Filed 11/9/26 In re A.C. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re A.C., a Person Coming B354573
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 24PSJP00060)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Mother J.O. appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights over her child A.C. Mother’s sole dispute is with
the adequacy of the investigation, preceding the termination of
her rights, into whether A.C. is an Indian child under the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and its
California analog. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in determining the Department of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) made an adequate inquiry. We therefore affirm.
I.
Mother has eight children older than A.C. She lost custody
of them after previous dependency proceedings. We have no
information about ICWA inquiries from the earlier proceedings at
which, presumably, ICWA was not applied.
DCFS initiated dependency proceedings to protect A.C. in
May of 2024. We recount only the facts about DCFS’s inquiry in
this present proceeding into mother’s family, as other facts,
including the details of the inquiry into father’s family — which
is unchallenged and involved numerous contacts with numerous
relatives — are unnecessary to resolve the appeal.
The ICWA-010 attachment to the dependency petition
indicated that DCFS questioned mother and maternal aunt A.O.
about A.C.’s Indian status and these inquiries gave DCFS no
reason to believe A.C. was an Indian child. DCFS records show
these inquiries, and one to a maternal great uncle, H.G., occurred
on May 28, 2024, and all denied Indian ancestry.
Mother, in her June 2024 ICWA-020 parental notification
form, denied Indian ancestry and tribal membership on her side
of the family.
At the June 2024 initial hearing, mother was present and
again denied Indian ancestry. The court found “no reason to
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know [A.C.] is an Indian child” and that “ICWA does not apply.”
At later hearings in June and July of 2024 and in February of
2025, the court sought ICWA updates, and as there were none,
the court reiterated its ICWA findings. At no time did anyone
object to the court’s ICWA findings.
In November of 2025, the court began a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
It again sought ICWA updates. Mother continued to deny Indian
ancestry. But then the court asked mother for contact
information for her mother, maternal grandmother Ju.O. The
court called Ju.O. The court asked Ju.O. if she had Indian
ancestry, and Ju.O. said “yes.” “If I’m not mistaken,” said Ju.O.,
“I think it’s Cherokee.” “It comes from my grandfather’s side of
the family on my mom’s side.” The court asked for the person
who has Cherokee ancestry, and Ju.O. said J.M. and gave his
birthdate. The court asked if anyone else had information, and
Ju.O. said no, the only other person who might have information
had recently passed away. The court said it could not continue
with the permanency hearing and ordered DCFS to contact Ju.O.
for more information and to notice the Cherokee tribes. The
court noted “[t]here’s been a lot of case law that’s come down
regarding this issue, and I just want to make sure that we do it
perfectly so that we don’t come back in the future.”
The next day, DCFS followed up with Ju.O.
Ju.O. addressed her maternal grandfather J.M., the child’s
maternal great-great-grandfather. If there was a “person who
would possibly have ancestry,” it “would be him.” He had
indigenous features and would talk about it. But “he [ ] never
registered.
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Ju.O. explained it “is unknown if her father’s side of the
family is indigenous.” Her father R.C., the maternal great-
grandfather, “does not have a phone number that she may
provide,” but Ju.O. “denied her father and his paternal family
were part of a tribe [and] denied her father or paternal family
attend[ed] tribal functions [or] received any financial assistance.”
Further, Ju.O. “reported visiting her father daily and reported
she would give [DCFS] a call when she visits him so [DCFS] may
make an ICWA inquiry.”
Ju.O. offered further background. DCFS reported her as
saying: “ ‘I was adopted by my grandparents [J.M. and C.]’ ‘I
was never part of a tribe nor enrolled.’ ‘So, if there are lineages,
there is possible Mexican Indian lineage not Native American
India[n].’ Regarding ancestry [Ju.O.] stated, ‘Possibly not
Cherokee.’ ‘It was a lot of rumor; it was more stories.’ ‘All I know
is my grandfather [J.M.] has some type of Indian blood, and I told
her (Court representative) I don’t know the tribe. ‘And she
(Court representative) asked me if my grandfather was registered
and I told them “no” ’ ‘I told them he may be Cherokee, and I
said I’m not sure.’ ‘Maybe his daughter knows, but my
grandparents passed.’ ‘There is no one else I can ask, I am the
only one left.’ ‘All of my family is gone.’ ‘The kids my
grandparents all had all passed.’ Again, [Ju.O.] reiterated there
is no other family who would have any information regarding
ICWA.”
The day after this conversation, DCFS called Ju.O. again to
ask about her father, R.C. Ju.O. explained her intention was “to
have [R.C.] call . . . but first off he can barely hear and second you
won’t understand what he is saying.” The DCFS worker asked if
“based on her statement, does that mean [I] will not be able to
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speak with [R.C.],” and Ju.O. replied “no.” Instead, Ju.O. relayed
that R.C. “informed her he does not have any Native American or
Alaskan Native ancestry.”
Shortly after these calls, DCFS prepared ICWA-030 notices
to various Cherokee tribes and the BIA. The tribes replied and
stated A.C. was neither a member nor eligible for membership.
The court reviewed the ICWA record at a non-appearance
progress hearing in January 2026. It recited the gist of the DCFS
interviews with Ju.O. And it described the tribal notices and
their replies. As to R.C., the court noted Ju.O. had stated he
“can’t speak, and he can’t hear. But when she was with him, she
did ask him” and “[h]e indicated there was no American Indian
ancestry.” It then found “there is no reason to know [A.C.] is an
Indian child within the meaning of ICWA” and “ICWA does not
apply.”
On March 13, 2026, the juvenile court resumed the Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing. It asked mother and others if there were any ICWA
updates. There were not. So the court reiterated again its
finding that ICWA does not apply.
The court found A.C. adoptable, declined to apply any
statutory exception to adoptability, terminated parental rights,
and identified adoption as the permanent plan.
Mother timely appealed.
II.
Mother contends DCFS did not comply with its ongoing
initial duty of inquiry when it failed to collect information
regarding A.C.’s Indian ancestry from maternal great-
grandfather, R.C.
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“ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards a state court must follow before removing an Indian
child from his or her family.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
275, 287.) In general, both ICWA and the Welfare and
Institutions Code define an “Indian child” as “any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (b)(1).)
DCFS, along with the juvenile courts, have “an affirmative
and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a
petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may
be an Indian child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).)
“[DCFS]’s duty arises when a report of abuse or neglect is made
and/or when the county takes the child into its temporary
custody.” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099
(Kenneth D.).) “This initial inquiry ‘includes, but is not limited
to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,
extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ ” (In re C.R. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 793, 799–800 (C.R.).) An extended family
member is an adult who is a “ ‘grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1132 (Dezi C.), quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);
accord, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
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“When the agency has ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian
child is involved, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian
status of the child is required. ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 224.2,
subd. (e); see also rule 5.481(a)(4).) The required further inquiry
includes (1) interviewing the parents and extended family
members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and
State Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the
child may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a
tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at pp. 1132–1133, fn. omitted.) A reason to believe arises when
there is “information suggesting that either the parent of the
child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for
membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
If there is reason to know a child is an Indian child, other
steps follow. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133.)
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a
child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence
were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no
reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 800; see
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) “We generally review
the juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not apply for
substantial evidence.” (C.R., at p. 800; ibid. [noting the Supreme
Court has not fully addressed this matter].) We defer to the
juvenile court’s credibility findings. (See Kenneth D., supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 1105–1106.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly
diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation]
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subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141.)
“ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad
discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Kenneth D., at
pp. 1101–1102.)
Here, the juvenile court’s “no ICWA” finding prior to
terminating parental rights was, in relation to A.C.’s maternal
family, supported and within its discretion.
First, despite mother’s unawareness of Indian heritage, the
juvenile court assured the involvement of maternal grandmother
Ju.O. Once Ju.O. disclosed potential Cherokee ancestry, the
court paused the ongoing permanency planning hearing and
directed additional ICWA compliance. DCFS interviewed Ju.O.
and fully pursued the one concrete potential tribal lead Ju.O.
provided — the potential Cherokee ancestry of J.M., whom Ju.O.
nonetheless asserted was not a tribal member. DCFS notified
Cherokee tribes and determined A.C. was not a member or
eligible for membership. The potential Cherokee — or potentially
indigenous Mexican — ancestry was all on Ju.O.’s maternal side.
A.C. contends the inquiry into Ju.O.’s father, maternal
great-grandfather R.C. was inadequate. On this record, it was
not. R.C. was not connected to the potential Cherokee ancestry of
J.M. The most Ju.O. ever said about her father’s side was any
“indigenous” ancestry was “unknown.” When a family member
asserts no reason to know of indigenous ancestry exists, there is
no reason to believe or know a child is an Indian child. (In re J.L.
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 921–923 [a “possibility” of ancestry
insufficient; “may have” ancestry insufficient; “not sure”
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insufficient]; see also In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870,
889, overruled in part on other grounds in Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18 [“Indian ancestry, without more,
does not provide a reason to believe that a child is a member of a
tribe or is the biological child of a member”].) This is not a case of
DCFS “failing to inquire further after a parent identified an
extended family member with more information about the child’s
potential Indian ancestry.” (Dezi C., at p. 1151.)
Ju.O., moreover, denied anyone on her father’s side was a
tribal member, attended tribal functions, or received tribal
assistance. Ju.O. said no one else could provide additional
information about Indian ancestry and Ju.O. confirmed with R.C.
he had no Indian ancestry. DCFS’s receipt of this information
through Ju.O. was substantial evidence the inquiry had reached
a sufficient end. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053
(D.S.) [“Based on this record — including Aunt’s representations,
after having spoken with her grandmother, that she had no
‘reason to believe [D.S.] is an Indian child,’ and had no ‘further
information’ to give the Agency — there was substantial evidence
supporting the court’s conclusion that the Agency complied with
its further inquiry obligations”].) Even so, DCFS included R.C.
on its ICWA notices to the Cherokee tribes. And DCFS had made
multiple efforts to reach R.C. directly. In the end, however, Ju.O.
disallowed DCFS direct access to R.C. because she was worried
about his communication difficulties. But Ju.O. was otherwise
open and cooperative with DCFS inquiries about ancestry and
offered a generational perspective helpful to DCFS. (See In re
C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 70 (C.L.).)
Given Ju.O.’s general cooperativeness on ICWA matters,
the trial court could credit Ju.O.’s assertions regarding R.C. (See
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C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 67 [credibility is for the
juvenile court].) To the extent Ju.O. eventually acted as a
gatekeeper to protect R.C. — with whom DCFS had no
independent contact — from having to interact directly with
DCFS, DCFS is not required to break through all the gates a
family keeps to render family members unavailable. (In re K.L.
(2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 989, 996 [“Nor do we expect DCFS to
hound family members who say they will supply contact
information, but do not do so. . . . DCFS is required to ‘ask an
added question of extended family members whom [they] often
already are investigating in their usual course of work’ ”]; In re
K.M. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 115, 119 [“Implicit in appellant’s
argument is that the maternal great-grandmother might have
provided information about possible heritage in some other
Indian tribe” but “the Agency’s request for information needed to
contact the great-grandmother was refused” and “ICWA does not
require further inquiry based on mere supposition”]; In re Q.M.
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082 [noting the problem of asking
DCFS to “interview individuals for whom no contact information
has been provided”].)
We also note great-grandparents, such as R.C., are not
included on the list of extended relatives of which DCFS must
make a direct ICWA inquiry. (See In re Allison B. (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 214, 220, disapproved on other grounds in
Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1107 and Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18 [“Even ICWA’s broad definition of
‘extended family member,’ however, does not include great-
grandparents”]; D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053 [same]; cf.
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3, subd. (a)(5) [including, in contrast,
great-grandparents as individuals whose information should be
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listed on tribal notices when there is reason to know a child is an
Indian child].)
DCFS need not contact “every possible extended family
member” to accomplish a reasonable inquiry. (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; see id. at p. 1167 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.)
[emphasizing this point]; C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 68;
compare In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 381, and In re
H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 718–721, with In re Claudia R.
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76.) “On a well-developed record, the
court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the
agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent.” (K.G.,
at p. 384 [finding inquiry adequate though DCFS did not contact
a maternal great-grandfather, along with other relatives].)
Ultimately, given DCFS’s full exploration of Cherokee
heritage through J.M., its dialogue with maternal grandmother
Ju.O. about her heritage and R.C., and its attempts to reach R.C.
— as well as its unchallenged exploration of father’s Indian
heritage — the juvenile court was within its rights to conclude
that DCFS’s ICWA inquiries were adequate and that a “no-
ICWA” finding was appropriate.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order of the juvenile court.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.
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