Filed 9/22/26 In re A.H. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re A.H., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN A175626
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. JD22-3285)
v.
A.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A.H. (appellant), a biological father, appeals following termination of
his parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing.1 He contends the juvenile court erred in denying requests for
placement of the minor A.H. (Minor) with his relatives. We affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
1
BACKGROUND2
In November 2022, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency)
filed a section 300 petition seeking to detain then one-year-old Minor after
her mother I.H. (Mother) had a public mental breakdown and was placed on
an involuntary psychiatric hold. The petition further alleged that appellant,
then the alleged father, had failed to protect Minor and that his whereabouts
and ability to care for Minor were unknown. The detention report stated that
the Agency had been unable to contact the alleged father and had only his
name and a date of birth. The report also noted that Mother had previously
signed a statement stating that Minor’s father was unknown. The Agency
also filed a search declaration detailing its efforts to locate the alleged father.
Subsequently, Mother failed to comply with an order to bring Minor to
the Agency to be assessed, and Mother and Minor’s whereabouts remained
unknown through October 2023, despite the Agency’s search efforts. In
November 2023, an amended section 300 petition was filed alleging that
Minor was found and removed from Mother’s custody on November 8, after a
shooting at the home where Mother and Minor were staying.
Also in November 2023, the Agency filed a declaration of due diligence
detailing its unsuccessful efforts to find appellant. In an order filed in
December, the juvenile court found that notice had been given as required by
law, reasonable efforts had been made to locate the alleged father, and his
whereabouts were unknown.
In January 2024, Mother submitted to the allegations in a second
amended petition and the juvenile court sustained the petition. In February,
2 This summary of the factual and procedural background is largely
taken from this court’s decision in case number A174851, filed June 22, 2026.
Appellant’s request that we take judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts
in appeal case numbers A173237, A173714 and A174851 is granted.
2
the Agency again asked Mother about the alleged father; she denied
knowledge of his whereabouts and stated that he was not on the birth
certificate, they were not a couple, he was not present for the birth, and she
did not know how to reach him.
In August 2024, at the time of the six-month review hearing, the
Agency recommended that Mother’s reunification services be terminated.
The Agency reported that Minor was thriving in a foster home. The
contested hearing was continued to February 2025; the Agency’s addendum
report for the February hearing continued to recommend termination of
reunification services. The February report also included an address for
appellant at a San Mateo County jail facility. Mother’s counsel had located
him, as reflected in a January 24 email. Counsel was appointed for appellant
on February 5.
According to a March 5, 2025 declaration, on February 27, the Agency
contacted the San Mateo County Sheriff and learned that appellant had been
sentenced to two years at a state hospital on January 7. On March 5, the
Agency located appellant at Atascadero State Hospital.
In March 2025, appellant filed a section 388 petition seeking to set
aside the prior findings based upon inadequate notice to him. The supporting
papers stated that he was in San Mateo County jail at the time of the
November 2022 detention hearing and was transferred to Atascadero State
Hospital on February 4, 2025. The Agency opposed the section 388 petition,
arguing that the Agency had exercised reasonable diligence. Minor’s counsel
also opposed the petition.
In April 2025, appellant filed a JV-505 Statement Regarding
Parentage. He checked a box stating that he did not know if he was the
parent of Minor and requested paternity testing. Among other things,
3
appellant asserted that he spent time with Minor “when she was 1 to 5
months old” and that then he was incarcerated and “unable to contact
[M]other until my attorney notified me of this pending dependency matter.”
In May 2025, the juvenile court denied the section 388 petition, finding
that the Agency exercised reasonable diligence to locate appellant. In case
number A173237, this court affirmed the juvenile court’s May 2025 order
denying his section 388 petition. (In re A.H. (Dec. 30, 2025, A173237)
[nonpub. opn.].)
On June 26, 2025, the juvenile court conducted a combined six-, 12-,
and 18-month review hearing. Before the hearing, the Agency filed an
addendum report recommending termination of reunification services and the
scheduling of a section 366.26 hearing. Among other things, the report noted
that appellant was an alleged father not receiving reunification services and
unable to be a placement for Minor.
At the June 2025 contested hearing, the juvenile court considered
appellant’s JV-505 statement and took testimony on the question of whether
he should be elevated to a biological or presumed father. The court
ultimately denied without prejudice appellant’s request for biological father
status and granted his request for paternity testing. The court found that
appellant did not meet the statutory criteria for presumed father status. The
court observed that appellant’s incarceration was the reason he was not able
to elevate himself to presumed parent status. The juvenile court stated that
appellant was not entitled to reunification services and that it was “not
finding that reunification services would be in [Minor’s] best interest.” The
court terminated Mother’s reunification services and scheduled a section
366.26 hearing for October 15, 2025.
4
Appellant filed a petition for writ relief (case No. A173715) that this
court denied on September 12, 2025. (A.H. v. Superior Court (Sept. 12, 2025,
A173715) [nonpub. opn.].) This court concluded the juvenile court did not err
in denying appellant’s requests for either biological or presumed father
status. As to appellant’s request for a paternity test, this court observed that,
even if a paternity test had shown alleged father to be the biological father, it
would not have affected scheduling the section 366.26 hearing, because the
juvenile court did not find reunification services were in Minor’s best interest.
Subsequently, this court dismissed a separate appeal, case number A173714,
based on appellant’s counsel’s representation that the decision in case
number A173715 “resolved all issues that could be raised in [case number]
A173714.” Based on a similar representation from counsel, this court also
dismissed appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (case No. A173897).
On September 30, 2025, the Agency filed a section 366.26 report
recommending termination of parental rights and that Minor be placed for
adoption with her current caregivers. The report stated that the Agency
received paternity results on August 28 showing that appellant was Minor’s
biological father. The report also stated that appellant “is not and has not
been in a position to care for” Minor, and there had been no visitation. Minor
was thriving with her current caretakers, with whom she had lived for nearly
two years. Minor had a strong relationship with her caretaker and the
caretaker’s son, Minor was participating in various activities, and the
caretaker was committed to adopting Minor. The section 366.26 report also
described the Agency’s efforts to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), following the maternal grandmother’s
disclosure that she believed her great-grandmother was Cherokee.
5
On October 6, 2025, appellant filed another section 388 petition seeking
to designate him as Minor’s biological father; grant him reunification
services; order the Agency to complete an assessment for relative placement;
and vacate or continue the section 366.26 hearing. As changed
circumstances, appellant listed the paternity test results and the
circumstance that a paternal great-grandmother had reported Native
American ancestry. Appellant attached the test results and an ICWA-020
form. He asserted the requests were in Minor’s best interest because
“[d]eveloping [M]inor’s connection and ties to her cultural, historical, lineal
and familial roots by expanding the nature of . . . her relationships with her
biological father and his relatives through visit and placements serves to
develop her self-identity, her cultural identity, and knowledge of her
heritage.”
The juvenile court directed that the question of whether the court
should grant an evidentiary hearing be addressed at a hearing on October 15,
2025 (the same date set for the section 366.26 hearing). Appellant appeared
remotely and the court began by addressing the section 388 petition. The
court elevated appellant’s status to biological father. The juvenile court made
ICWA inquiries of appellant and another present family member and
directed appellant to provide names and contact information for his relatives.
Appellant’s counsel asked the court to exercise its discretion to order
reunification services or order an evidentiary hearing to “further maintain
the bond between [Minor] and [appellant] and especially now that relative
placements are being considered in order to fully support the interests of the
minor to have contact with her paternal family and relatives.” Minor’s
counsel objected on the basis that appellant did not meet his burden to show
it would be in Minor’s best interest, observing that appellant would not be in
6
a position to care for Minor even if he were granted services, given his
confinement. Minor’s counsel also observed that appellant did not have a
relationship with Minor and that Minor was doing well in her placement of
two years. The Agency joined in those arguments.
The juvenile court denied appellant’s request for an evidentiary
hearing. The court found the paternity results were a changed circumstance,
but an evidentiary hearing was unwarranted because appellant failed to
make a prima facie showing that reunification services were in Minor’s best
interest. The court observed the petition was not supported by a declaration
and that appellant had “essentially no relationship with [Minor]. It is
undisputed that he is going to be in the custodial setting for a significant
time period.” The juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing,
directed the Agency to comply with ICWA, ordered that the relative
placement issue would be heard at the time of the section 366.26 hearing,
and gave the Agency discretion to arrange visitation between appellant and
Minor. In June 2026, this court affirmed, concluding the juvenile court did
not err in finding appellant had not made a prima facie case that his request
for reunification services was in Minor’s best interest. (In re A.H. (June 22,
2026, A174851) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Relative Placement Issue
On June 26, 2025, before appellant’s biological paternity was
established, his aunt, Ghana H., filed a relative information form indicating
she wanted to have telephone and written contact with Minor, and wanted to
have Minor live with her. In a November 25 Addendum Report, the Agency
described a November 12 phone call with Ghana H. and appellant’s
grandmother, Patsy H., who lived together in Nevada. Appellant’s relatives
indicated they wanted to raise Minor together with appellant, who they
7
reported was released from custody and moved in with them the week before.
They stated they would have appellant move out if needed, but they hoped he
could receive reunification services. Ghana H. said she would pass a
background check, as she was licensed for foster care in Nevada.
The Agency observed that placement out of state would require going
through the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”)
process, which “can take several months.” The Agency was also concerned
about appellant living with the relatives requesting placement. The Agency
opined that placing Minor with relatives with whom she had no relationship
was not in her best interest, given that she had been in her current
placement for more than two years.
The juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing on December 15,
2025, and addressed the relative placement request at the same hearing.
Appellant testified that he wanted an opportunity to parent Minor and that,
if he could not receive reunification services, he wanted Minor placed with his
relatives in Nevada. He said that he planned to move to Nevada when his
parole ended in November 2026 and that he could abide by a rule not to have
any contact with Minor if she was placed with his relatives. Ghana H.
testified she had been a certified foster placement in Nevada since 2019. She
had fostered three children, and had also raised her own child, appellant, and
appellant’s brother. She wanted Minor placed with her and she could abide
by a rule that Minor not have contact with appellant. Ghana H. clarified that
appellant was only visiting when they spoke to the Agency, that the plan was
for all of them to live together to raise Minor, and that she had never visited
with Minor.
The Agency social worker testified that Minor’s current “caregiver is
fully committed to [Minor], has had her in her care for over two years now,
8
and [Minor] has become part of that larger extended foster family as well, so
[the caregiver] is fully committed to adoption.”
The juvenile court concluded that the relative placement preference did
not apply at the section 366.26 hearing stage and that the Agency did not fail
to fulfill its statutory duties. In any event, the factors listed in section 361.3
did not support placement of Minor with appellant’s relatives in Nevada. The
juvenile court summarized the factors as follows: Minor’s best interest
“overwhelmingly favors maintaining the current placement”; the parents
requested placement with appellant’s relatives; the third factor was not
relevant postreunification; the fourth factor was not relevant because there
are no siblings; Ghana H. is of good moral character; the relatives are willing
to provide permanency for Minor, but they have “no relationship whatsoever
with the child”; there is some concern that the relatives may give appellant
access to Minor; and the relatives’ home is safe. The juvenile court also
observed that putting the relatives through the ICPC process would delay
permanency.
The juvenile court concluded, “[A]fter careful evaluation of all of these
factors and after reviewing [the written evidence] and listening carefully to
the testimony offered today[, I find] that a change in placement is not
warranted and that it would not be in the child’s best interest to move the
child from the only home it has known for the last two years to place the child
with these relatives. Even though they seem lovely, they are virtual
strangers to this child. [¶] And so the Court is finding that it would be
detrimental to uproot this child and move this child to another state with
people that this child does not know.”
The court continued the case for ICWA compliance and then
terminated parental rights in February 2026.
9
DISCUSSION
“The relative placement preference is set forth in section 361.3, which
states, ‘In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of
his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be
given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the
relative.’ (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) ‘ “Preferential consideration” means that the
relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and
investigated.’ (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) ‘The statute does “not supply an
evidentiary presumption that placement with a relative is in the child’s best
interests” but it does require the social services agency and juvenile court to
determine whether such a placement is appropriate.’ [Citation.] ‘The correct
application of the relative placement preference places the relative “at the
head of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the
child’s best interests.” ’ ” (In re N.J. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 96, 123.)
“ ‘[A] timely request for placement, made in open court, is sufficient to
trigger the investigation and evaluation required by section 361.3.’
[Citation.] In assessing a relative’s request for placement, [the social services
agency] and the court must consider the factors enumerated in section 361.3,
subdivision (a). These factors include ‘[t]he best interest of the child,
including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional
needs’; the ‘wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate’; the
provisions of the Family Code regarding relative placement, including the
preference for relative placement under Family Code, section 7950; the ‘good
moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the home’; the
‘nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative,
and the relative’s desire to care for, and to provide legal permanency for, the
child if reunification is unsuccessful’; the safety of the relative’s home; and
10
the ability of the relative to provide a stable environment for the child,
protect the child from his or her parents, facilitation with other relatives, and
‘provide legal permanency for . . . the child if reunification is unsuccessful.’
(§ 361.3, subd. (a).)” (In re N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123–124.)
In the present case, appellant contends the juvenile court erred in
failing to place Minor with appellant’s relatives in Nevada.3 The juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
318.) As the Supreme Court explained in Stephanie M., “In any custody
determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s best
interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity. [Citation.] ‘When
custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and
stability assumes an increasingly important role. That need will often dictate
the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the
best interests of that child.’ ” (Id. at p. 317.) Here, it was reasonable for the
juvenile court to prioritize Minor’s need for stability in her current, extended
successful placement, even though appellant’s relatives could have also
provided adequate care. (See id. at p. 318 [juvenile court properly declined to
change placement despite “evidence that the grandmother would provide an
appropriate home”].) It is undisputed that Minor was thriving in her current
placement (of two years, at the time of the hearing below); that Minor had
formed strong attachments to her foster family; that appellant’s relatives had
3 Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in concluding that the
request for family placement was untimely. However, as the Agency points
out, “the juvenile court gave [appellant’s relatives] preferential consideration
and substantively evaluated . . . paternal relative placement under section
361.3 . . . and concluded [that] placement would be contrary to [Minor’s] best
interests.” Given that we conclude the court did not err in applying section
361.3, we need not address the Agency’s contention that we should reject the
appeal because appellant did not clearly request placement with his relatives.
11
no relationship with Minor; and that the ICPC process would have created
additional delay before any placement with appellant’s relatives.4
Appellant argues the present case is analogous to In re N.J., supra, 104
Cal.App.5th 96. There, the minor’s maternal aunt requested assessment “[a]t
the same time” as the minor’s initial placement with another caregiver. (Id.
at p. 103.) The social services agency “did not do this assessment then, nor
did it do so for the following year, despite repeated requests by mother’s
counsel, [the minor’s] counsel, and aunt herself.” (Ibid.) The social services
agency “failed to place [the minor] with aunt on an emergency basis during
the seven months aunt was waiting for resource family approval, or during
the seven months between approval of aunt’s home and termination of
mother’s reunification services.” (Ibid.) Ultimately, “at the section 361.3
hearing” that took place “one year and four months after aunt first requested
placement,” the juvenile “court found it was too late to apply the relative
placement preference” and, in any event, it was not in the minor’s “best
interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver and the passage of
4 Appellant also contends the Agency failed to comply with its
obligations under the family placement statutes, because it failed to assess
appellant’s relatives and arrange visitation for months after Ghana H.’s June
2025 request for placement. In particular, appellant contends his relatives
“were never given an opportunity to . . . bond with” Minor. Even if the
juvenile court erred in concluding that the Agency complied with its statutory
obligations, appellant has not shown a “reasonable probability of a different
result” absent the Agency’s errors. (In re N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p.
127.) He has not shown any likelihood that whatever visitation would have
been possible in the less than six months between Ghana H.’s June 2025
request for placement and the December 2025 hearing would have affected
the court’s determination, particularly given the complications posed by the
relatives’ location out of state. Similarly, there is no reasonable probability of
a different outcome had the Agency completed a more complete assessment,
given that the juvenile court viewed appellant’s relatives favorably.
12
time.” (Id. at pp. 103–104.) Under those “egregious circumstances,” the N.J.
court held that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the relative
placement preference after termination of reunification services and that the
error was not harmless, despite the juvenile court’s best interest
determination. (Id. at pp. 127–128.) The court stated, “[The social services
agency] and the juvenile court cannot completely abdicate their duties in
applying the legislative preference of placing detained children with a family
member, to the detriment of the child and the family, and then later rely on
the passage of time caused by their own failures to preclude that relative
from seeking placement of the child as a finding based on the child’s best
interests.” (Id. at p. 130.)
The decision in In re N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 96 is distinguishable.
Most fundamentally, any delay by the Agency in assessing appellant’s
relatives did not result in the bond between Minor and her current foster
family. That bond was well established before any request for relative
placement. Thus, the juvenile court’s reliance on that bond in denying
change of placement did not implicate any of the concerns expressed in N.J.
And, as noted previously, there is no basis to conclude the juvenile court’s
conclusion would have been different if the Agency had acted more quickly to
evaluate appellant’s relatives and arrange visitation, especially with the
relatives residing in Nevada.
Appellant has not shown the juvenile court erred.5
5 Appellant again argues that his constitutional rights were violated
because the Agency failed to give him timely notice of the proceedings and
because he was not provided reunification services. Those claims have been
resolved in the prior appeals. Appellant has not shown any new basis to
support his claim of constitutional error and the cases he cites are inapposite.
In particular, we explained in our decision in case number A174851 why the
decision in In re Julia U. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 532 is distinguishable.
13
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A175626)
14