merits of any
potential defenses.
We appreciate the juvenile court’s and the agency’s concerns about appellant’s
challenging behavior, particularly as these concerns relate to the efficiency of the
dependency proceedings and the safety, privacy, and interest in permanence of the
children. We do not intend anything in this opinion to be construed in any way to limit or
discourage the exercise of the juvenile court’s statutory or inherent power to otherwise
prevent disruption to the underlying dependency proceedings by appellant, for example
by limiting appellant’s ability to be present at hearings, or as it has already done, limiting
the dissemination of minute orders or forwarding evidence of any illegal conduct to the
appropriate authorities, or any other order that is not inconsistent with this opinion. We
also express no opinion on the merits of a properly noticed vexatious litigant motion, for
which appellant is provided an opportunity to be heard and present evidence pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 391 et seq.
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III. Order Granting Appellant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw
A litigant’s attorney may withdraw from representation either (1) with the client’s
consent, or (2) by court order “after notice” to the client. (Code Civ. Proc., § 284.) An
attorney may withdraw from a case “when withdrawal can be accomplished without
undue prejudice to the client’s interests.” (Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th
904, 915; Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(d).)
Because the decision whether to allow counsel to withdraw requires balancing
competing factors, we review the juvenile court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.
(Estate of Falco (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014.) A court abuses its discretion when
its ruling “ ‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason.’ ” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283.)
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by granting counsel’s motion to
withdraw because it was granted in a “summary proceeding” that left her without counsel
near in time to the vexatious litigant declaration and “materially affected [her] ability to
protect her interests in the dependency proceeding.”
We find no abuse of discretion. First, although notably, appellant does not assert
otherwise, counsel established cause for his request by asserting communication between
his firm and appellant had completely broken down and a conflict existed which
“irreparably impairs the fundamental attorney-client relationship, rendering it
unreasonably difficult for [him], or anyone from the firm, to effectively carry out the
representation of [appellant].” (See Aceves v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 584,
591–592; Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(4) [“a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if … [¶] the client by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult
for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively”]; see also Aceves, at p. 592 [a
breakdown may be established by the attorney’s representation that it exists].)
Next, contrary to appellant’s contention, the order granting counsel’s motion
resulted in minimal prejudice. After appellant’s guardianship as to A.K. was terminated
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in early November 2025, she was no longer a party to the proceedings. The reunification
period had ended, and the juvenile court’s focus was on the children’s interest in
permanency. Appellant was no longer entitled to notice of nor participation in the
proceedings.9 The court had determined that visitation between the children and
appellant was detrimental. Though appellant has asserted she was entitled to
representation to ensure her “interests in the dependency proceeding” were protected, she
does not identify those interests. To the extent she still desired legal counsel, she was
given ample notice of counsel’s intention to withdraw (approximately 44 days) and had
time to file a written opposition or retain other counsel. We acknowledge appellant’s
point that the court granted counsel’s motion between the time it declared her a vexatious
litigant on January 5, 2026, and entered the prefiling order on January 14, 2026. Our
reversal of vexatious litigant orders negates any prejudice resulting from the timing of
these orders.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that the juvenile court did not
conduct a “meaningful inquiry” into whether counsel should be allowed to withdraw.
The case she cites to support this assertion—Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 1128—is inapposite. In Manfredi & Levine, the superior court denied the
attorney’s motion to withdraw because the attorney refused to give any specifics as to the
conflict he was claiming as the basis for his motion. (Id. at p. 1131.) The appellate court
denied the attorney’s subsequent petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at p. 1137.) The court
9 We acknowledge that when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown, grandparents are
entitled to notice of the section 366.26 hearing. (See §§ 294, subd. (a)(7), 349; see also
In re Steven H. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032–1033.) On our own motion, we take
judicial notice of the record on appeal in case No. F091788, which contains the notice of
the section 366.26 hearing. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The record indicates that
mother was present at the hearing where the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing was confirmed, and mother’s whereabouts were known at the time the notice was
sent, and it was served upon her by mail.
20.
explained under the circumstances of that case, the trial court acted within its discretion
by denying the motion. (Id. at pp. 1132–1136.)
The present case is in a different procedural posture. We are applying the
deferential abuse of discretion standard to the juvenile court’s grant of counsel’s motion.
Here, the court was satisfied with counsel’s assertions and impliedly found counsel could
have withdrawn without undue prejudice to appellant, and we see no reason to disturb
that finding.
IV. Asserted Cumulative Error
Appellant makes the somewhat amorphous argument that “the combined effect of
the January 2026 orders deprived [her] of meaningful access to the court and prejudiced
her ability to protect her rights.” (Unnecessary capitalization and boldface omitted.) She
contends the “sequence” of the orders “as a whole” prejudiced her in “concrete ways”
including “remov[ing] visitation, restrict[ing] filings, depriv[ing] her of counsel,
burden[ing] her attempt to appeal, and limit[ing] access to written court orders.” She
contends “[t]aken together,” the challenged orders violated her due process rights.
We disagree. We have determined the order declaring appellant a vexatious
litigant and the prefiling order were made in error and must be reversed. Appellant has
not established any other errors have occurred.10 Accordingly, she has not established
that the alleged errors’ cumulative effect caused her any additional prejudice or
constituted a due process violation necessitating reversal of any other findings or orders.
DISPOSITION
The orders declaring appellant a vexatious litigant and requiring her to obtain
prefiling permission are reversed. If any party moves to declare appellant a vexatious
10 Appellant briefly mentions the order prohibiting any person or entity besides the
office of county counsel from obtaining minute orders as part of the “sequence” she
challenges, but appellant has not made any claim that this was an erroneous order nor
established it was in any way connected to the vexatious litigant finding.
21.
litigant, a noticed hearing shall be conducted in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure
section 391.2. If no party elects to make such a motion, or the juvenile court determines
appellant is not a vexatious litigant following a hearing, the court is directed to cause
appellant’s name to be removed from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious litigants.
All other findings and orders from which appellant appeals are affirmed.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
FRANSON, J.
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