Filed 8/20/26 In re A.J. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.J., et al., Persons Coming B347042
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP04085)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.L. et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants;
J.J.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Syna N. Dennis, Judge Pro Tempore. Reversed.
Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.L.
Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant A.C.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel and William D. Thetford, Principal
Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
John M. Kennedy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
___________________
This appeal concerns A.L. and A.J., the two minor children
of mother J.J. (mother).
J.L., whom the juvenile court found to be the alleged father
of A.L., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
jurisdiction over A.L.
A.C., the father of A.J., appeals from an exit order granting
mother sole legal custody of A.J.
Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) concedes J.L. did not receive
statutorily required notice and opportunity to contest his alleged
father status. DCFS further concedes there was insufficient
basis in the record for the juvenile court to deny A.C. joint legal
custody of A.J. with mother. We agree with these concessions,
and reverse.
2
BACKGROUND
Mother has two children, son A.J., born 2021, and daughter
A.L., born 2022. A.C. is the father of A.J., and the juvenile court
found J.L. to be the alleged father of A.L.
In 2022, the juvenile court sustained allegations mother
and A.C. fractured A.J.’s ribs by pulling the child back and forth
in an effort to remove him from one another’s hold. The court
further found mother and A.C. had a history of violent
altercations in A.J.’s presence. The court terminated jurisdiction
in 2023 with an order granting the parents joint legal custody
and mother sole physical custody.
In 2023, A.C. was sentenced to 32 months in state prison
for a firearm possession offense unrelated to the instant case.
A.C.’s parole eligibility date was in November 2024.
In June 2024, DCFS filed the dependency petition at issue
in the instant case, alleging under Welfare and Institutions1
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) that J.L. endangered A.L.
when, in A.L.’s presence, J.L. engaged in a verbal altercation
with an unknown person and brandished a firearm. DCFS
alleged mother knew or reasonably should have known J.L.
possessed a loaded weapon and mother allowed J.L. to live in the
family home and have unmonitored contact with the children.
DCFS alleged J.L.’s conduct and mother’s failure to protect A.L.
put both A.L. and her sibling A.J. at risk of harm. The petition
raised no allegations about A.C.
Notice of the initial hearing was sent to both mother and
J.L. at the home they shared in Inglewood. J.L. was not living in
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3
the home at the time having been arrested and incarcerated
following the firearm incident that led to the referral. Apart from
the notice sent to mother’s and J.L.’s home, the record does not
indicate J.L. received notice of the initial hearing.2
In advance of the initial hearing, mother filed a parentage
questionnaire indicating J.L. was present at A.L.’s birth, J.L.
signed A.L.’s birth certificate naming him as her father, mother
and J.L. were living together at the time of A.L.’s conception and
birth, no other adult had raised A.L. in a co-parenting
relationship, J.L. had held himself out openly as A.L.’s father,
and J.L. had received A.L. into his home.
Mother also filed a parentage questionnaire regarding A.C.,
stating, inter alia, A.C. had submitted to a DNA test that
confirmed he is A.J.’s father.
Neither J.L. or A.C. appeared at the June 25, 2024 initial
hearing. The juvenile court stated it had received the parentage
questionnaires submitted by mother. The court found J.L. to be
the alleged father of A.L., and A.C. to be the biological father of
A.J. The court set J.L.’s and A.C.’s arraignment for July 25,
2024, and the adjudication hearing for August 8, 2024.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, at this
point in the proceedings J.L. was incarcerated at North County
Correctional Facility in Castaic, a facility administered by the
Los Angeles County Sheriff.3 DCFS mailed notice of the July 25
2 Because A.C. in his appeal raises no challenge concerning
notice, we do not summarize the facts concerning notice to him.
3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of
Los Angeles County’s website indicating the North County
Correctional Facility is administered by the sheriff.
(<https://locator.lacounty.gov/lac/Location/3057019/los-angeles-
4
and August 8, 2024 hearings to J.L. at the correctional facility.
DCFS attached the dependency petition and a “Social Worker’s
report” to the notice of the August 8 hearing. The juvenile court
signed orders directing the sheriff to transport J.L. to the July 25
and August 8, 2024 hearings.
A DCFS investigator spoke to J.L. in the correctional
facility on July 19, 2024 about the allegations in the dependency
petition. The record does not indicate the investigator discussed
anything procedural such as the upcoming hearings, the status of
the case, or the juvenile court’s finding that J.L. was A.L.’s
alleged father.
The juvenile court did not arraign J.L. on July 25, 2024 as
scheduled. The minute order states the matter was not called for
hearing but instead, was heard by way of submission with no
appearances. The order states, “A submitted case form is signed
and filed this date,” although no such form appears in the record.
The juvenile court trailed J.L.’s arraignment to the adjudication
date, August 8, 2024.
The juvenile court arraigned A.C. on July 25, 2024 as
scheduled. A.C. waived his appearance. The court appointed
counsel for A.C., and counsel stated A.C. submitted to the court’s
jurisdiction. The court designated A.C. as “non-offending.”
On August 7, 2024, DCFS filed a last minute information
indicating J.L. had a criminal court hearing scheduled for
August 8 and would not be able to attend the juvenile court
hearing scheduled for that day. At the August 8 hearing, the
juvenile court continued the hearing to August 20 so attorney
county-sheriff---north-county-correctional-facility> [as of Aug. 12,
2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/HW4C-SMF6>.)
5
Milena Reyes could meet with J.L. as a “friend of court for [J.L.].”
It does not appear from the record Reyes was present at this
hearing or any subsequent hearing.
DCFS sent notice of the August 20, 2024 hearing to J.L. at
the correctional facility. The juvenile court ordered the sheriff to
transport J.L. to the hearing.
DCFS filed a last minute information on August 16, 2024
stating that a DCFS social worker was scheduled to speak with
A.C. that day, but A.C. “refused to speak to” the social worker.
At the August 20, 2024 hearing, neither J.L. nor A.C.
appeared, nor did attorney Reyes. After a discussion off the
record, the juvenile court stated, “[J.L. has] been contacted by
[DCFS] and refused to speak to [DCFS],[4] and there’s a request
to continue the matter for three weeks in order to allow
Ms. Reyes who is friend [of] the court for [J.L.] to make contact
with her client.”5 The court continued the matter to September
16, 2024.
DCFS mailed notice of the September 16, 2024 hearing to
J.L. at the correctional facility. Unlike the previous hearings,
there is no order in the record directing the sheriff to transport
J.L. to the hearing on that date. The record does contain an
order directing the warden of A.C.’s prison to allow A.C. to attend
the September 16 hearing.
4 The record does not explain on what basis the juvenile
court found J.L. had refused to speak with DCFS. As noted, the
last minute information filed four days before the hearing
indicated A.C., not J.L., refused to speak with the social worker.
5 The record does not indicate from whom the juvenile
court received the continuance request.
6
J.L. did not appear at the September 16, 2024 hearing.
Counsel for DCFS stated, “It’s my understanding that
transportation was arranged. [J.L.] was supposed to be on that
transportation, and he has not arrived today.” Counsel further
stated A.C. had refused to attend. The juvenile court found
notice was proper. The court further found A.C. was A.J.’s
presumed father because A.C. had been found to be A.J.’s
presumed father in another case.
The court proceeded to adjudication. No witnesses
testified. Following argument of counsel, the court amended the
petition to omit the allegation that mother knew of J.L.’s firearm,
but left intact the allegation that mother reasonably should have
known about the firearm. The court sustained the petition as
amended against mother and J.L. The court ordered A.L.
removed from J.L. and placed with mother. The court ordered
services for J.L., including parenting, anger management, and
individual counseling, as well as monitored visitation via
telephone or video. The court set a review hearing for March 17,
2025.6
A second minute order from the hearing states J.L. was
noticed and had transportation available but was not present in
court.
DCFS filed a status review report on February 26, 2025
listing J.L.’s address as the Inglewood address he shared with
mother before he was incarcerated. The report does not indicate
if or when J.L. was released from jail. DCFS sent notice of the
6 Mother appealed from the jurisdictional and dispositional
orders. The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction while the
appeal was pending, and we dismissed the appeal as moot. (In re
A.J. et al. (July 25, 2025, B341241) [nonpub. opn.].)
7
March 17, 2025 hearing to J.L. at the Inglewood address.
Although notice was not sent to the correctional facility, the
juvenile court signed an order directing the sheriff to transport
J.L. from jail to the March 17 hearing.
J.L. did not appear at the March 17, 2025 hearing, nor was
he mentioned or discussed during the hearing. The juvenile court
set the next hearing for June 16, 2025.
DCFS filed another status review report on May 29, 2025,
again listing J.L.’s address as the Inglewood home he previously
shared with mother, although mother’s listed address was now
different. The report confirmed J.L. was no longer in jail. The
report stated J.L. met with a DCFS social worker on May 12,
2025, and J.L. was respectful and apologetic about not complying
with his case plan. J.L. said he and mother were no longer living
together. The social worker again spoke with J.L. on May 27,
2025 and advised him to consult his attorney for additional
information regarding his case plan. The social worker also
arranged visits between J.L. and A.L.
DCFS sent notice of the June 16, 2025 hearing to J.L. at a
new address on “Terise Avenue” in Hawthorne. This was a
misspelling—J.L. in fact lived on Cerise Avenue.
J.L. did not appear at the June 16, 2025 hearing. A.C.
appeared by speakerphone. The juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction with a custody order granting mother sole legal and
physical custody of A.J. with monitored visits for A.C. The court
found no custody order was required for A.L. because J.L. was an
alleged father only.
J.L. filed a notice of appeal two days later. That same day,
J.L. filed a request to change court order contending he “was not
given the correct court date to attend my hearing,” and “was
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never contacted by any attorney to represent me at any
hearings.” J.L. requested the juvenile court grant him joint legal
and physical custody of A.L. The record does not indicate the
juvenile court ruled on the request.
A.C. also filed a timely notice of appeal from the June 16,
2025 hearing.
DISCUSSION
A. J.L.’s Appeal
J.L. contends he did not receive proper notice of the
proceedings. He further argues he was improperly denied the
right to counsel, and the juvenile court erred in finding him an
alleged rather than presumed father. We agree there were errors
in determining J.L.’s parentage status, and those errors affected
the entire case, requiring reversal of the order terminating
jurisdiction. We do not reach J.L.’s other claims of error.
Dependency law distinguishes between “presumed” fathers
and “alleged” fathers. “A presumed father is a man who meets
one or more specified criteria in [Family Code] section 7611.” (In
re P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 (P.A.).) Those criteria
include, inter alia, “The presumed parent receives the child into
their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.”
(Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).) Presumed fathers are entitled to
appointed counsel and reunification services. (P.A., at p. 980.)
“An alleged father . . . is a man who has not established
biological paternity or presumed father status.” (P.A., supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.) An alleged father is entitled to notice
and an opportunity to appear in the dependency proceeding, but
is not entitled to counsel or reunification services. (In re D.P.
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 689, 695.)
9
“An alleged father is ‘entitled at the earliest possible point
to be informed of the importance of, and apprised of the statutory
method for, seeking presumed parent status. [¶] Specifically,
section 316.2 requires the court to give to all men who are
identified as an alleged father a statutorily prescribed notice and
a statutorily prescribed form containing various advisements that
enables them to exercise their rights as an alleged father to
assert a claim to parentage. This procedure mandated by section
316.2 is the statutory means of protecting an alleged father’s
limited due process to notice and an opportunity to appear in the
case to assert a position and attempt to change his paternity
status.’ [Citations.]” (In re A.K. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 252, 265.)
As DCFS concedes, there is no indication in the record J.L.
was provided with the notice and form mandated under
section 316.2. He therefore had neither proper notice nor
opportunity to elevate his fatherhood status to presumed and
obtain, inter alia, appointed counsel.
This error was not harmless. There was evidence in the
record from which the juvenile court could have concluded J.L.
was A.L.’s presumed father, including mother’s parentage
questionnaire indicating J.L. had held himself out openly as
A.L.’s father, and J.L. had received A.L. into his home. Thus it is
conceivable that, given the opportunity, J.L. could have elevated
his fatherhood status and been appointed counsel. Instead, he
was unrepresented throughout the proceedings. DCFS agrees
with J.L. the error requires reversal.
B. A.C.’s Appeal
A.C. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by
divesting him of joint legal custody of A.J. DCFS agrees, “[T]here
is little support for the order granting the mother sole legal
10
custody” and does not oppose reversal and remand for further
hearing.
1. Additional background
The May 29, 2025 status review report indicated mother
had reported A.J. was exhibiting behaviors after his overnight
visits with his father A.C. and paternal great grandmother that
mother thought suggested A.J. was being sexually abused.
Mother stopped sending A.J. on overnight visits, and said she
had not observed the concerning behaviors since the visits ceased.
At the June 16, 2025 hearing, DCFS recommended
termination of jurisdiction and a custody order granting mother
sole physical and legal custody of A.J., with A.C. having
monitored visits. Counsel for the children agreed, stating joint
legal custody and unmonitored visits were not appropriate “given
the history between the parents previously.” The children’s
counsel noted “concerns of the minor exhibiting sexualized
behaviors after the visits” with A.C., after which A.C.’s “visits
were reverted back to monitored.” Mother’s counsel also joined
DCFS’s recommendation.
A.C.’s counsel submitted on termination of jurisdiction with
mother having sole physical custody, but asked for joint legal
custody and unmonitored overnight visits at the home of paternal
great grandmother. Counsel noted A.C. was granted joint legal
custody at the end of the previous dependency proceeding, and
was nonoffending in the instant proceeding. Counsel called
mother’s assertions of “sexualized behaviors” vague, and argued
DCFS had not conducted any “meaningful investigation” before
barring the overnight visits.
DCFS counsel represented that when mother reported the
concerning behaviors, A.C. would not talk to the DCFS
11
investigator, and according to mother, she had not heard from
A.C. either. Counsel thought it significant mother reported the
concerning behaviors had stopped once A.J. stopped visiting his
father overnight, “[a]nd because minor is such a young child, such
sexualized behavior is strongly suggestive of some sort of
inappropriate sexual abuse.” Counsel argued, “[T]he overnight
visits clearly were not appropriate and had to be stopped.”
The juvenile court stated it would terminate jurisdiction
upon receipt of a custody order granting mother sole legal and
physical custody of A.J. and granting A.C. monitored visits.
2. Granting mother sole legal custody was an
abuse of discretion
“When ‘the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . the juvenile
court on its own motion[ ] may issue . . . an order determining the
custody of, or visitation with, the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re N.M.
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094, quoting § 362.4, subd. (a).)
This custody/visitation order, which is “commonly referred to as
an ‘exit order[,]’[ ] . . . will become part of the relevant family law
file and remain in effect in the family law action ‘until modified
or terminated by a subsequent order.’ ” (See In re T.S. (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) “ ‘When making a custody
determination in any dependency case, the court’s focus and
primary consideration must always be the best interests of the
child.’ [Citations.]” (N.M., at p. 1094.) “We review a custody (or
‘exit’) order pursuant to section 362.4 for abuse of discretion . . . .”
(N.M., at p. 1094.)
We agree with A.C. and DCFS the record does not support
the juvenile court’s depriving A.C. of joint legal custody. The
court did not articulate why it believed granting mother sole legal
12
custody was in A.J.’s best interest, nor does the record support
such a conclusion. As A.C. argued below and repeats on appeal,
the juvenile court previously had granted A.C. joint legal custody
at the termination of the 2022 proceeding, and A.C. was
nonoffending in the instant proceeding. Thus there were no
jurisdictional findings justifying a change of A.C.’s legal status
regarding his child. As for mother’s more recent allegations,
vague assertions of sexualized behavior, without more, is not
substantial evidence justifying a change in the prior custody
order.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating jurisdiction over A.L. is reversed.
On remand, the juvenile court shall provide J.L. with the notice
and form required by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 316.2, and then determine if J.L. is A.L.’s presumed
father. In view of the errors earlier in the case with respect to
J.L., the juvenile court should appoint counsel to represent him
in any further proceedings. Our decision is without prejudice to
J.L. on remand filing an appropriate motion pursuant to
section 388 to challenge any orders and/or findings previously
entered against him, including but not limited to the
jurisdictional findings and orders.
The exit order concerning A.J. is reversed to the extent it
grants mother sole legal custody. The order otherwise is
affirmed. On remand, the juvenile court shall consider whether
any new circumstances justify granting sole legal custody of A.J.
to mother. If not, the court shall enter an order granting mother
and A.C. joint legal custody of A.J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
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