Filed 8/20/26 In re A.G. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re A.G. et al., Persons Coming B347952
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01687A-B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge, and Robin R.
Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed.
Jordan Brown and Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
S.W. (Mother), the mother of A.G. (born 2013) and H.M.
(born 2023), appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and
disposition order declaring A.G. and H.M. dependents of the court
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a)
and (b).1 Mother argues substantial evidence does not support
the court’s jurisdiction findings relating to a domestic violence
incident against her involving T.M., the father of H.M. While
this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction with exit orders granting Mother the same custody
she had before the dependency proceedings were initiated. We
requested supplemental briefing regarding whether Mother’s
appeal is moot and conclude that it is.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Dependency Petition and Detention Proceedings
In June 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a section 300
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
petition against Mother and T.M.2 The petition alleged the
children were at risk of nonaccidental physical harm due to
domestic violence between Mother and T.M. (§ 300, subd. (a);
count a-1); Mother and T.M. failed to protect the children from
T.M.’s violent conduct, placing them at risk of physical harm
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1); count b-1); Mother and T.M. were unable to
provide regular care and supervision of H.M. due to substance
use, and Mother failed to protect H.M. from T.M.’s substance use
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1); counts b-2 and b-3); and A.G. was at risk of
harm due to Mother’s failure to protect H.M. from T.M.’s
substance use (§ 300, subd. (j); count j-1). The children have
remained with Mother throughout the dependency proceedings.
The Department’s detention report stated it was notified of
a domestic violence incident between Mother and T.M. in the
children’s presence on April 1, 2025: “[T.M.] accused mother of
hiding his wallet and when she told him she didn’t know where it
was, [T.M.] pulled mother by her hair through the home,
attempted to push mother over the second level balcony, and
when mother tried to defend herself by hitting father [T.M.] with
a wrench[,] father snatched the wrench away from mother and
hit her in the back of her head twice. Father also choked mother
to the point where she almost lost consciousness. The child
[H.M.] and the child [A.G.] were present during the incident. It is
unknown if [H.M.] witnessed the incident or not, but it is
presumed she heard the commotion. . . . [A.G.] saw mother and
stepfather fighting and ran out of the home to get help calling the
police.”
2 T.M. is not a party to this appeal. A.G.’s non-offending
father, E.G., is also not part of this appeal.
3
Officers from the Long Beach Police Department responded
to the scene and reported that Mother sustained “ ‘a 1 ½ inch
scratch on her left arm, redness to her neck and blood shot,
watery eyes, and complaint of soreness to the back of her head.’ ”
Mother was also “ ‘observed to have difficulty breathing and was
coughing while she was reporting what occurred.’ ” A neighbor
reported seeing T.M. “trying to throw mother over the 2nd floor
balcony.” Mother told police that T.M. “verbally told [her] that he
was going to kill her” and “cho[]ked her for 15-20 minutes causing
her to feel like she was going to faint.”
The Department reported that T.M. had a prior dependency
history from 2011 to 2016 regarding two other children, including
sustained allegations of domestic violence with a previous
partner and illegal drug use, which resulted in T.M. losing legal
and physical custody of the children after failing to comply with
court orders. T.M. also had “criminal history that includes, but is
not limited to, arrests and/or convictions for violations of
controlled substance, theft, violence, and weapons-related
offenses, including a 2019 arrest for attempted murder,” which
resulted in a conviction for assault with a firearm and a two-year
prison sentence. T.M. later told the Department that he smoked
marijuana “ ‘responsibly’ ” and “ ‘[d]aily’ ” since the age of 24
or 25.
At a detention hearing on June 20, the juvenile court
released A.G. and H.M. to Mother but detained the children from
T.M. with an order for monitored visitation.3
3 The juvenile court also declined to detain A.G. from E.G.
4
B. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Proceedings
In one of the Department’s reports to the court, it stated
that:
[H.M.] was detained from the presumed father,
[T.M.,] and based on his interview with the
[Department] there is good reason to continue
detention from the father as he appears to struggle
with . . . domestic violence and substance abuse. The
father, [T.M.], denied the allegations and minimized
substance use. There is no restraining order in place
and/ or family custody order, thereby placing the
minor child, [H.M.] at risk.
In addition, the Department continues to have
concerns with the mother’s lack of accountability and
that she still has not grasped the risk she placed the
minor children in by allowing the father, [T.M.] to
frequent the home . . . two weeks [after] being
assaulted by [T.M.] The mother presented as
ambivalent and un[faz]ed by the father, [T.M.]’s prior
child welfare history.
The juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing on July 29, 2025. The court sustained count
a-1 alleging T.M.’s domestic violence against Mother. The court
also sustained count b-3 alleging Mother failed to protect the
children from T.M.’s substance use. The court “note[d] that
substance abuse issues did play a part in the act of domestic
violence that did occur. [T.M.] had a positive toxicology screen for
5
marijuana. The mother was aware of [his] substance abuse
issues and was still allowing him around the children.”
The court sustained count b-1 but struck the language
alleging Mother’s failure to protect the children from T.M.’s
violent conduct, finding that “this was a first-time domestic
violence incident, and, yes, while the mother still allowed [T.M.]
to come back one time to obtain his property and she did not
obtain a restraining order, that doesn’t indicate to the court that
she wasn’t protecting the children and that she was routinely
allowing him back in the home and allowing him around the
children . . . [S]he has acted appropriately with care since the
removal order was granted.” The court entirely struck count b-2
alleging Mother’s substance use rendered her unable to care for
the children, reasoning that “[i]t does appear to be a one-time
positive toxicology screen for the Mother. There is no nexus of
harm. There is no significant history of use from the Mother.”
Finally, the court struck count j-1 “given that [T.M.] is not the
father for [A.G.], and therefore j-1 cannot be sustained regarding
[T.M.]”
The court further found “the mother’s statements to the
law[]enforcement to be credible, [and that] the mother’s
statements are supported by [A.G.]’s observations as well as the
visible injury that the mother suffered, which are consistent with
the conduct that was alleged. [¶] This is a very significant
incident of domestic violence. This isn’t a low level. This would
be characterized as a very significant incident where there were
weapons involved, and therefore the court does believe there is a
significant risk and a nexus of harm based off of the prior
incident of domestic violence and the injuries that were suffered
and the fact that [T.M.] has not done anything to indicate that he
6
understands the seriousness of the conduct.” The court found the
children were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (a)
and (b), and adjudicated them dependents of the court.
As to disposition, the court removed H.M. from T.M.’s
physical custody and released her to Mother with family
maintenance services, and monitored visitation for T.M. The
court released A.G. to his parents, Mother and E.G. The court
ordered Mother to submit to drug and alcohol testing as well as
individual counseling to “address case issues, child protection,
domestic violence, and anger management.”
Mother timely appealed.
C. Post-appeal Proceedings
On April 28 and May 14, 2026, while this appeal was
pending, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction,
awarding sole custody of H.M. to Mother and joint custody of A.G.
to Mother and E.G.4 Mother did not appeal from the orders
terminating jurisdiction. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.406(a)(1).) We requested supplemental briefing on
mootness. The Department filed a supplemental letter brief
arguing Mother’s appeal was moot and should be dismissed.
Mother did not file a supplemental brief.
4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s orders terminating jurisdiction. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d) [judicial notice may be taken of “[r]ecords of . . . any
court of this state”], 459.)
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DISCUSSION
A. Mootness and Dependency Appeals
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to
grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief
to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the
plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm
must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome
the plaintiff seeks.” In other words, “relief is effective when it
‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
legal status.’ [Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for
effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she
has suffered from a change in legal status.” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276-277 (D.P.).) “An order terminating juvenile
court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier
order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163
(Rashad D.).) “However, dismissal of a dependency appeal for
mootness following termination of jurisdiction ‘is not automatic,
but “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 163.)
Even when a case is moot, however, the reviewing court
has “ ‘inherent discretion’ ” to reach the merits of an appeal.
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The reviewing court may
exercise that discretion when a case involves an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy
between the parties may recur, or when a material question
remains for the court’s determination. (See ibid.) The California
Supreme Court in D.P. identified several other factors for courts
to consider in deciding whether discretionary review of a moot
8
case is appropriate. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, the court may
consider whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could impact
current or future dependency proceedings, for example, by
influencing a child protective agency’s decision to file a new
dependency petition or a juvenile court’s determination about
further reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court
may consider the allegations against the parent because “[t]he
more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the
parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot
because a parent promptly complied with his or her case plan.
(Ibid.)
B. Mother’s Appeal Is Moot
The circumstances before us present a quintessentially
moot case. First, as stated, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction as to both children, awarding sole custody of H.M. to
Mother and joint custody of A.G. to Mother and E.G. Mother did
not appeal the orders terminating jurisdiction. “An order
terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an
appeal from an earlier order moot.” (Rashad D., supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 163; accord, D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 285; see also In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225 [“ ‘in
most cases . . . for this court to be able to provide effective relief,
the parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and
disposition order but also from the orders terminating
jurisdiction and modifying the parent’s prior custody status’ ”].)
The juvenile court’s termination orders render it impossible to
grant Mother any effective relief. Under these circumstances,
“the jurisdictional findings are not the basis of any current order
9
that is adverse to [Mother].” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
53, 61.)
Second, Mother’s appeal seeks review of some but not all of
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings. Specifically, Mother
argues the juvenile court lacked substantial evidence for its
jurisdiction findings relating to T.M.’s domestic violence (count a-
1 and b-1) because there was only a single domestic violence
incident. But Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s
finding that she failed to protect H.M. from T.M.’s substance use
(count b-3).5 That means that even if we were to accept Mother’s
arguments, the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings would
continue to support its orders relating to H.M. (In re Ashley B.
(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“As long as there is one
unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another
might be inappropriate.”].) Additionally, T.M. did not appeal any
of the jurisdiction findings against him involving either of the
children and these unchallenged findings would support exercise
of dependency jurisdiction. (See id.; cf. In re Alysha S. (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [“a jurisdictional finding good against
one parent is good against both”].)
A reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to
reach the merits of the appeal when a case involves an issue of
broad public interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy
between the parties may recur, or when a material question
remains for the court’s determination. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 283.) This case does not present these circumstances, and
Mother did not submit a supplemental brief explaining why her
5 As stated, the juvenile court struck count j-1, which alleged
Mother failed to protect A.G. from T.M.’s substance abuse.
10
case is not moot or asking us to exercise our discretion to hear
her appeal. Under these circumstances, we decline to exercise
our discretion to review Mother’s appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal from the jurisdiction findings and disposition
order is dismissed as moot.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
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