Filed 8/19/26 In re A.F. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.F., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088198
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ700002)
v. OPINION
S.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun,
Judge. Conditionally reversed.
Sara N. Taylor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Larisa R-McKenna, Deputy County Counsel, and Minh C. Tran, County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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S.F. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s February 2026 order at the
permanent plan selection and implementation hearing terminating parental rights to A.F.
(born in September 2024; hereafter Minor), the daughter he conceived with J.W.
(Mother). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further undesignated statutory
references are to this code.) Minor was detained from her parents’ custody after Mother
tested positive for methamphetamine at Minor’s caesarian birth, and Minor entered foster
care directly from the hospital. Father contends the Riverside County Department of
Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to meet its duty of inquiry to ask any of Mother’s
many relatives known to DPSS whether Minor may have Native American ancestry to
qualify as an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
and applicable state law (Cal-ICWA). (See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq; § 224.2, subds. (a) &
(b); In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 278; In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125
(Dezi C.).) DPSS in a brief letter response concedes—and we agree—there was inquiry
error and that conditional reversal is necessary to correct it.
“[A] social services agency has the obligation to make a meaningful effort to
locate and interview extended family members to obtain whatever information they may
have as to the child’s possible Indian status.” (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701,
709.) This step is essential: “ ‘ensuring a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry . . .
is foundational to fulfilling the purpose underlying ICWA and related California law.’ ”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.)
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The juvenile court on several occasions throughout the dependency proceedings
found that ICWA did not apply. “The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply
to a proceeding if it determines ‘that . . . inquiry and due diligence as required . . . have
been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child.’ ” (In
re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 589.) However, “[w]hen there is an inadequate
inquiry and the record is underdeveloped, it is impossible for reviewing courts to assess
prejudice because we simply do not know what additional information will be revealed
from an adequate inquiry.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) In such instances,
conditional reversal for the child welfare agency to make the proper inquiry is necessary.
(Ibid.)
DPSS acknowledges “inadvertent omissions in conducting [its] initial inquiry
[into] whether [Minor] is an Indian child.” DPSS’s concession is well-taken and a model
of forthright advocacy. DPSS does not dispute that Father may raise inquiry omissions as
to Mother’s relatives, given that an appealing parent in effect acts as a surrogate for tribal
interests protected by ICWA. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1138 [appellate
standing for parents seeking conditional reversal to remedy inquiry error “best supports
the interests of the tribes, which are independently protected by ICWA”].)
Here, despite agency contact with Minor’s maternal grandmother, Minor’s adult
half sister on her maternal side, two maternal aunts, and another unidentified “relative,”
DPSS asked none of them about Minor’s Indian ancestry, if any. Additionally, Mother
had told a DPSS social worker that her father lived in Lucerne Valley and that she had a
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“really good” relationship with her siblings—including two brothers in addition to
Minor’s two maternal aunts who were contacted—but nothing indicates Mother was
asked how to reach these other relatives. Nor did the juvenile court ensure Mother filed
an ICWA-020 Notification of Indian Status form with contact information.
Given these conceded omissions, DPSS “does not oppose a conditional reversal
and remand” to ensure proper inquiry, which is the same relief Father requests. That is
the correct outcome here. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125 [“an inadequate Cal-
ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by
record documentation.”].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed.
On remand, the juvenile court shall direct DPSS to either: (a) fulfill and document its
Indian ancestry inquiry obligations (§ 224.2), or (b) provide evidence of already having
fulfilled that duty. Upon receipt of information documenting DPSS’s completed inquiry
efforts, the juvenile court must determine whether ICWA applies in this case. If the court
determines ICWA does not apply, then the court is directed to reinstate the order
terminating parental rights. (In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 343.) If the
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juvenile court determines that ICWA applies, then the court is directed to proceed in
compliance with the provisions of ICWA and related California law. (Ibid.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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