Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re A.G. CA6

Filed 11/19/26 In re A.G. CA6
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/19/26 In re A.G. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under the H053049
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 17JU00027)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

After a jury found true the allegation that A.G. is physically dangerous to
the public due to a mental or physical condition, disorder, or other problem that
causes him to have serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior, the
juvenile court, by written order, extended his commitment in a Secure Youth
Treatment Facility (SYTF) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 876,
subdivision (f).
On appeal, A.G. argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting
improper demonstrative evidence and that the prosecutor committed misconduct

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1
by eliciting inadmissible evidence, either because it was guilt-by-association
evidence or that it relied on facts outside the record. A.G. further argues that, to
the extent any errors were individually harmless, the cumulative effect of all the
errors requires reversal.
As discussed below, we agree that the trial court should have excluded the
demonstrative evidence as any probative value it had was substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission created substantial danger of undue prejudice.
Nevertheless, on this record, A.G. has not shown that the error was prejudicial. As
to A.G.’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we find that it was forfeited. Even
assuming such a claim was not forfeited, we conclude that the prosecutor did not
engage in misconduct in eliciting the testimony regarding a non-involved juvenile
offender nor could that testimony be deemed prejudicial. Consequently, there
were no errors to cumulate.
We will affirm the order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural background
On April 13, 2021, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed an
amended wardship petition against A.G. under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602, subdivision (a). The petition alleged that, on or about July 26, 2015,
A.G., then age 15, committed one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a); count 1); one count of kidnapping to commit rape, lewd or lascivious
acts involving children, and penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code, § 209,
subd. (b)(1); count 2); one count of forcible sexual penetration of a child under age
14 (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(B); count 3); two counts of forcible lewd and
lascivious acts on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 4,
6); one count of forcible rape of a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 261, subd.
2
(a)(2); count 5); and one misdemeanor count of destruction of evidence (Pen.
Code, § 135; count 7).
The petition further alleged the following aggravated circumstances: (1) as
to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, A.G. used a dangerous or deadly weapon in
committing the offenses (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61, subds. (a), (b), (e)(3), 12022,
12022.3); (2) as to counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, A.G. kidnapped the victim, and the
movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm over and above
the level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offenses (Pen. Code, §§
667.61, subds. (a), (b), (d)(2), (e)(1), 207, 209); (3) as to counts 3, 4, 5, and 6,
A.G. tied or bound the victim in committing the offenses (Pen. Code, § 667.61,
subds. (a), (b), (e)(5); and (4) as to counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, within the meaning of
Penal Code sections 667.61, subdivisions (j)(2), (e)(1), (e)(3), and (e)(5), the
victim was a child under 14, that A.G. kidnapped the victim, that A.G. personally
used a dangerous or deadly weapon, and A.G. tied or bound the victim.
At a hearing on April 13, 2021, A.G. admitted all the charges and special
allegations in the amended petition. On April 27, 2021, the juvenile court declared
A.G. a ward of the court and committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice
(DJJ) for the maximum allowable term.
In June 2023, after the DJJ was closed pursuant to Senate Bill No. 823,
A.G. was transferred to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF). In May 2024,
pursuant to section 876, the probation department requested a two-year extension
of A.G.’s commitment at the SYTF.
Following a hearing, the juvenile court found probable cause to believe that
A.G.’s discharge in October 2024, when he turned 25, “would be physically
dangerous to the public based on criteria, which state because of a person’s mental
or physical condition, disorder, or other problem that causes [him] to have serious
3
difficulty controlling dangerous behavior.” Based on that ruling, the juvenile
court ordered that the matter be tried by a jury to decide the question beyond a
reasonable doubt.
On February 19, 2025, at the conclusion of the trial, a jury found true the
allegation that A.G. is physically dangerous to the public due to a mental or
physical condition, disorder, or other problem that causes him to have serious
difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior.
A.G. timely appealed.
B. Factual background2
1. Stipulated facts of the offenses
Pursuant to a stipulation, the following facts regarding the underlying
crimes were read to the jury.
“About 4:59 p.m. on July 26, 2015, [A.G.], then 15 years, 9 months old,
lured 8-year-old neighbor, Madyson [Middleton] (Maddy), in his apartment by
offering her ice cream. At the time, [A.G.] was approximately 5’10”, and 170
pounds. Maddy was small for her age, and weighed approximately 50 pounds.
“[A.G.] and Maddy lived with their respective mothers at the Tannery Arts
complex on River Street in Santa Cruz. But [A.G.]’s mother was away that
evening.
“When [A.G.] contacted Maddy, she was riding her scooter and she brought
it and her helmet up to [A.G.]’s apartment on the third floor. A surveillance
camera at the apartment recorded [A.G.] following closely behind as Maddy
walked towards his building. [A.G.]’s account of the crime after his arrest and

2
Our recitation of the facts is limited to the evidence and testimony
presented at the hearing on the motion to extend A.G.’s commitment (the
extension hearing).
4
waiver of rights provided that once he and Maddy arrived in his apartment he
suggested she serve herself ice cream so that he can position herself [verbatim]
behind her. [A.G.] said that while Maddy scooped ice cream, he walked behind
her, grabbed her by the throat, and dragged her to his bedroom where he threw her
around while she fought back and screamed. [A.G.] tried to cover her mouth with
duct tape to prevent her from screaming to no avail.
“The autopsy later revealed a large bruise to Maddy’s forehead and a
cluster of small bruises to her jaw. [A.G.] held Maddy down on his bed and pulled
down her leggings. [A.G.] noted that Maddy tried to cover her vaginal area with
her hands. [A.G.] choked Maddy for between 15 and 30 minutes until she was
blue by using one hand to squeeze her throat and by placing the other hand over
her nose and mouth.
“Believing that Maddy was dead, [A.G.] said he had an erection. He cut off
her underwear with his scissors and attempted to penetrate her vagina with his
penis but was unable because her vagina was too small. Afterwards, [A.G.]
digitally penetrated Maddy’s vagina for approximately 10 to 15 seconds, and only
stopped when he saw some blood on her rectum.
“The autopsy revealed that Maddy had suffered a laceration, abrasions, and
bruising to her vagina from blunt force trauma. [A.G.] said he bent Maddy’s body
in half and placed her in a garbage can lined with a plastic bag, then concealed her
with two more bags. However, [A.G.] heard Maddy gasping and crying. He
retrieved a kitchen knife, opened the bag, and stabbed Maddy in the neck; twice on
one side, once in the other side, intending to and succeeding in cutting her jugular
vein.
“[A.G.] made sure Maddy was sufficiently covered by the three plastic bags
so her blood would not spill on the floor. [A.G.] turned on loud music to drown
5
out the sounds of Maddy panting and crying. He recalled playing ‘After You’re
Gone’ and ‘I’ll See You In My Dreams.’
“The autopsy revealed each wound to Maddy’s neck was about two inches
deep and one had nicked her jugular vein, causing extensive bleeding. During the
time it took Maddy to die, [A.G.] said he cleaned the knife with hydrogen
peroxide and paper towels and returned it to the kitchen. The autopsy concluded
that Maddy died from stab wounds to the neck and also from the positional
asphyxia from being squeezed into the plastic garbage can.
“[A.G.] initially placed Maddy’s scooter and helmet on the common front
porch of the apartment complex to direct focus away from his apartment but
ultimately hid those items in his closet. He later discarded Maddy’s house keys
and the handle covers from her scooter in an outside garbage can away from his
building. [A.G.] texted friends about the uproar in the complex over Maddy’s
disappearance and said he hoped she was safe.
“At about 6 p.m., [A.G.] carried the garbage can with Maddy’s body
downstairs using the stairwell instead of the elevator in order to avoid being seen.
He decided not to place Maddy’s body in the garbage dumpster which was full
because she might be discovered and instead placed her in the nearly empty
recycling dumpster. After doing so, [A.G.] further concealed Maddy’s body with
cardboard. About 6 p.m., surveillance cameras of the elevator bank recorded
[A.G.] carrying a heavy plastic garbage can to the dumpster and leaving the area
with an empty can. At 6:03, surveillance cameras at the elevator bank recorded
[A.G.] entering the elevator to return to his apartment.
“[A.G.] returned to clean his bedroom. He resumed texting friends about
clothing, food, and suicide as he had done immediately before he had lured
Maddy.
6
“About 6:15, [A.G.] arranged to meet a friend who lived in the complex,
and gave him a birthday gift. The boys walked to Chipotle, [A.G.] bought dinner,
and they returned to the complex together.
“Surveillance cameras at the complex showed the boys walking together
towards Chipotle. Surveillance cameras at Chipotle recorded [A.G.]’s relaxed
demeanor as he ordered dinner. About 7:03 p.m., surveillance cameras at [A.G.]’s
apartment showed that he returned to look at the recycling bin where he had
discovered [sic] Maddy’s body.
“Meanwhile, at about 6:08 p.m., Maddy’s mother reported her missing and
a massive search for Maddy commenced that night and continued the following
day. The search was coordinated by the FBI and included local law enforcement
agencies and the public.
“When [A.G.] returned from dinner at Chipotle on the night of Maddy’s
disappearance, he spoke to several officers … and repeatedly offered to assist in
the search. Some of those conversations were recorded.
“About 7:45 on July 27, 2015, after viewing the surveillance videos
showing [A.G.] carrying something heavy down the stairs from his apartment and
emptying it in the recycling dumpster on the night Maddy disappeared, officers
searched the dumpster and found her body. [A.G.] was seen watching that search
before leaving the area. He was arrested nearby.
“Pursuant to a search warrant for [A.G.]’s apartment, Maddy’s scooter and
helmet were found in his closet. [A.G.] had so thoroughly cleaned the murder
weapon that forensic analysis revealed no blood or other evidence on the kitchen
knife.
“[A.G.]’s social media messages included statements of depression and
suicide; however, [A.G.]’s texts to friends on the night of the murder were
7
primarily about clothing, food, and other innocuous things. His texts also
described the search for Maddy and shortly after disposing of her body in the
dumpster, expressions of concern for her safety.
“During booking at the police station, [A.G.] initially denied any
knowledge of Maddy’s murder. His taped statement provides that he said, ‘I don’t
know what I did that caused me to be here, and how come I am here?’ He asked
officers to ‘explain why I am here.’ After he waived his Miranda rights, [A.G.]
made a detailed statement regarding his movements on the day of Maddy’s
disappearance but omitted any mention of her kidnapping and murder.
“When the officers asked if [A.G.] had problems sleeping, he responded
that his ‘sleep patterns are wonky due to the summer.’ When shown the
surveillance video of him carrying the garbage can to the dumpster, [A.G.]
acknowledged that he was the person in the video but he continued to deny hurting
Maddy.
“Only after [A.G.] was told that DNA evidence would link him to the
murder, did he start to incrementally admit his role in Maddy’s kidnapping, rape,
and murder. Although [A.G.] said that he regretted the homicide, he also said he
should have chosen an even smaller child because Maddy was so hard to kill.
“[A.G.] provided several alternatives when asked to explain why he killed
Maddy; he did not get the attention he needed, he was depressed and suicidal, and
was testing the waters to see how his neighbors responded to death, and his mother
was unavailable, and father was absent.
“About 8:00 a.m., on July 28th, during the intake interview in juvenile hall,
[A.G.] calmly recited the kidnapping and murder. [A.G.] said, ‘I killed Maddy,’
but he did not mention his erection or the attempted rape.”

8
2. A.G.’s behavior immediately after the offenses and after his
arrest
As police were going door to door in Maddy’s apartment complex, A.G.
introduced himself to one of the police officers, provided his apartment number,
and telephone number, and said he “would be downstairs if [police] needed any
help.” A.G. was “calm,” and “seemed like someone who was just trying to be of
service to the search.” He thanked the officer and said that the police “were doing
a good job.” Another officer who spoke with A.G. during the search described
him as “super friendly, outgoing,” and “seemed eager to help and eager to talk to”
officers.
Following his arrest, A.G. was transported to the police station and placed
in an interview room. Throughout his contact with officers, A.G.’s demeanor
“was very even keeled, so much so” that it “stood out to [officers] that [they]
weren’t seeing what [they] would have expected to see.” A.G. did not cry, and
according to the testifying officer, he was much less emotional than most other
people that officer had interviewed who were involved in violent crimes. A.G.
was “articulate and well-spoken,” but his social cues “seemed off.”
3. Juvenile hall detention: July 28, 2015–October 24, 2017
A.G. was detained in juvenile hall from July 28, 2015, through October 24,
2017. On A.G.’s arrival, he met with an intake officer who prepared an
assessment report. The intake officer stated that A.G. was “pretty polite in his
demeanor,” and was cooperative. When asked what he enjoyed doing, A.G.
smiled and replied that he liked playing with his yo-yo.
The intake officer informed A.G. of the charges against him, and A.G.
“immediately said, ‘It’s all true,’ ” and admitted “that he killed Maddy.” The
intake officer said that A.G.’s demeanor did not change throughout their interview
and when he admitted killing Maddy, “[t]here was really no affect or facial
9
expression.” A.G. proceeded to narrate, “mainly talking on his own,” providing
the details of how he lured Maddy into his apartment, choked her until he thought
she was dead, tried to digitally penetrate her, stabbed her when she began to make
noise, and finally disposed of her body in the dumpster. A.G. spoke carefully
throughout and never cried or expressed remorse. A.G. declined mental health
services. After A.G. was escorted back to his unit, the intake officer had to go out
for a run before writing his report because he was “in shock about what [A.G.] had
just told me.”
The supervisor of the sex offender units, along with medical staff and
mental health staff, subsequently met A.G. “to assess his needs and his risks.” The
supervisor stated that A.G. was stable, did not seem anxious, or “abnormally
stressed.” A.G. was not placed on suicide watch but was placed on “special
watch” which meant that mental health staff would check on him each day. The
supervisor testified that they established a special program for A.G. where he
would be out in the unit by himself because of concerns for his safety.
A.G.’s mother visited him on his first day, and she appeared anxious. A.G.
was calm and when his mother asked him if “he had done the things that they had
said that he had done,” he replied, “ ‘Yes, mom.’ ” A.G.’s mother became
“emotional and … tearful.” She asked how he killed Maddy, and he replied
calmly, “ ‘Asphyxiation.’ ” She also asked if he had hurt Maddy “sexually,” and
he said, “ ‘Yes, digital penetration.’ ”
A.G.’s mother became increasingly emotional and tried to touch and hug
A.G., but he did not respond to her physically. A.G. remained “calm, easygoing
and relaxed” but then “raised his palm up as if to motion to stop, and said, ‘Mom,
what’s done is done.’ ” A.G. kept repeating that as his mother kept crying and
asking, “Why Maddy? She trusted you. Why?” A.G. responded, “ ‘Mom, you
10
need to move on. We need to move on. What’s done is done.’ ” A.G. did not
appear to be concerned that his mother was upset, but more that he was “frustrated
and perhaps annoyed.”
A.G. did ask his mother who knew what had happened and when she said
that “ ‘everyone knows, it’s on the news,’ ” A.G. “seemed more engaged.” The
supervisor testified that A.G. “actually leaned forward in his chair” and asked the
supervisor about the media. The supervisor got the impression A.G.’s change in
demeanor indicated that he “might want to speak with the media.”
During his initial stay in juvenile hall, A.G. was the “most high-risk
youth”3 in the facility and the supervisor observed him nearly every day. She
considered A.G. to be “very smart,” “very articulate,” but also manipulative with
staff. When one staff member refused a request, A.G. would go ask another.4 The
supervisor also considered A.G. to present an “escape risk” because he was “very
attentive and asking questions about safety issues, policy, procedure, like no other
youth that we had experienced before.” A.G. noticed the control panel that
released electronic door locks, and asked questions about it. Within the first week
at juvenile hall, A.G. knew the staff’s schedules and could identify them, even
before seeing them, by how they walked. A.G. would tell the supervisor which
staff were not doing room checks in a timely manner. As a result of A.G.’s

3
The supervisor explained that by “high risk,” she was referring to A.G.’s
own safety, the safety of the facility, and the safety of others.
4
For example, books that described graphic violence were not permitted at
juvenile hall, but A.G. kept asking if he could have a copy of “[A] Clockwork
Orange.” Even though staff would tell him no, he could continue to ask for it.
A.G. also asked a teacher if he could have a book on human anatomy, even though
none of the courses at juvenile hall covered anatomy. Due to his persistence, the
supervisor sat down with A.G. and the teacher, telling him directly that he could
not have an anatomy book and he should stop asking for one.
11
attentiveness, the supervisor changed the placement of the control panel monitor
and made her staff undergo refresher training on security policies.
4. County jail detention: October 24, 2017–May 25, 2021
From October 24, 2017, to May 25, 2021, A.G. was housed at the Santa
Cruz County Jail. He was in the jail’s transitional housing unit at first but in
January 2018, he was placed in a protected custody unit for sex offenders and
gang dropouts. While in this unit, A.G. was housed with M.C. and J.C.5
M.C. testified that at first he did not know who A.G. was, although he knew
about Maddy’s murder. M.C. said that A.G. was “a pretty smart kid” who would
do other inmates’ schoolwork. One day, M.C. approached A.G. and said, “ ‘Tell
us what’s up.’ ” M.C. did not expect A.G. to talk about it, but A.G. revealed
everything that happened the day he killed Maddy. As A.G. described stabbing
Maddy, he acted as if he was holding a knife in one hand and pushing on the
handle with the other, saying that was why “there were no hesitation marks.”
M.C. said that A.G. had a “blank” demeanor while narrating what he did, “like he
really didn’t have no emotion or anything … . No tears. No nothing. No
remorse,” and was actually “smiling most of the time.” A.G. told M.C. he would
not do this again, and that he intended to kill himself afterward, but “chickened
out.”
J.C. was A.G.’s cellmate and said that he thought A.G. was “weird,” in that
“everything he said was practiced,” but he was also “really smart.” He studied
other people and mimicked their gestures when responding, and “everything was
like a little monotone.” J.C. said everyone in the unit knew who A.G. was and the
crime he committed. One time when in their cell, J.C. asked A.G. about his crime.

5
We refer to civilian witnesses by their initials to protect their personal
privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
12
A.G. described the details to J.C., “like it was nothing,” saying he was worried
someone would hear Maddy “gurgling like a frog” so he turned on music to cover
the sound. A.G. did not cry, show any remorse, and it was if he had “squish[ed] a
bug.” A.G. told J.C. he knew he was going to “get out when he’s 25.”
J.C. testified that he was going to try to cut a deal with the district attorney
so he tried to convince A.G. they should write a book or a movie script about the
crime to make money.6 In the notes J.C. made of his conversations with A.G., J.C.
wrote: “ ‘I asked, would you do it again. He replies with no emotion, “Probably, I
am not sure.” Then he says, “You promise not to write about this until after the
trial is done?” I say, “I promise.” He says, “Then I will try to get away with it.” ’
” In J.C.’s notes, he asked A.G. why he picked Maddy, and A.G. said, “he
obsessed for six or five years over her, that she was the one from the day he met
her.” A.G. told J.C. “he had been waiting for that day for her for a long time … .
[and] “ ‘[he] felt nothing at all.’ ”
5. DJJ detention: May 25, 2021–July 2023
Dr. Gabriela Pivaral, a psychiatrist at DJJ, conducted A.G.’s initial
evaluation after he arrived at DJJ on May 25, 2021. During Dr. Pivaral’s clinical
interview, A.G. was articulate, and he used both legal and clinical jargon when
speaking with her. Dr. Pivaral determined that A.G. was not suicidal, “did not
present with any concerns related to psychosis,” and had no acute need for mental
health services. When Dr. Pivaral asked what A.G. had learned from any therapy
he received before coming to DJJ, A.G. said “he probably would have committed
suicide” if he had not killed Maddy. Dr. Pivaral’s diagnostic impression of A.G.

6
J.C. testified that he gave his notes of A.G.’s description of the crime to
the district attorney but was told “the trial was so far along they couldn’t use it
anymore.”
13
was that he “had a[n] egocentric point of view,” adolescent antisocial personality,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and “an autism spectrum disorder [(ASD)]
per history.” Dr. Pivaral reported that A.G. “had a history of ADHD and major
depression” but he was not presenting with symptoms of those at the time of her
evaluation.
On June 2, 2021, Dr. Brenda Chiu, a DJJ psychologist with the sexual
behavioral treatment team, began orientation sessions with A.G. Dr. Chiu met
with A.G. at least one hour each month, and she recalled that he behaved
appropriately, was respectful, and denied being suicidal. During one session, A.G.
reported “he was depressed and suicidal at the time of the offense and … wanted
to have sex with a female before he died.” A.G. also told Dr. Chiu he “did not
enjoy what he was doing … and regretted his actions.”
Joseph Gates, a youth correction counselor at DJJ, prepared individual
change plans and annual reviews regarding A.G.’s progress in his sexual behavior
treatment. Gates met with A.G. on a weekly basis to discuss “the domains that
had been assigned to him” and, based on Gates’s assignment to the building where
A.G. was housed, Gates would take notes on his observations of A.G. during the
week. In his February 2022 individual change plan report, Gates noted that A.G.
had made “ ‘unsatisfactory progress’ ” toward learning to identify his triggers. In
his April 2022 report, Gates wrote that, although A.G. was progressing through the
sexual offender curriculum with “satisfactory work,” “he continues to be a danger
to the community.”
Gates testified that, during his time at DJJ, A.G. “never received any
disciplinary action” which was, in Gates’s experience, “fairly rare.” Gates
believed that, while he was working with A.G., A.G. was “actively engaged in
trying to utilize the different counseling and treatment … provided to him.”
14
In Gates’s final jurisdiction transfer report, Gates wrote “[A.G.] is still
unclear of why he committed his offense” and “cannot say for sure that his
behavior would have continued if [he were] not arrested.” Gates also wrote that
“[A.G.] says he does not want to hurt anyone again and wants to understand more
why he was so violent.” A.G. explained to Gates that he “knew that people trusted
him, which is, in part, why he thought he would get away with his crime.” Gates
wrote that A.G. “struggles to articulate that he has genuine empathy for his
victim” but “knows what he did was wrong. As [A.G.] describes the graphic
details of [the murder] he leaves staff unsettled by the dispassionate ease of his
presentation.”
Dr. Ashlan Chavez was the clinical psychologist assigned to work with
A.G. in the sexual behavior treatment program (SBTP). She described him as
“very polite … analytical, very curious as to … how things worked … and very
articulate.” Dr. Chavez’s June 2023 treatment summary noted that A.G. had
“difficulty understanding the complex nature of victim impact beyond an
intellectualized level.” Dr. Chavez wrote that A.G. “struggles [to] remain[] open
and honest, at times engaging in minimization, rationalization, intellectualization
and justification as a defense mechanism” and “downplay[ed] various predatory
behaviors.”
6. SYTF Detention: July 2023–2024
Daniel Flamson, division director of Sonoma County’s SYTF, collaborated
with the Santa Cruz County Probation Department on A.G.’s transfer from DJJ to
SYTF. On arrival, A.G., who was then 23 years old, was assigned to a housing
unit with other youth participating in the SBTP. Flamson testified that he would
see A.G. on a daily basis and A.G. was “polite and courteous” when they met.
Flamson did not believe that A.G. had any behavioral incidents while at SYTF.
15
A.G. would express concerns to Flamson about “access to his attorney and …
family members.”
Flamson recalled that, when A.G. first arrived at the SYTF, he was
“nervous about being in a new facility” and had some “frustrations because
[SYTF] is run a little more stringent [sic] than DJJ.” Flamson testified that the
primary focus of A.G.’s treatment was participating in the SBTP, which was
provided virtually by an outside entity, San Francisco Forensic Institute (SFFI).
In A.G.’s July 2023 treatment notes, one of his clinicians at SFFI reported
that she was “not seeing a lot of progress in [A.G.’s] sexual treatment program”
during A.G.’s first month at SYTF. A.G.’s October 2023 treatment notes
indicated that A.G. had “some issues as to authenticity versus compliance” and
there were “concerns about [A.G.] being someone who has intellectual insight but
needs to build his emotional connection as well.” In discussing A.G.’s need to
register as a sex offender on release, the notes indicated that “ ‘[h]e superficially
accepted … having to register[, but] … attempted to rationalize and explore ways
that he will … try to see if legally he can work around the issue.’ ” The November
2023 treatment notes reported staff concerns that A.G. “continued to be insightful
but emotionally removed.”
Dr. Ashley Mowrey, a forensic psychologist employed by SFFI, prepared
an intake assessment and evaluation of A.G. in January 2023. For this evaluation,
Dr. Mowrey reviewed A.G.’s records, interviewed him for approximately three
hours, and provided him with a link to take a personality test. Dr. Mowrey
prepared one report in February 2023 and an addendum in October 2023, but she
did not complete any recidivism assessments because of his age at the time of the
offense and his age at the time of her evaluation.

16
Dr. Mowrey testified that A.G. was “very linear” in his description of the
murder, “meaning you could tell that he is someone who had to speak about his
offense and details pretty repetitively.” His “affect … was very flat, meaning his
speech was monotone.” A.G. “was not very expressive.”7 A.G. reported he
watched “predominantly heteronormative” pornography, but also “content about
… bondage, dominan[ce], sadism, [and] masochism.” Dr. Mowrey testified that
A.G. had previously been diagnosed with ADHD, ASD, and major depressive
disorder. She did not do diagnostic work regarding ADHD or ASD with A.G.,
because they are neurodevelopmental disorders. Dr. Mowrey did evaluate A.G.
for major depressive disorder and concluded that he met the criteria for that
disorder.
Dr. Mowrey’s October 2023 report included the results of A.G.’s
psychological testing. A.G. had elevated scores on the schizophrenia, paranoia,
and psychopathic deviant scales. Dr. Mowrey explained that these scores
“depict[] an individual who is preoccupied by … negative self beliefs … fixated
on their perceived faults … consumed [by] being liked, … [their] fear of being
rejected, humiliated, [who] tend[s] to internalize their emotions, [and] tend to be
more … socially alienated because of the fear and hypersensitivity to other
people.” Dr. Mowrey testified that a person with these scores will suppress “all
this negativity and hostility” which “can result in outward external [severely
aggressive] behaviors.”
Dr. Mowrey said that, on one of his personality tests, A.G. had elevated
scores for low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. On a second personality test,

7
Dr. Mowrey said that, when discussing “a positive interaction [A.G.] had
with … one of [his] pen pals,” he became “happy, excited” to the point of
shedding tears.
17
A.G.’s melancholic, masochistic, and avoidance scales were elevated. Dr.
Mowrey testified that A.G.’s “schizotypal” score was also elevated, which
indicated someone “who … struggles socially” and can “seem kind of detached”
when others interact with them.
According to Dr. Mowrey, A.G. scored an 11 on the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist, which tested subjects for empathy and ability to feel remorse. A.G.’s
score did not meet the threshold for “the construct of psychopathy.” Dr. Mowrey
also concluded that A.G. did not meet the criteria for paraphilic disorders, because
those are “time limited” in that the “person would have had to have engaged in
these behaviors, be distressed by this behavior, experience some kind of functional
impairment” within the last six months.
Dr. Mowery testified regarding the dynamic factors in her assessment,
stating that A.G. “did not illustrate a capacity for relationships developing,” but
could emotionally identify with children, was not hostile toward women, and did
not lack concern for others. Dr. Mowery stated A.G. “was willing to take
accountability” and “care[d] about the consequences of his actions.” In her
opinion, A.G. was remorseful because he had shown he “thought beyond [himself]
as far as the consequences for [his] actions.” Based on the reports from A.G.’s
earlier confinement at juvenile hall and at DJJ, Dr. Mowrey noted that A.G. had
done well in those environments and, at the time of her initial assessment in July
2023, “question[ed] whether [A.G.] [could] actually contain himself without …
external restrictions.”
From December 2023 to May 2024, Emma Ewel, a licensed marriage and
family therapist, conducted weekly virtual sexual offender sessions with A.G. at
SFFI, including 60-minute individual sessions and 90-minute group sessions.
Ewel testified that A.G.’s monthly treatment reports included concerns about
18
A.G.’s lack of authenticity in group therapy, but when she worked with him in
individual sessions, she had no such concerns. Ewel observed A.G. go “from very
reserved to being more able to show emotion and open up during group [therapy].”
During A.G.’s therapy, Ewel explored with him his use of pornography, his
luring Maddy into his apartment, and the violence he employed in killing Maddy.
Ewel certified that A.G. completed the treatment set forth by the California Sex
Offender Management Board on October 31, 2024. She informed A.G.’s
“containment team,” including his probation officer, that he was ready to graduate
from the treatment program and none of them voiced any objections or concerns.
Ewel agreed that completing the sexual offender program did not mean that the
individual would never re-offend. Ewel testified that, though she had a “clear idea
of the various risk factors that led up to the offense occurring,” she did not “have a
clear idea of why [it] happened.” She said that she “worked on” the major risk
factors that led to A.G. committing the crime, but she did not “fix[]” them.
Nick Jilka testified that he became A.G.’s probation officer in April 2023.
Jilka would meet with A.G. once a month at SYTF for anywhere from 30 to 90
minutes to ensure he was doing well physically and mentally as well as to check in
on his schooling and his sex offender treatment progress. Jilka testified that, at
SYTF, A.G. could only have telephone, virtual, or in-person contact with specified
people. A.G. could ask to add someone to that list and Jilka would run a criminal
background check before approving the request. Jilka said that, not including
family members, there were 11 people on A.G.’s list of approved contacts, two of
whom were sex offenders who had completed SFFI’s sex offender treatment
program.8

8
Jilka explained that he only approved the two sex offenders after
discussing the matter with staff at SFFI who advised him that “sex offenders
19
Katrina Rogers, an investigator for the district attorney’s office, testified
that she reviewed A.G.’s tablet for text messages and video calls. She discovered
that A.G. both messaged and had video calls with a former cellmate at the Santa
Cruz County jail, who had been convicted of possessing child pornography and
committing lascivious acts on a child under 14.9 The former cellmate had served
his prison sentence and was then out on parole. In July 2024, the same former
cellmate transferred money to A.G.’s commissary fund and, in August and
November 2024, transferred time credits to A.G.’s tablet.
7. Prosecution testimony on extending commitment
a. Jilka’s testimony
Jilka testified that he participated in the decision to ask the district
attorney’s office to file a petition to extend A.G.’s commitment and it was his
recommendation to do so. In his opinion, A.G. had not yet “achieved all of his
rehabilitative goals and he would benefit from further treatment.” Once A.G. was
released, the probation department would have no jurisdiction to monitor A.G.’s
whereabouts or require him to continue any therapy.
Jilka testified that A.G. had identified a program in the suburbs of a large
metropolitan area where he would stay following his release. According to Jilka,
that program did not have mandatory case management or therapy, there were no
clinicians at the residence, and residents could leave the facility at any time.

oftentimes receive the most support from other people [who] have completed the
program, similar to Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous in their 12-
step meeting format.”
9
Jilka testified that the former cellmate was not on A.G.’s list of approved
contacts.
20
b. Dr. Napolitano’s testimony
Dr. Susan Napolitano, a psychologist who evaluated sexually violent
predators (SVP) for the Department of State Hospitals, testified as an expert in
clinical and forensic psychology. Dr. Napolitano had testified as an expert witness
approximately 200 times in all, about half of the time for the prosecution and the
other half for the defense. Dr. Napolitano had never testified in favor of keeping a
juvenile offender in custody.
In this case, Dr. Napolitano reviewed and analyzed the records in A.G.’s
underlying juvenile case, including autopsy reports, his treatment reports, and
observed the testimony in the current trial by Dr. Mowery and Ewel, to determine
whether A.G. would be a danger to the public if he were to be released. Dr.
Napolitano explained that there is a distinction between evaluations performed for
purposes of treatment versus those performed to “answer a legal question.”
Someone performing an assessment for treatment could be biased because their
motivation is to help the subject, so they may see the best in that person. A person
performing a forensic evaluation is not treating the subject, so is less likely to be
biased in their favor.
Dr. Napolitano considered several risk factors in assessing A.G. for
recidivism, including the details of his offense, his mental health background, his
social history, his age, sex, and his sexual deviance. She stated that it was
important to have the details of the crime because people “do not offer that they
are having deviant sexual thoughts and desires” or “that they feel like hurting
people.” However, “if you see it in the crime,” you can ask the person questions
about those thoughts and feelings to determine what led to the crime. Dr.
Napolitano testified that it was important to understand how and why the crime

21
occurred because, “[i]f you don’t understand why they did what they did, then you
don’t know how to treat” the person.
Dr. Napolitano said that Dr. Mowery’s report failed to thoroughly analyze
paraphilic disorder and failed to differentiate what might be symptoms of ASD
from symptoms of psychopathy, “which can look a lot like [ASD].” She
explained that one of the most pronounced traits of a person with psychopathy is
“callousness and lack of empathy.” Someone who has this trait and is aggressive
can be “very very dangerous.”
Dr. Napolitano further testified that people with psychopathy have shallow
emotions and are manipulative of others. Dr. Napolitano believed that A.G. had
psychopathic tendencies and traits, though she agreed that Dr. Mowery’s score of
11 on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist was “in the ball park [sic] of accurate” with
her own assessment. However, Dr. Napolitano believed that this measure is only
one part of the equation and “clinical judgment and comprehensive understanding
of a complex situation could lead to reasonable hypotheses of having psychopathy
regardless of what that checklist said.”
With respect to paraphilic disorders, Dr. Napolitano testified they were not
common and to determine if a sex offender also has such a disorder, one must look
closely at the details of the offense. A paraphilic disorder is an atypical sexual
interest that is harmful to oneself or others. According to Dr. Napolitano,
paraphilic disorders do not go into remission and are considered “life-long
conditions.” Someone with a paraphilic disorder would be more of a risk to the
community on release because “that drive will continue throughout [that person’s]
life.”
Based on the brutality, sophistication, and planning of the offense, Dr.
Napolitano believed that A.G. had a sexual sadism disorder and based on the
22
victim’s age and her lack of sexual development, Dr. Napolitano also considered
that A.G. had pedophilic disorder.10 Dr. Napolitano stated that “[f]or a crime like
this, it is much more likely that a person has had thoughts about this for an
extended period of time, sexually arousing fantasies related to the … crime that
were then acted out.” With respect to paraphilic disorders and atypical sexual
interests, Dr. Napolitano testified that it is “very rare” for people to be “honest and
forthcoming about that information.”
Because of that lack of honesty, Dr. Napolitano utilizes the details of the
crime to try to uncover “what kind of fantasies or patterns” led to the offense. The
fact that A.G. reported that he had an erection after believing Maddy was dead,
tried to then penetrate her with his penis, and then his fingers could indicate that
he had necrophilia. Dr. Napolitano’s primary focus in this case were indications
that A.G. had sexual sadism, which involved “recurrent intense sexual arousal
fantasies, urges, or behavior related to the suffering and humiliation of another
person.”
Dr. Napolitano said that a “key factor[] in sexual sadism is to have a script,
a plan of what you are going to do,” and “the sophistication in [A.G.’s] offense …
suggests there was a plan of action.” She was “really taken aback by the fact that
a 15-year-old could so brutally murder a child and leave no blood evidence; that
was very surprising and unusual.” A.G. thoroughly cleaned the knife he used to
stab Maddy and “set[] the stage … by offering [her] ice cream … to bring her up
into the room.” Dr. Napolitano also pointed out that A.G. had duct tape at hand,
which had been cut into five pieces, and it seemed unlikely he could cut that tape
while holding Maddy down. In addition, A.G.’s use of three garbage bags to keep

10
Dr. Napolitano acknowledged that pedophilic disorder is not formally
diagnosed in subjects under the age of 18.
23
Maddy’s blood from getting onto any of the surfaces in the apartment, which he
admitted he learned from a television show, demonstrated that A.G. planned the
murder. Dr. Napolitano said that A.G.’s planning and sophistication suggested
both psychopathy and sexual sadism.
Dr. Napolitano also spoke about how A.G. choked Maddy for an extended
period of time, 15 to 30 minutes, which was “a very intimate … very violent act
… that could be part of the sadistic interest in overpowering someone or harming
them and terrifying them.” She noted that A.G. described how, as he was choking
Maddy, he looked into her eyes and “read her emotions of sadness,” which could
“very much” be part of sexual sadism if those emotions aroused A.G. A.G. also
admitted he had an erection while strangling Maddy, which strongly indicated an
atypical sexual interest as “it’s not typically arousing to see somebody suffering or
dying.”
Dr. Napolitano took note of how A.G. characterized his act of stabbing
Maddy as “insertions,” not stabbings, which led her to believe there was “a sexual
component to that [act] as well.” She further found an element of sexual sadism in
how A.G. kept Maddy’s scooter and helmet, which echoed how serial killers often
keep trophies relating to their victims.
When asked about how A.G. played music during the crime, Dr.
Napolitano said she would want to explore that fact, because although he may
have done so to cover the noises Maddy was making, it was possible that those
specific songs were a part of his fantasy.
Dr. Napolitano was also struck by how A.G. inserted himself into the
investigation. She testified that “in the literature of serial killers, which often
involves sexual sadism … they insert themselves into the investigation” and that
this participation “is actually another arousing part of the entire fantasy” because
24
they have this secret knowledge of what happened. The killer may find it
“invigorating … to return to the scene to drink in all that is taking place.”
Dr. Napolitano considered it “extreme[ly] significan[t]” that A.G. admitted
in his interview to watching pornography where a woman is choked and “[she] did
not enjoy it.” In her opinion, that disclosure “provide[d] a hint as to what was
going on beneath the surface” regarding A.G.’s fantasies before the murder. Dr.
Napolitano believed that Dr. Mowery was too accepting of A.G.’s self-report that
he watched “mainstream BDSM” pornography and that Dr. Mowery should have
explored that subject further before concluding it was “not reflective of a
disorder.” In Dr. Napolitano’s opinion, Dr. Mowery should have looked deeper
because it was a “well known fact that when people have a paraphilic disorder,
they do their best to hide it.”
Dr. Napolitano also found it significant that A.G. reported that, when he
was in the Philippines at one point, he kicked some kittens. Cruelty to animals is a
“sign of sadism.” Although A.G. minimized his conduct by saying “[the kittens]
were annoying, but he didn’t think he did any severe damage [to them],” Dr.
Napolitano would have asked further questions about that.
Dr. Napolitano identified “quite a few signs of empathy deficits and
callousness” in A.G.11 Adolescents with empathy deficits and callousness are
different from typical adolescents who most often commit offenses “because they
have reactive aggression and impulsivity.” The former are “more likely to

11
On cross-examination, Dr. Napolitano agreed that Gates’ reports of
A.G.’s empathic characteristics at DJJ would be inconsistent with her psychopathy
hypothesis “[i]f [Gates’s] terminology is measuring the same things we’re talking
about today and he accurately saw those kinds of signs of affective empathy.”
25
recidivate,” and because those traits tend to persist, they do not benefit from the
“advanced brain development” other adolescents experience.
Dr. Napolitano testified that A.G.’s crime did not appear to be impulsive
but was “calculated and planned.” The details of the crime stood out as
demonstrating A.G.’s callousness and lack of empathy. A.G. attacked a young
girl, sexually abused her, texted a friend while the girl panted and gurgled, placed
her corpse in bags, put her in a dumpster, went to get food with a friend, and later
talked about the crime with the police with no emotion. Dr. Napolitano noted that,
during his police interview, A.G. seemed playful and silly, bantering with officers,
“like this was a light-hearted matter.” When A.G. spoke with his mother, who has
hysterical, A.G. repeatedly told her, “It’s time to move on,” and “What’s done is
done.”
Dr. Napolitano also found it significant that, from 2015 to 2024, A.G.
consistently showed a lack of emotion when he recounted the details of the
murder. Dr. Napolitano testified it would be understandable if A.G. had been
emotional in 2015 and that emotion diminished over time. In her opinion, A.G.’s
statement to Dr. Pivaral that he believed killing Maddy saved his life demonstrated
“profound” “self-centeredness and lack of awareness for the impact [of the crime]
on other people.” She also saw evidence of self-centeredness in A.G.’s interview
with the police where he tried to explain the murder by saying, “I wasn’t getting
attention” and by repeatedly asking police “what’s going to happen to me now.”
Dr. Napolitano considered A.G.’s manipulative behavior, particularly his
participation in the search for Maddy and pretending to be worried about her, to be
indicative of psychopathy. She also noted that when A.G. was discussing having
to register as a sex offender, he said that he would “try[] to get around it, which
would be a manipulation.” Dr. Napolitano hypothesized that, if A.G. was
26
“showing … façade … to fool people, to make them think he [was] remorseful …
or it was just an impulsive act, that would be the biggest manipulation of all,”
because, in her opinion, “a lot of people have come to believe that that
presentation is true.”
Dr. Napolitano found it significant that A.G. was almost a “model kid”
prior to killing Maddy. She explained that if A.G. had been a “typical juvenile
delinquent” who committed this crime in concert with someone else, she “might
be testifying for the other side.” In that case, she would have perhaps seen that
A.G. was acting in an impulsive manner and was “out of control.” Instead, A.G.
went from being that model child to committing “something so dramatic and so
different”, then reverting to the model child “during this 40-hour period.” Dr.
Napolitano testified regarding a “groundbreaking book[] on the study of the
psychopathic personality,” called The Mask of Sanity. As explained in the book,
people might not notice someone is a psychopath because they wore a “mask” and
appeared “perfectly sane.”
Dr. Napolitano explained that deceitfulness is another psychopathic trait
she discerned in A.G.’s behavior both before and after the murder. Before the
crime, A.G. deceived Maddy to lure her inside the apartment. After the crime, he
pretended to search for Maddy, he charmed police officers by stepping forward as
they investigated, interacting with them calmly and calling officers by their first
names, showing everyone the “shy, mild mannered, awkward kid who seems
completely harmless.” This kind of masking would have enabled A.G. to fool the
doctors and therapists over the years.
Dr. Napolitano opined that “there is a reasonable likelihood [A.G. had]
psychopathic traits” and explained there was no treatment for psychopathy.
Although it is possible that a person could have both ASD and psychopathy, Dr.
27
Napolitano believed that early references to the possibility of A.G. being autistic
carried over into his subsequent treatment reports. She believed the other
evaluators failed to carefully consider that A.G. may have psychopathy. Dr.
Napolitano disagreed with how Dr. Mowery scored A.G. as to psychopathic
deviate, schizophrenia, and paranoia, and Dr. Napolitano would have given A.G.
the highest score on the psychopathic deviate scale.
Dr. Napolitano testified that psychopathy, while not curable, could be
managed in an incarcerated setting. In custody, staff could “look for
manipulation, confront it, and teach the person that they are not always going to
get away with what they are doing.” If A.G. were released, however, the “[s]ame
thing could happen again,” as he is able to view and masturbate to pornography
which would reinforce his memories of the crime, and his paraphilic urges “could
strengthen.” Dr. Napolitano said that A.G.’s stated reasons for committing the
crime did not really fit with the initial diagnosis of ASD, depressive disorder, and
ADHD. Even with that diagnosis, A.G. would still be “responsive to distress
cues” and would not have been able to carry out the crime. In addition, Dr.
Napolitano said there “was no indication of suicidal behavior after” A.G. killed
Maddy, nor was there any “indication of self loathing,” which she would have
expected had A.G.’s explanation been accurate.
Dr. Napolitano also testified she did not believe A.G. when he stated he did
not know why he committed the offense, because there “was way too much
planning involved; … way too effective of a clean up [and] almost no signs of
impulsivity.” Dr. Napolitano believed, based on her experience and the records
she reviewed, A.G planned the crime and knew why he did it. A.G.’s paraphilic
and psychopathic traits were the “diagnostic areas that would explain such
brutality.” To date, A.G. had not received substantial treatment relating to those
28
traits. Dr. Napolitano also testified that the “violence of [the crime] is very
disturbing,” citing the “lengthy period of choking, [the] … pushing, shoving,
choking, stabbing, [and] suffocating,” all of which indicated sadistic paraphilia
because A.G. used more violence “than was necessary to achieve the rape of this
child.” Dr. Napolitano said that there was nothing in the records demonstrating
that A.G. “received any substantial treatment related to” the violence he employed
in this crime.
Dr. Napolitano testified that she reviewed the limited literature regarding
juvenile sexual homicides and, though there was a small sample size due to the
rarity of such perpetrators, the studies showed that juvenile offenders with
psychopathic, sadistic, and schizotypal traits killed again after release to the
community. Dr. Napolitano was not surprised that A.G. seemed to be doing well
in custody because violent offenders can often do well in an institutionalized
setting, because that setting provides “a lot of structure, [and] monitoring.”
Based on all the information she reviewed, Dr. Napolitano believed that
A.G. posed a danger to the community.
c. Dr. Tucker’s testimony
Dr. Douglas Tucker, a psychiatrist with nearly 30 years of experience
working with sex offenders, testified as an expert in psychiatry, forensic
psychiatry, and psychiatric assessment and treatment of sex offenders. Dr. Tucker
reviewed and analyzed the records in A.G.’s underlying juvenile case, as well as
his treatment reports, and transcripts of relevant witness testimony, for the
purposes of the extension hearing. Dr. Tucker testified that the results of A.G.’s
personality profiling, which showed “schizotypal avoidance, melancholic
masochistic, psychopathic, deviate schizophrenic paranoia,” were indicative of
risk factors for future violence and danger to the community. If A.G. were “under
29
significant stress,” those personality “traits are likely to become more pronounced
and could contribute to [the] return of violent behavior.” Dr. Tucker said that it
was possible for someone to have ASD and psychopathy.
Based on his review of the records in this case, Dr. Tucker saw callousness,
a lack of empathy, manipulation, self-centered behavior, and attention seeking in
A.G. Dr. Tucker testified that psychopathy is “prominent in people who go onto
have criminal careers and [is a] negative prognostic factor for future violent sexual
recidivism.” He explained that “[p]sychopathic personality traits … involve[] a
relative lack of conscience or ability to experience remorse, guilt … [or]
empathy.”
Dr. Tucker also testified that A.G.’s crime “had elements of sexual
deviance … including pedophilia … sadism … [and] necrophilia.” According to
Dr. Tucker, sexual deviance “doesn’t just occur for a short period of time and
disappear.” In Dr. Tucker’s opinion, the fact that A.G. reported having an erection
as he killed Maddy “implies significant sexual deviance and interest in sadistic
theme.” In Dr. Tucker’s experience, it was “very unusual” to encounter cases
involving sexual sadism, pedophilia, and necrophilia, but such cases were “not that
unusual” “if you look at serial sexual killers.” Dr. Tucker testified that paraphilia
can be treated to a point where one sees “prolonged remissions and apparent
success,” but the conditions are “not curable at this point.”
Regarding why A.G. killed Maddy, Dr. Tucker did not believe A.G.’s
explanations that he was suicidal but wanted to have a sexual experience before he
died, that he wanted to see how others would react to Maddy’s death to gauge how
they might react to his suicide, that he was seeking attention from people, or that
he simply did not know. When asked his opinion on why A.G. committed the
crime, Dr. Tucker opined that A.G. was sexually preoccupied at the time of the
30
incident, had been viewing choking pornography, and was depressed. A.G.’s
depression lowered his inhibitions, and he “wanted to have this sexual experience,
so this is what he did.”
Dr. Tucker testified that it was very unusual for someone to have no prior
criminal history then committing an “extremely severe offense.” Typically, there
would be instances of lower level offenses, including sex crimes which might
show “sexual dysfunction” that would precede a significant offense. As a result,
there is “difficulty of predicting this happening again because there was very little
in the way of any warning signs someone could have seen that this was coming.”
Relapse prevention treatment is used to “identify[] the antecedents … so you can
intervene … to prevent a gradual slide back into an offending pattern.” In a case
like A.G.’s, where there were no warning signs before he offended, Dr. Tucker
stated it is “a lot more difficult to intervene in some sort of therapeutic way.”
Dr. Tucker opined that A.G.’s good behavior in custodial settings was due
to “the very high level of structure and support” in those settings when “his life
before his arrest was … somewhat chaotic … as he describes it.” On his release,
A.G. would be in a “much more stressful, much more unpredictable, much more
risky” environment, and Dr. Tucker said “the full impact of all of those changes”
could not be known.
Dr. Tucker said that, in working with sexual offenders, one always has to
consider whether the offender is “intelligent enough to [] figure out what they
need to say.” Dr. Tucker said that it was dangerous to “oversimplify” A.G. and
determine that what he did was “just adolescent acting out or [a] mistake he made
once because he was depressed.” According to Dr. Tucker, oversimplifying
A.G.’s crime could result in underestimating the risk he posed to others.

31
Dr. Tucker opined that A.G. had not received sufficient treatment from
2015 to 2024. A.G. did not receive any sex offender treatment until he was
transferred to DJJ in June 2021, but even that treatment, consisting of group
therapy three hours per week and monthly 75-minute individual sessions, was
insufficient, in Dr. Tucker’s opinion, both in its frequency and intensity. When
A.G. left DJJ, he had completed only three of the seven stages of treatment. Dr.
Tucker also opined that A.G.’s treatment with SFFI from July 2023 until October
2024, which was entirely remote and consisted of weekly one-hour individual
therapy sessions and weekly 90-minute group therapy sessions, was also
insufficient. Dr. Tucker testified that A.G. should be getting “five days a week of
programming.” Dr. Tucker also said that A.G.’s sexual deviance was not
addressed nor was he provided any treatment regarding the violence he employed
in the offense. Given that A.G. has demonstrated that he is capable of acting on
his impulses, Dr. Tucker believed that it was necessary that A.G. “gets suitably
intensive and focused treatment on his particular … criminogenic needs.” In Dr.
Tucker’s opinion A.G. “would be physically dangerous to the public as described
in” section 876, if he were released.
8. Defense testimony on ending commitment
a. Social history
Dr. Catherine Johnson, a psychologist and an investigator for the public
defender’s office, created A.G.’s social history by gathering his education, social
services, mental and medical health records, as well as by interviewing friends,
family, neighbors, and teachers. A.G.’s mother, R.F., immigrated to the United
States from the Philippines and met A.G.’s father here. A.G.’s parents’
relationship was “very volatile,” and his parents drank and used drugs often.
Police responded to reports of domestic violence at the home beginning when
32
A.G. was around four months old. According to the police reports, the violence
was between the adults, but A.G. was present when it occurred. When A.G. was
around 19 months old, his father was arrested again and deported. R.F. continued
to drink heavily and spent most of her time trying to find a new partner. When
A.G. was five, R.F. sent him to the Philippines to live with family for several
months, even though A.G. did not speak Tagalog.
A.G. returned from the Philippines and R.F. was married again. The new
husband was also verbally and physically abusive toward R.F., so she left him.
R.F. “cycl[ed] through different male companions,” continued to use alcohol and
drugs, including methamphetamine. Child Protective Services was called four
different times over the years, but A.G. was never removed from his mother’s
care. When A.G. was nine years old, he and R.F. moved into the apartment
complex where the murder occurred. In all, between the ages of three and nine,
A.G. had moved 35 times.
A.G.’s school attendance was poor, to the point he was deemed truant. In
middle school, A.G. spoke to a counselor because he was “expressing depression
and … cutting himself.” R.F. was called into school and she got angry with A.G.
for “causing a situation where she had to be called in and meet with the
counselor.” There were no records to indicate that A.G. received any mental
health treatment.
After they moved into the Tannery apartments, R.F. spent more time away
from the apartment, leaving A.G. by himself. A.G. did not pass eighth grade but
was promoted to ninth grade anyway. A.G. also failed to complete ninth grade,
but again his school “plan[ed] to promote him to his sophomore year.” A.G.
began speaking more openly to classmates, friends, and a counselor about his
depression and suicidal feelings.
33
b. Lay witnesses
Reverend Beverly Brook testified that she provided spiritual services at the
Santa Cruz County jail and juvenile hall. She met A.G. at the jail in 2015 and
would speak with him privately, mostly about spiritual matters. Reverend Brook
continued to speak with him by telephone, and twice in person, after he was
transferred to DJJ and SYTF. In her opinion, A.G. had matured over the years she
had known him and had seen “growth in his empathy.” Reverend Brook said that
A.G. began asking about her life and even sent her a condolence card when her
mother died.
Melissa Wolf provided animal assisted therapy at Santa Cruz County
juvenile hall, in which she paired shelter dogs with at-risk youth for them to train,
socialize, and prepare the dogs for adoption. A.G. was paired with two dogs, one
at a time, and was “very involved” and successful with his assigned dogs, even
though one of them was described by Wolf as being “more … challenging.”
Rhonda Findling, a counselor from Santa Rosa Junior College, testified that
she had been working with A.G. for a little over a year and a half and that he was
on track to complete his associate of arts degree in humanities by the end of the
summer semester. She described A.G. as “an excellent student” with “close to a
3.5 GPA.”
c. Defense expert witnesses and clinicians
i. Dr. Shaw’s testimony
Dr. Richard Shaw, a psychiatrist, testified as an expert in child, adolescent,
and adult psychiatry. Dr. Shaw evaluated A.G., beginning in 2016 and concluding
in 2017, by reviewing police records, mental health records, A.G.’s police
interview, video testimony, and school records, among other things. Dr. Shaw
also met with A.G. in juvenile hall three times for a total of 10 to 12 hours. Based
34
on his records review and his discussions with A.G., Dr. Shaw opined that A.G.
met the criteria for autism. Dr. Shaw testified that A.G.’s “language was …
stilted” and he “presented as flat.” In Dr. Shaw’s opinion, A.G. had emotional
empathy, but he “imagine[d] … it was a constant struggle [for A.G].” Dr. Shaw
said that it was difficult to know if people with ASD have emotional empathy.
They may “feel[] emotions appropriately” but present in a “really flat way” so it
appears to others that they do not have the appropriate emotions for the situation.
Dr. Shaw interviewed A.G. again in 2024 for four hours, via video, and
believed A.G. still met the criteria for ASD. Dr. Shaw explained that ASD cannot
be cured but a person can learn social skills, and some of A.G.’s treatment “taught
ways to develop more empathy into what he had done and to be able to understand
and respect other people.”
Dr. Shaw testified that psychopathy, or antisocial personality disorder, can
overlap with ASD as those with psychopathy have cognitive empathy but not
emotional empathy. However, Dr. Shaw said that it “wasn’t my role in this case to
evaluate whether or not [A.G.] had” psychopathy. Dr. Shaw said that he “was
hired to talk about autism.”
ii. Dr. Karlsson’s testimony
Dr. Roger Karlsson, a forensic psychologist and psychoanalyst, testified as
an expert in forensic psychology and psychoanalysis. When he evaluated A.G. in
November 2024, Dr. Karlsson reviewed A.G.’s records, including his mental
health and treatment reports, educational records, police reports, A.G.’s interview
with police, and reports from other doctors. Dr. Karlsson then conducted a five-
hour clinical interview of A.G. during which he gave A.G. several autism
screening tests. According to Dr. Karlsson, the results of those tests were
consistent with a diagnosis of ASD, but he admitted that because the screening
35
tests are publicly available, it was possible for the subject to manipulate the
results.12 According to Dr. Karlsson, ASD is not considered a risk factor for
reoffending.
Dr. Karlsson also administered tests for personality disorder and
psychopathy, although he did not think A.G. had a personality disorder. On the
Hare Psychopathy Checklist, A.G. scored a 17, which Dr. Karlsson said was “just
in the lower range of moderate” and that a score of 30 or above would indicate “a
prototypical psychopath.” Dr. Karlsson acknowledged that this score was six
points higher than that recorded by a previous clinician, but that even the score of
17 is “not so high that it … becomes a problem in a risk assessment.” On cross-
examination, Dr. Karlsson acknowledged that the Hare psychopathy test was
subjective to a degree, “depend[ing] on the [test administrator]’s skill,” and
different test givers could get different scores.
Dr. Karlsson concluded that A.G. did not have the psychopathic traits that
would qualify him as a “Life Course Persisters” (LCP) which research has shown
are people who commit crimes “through adolescence and … seem to never stop.”
In contrast to LCPs, Dr. Karlsson explained there are “adult limited offenders”
(AL) whose criminal activities peak around the age of 17 and who thereafter
commit fewer crimes until their “late 20s or … 30s” when they “become regular
citizens.” In Dr. Karlsson’s opinion, A.G. would fall into the AL group whose
recidivism would decline after the age of 17 or so. Dr. Karlsson considered
several risk factors that bear on a person’s risk of reoffending and determined that,
although the risk of reoffending “is never zero,” the risk for A.G. is “on the lower
end.”

12
On cross-examination, Dr. Karlsson testified that, during his interview,
A.G. told him that he had gone over all the criteria for an ASD diagnosis.
36
On cross-examination, Dr. Karlsson testified that, in evaluating the risk of a
sex offender it would be “important to consider whether they are motivated by
paraphilic interests” in committing their offense. Dr. Karlsson was not aware: (1)
of the time period—between 15 and 30 minutes—that A.G. choked Maddy; (2)
that A.G. reported that he looked into Maddy’s eyes as he choked her and that “he
could read her emotions”; (3) that A.G. described pushing the knife “slowly into
[Maddy’s] neck,” demonstrating to acquaintances how he did so; (4) that A.G. got
the idea of placing Maddy into plastic garbage bags to contain her blood from
watching a television program about a serial killer; (5) that A.G had an erection
when he believed Maddy was dead and tried to insert his penis into her vagina;
and (6) that A.G. told police he played music “to drown out” the sounds Maddy
was making.13 Dr. Karlsson did not believe that A.G. met a diagnosis of sexual
sadism, necrophilia, pedophilia, or sexual paraphilia although there were aspects
of sexual sadism in the crime.
Dr. Karlsson testified that for a diagnosis of sexual paraphilia, there had to
be a pattern for six months either of the person committing the same acts or “that
he had fantasies that seem[] to be consistent.” Dr. Karlsson admitted that he was
not aware that A.G. told police at the time of his arrest that he watched “choking
pornography” and reported to others multiple times that he watched pornography,
including BDSM. Dr. Karlsson acknowledged that it “would have been good” to
know A.G. talked “multiple times … about watching pornography and what type
of pornography he has been watching.” Dr. Karlsson admitted that, with respect to
A.G.’s sexual interests, he relied entirely on A.G.’s self-report.

13
Dr. Karlsson said that A.G. told him he played the music “to make
himself calm down.”
37
iii. Dr. Hunter’s testimony
Dr. Krys Hunter, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified she worked
as the program coordinator for DJJ’s SBTP. Dr. Hunter had previously worked
with adult sex offenders at Atascadero State Hospital but decided she preferred
working with juveniles because of her belief she could be more helpful. Dr.
Hunter explained that, according to research, human brains grow and develop until
around age 25, and therefore a juvenile’s brain is “much more malleable.” By
working with a juvenile at an early age, Dr. Hunter testified you could help in “the
appropriate development” of their brain. Although Dr. Hunter was not an expert
in ASD, she saw that A.G. had “characteristics that were in line with” a diagnosis
of ASD.
iv. Therapist Capasso
Steven Capasso, a therapist, testified that he supervised a team of clinicians
at juvenile hall in 2015. When A.G. was admitted to juvenile hall, Capasso
assessed him for severe mental health issues because of the high-profile nature of
the crime and to ensure that A.G. would be safe and not harm himself. Capasso
said that A.G. made progress with his depression while at juvenile hall. Capasso
was “made aware that [A.G.] was very hyperaware of his surroundings,” but in his
opinion this was A.G.’s way to organize himself in a new environment not to form
an escape plan. Capasso believed that A.G. was authentic in therapy sessions and
believed that A.G. showed emotions at times.
d. A.G.’s testimony
A.G. testified in his own defense. He remembered that he went to three
different schools between kindergarten and fifth grade, but he could not remember
how many times he and his mother moved during that period. A.G. said they
sometimes rented out a room, stayed in a shelter, or in his mother’s car. A.G.’s
38
mother had a number of different partners at the time, but A.G. had no specific
memories, positive or negative, about any of those men. A.G. described his
childhood as “normal” as it was “what I knew.” A.G. testified that his mother
provided for him, buying him food, clothes, video game consoles, iPhones, and
gave him money to buy art supplies or go out with friends.
When he was in seventh grade, A.G. began having difficulty keeping up in
school, and he remembered failing some classes or getting low grades. A.G. said
that he had no memories of his mother helping him with school, even before
seventh grade. A.G. said that his academic struggles continued in eighth grade
and, even though he did not meet the academic requirements and did not graduate,
he was allowed to enter high school. A.G. remembers being bullied in eighth
grade, especially in PE class, where other students called him fat or gay. A.G. said
that he began cutting himself around that time to make himself feel better and that
this was when he first began having suicidal thoughts. When A.G. entered high
school, he enjoyed some classes but was still feeling depressed. A.G. began
thinking of suicide more frequently as well.
A.G. testified that in July 2015 he had just finished ninth grade and was
feeling like a failure academically and personally. He was feeling suicidal, so he
went out to a busy street and thought about walking into traffic. A.G. texted his
mom who replied that she did not care and “it would make no difference to her.”
A.G. called a friend who was supportive and so A.G. did not follow through on his
plan to kill himself.
A.G. knew Maddy and her mother as they lived at the same apartment
complex. On July 26, 2015, A.G. had put away groceries, including ice cream, his
mother had dropped off before she went to work. A.G., who had seen Maddy by
the picnic tables by the apartment’s garage, decided he wanted to talk to her, “get[]
39
her to the apartment, and hav[e] sex with her.” A.G. did not think Maddy, who he
knew was only eight years old and perhaps half his size, would willingly have sex
with him.
Maddy agreed to go to A.G.’s apartment to get some ice cream. A.G. said
that he put the ice cream on the counter for her to serve herself. A.G. already had
a piece of duct tape in his hand14 when he grabbed her and picked her up, covering
her mouth with the tape. A.G. carried her into his bedroom. A.G. put Maddy on
his bed, and she was kicking her legs and “trying to get up and trying to fight
back.” A.G. “had [his] hand on her mouth and … on her neck to choke her.” A.G.
could not recall how long he choked Maddy, but he stopped when she stopped
moving. A.G. testified he thought Maddy was losing consciousness, but it was
“unclear” to him whether she was still alive. A.G. did not check Maddy’s pulse
but started to undress her, cutting her clothing with scissors, and tried to rape her.
A.G. said that after he removed Maddy’s clothing he got an erection and tried to
penetrate her. A.G. denied that he was aroused by “anything specific to [Maddy].”
A.G. could not penetrate her with his penis, so he put one finger inside her. A.G.
stopped when he saw some blood around her anus and tried to figure out what he
would do next. A.G. wanted to hide what he had done so he decided to kill her.
A.G. testified that he “wasn’t thinking, [but] just reacting.” A.G. took the
garbage can and a knife from the kitchen. He put her inside the plastic garbage
bag that was already in the garbage can to hide her body. A.G. stabbed her twice
in the neck, holding the knife with both hands. A.G. did not know if Maddy was
making any noises before this, but “while she was in the garbage can she was
making … [¶] … a combination of gurgling noises and moaning.” A.G. played

14
A.G. said that he cut the piece of duct tape after Maddy entered the
apartment, not before.
40
some music on his CD player to cover up those sounds and waited for the noise to
stop. A.G. testified that he could not “remember any specific feeling or emotion”
in that moment. A.G. decided to take the garbage can with Maddy’s body
downstairs to the dumpsters and deliberately took the stairs to avoid the
surveillance cameras by the elevator. After putting Maddy’s body in the recycling
dumpster, A.G. returned to his apartment and tidied up, cleaning the knife and
replacing it in the knife block. A.G. then met up with a friend to get something to
eat.
When A.G. returned, he saw people were looking for Maddy and he began
to panic but tried not to show any anxiety to others. A.G. testified that he got
involved in the search to “blend in.” A.G. saw Maddy’s mother as he was
pretending to help with the search but could not say specifically how that made
him feel. The day after the murder, A.G. saw that police were keeping people
away from the dumpster area and knew they had found Maddy. A.G. testified that
he was arrested shortly thereafter. A.G. said that he initially lied to police in his
interview, thinking he could perhaps get away with it, but started telling the truth
once he realized “there was no getting out of it.”
A.G. testified that, once he was placed at DJJ, he began the seven-stage sex
offender treatment program, completing the first two stages.15 A.G. was working
on his final assignment in stage three, which focused on trauma and victim impact,
when he was transferred to SYTF.

15
A.G. testified the first stage is called “The Autobiography” and involves
looking at the events in your past, such as childhood trauma, and the offense.
A.G. said that stage two “is a lot about learning, accountability and responsibility”
for your offense.
41
A.G. admitted to breaking SYTF rules by asking a woman, A.V.,16 who
was on his approved list of phone contacts to place third person calls to people
who were not on the approved list. A.G. said that he spoke with A.V. “about
music, friends … interests we had and getting to know each other.” He also said
that they spoke “roman[tically]” and that he had phone sex with her. A.G.
testified that, at some point, A.V. stopped taking his calls and he did not hear from
her again. When A.V. testified for the prosecution at the extension hearing, A.G.
said he “was shocked and surprised” and “some of the bitter feelings” he had
about the end of their relationship resurfaced.
A.G. said that he completed all the assignments he was given by SFFI, the
sex offender treatment program offered at SYTF. The program was remote, and
he met with his clinician once a week for an hour and participated in adult group
sessions which he felt were more appropriate due to his age. The assignments he
was provided at SFFI focused on sexual offenses rather than violence.
When asked about juvenile hall staff reporting that he was paying attention
to their routines, A.G. testified that he was not doing so to escape, but because it
gave him “a sense of … schedule and sense of routine.” A.G. also testified that, if
released, he would contact people, such as his former cellmate, who had been
convicted of sex offenses, because he had become friends with them while in
custody. A.G. said that he would “try to help guide” his friends away from the

16
In the reporter’s transcript for A.G.’s testimony, this person’s first name
is transcribed as beginning with the letter I. A.V. testified for the prosecution and
said that she worked with A.G.’s mother. A.V. began conversing with A.G.
sometimes when he would call his mother, who later gave A.V.’s phone number to
A.G. A.V. spoke to A.G. every day for three months, even after she learned about
his crime. A.V. confirmed that she placed three-way calls for him and, on “just
one day” had phone sex with him.
42
behavior that led to their incarceration and would “cut … off” contact if they
persisted.
A.G. testified that he had been accepted at a transitional housing facility
where he could live after his release and understood that he would have to register
as a sex offender. He said that the cognitive behavior therapy “has really helped”
him. A.G. testified, “in all the hard work I have done and support that I have
around me that I won’t be dangerous” to the public is released.
On cross-examination, A.G. denied getting a sense of enjoyment or
“lik[ing] the attention” he got when talking about his crime. A.G. admitted “all
the times over the years, talking about it,” he did not think he ever cried. A.G.
also admitted he had been manipulative in the past but that, through his treatment,
he has become “less manipulative.”
The prosecutor asked A.G. about how often he watched pornography when
he was between 12 and 15 years old. A.G. estimated it was probably two hours
per day every day at first, but by the time he was 15, it was between one and two
hours. A.G. admitted watching porn with BDSM and with men choking women.
A.G. said that he watched this kind of porn “out of curiosity” not for pleasure.
In response to the prosecution’s questioning, A.G. denied planning the
crime, stating that he “had a desire to have sex with someone” and that Maddy was
just who he saw after his mother dropped off the groceries. A.G. admitted that “a
part of [him] knew that it wasn’t going to be consensual sex.” When shown the
surveillance video of him walking with Maddy to his apartment, A.G. testified that
“in the moment” he had not given “thought as to what I was going to do next,” but
he denied being aroused because Maddy had agreed to go with him.
A.G. said that, after he carried Maddy to his room and threw her on his bed,
he could tell she was scared, but he was “thinking more about myself” and that he
43
wanted to have sex. A.G. said that he immediately began “choking her and trying
to keep her on the bed” as Maddy was struggling and trying to scream. A.G. said
that his left hand was covering Maddy’s mouth and his right hand was squeezing
her neck. A.G. could see that Maddy was in pain, and he saw her turn blue.
When asked how Maddy got bruised on her head, A.G. believed that as he
was moving her to the garbage can, she slipped from the bed and hit her head.
A.G. denied that he was aroused when he was choking Maddy or after she either
lost consciousness or had died. A.G. wanted the jury to know that he was not
sexually attracted to prepubescent girls. In A.G.’s view, what he did with Maddy
did not constitute “torture” and he did not intend to use “violence or murder her
for [his] enjoyment or … pleasure.” A.G. said that it was only after he saw blood
on Maddy that he thought about not getting caught and decided to kill her.
Using a 27-inch-long orange and purple human-shaped stuffed doll and an
11.3-gallon garbage bin, the prosecutor had A.G. demonstrate how he took
Maddy’s body and fit it into the garbage bin. The prosecutor later asked A.G. to
demonstrate with the doll how he put Maddy’s body into the two other garbage
bags.
9. Rebuttal testimony
The district attorney called Dr. Napolitano as a rebuttal witness. Dr.
Napolitano testified that she reviewed Dr. Karlsson’s report and remotely
observed both his testimony and A.G.’s testimony. Dr. Napolitano discussed how
A.G.’s score of 17 on the Hare psychopathy test did not indicate A.G. had no
psychopathy but rather there were moderate levels of psychopathy. Based on Dr.
Napolitano’s review of the record along with A.G.’s testimony in this hearing,
specifically his responses on cross-examination, she believed that A.G. had
“prominent psychopathic traits that are an enduring part of his personality.” Dr.
44
Napolitano opined that A.G.’s psychopathy “is one of the main driving factors in
his killing … Maddy.” Using the “information … [she] reviewed,” Dr. Napolitano
scored A.G. as a 20 on the Hare psychopathy checklist. According to Dr.
Napolitano, “20 is an important threshold” as it indicates the subject has
“[psychopathic] traits, it’s just not heavily confirmed.” Dr. Napolitano testified
that psychopaths “have [the] ability to be glib and have superficial charm” which
allows them to manipulate others.
Dr. Napolitano specifically noted A.G.’s testimony that, prior to killing
Maddy, he had stolen painting materials from a store and set some small fires. In
her opinion, these criminal acts indicated that A.G. met the criteria for conduct
disorder. Dr. Napolitano testified that when a person meets the criteria for
conduct disorder, it is important to determine if they fall into one of two
“specifiers.” The first is “callous, unemotional type … [which] is considered
much more dangerous, much less amenable to treatment and more rare.” The
second specifier “captures the more reactive impulsive type of teenager.” Dr.
Napolitano said that, before A.G. killed Maddy, it would have been unclear
whether he fell within the callous unemotional category, but “after the crime, after
the interrogation and the confession” it was clear that he did. Dr. Napolitano
testified that she could not conclude that A.G. has antisocial personality disorder,
but it was also not something she would rule out.
Dr. Napolitano also testified that she continued to believe that A.G. met the
criteria for paraphilic disorder, specifically sadism and possibly pedophilia. In her
view, A.G. “engaged in more violence than was needed to commit the act” and
choked Maddy as he looked her in the face, “seeing [her] terror.” Dr. Napolitano
believed that A.G.’s testimony about his pornography viewing and masturbation

45
habits prior to the killing met the criteria for a six-month pattern of paraphiliac
acts.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Demonstrative evidence
A.G. argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to have
him demonstrate, using a doll and a garbage can, his actions in placing Maddy into
the container and disposing of her body. A.G. specifically contends that the
demonstration was not relevant, was cumulative, was more prejudicial than
probative, and allowing it violated his constitutional rights.
The Attorney General counters that, to the extent that A.G. argues that the
demonstration should have been excluded because the conditions of the
demonstration were not “substantially similar” to what happened, A.G. has
forfeited these arguments by not raising a foundational objection at trial. The
Attorney General also argues the testimony was admissible because it was more
probative than prejudicial and it was not cumulative.
As explained below, the record shows that defense counsel adequately
objected to the district attorney’s proffer of the demonstrative evidence, and we
thus reject the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument. We further find that, on
this record, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the demonstrative
evidence, as the jury had heard from multiple sources, including from A.G.
himself, how he folded Maddy into the garbage can and encased her in three
garbage bags.17 Despite this error, however, we conclude that A.G. cannot show
prejudice on this record.

17
Despite our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing this demonstration, the scope of the demonstration itself was not, as A.G.
argues in his briefing, “a second-by-second re-enactment of [all] the offense[s].”
46
1. Additional background
At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the parties discussed the
district attorney’s proffer that she would ask A.G. to physically demonstrate, using
a 27-inch, stuffed, orange and purple, human-shaped doll and an 11.3-gallon
garbage can, how he put Maddy into his kitchen garbage can. The district attorney
argued that the demonstration was necessary because “the manner in which this
crime was committed … is of utmost importance to his trial” and A.G.’s
description of his crime, as recounted in the testimony of other witnesses’
testimony and in his own testimony, “has completely changed.” The district
attorney explained that the “People had looked at sex dolls that are inflatable to be
able to use that were the approximate size [of Maddy] [and] stuffed animals” but
ultimately chose the “least prejudicial item” she could find. The district attorney
argued that A.G.’s demonstration of what he did would help the jury understand
whether “sadism … [and] torture … was … part of this [crime].”
Defense counsel objected, arguing the prejudicial impact of such a
demonstration would outweigh its probative value since “we are not talking about
guilt but we’re talking about mental status in general.” The district attorney
explained that it was “[f]or this jury to determine whether sadism was part of this
crime, torture was a part of this, [A.G.] demonstrating exactly what he did is
important.” Therefore, she intended to “ask [A.G.] to demonstrate with his hands
how he choked [Maddy,] … how he placed her body into the garbage can,” how
he “position[ed] … her body when she was stabbed … how he wrapped her body
in the three separate [garbage] bags[,] and … how he then disposed of her body.”
The court allowed the district attorney to offer the demonstrative evidence because
it was “probative” in light of A.G. having been “very general in his descriptions
[of what he did].”
47
During her cross-examination of A.G., the district attorney introduced the
doll and the garbage can. In his testimony, A.G. said he could not specifically
recall how he moved Maddy from his bed into the garbage can. Using the doll,
A.G. explained how he pulled Maddy from the bed and how she fell off, hitting
her head on the floor.
As A.G. described how Maddy was positioned on the floor, the district
attorney placed the doll accordingly. Again using the doll, A.G. demonstrated
how he “folded” Maddy’s body and put it in the garbage can, with “her feet and
head … coming together.”
A.G. later showed, using a pointer, how he held the knife with both hands
when he stabbed Maddy, though he did not use the doll for this part of the
demonstration. A.G. testified that, inspired by a television show about a serial
killer, he got two more trash bags to “better hide [Maddy] and … contain the
blood.” After the district attorney gave A.G. two plastic garbage bags to
demonstrate what he did, A.G. took the bag containing the doll out of the garbage
can, placed it on the floor, put a second bag “over the top” of the first bag, then put
a third bag over the other two. A.G. then placed the bags with the doll back into
the garbage can.
2. Applicable legal principles
i. Section 876
Section 876 provides the mechanism for extending the commitment of a
person confined to a SYTF who is otherwise due to be released from that
confinement. Assuming the district attorney’s petition to extend the commitment
is timely filed and, at a contested probable cause hearing, the juvenile court finds

48
that there is probable cause to support it, the matter is set for jury trial.18 (§ 876,
subds. (a), (c), (d).) To grant the petition and extend the commitment, the jury
must unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “the person [is] physically
dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical condition, disorder, or
other problem that causes the person to have serious difficulty controlling their
dangerous behavior.” (§ 876, subd. (e).)
ii. Demonstrative evidence
Demonstrative evidence is admissible only where “(1) the demonstration is
relevant, (2) its conditions and those existing at the time of the alleged occurrence
are shown to be substantially similar and (3) the evidence will not consume undue
time or confuse or mislead the jury. [Citation.] The party offering the evidence
bears the burden of showing that the foundational requirements have been
satisfied. [Citation.] The determination whether to admit demonstration evidence
requires the trial court to decide whether the evidence is ‘of any value in aiding the
jury.’ [Citation.] The trial court’s ruling on admissibility will be reversed only
where the trial court abused its broad discretion.” (People v. Gilbert (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387–1388.)
“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “The
weighing process under [Evidence Code] section 352 depends upon the trial
court’s consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case, rather than upon

18
The person confined, after being fully advised of their constitutional
rights, may waive the right to a jury trial in which case the matter is tried by the
court. (§ 876, subd. (e).)
49
the mechanical application of automatic rules.” (People v. Jennings (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314–1315.) “Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section
352 means evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant
with very little effect on issues, not evidence that is probative of a defendant’s
guilt.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 842 (Crew).)
We “appl[y] the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a
trial court on the admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 723.) Under this standard, we will not disturb a trial court’s ruling “except on
a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People
v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)
3. Analysis
i. Forfeiture
The Attorney General argues that A.G. has forfeited any claim of error to
the demonstrative evidence’s foundation by failing to raise that specific objection
at the trial. We disagree. In general, “a judgment can be reversed because of an
erroneous admission of evidence only if the record contains an objection both
‘ “timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the
objection” ’ or motion. [Citation.] If a defendant fails to make a timely objection
on the precise ground asserted on appeal, the error is not cognizable on appeal.”
(People v. Polk (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194.) “ ‘While no particular form
of objection is required [citation], the objection must be made in such a way as to
alert the trial court to the nature of the anticipated evidence and the basis on which
exclusion is sought, and to afford the People an opportunity to establish its
admissibility.’ ” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 666–667.)

50
During trial and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected
to the introduction of a “stuffed replica of a human that is in no way, shape, size or
bulk-wise what a human would be eight years old or otherwise. And to be
manipulating this device … I just don’t see it being probative.” Based on the
record before us, we find defense counsel sufficiently alerted the trial court to the
grounds on which it should exclude such demonstrative evidence and afforded the
People an opportunity to explain why this form of evidence should be allowed.
After hearing from both the defense and the People, the trial court concluded the
demonstrative evidence was probative and overruled the objection. A.G. raises
those same arguments before this court, and we disagree with the Attorney
General that such arguments have been forfeited.
ii. Admission of demonstrative evidence
On this record, utilizing the abuse of discretion standard of review, we find
that the demonstrative evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, particularly as to the salient question before the jury: whether A.G., at
the time of the extension hearing, was physically dangerous to the public due to a
mental or physical condition, disorder, or other problem that causes him to have
serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior. The demonstrative
evidence had little to say about that question. The details of the murder and the
subsequent acts taken to conceal the victim’s body were presented to the jury
multiple times during the extension hearing, i.e., by the stipulation of facts which
were presented to the jury, in the prosecution’s opening statement, in the video of

51
A.G.’s interview with the police,19 and through the testimony of numerous
prosecution witnesses, including Dr. Napolitano.
People v. Rivera (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 353 (Rivera) is instructive. In
Rivera, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present demonstrative evidence
by having the defendant reenact how he strangled the victim using a mannequin in
order to establish defendant’s “ ‘intent to kill.’ ” (Id. at pp. 359, 360.) In
analyzing the question of whether the evidence should have been excluded under
Evidence Code section 352, the Court of Appeal noted that the evidence had been
offered to show the defendant’s malice and intent to kill, and on appeal, “[t]he
Attorney General also suggests that the evidence was probative ‘to fill gaps’ in
defendant’s testimony” regarding details of the strangling. (Id. at p. 363.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that the reenactment had little to no
probative value as to the issues of malice and intent, because those issues had been
“convincingly established by defendant’s testimony” that he hated the victim and
that he strangled him until he knew the victim was dead. (Rivera, supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at p. 364.) In addition, the reenactment “did not alter any
inconsistencies in defendant’s testimony or affect his lack of recollection of the
particulars of the killing.” (Ibid.)
Turning to the question of prejudice, the court found that the demonstrative
of the murder was “inflammatory.” (Rivera, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)
The court explained: “It is one thing for the jury to hear a defendant’s verbal
account of a murder. Watching the defendant strangle a substitute for the victim is
more likely to inflame the emotions of the jury and evoke an emotional bias, while
having exceedingly negligible probative value, if any, on the issues.” (Ibid.)

19
The jury was provided a transcript of this video and thus had A.G.’s
admission of these details with them during deliberations.
52
We are not persuaded by the Attorney General’s arguments that this
evidence was necessary because, during his testimony, A.G. claimed to have
forgotten certain details. The specific details offered by the Attorney General to
justify the demonstrative evidence are as follows: “whether [A.G.] viewed
‘torture-related’ or ‘red-headed teen’ pornography prior to the crime; whether he
previously acknowledged ‘planning’ to have sex; what he said or did immediately
before grabbing Maddy from behind; where in the apartment he obtained duct
tape; how many pieces of duct tape he used and whether he cut or ripped it;
whether he ‘did anything specific to his bedroom’ to prepare; how long he choked
Maddy; when, how he became, and how long he remained erect; and how or when
he moved Maddy off his bed and her positioning after choking her.” We simply
do not discern how this demonstrative evidence could help the jury understand
many of these details. Seeing A.G. fold a doll into a garbage can and then place it
inside other garbage bags told the jury nothing about what pornography A.G. may
have viewed before the crime, where he kept the duct tape, etc. Even considering
the last contention, that the demonstrative evidence was necessary to establish how
and when A.G. moved Maddy off his bed and her positioning, we do not agree that
utilizing a 27-inch, stuffed, human-shaped doll provided any new insight as to
what occurred at the time of her murder or more relevantly whether A.G., at the
time of the extension hearing, was physically dangerous to the public due to a
mental or physical condition, disorder, or other problem that causes him to have
serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior.
However, it is apparent to this court that watching A.G. treat the doll in the
same manner as he treated Maddy would have “tend[ed] to evoke an emotional
bias against [A.G.] with very little effect on issues” (Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
842) that the jury had to decide. (See Rivera, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 365
53
[“Watching the defendant strangle a substitute for the victim is more likely to
inflame the emotions of the jury and evoke an emotional bias.”].) On these facts,
A.G. has met his burden to show that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
admitting this demonstrative evidence which had little to no probative value to the
jury’s resolution of whether A.G. “[is] … physically dangerous to the public
because of a mental or physical condition, disorder, or other problem that causes
the person to have serious difficulty controlling their dangerous behavior.” (§ 876,
subd. (e).)
iii. Prejudice
Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
demonstrative evidence, we turn to whether A.G. can show that he was prejudiced
thereby.
Error in admitting or excluding evidence at trial is reviewed under the
standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 (Watson).20
Under Watson, we ask whether there is a reasonable chance—more than an
abstract possibility but not necessarily “ ‘more likely than not’ ”—that a result

20
A.G. argues that admitting the demonstrative evidence violated his due
process rights and that the error is therefore subject to review under the stricter
standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, pursuant to
which the burden is on the Attorney General to show the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree that the admission of this evidence
violated A.G.’s due process rights or deprived him of his right to a fair trial. A.G.
has not met the “high constitutional standard to show that the erroneous admission
of evidence resulted in an unfair trial.” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 214, 229.) There was no material dispute regarding either the horrific
nature of A.G.’s offense or the lack of empathy he exhibited when he committed
it. Furthermore, as A.G. acknowledges in his opening brief, the demonstration had
some probative value, even though “little,” and that value was “substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] … create substantial
danger of undue prejudice.” (Evid. Code, § 352, subd. (b).)
54
more favorable to defendant would have been reached absent the assumed error.
(People v. Vasquez (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1041.)
In this case, the jury was tasked with deciding whether A.G. “[is]
physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical condition,
disorder, or other problem that causes the person to have serious difficulty
controlling their dangerous behavior.” (§ 876, subd. (e).) After the murder, as
noted above, multiple witnesses testified about how A.G. dispassionately
described to them the graphic details of how he kidnapped, choked, attempted to
rape, and stabbed Maddy to death, as well as how he methodically disposed of her
body by folding her into a garbage can, putting her into several garbage bags to
keep his room free of blood evidence, then placing her body into the apartment
complex’s recycling dumpster. The jury also heard testimony about how A.G.
played with his yo-yo as he walked back to his apartment, cleaned the apartment
and the knife he used to stab Maddy, hid her scooter and helmet in his closet,
texted a friend about going to get something to eat, then walking with that friend
to a nearby restaurant. The jury was shown photographs of Maddy from when she
was alive, along with photographs of the crime scene, including photos of
Maddy’s body inside the dumpster, and photos of her autopsy.
Also relevant to the jury’s ultimate determination, the district attorney
presented expert testimony from Drs. Napolitano and Tucker, both of whom
opined that A.G. would be dangerous to the public due to signs of paraphilic
disorders, such as sexual sadism, pedophilia, and necrophilia, as well as
psychopathy. Drs. Napolitano and Tucker agreed that these traits can be mitigated
or managed through treatment, but they are not curable.
Utilizing the Watson standard for our review, we conclude that admission
of the demonstrative evidence did not prejudice A.G. The demonstration was
55
essentially cumulative to that provided by multiple other witnesses who testified
about how A.G. described the crime to them, as well as A.G.’s initial interview
with police after his arrest and his testimony at the extension hearing. Drs.
Napolitano and Tucker testified at length regarding their assessment of A.G.,
specifically how the details of the crime as described by A.G. himself supported
their opinion that he had paraphilic disorders and psychopathy. Therefore, in their
expert opinion, A.G. presented a danger to the public and that his commitment
should be extended for further treatment. In light of the strong evidence regarding
whether A.G. posed a threat to public safety if released, it is not reasonably
probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to A.G. had it not
viewed the demonstration. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
B. Prosecutorial misconduct
A.G. argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting
testimony regarding an unrelated juvenile offender, Donald Schmidt, who raped
and murdered a young child, received sexual behavior treatment during his 20-plus
years in custody, but reoffended after his release. A.G. claims that the evidence
was improper because it was guilt-by-association evidence and because the
prosecutor stated facts outside the record by asserting that Schmidt was returned to
custody after reoffending.
The Attorney General argues that A.G. forfeited this claim by not objecting
to the testimony at trial. Alternatively, the Attorney General contends A.G.
waived the argument because defense counsel opened the door to the evidence by
further questioning the witness, Dr. Hunter, about the specifics of Schmidt’s
offenses, eliciting both his name and the fact that his offenses were also committed
in Santa Cruz County. The Attorney General also argues that the prosecutor’s

56
questioning did not amount to misconduct, but even assuming misconduct, A.G.
cannot show prejudice.
1. Additional background
During Dr. Hunter’s testimony about her assessment of A.G.’s future risk,
the district attorney asked if, in Dr. Hunter’s work with sex offenders, had she ever
before “seen a case where a 15-year-old kidnapped, tortured, raped, and murdered
an 8-year-old child.” Dr. Hunter replied there was a similar case but “there was no
kidnap involved” and the victim was younger than eight years old. Dr. Hunter
then confirmed that she had not seen a case involving all the elements, i.e., kidnap,
torture, rape, and murder, present in this case.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Hunter to confirm that
she had “dealt with other individuals” with “similar … charges.” After Dr. Hunter
said she had, defense counsel asked whether the victim in the other case was a
“[two]-year-old” that the juvenile raped and killed. Dr. Hunter corrected defense
counsel, saying the victim was three years old, and confirmed that the offense was
“out of Santa Cruz County.”
During redirect, the district attorney asked Dr. Hunter if the perpetrator in
the Santa Cruz case discussed on cross-examination was Donald Schmidt. Dr.
Hunter said that it was and said she had worked with Schmidt during the more
than 20 years he had been confined to DJJ. The district attorney stated that
Schmidt, after his release from custody, was returned to custody “because he
continued to violate terms of release and harm others.” After the trial court
overruled defense counsel’s relevance objection, Dr. Hunter replied she was “not
familiar with … Schmidt’s history once he left DJJ.” Dr. Hunter confirmed that
Schmidt had participated in SBTP at DJJ.

57
On recross-examination, Dr. Hunter testified that every youth who comes
into DJJ has different circumstances, that Schmidt’s and A.G.’s circumstances
were “very different,” and A.G.’s treatment history was also very different from
Schmidt’s. The trial court interrupted when defense counsel asked if it was “fair
to compare the two cases,” stating “[w]e are not having a trial within a trial.” The
district attorney moved to “strike the testimony regarding the time … Schmidt was
kept incarcerated in the [DJJ]. … [¶] [Defense counsel] opened the door.” The
trial court responded, “You opened the door. We’re just moving on.”
2. Applicable legal principles
“ ‘ “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the
conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to
persuade either the trial court or the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th
1146, 1205 (Linton).) In addition, it must have been reasonably probable that “
‘without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would
have resulted.’ ” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 760 (Dykes).)
“We review the trial court’s rulings on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse
of discretion.” (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 792–793.) Accordingly,
“ ‘ “a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in
a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant made an assignment of
misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the
impropriety.” ’ ” (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 760.) Where no objection is
made, “ ‘the point is reviewable only if an admonition would not have cured the

58
harm caused by the misconduct’ ” or an objection would be futile. (People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577 (Clark).)
3. Analysis
i. Forfeiture
The record does not show that the prosecutor intentionally elicited improper
testimony from Dr. Hunter. On direct examination, the district attorney asked Dr.
Hunter if she had ever “seen a case where a 15-year-old kidnapped, tortured,
raped, and murdered an 8-year-old child.” Dr. Hunter responded that she had seen
a similar case but with a younger victim and without a kidnapping. The district
attorney did not ask further questions about that other case but asked Dr. Hunter if
“specifically had [she] ever seen a case where a 15-year-old had kidnapped,
tortured, raped, and murdered another child?” Dr. Hunter confirmed that she had
not. At this point, the jury had not heard any specifics about that other case, such
as the name of the juvenile offender, the age of the victim, or where the offenses
had taken place. It cannot be said that the record demonstrates the district
attorney’s question (which was similar to one she asked of Dr. Mowery21) was
intended to elicit evidence unrelated to the trial nor did the district attorney
explore the subject further on direct, only returning to it following cross-
examination. “[A] prosecutor cannot be faulted for a witness’s nonresponsive
answer that the prosecutor neither solicited nor could have anticipated.” (People
v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1035.)

21
The district attorney asked Dr. Mowery on direct: “In your experience,
working at Shepherd, working at SFFI, and working at CDCR, have you ever
worked with an individual who had committed kidnap, rape, torture and murder of
an 8-year-old all in one crime?” Defense counsel did not object to this inquiry
and, after Dr. Mowery answered, “Not of an 8-year-old,” the district attorney
ended her direct examination.
59
Instead, it was defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who revisited this
subject area: (1) asking Dr. Hunter whether the victim in that other case was a
“[two]-year-old” that the juvenile raped and killed; and (2) after Dr. Hunter
clarified that the victim was three years old, asking her if the offense was “out of
Santa Cruz County.” As a result, the jury was now aware that another juvenile
offender had raped and killed a three-year-old in Santa Cruz County at some point
in the past. While defense counsel was not responsible for Dr. Hunter disclosing
the offender’s name or that he participated in SBTP during his lengthy
confinement (that information came in on redirect examination), both parties
pushed on the door that was cracked open through successive questioning.
Based on this record, we conclude A.G. has forfeited his claims through his
failure to object at trial. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 577.) A.G. has also not
given any reason why a timely objection or request for an admonition would have
been futile.22 (Ibid.)
ii. No misconduct
Even assuming no forfeiture, A.G.’s claims of misconduct are without
merit. We are not persuaded that the evidence regarding Schmidt amounts to
evidence of guilt by association. Aside from Schmidt’s name and that he raped
and murdered a three-year-old, the jury heard Dr. Hunter testify that Schmidt’s

22
A.G. does argue that we should exercise our discretion and consider this
claim of error because it presents “a pure question of law based on undisputed
facts.” We decline to do so. “ ‘The primary purpose of the requirement that a
defendant object at trial to argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct is to
give the trial court an opportunity, through admonition of the jury, to correct any
error and mitigate any prejudice.’ ” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293,
1328.)

60
and A.G.’s circumstances and their respective treatment histories were “very
different.” Although the district attorney stated that Schmidt reoffended and was
returned to custody, Dr. Hunter treated that statement as a question and replied
that she was “not familiar with … Schmidt’s history once he left DJJ.” This
testimony, and how it was elicited, did not “involve[] the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade … the jury.” ’ ” (Linton, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 1205.) Nor can it be said that there is a reasonable probability that “
‘without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would
have resulted.’ ” (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 760.)
The cases cited by A.G., such as People v. Adams (1939) 14 Cal.2d 154
(Adams), People v. Jackson (1955) 44 Cal.2d 511 (Jackson), and In re Brian J.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 97 (Brian J.) are inapposite. In Adams, supra, 14 Cal.2d
at pages 160–162, the California Supreme Court found that the defendant was
deprived of a fair trial due to the prosecutor referring by name to the “most
outrageous” and “most notorious” cases in that time period for the purpose of
inflaming the jury. In Jackson, supra, 44 Cal.2d at pages 512, 516–517, the
defendants were charged with kidnapping for ransom and inflicting bodily harm
on the victim, who was rescued unharmed. At trial, the prosecutor committed
misconduct by repeatedly referencing cases involving kidnapping and murder,
including the abduction and murder of Charles Lindbergh’s infant son. (Id. at pp.
520–521.)
In re Brian J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 97, involved a proceeding to extend
a juvenile’s commitment under section 1800, which required a finding that the
defendant was “ ‘likely to be physically dangerous to the public due to his mental
or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.’ ” (Brian J., at p. 105; § 1800,
subd. (a).) On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor committed
61
misconduct by “appealing to the jurors’ passions and prejudices by implying they
could protect society with their verdict,” by “interjecting his personal views into
his argument by giving the jurors his own definition of addiction,” and by offering
his opinion that the defendant’s victims might molest others in the future and use
their victimization by defendant as a defense. (Brian J., supra, at p. 121.) The
Court of Appeal, noting the trial court found that the prosecutor’s remarks
amounted to misconduct and duly admonished the jury, concluded that “the trial
court’s admonition … was sufficient to cure any prejudice from the prosecutor’s
misconduct.” (Id. at p. 123.)
The discussion of Schmidt’s case, part of which was elicited by defense
counsel, is categorically different from these cases. Dr. Hunter testified briefly
about her knowledge of certain basic details of Schmidt’s crime and that he
participated in SBTP during his lengthy detention at DJJ. While the prosecutor
may have hoped that Dr. Hunter would confirm that Schmidt reoffended on
release, Dr. Hunter said only that she was “unfamiliar” with Schmidt’s post-
detention history.
We also reject A.G.’s contention that the district attorney’s statement that
Schmidt was arrested after release because he reoffended amounted to her stating
facts outside the record. At most, the district attorney’s statement to Dr. Hunter
about what happened to Schmidt after his release was leading. Dr. Hunter treated
it as a question, however, not a statement of fact, responding that she was not
familiar with what happened after Schmidt was released. Even if the jury viewed
the district attorney’s remark as evidence that A.G., like Schmidt, would reoffend,
Dr. Hunter made clear that Schmidt and A.G. were not alike, in that Schmidt’s and
A.G.’s circumstances were “very different,” and A.G.’s treatment history was also
very different from Schmidt’s.
62
iii. No prejudice
Finally, even if we were to consider the possibility that misconduct
occurred, A.G. has failed to demonstrate how: (1) such conduct could be
considered deceptive or reprehensible or that it so infected the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting order extending his commitment a denial of due process;
and (2) it is reasonably probable that absent such alleged misconduct, the outcome
of the trial would have been different. The amount of testimony regarding
Schmidt was miniscule in comparison to the other evidence introduced during this
38-day trial. Over the course of the trial, the district attorney presented multiple
witnesses, both lay and professional, who testified regarding their interactions with
A.G. over the years, including testimony from fellow inmates, treating clinicians,
an expert in clinical and forensic psychology (Dr. Napolitano), and an expert in
psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, and psychiatric assessment and treatment of sex
offenders (Dr. Tucker). A.G. testified on his own behalf, and presented the
testimony of treating clinicians, lay witnesses, as well as testimony of an expert in
child, adolescent, and adult psychiatry (Dr. Shaw) and an expert in forensic
psychology and psychoanalysis (Dr. Karlsson). The record does not support a
claim that the introduction of this brief testimony about Schmidt rendered A.G.’s
trial fundamentally unfair or that it is reasonably probable the outcome of the trial
would have been different absent that testimony.
A.G. was “ ‘ “ ‘entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 702.) The trial’s evidentiary phase was not free of
error, but the procedures were fair at the fundamental level, and because
“fundamental fairness [is] the touchstone of due process” (Gagnon v. Scarpelli
(1973) 411 U.S. 778, 790), due process was afforded to A.G.

63
C. Cumulative error
A.G. argues that even if any errors identified in this case were individually
harmless, the cumulative prejudicial effect of all the errors rendered the trial so
fundamentally unfair as to deny his right to due process. “In theory, the aggregate
prejudice from several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal
even if no single error was prejudicial by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th
428, 483.) Here, we have found one error but found that A.G. has not shown
prejudice from that error. We also rejected A.G.’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct as forfeited, but even assuming no forfeiture, found such an argument
to be without merit. Consequently, we reject A.G.’s claim of cumulative error.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

64
____________________________
WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
LIE, Acting P. J.

_____________________________
ADAMS, J.

People v. A.G.
H053049

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