Filed 8/19/26 In re A.F. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re A.F., a Person Coming B350100
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 24CCJP02673A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lucia J. Murillo, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel and Courtney Fisher Senior Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.F. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s October 16,
2025, finding at a 12-month review hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.22, subdivision (f), that defendant
and respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) had provided him with reasonable
reunification services.1 We affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14
[“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
Father appeals the court’s reasonable services finding at
the 12-month review hearing, arguing that the Department failed
to make reasonable efforts to facilitate visitation with minor
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
(then six years old) as a core reunification tool.2 According to
father, although the court in May 2025 ordered the Department
to assess liberalizing father’s visits, the Department delayed
granting him unmonitored visits despite father consistently
testing negative for drugs and alcohol through his treatment
program at the Altadena Recovery Center (the Center). Father
argues that the Department did not substantiate its position that
the Center’s testing was not an acceptable substitute for testing
at a Department-approved site. Further, father argues that even
after he was forced to seek court intervention and the court
ordered the Department to provide father with unmonitored
visits, the Department then imposed additional hurdles, such as
requiring 24-hour notice and for visits to occur at a neutral
location.
“When a finding that reunification services were adequate
is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.”
(In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) “When applying
the substantial evidence test, however, we bear in mind the
heightened burden of proof. [Citation.] ‘Under this burden of
2 We note that at the same hearing, the court ordered
minor returned to parental custody under court supervision. For
purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that father was
aggrieved by the reasonable services finding. (See In re A.O.
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1058–1061 [reasonable services
finding is appealable because parent is aggrieved by an erroneous
finding]; see also In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 376
[after initial removal, statutory periods for services are “not reset
if the parent regains custody at some point during the time
period”].) Even if he was not aggrieved, for father’s benefit, we
explain why his challenge to the reasonable services finding lacks
merit. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
3
proof, “evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.
It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating
assent of every reasonable mind.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Alvin
R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) “The adequacy of the
reunification plan and of the [D]epartment’s efforts to provide
suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the
particular case.” (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446,
1451.) “The [D]epartment must make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ to
provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of
each family.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
996, 1010, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504.)
“We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
[D]epartment and indulge all legitimate and reasonable
inferences to uphold the order.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Monica C.
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)
To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as
possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) Visitation requirements exist “[i]n order to
maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to
provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a
child to the custody of his or her parent[.]” (Id., subd. (a).) “While
visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus
on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of
conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child
has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm . . . .’ ” (In re Julie M.
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50.) To that end, subdivision (a)(1)(B)
of section 362.1 mandates that “[n]o visitation order shall
jeopardize the safety of the child.”
The record on appeal supports the juvenile court’s finding
4
that the Department made reasonable efforts to assist father in
his efforts to reunify with minor. Father had monitored visits
with minor from the outset of the case, and the Department
accommodated father after he was injured in September 2024,
permitting visits to take place at a rehabilitation center until it
was brought to the Department’s attention that the court had
ordered monitored visits at the Department offices.
Subsequently, paternal grandparents, who were minor’s
caregivers, monitored father’s visits three times a week for three
hours a visit. We recognize that father did not appeal from the
court’s reasonable services finding from the first reunification
period, which ran from February through August 2025, but we
note the consistency of father’s monitored visits as evidence that
any delay in commencing unmonitored visits—regardless of the
cause of delay—did not pose an obstacle to father’s opportunity to
have meaningful contact and interaction with minor.
Turning to the key question of the timing for commencing
father’s unmonitored visits, the Department consistently reached
out to father and communicated with him about the need to
demonstrate that he was no longer using drugs or alcohol by
being tested at a Department-approved testing site. The
Department consistently provided testing dates at a Department-
approved site from March through September of 2025, and during
that time, father only completed a Department-approved drug
test twice: once on August 1 and a second time on September 24,
2025. Throughout this time period, father and his attorney
pointed to the fact that father was testing negative for drugs and
alcohol through his treatment program, but the record also
includes evidence that the program manager acknowledged
testing is only for their program and its purpose is not to satisfy
5
the Department’s testing requirements. The program manager
was aware that father had been advised that the Center’s drug
testing was not equivalent to the Department’s approved testing,
and she encouraged all of her clients to test at a Department-
approved testing site and to comply with court orders. In other
words, the delay for commencing unmonitored visits was not
caused by the Department, but by father’s unwillingness to
satisfy reasonable drug testing requirements.
Father began his unmonitored visits on October 1, 2025,
and despite a court order authorizing the Department to drop in
on the unmonitored visits unannounced, father consistently failed
to comply with the common-sense requirement that he provide
the Department with at least one day notice of when and where
his visits would take place.
Although father argues on appeal that services were not
reasonable because unmonitored visits would have permitted him
to maintain a closer relationship with minor, he does not point to
any evidence that the monitored visits in any way impeded his
ability to maintain his relationship with minor, or that the
Department unreasonably failed to assist father in accessing
approved testing. Considering the circumstances under which
minor came to the Department’s attention, father and mother’s
histories of substance abuse, and the fact that by the 12-month
hearing from which father appeals, the court ordered minor’s
placement to be home of father in the paternal grandparents’
home, we find substantial evidence supported the court’s
reasonable services finding.
6
DISPOSITION
The October 16, 2025 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:
KIM (D.), J.
7
In re A.F.
B350100
BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting
The only issue in this appeal is whether the juvenile court
properly found that the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services provided A.F. (Father) with
reasonable reunification services at the time of the 12-month
dependency review hearing. The majority resolves that claim on
the merits. I would not. The majority reveals—in a footnote—
that the juvenile court returned the child in question to Father’s
custody at the very same 12-month hearing. In other words, they
were reunified. So this appeal should be dismissed because
Father cannot have been aggrieved by the court’s reasonable
reunification services finding. The contrary notion, that Father
was aggrieved because at some future point he might again lose
custody of the child and seek additional reunification services, is
both too speculative and seemingly irrelevant insofar as In re
Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357 is correctly decided. I
would dismiss the appeal. (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.)
BAKER, Acting P. J.