Filed 9/22/26 In re A.A. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re A.A. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F090780
SOCIAL SERVICES/CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES, (Super. Ct. Nos. MJP019403
& MJP019404)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
OPINION
C.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County. Timothy A.
Kams, Judge.
Lelah S. Forrey-Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Regina A. Garza, County Counsel, and Christopher B. Dorian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In this juvenile dependency case, C.A. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders as to his two minor children, An.A.
and Au.A. (collectively, the children).
Father contends the juvenile court erred by (1) finding the children were described
by Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1) based on his conduct
because the finding was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) ordering him to
participate in a parenting education program as part of his reunification case plan because
it was not reasonably related to the conditions leading to dependency; (3) ordering
visitation between him and the children to be supervised, to the extent that was the court’s
intended order; and (4) finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) (ICWA)2 did not apply because the department failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry. He asks this court to reverse the jurisdictional finding as to him, and
remand to the juvenile court with directions to strike the parenting education program
from his case plan, clarify he is entitled to unsupervised visitation, and ensure compliance
with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (§ 224
et seq.) (Cal-ICWA).
We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply and
remand for further proceedings to ensure compliance with the provisions of ICWA and
Cal-ICWA. In all other respects, we affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders from
which father appeals.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 “The language of both federal and state law uses the term ‘Indian.’ California
courts have used alternative terms, such as ‘American Indian’ or ‘Native American’; we
use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory language but keep the
terminology used by the various courts when quoting from their opinions. No disrespect
is intended.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1. (Dezi C.).)
2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Background, Referral, Petition, and Detention Reporting and Hearing
Father and the children’s mother, J.M. (mother), were in a relationship from
around 2010 until October 2014 and lived in Madera County. During their relationship,
they had two children: An.A., born in 2012 and Au.A., born in 2013. After their
separation, the parents shared legal custody, and mother had sole physical custody, with
father having visitation with the children every weekend. The parents had very little
contact after their separation. Eventually, the parents agreed to a visitation schedule of
every other weekend. At the time these dependency proceedings were initiated, father
lived in Mexico, worked in San Diego, and traveled to Madera County, where the
children lived with mother and their half sibling, for visits with the children.
In August 2025, mother was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI) twice in three days, on August 9, 2025, and August 11, 2025. On August 9, 2025,
mother’s youngest child, the children’s half sibling, was in the car with her.3 Mother had
two previous DUI convictions from October 5, 2016, and July 5, 2023. At the time of her
August arrests, she was still on probation for the July 2023 conviction. Mother also had
DUI arrests from October 2021 and June 2025.
The Madera County Department of Social Services/Child Welfare Services
(department) began investigating the referral on August 11, 2025. When the investigating
social worker arrived at mother’s residence, the paternal aunt was present in the
driveway, and “several females were getting in and out of” the vehicle. The paternal aunt
3 Portions of the department’s reporting, as well as the petition, state that a child
was in the car with mother when she was arrested for the DUI on August 11, 2025.
However, the August 9, 2025 police report, which was attached to the department’s
detention report, indicated that the child was in the car with mother on that date. The
police report for the August 11, 2025 arrest does not appear to have been provided to the
juvenile court and is not a part of the record on appeal. The facts regarding the
August 11, 2025 arrest are unclear. Mother reported that she was driving home from the
hospital when she was pulled over and may have been with a friend.
3.
advised the social worker she and her family were stepping in and trying to help mother
and that she and her wife were resource parents. The paternal aunt reported Au.A. was
going to stay with her and her wife, and An.A. would be staying with the maternal
grandmother. The family wanted to have an intervention with mother regarding her
drinking and unstable mental health.
Mother admitted to the investigating social worker that the August 11, 2025 DUI
arrest was her fifth. She admitted to often hiding alcohol in her drinks, including putting
vodka in soda she drank at work. She expressed needing help with depression, anxiety,
and alcoholism. Mother stated she was the victim of domestic violence in her
relationship with her former boyfriend. She denied having much contact with father and
said they only spoke for the well-being of the children.
The social worker asked mother if she would agree to a safety plan for the children
to stay with the paternal aunts, and mother advised she had made those arrangements
prior to the social worker’s intervention and agreed. Both children were placed with the
paternal aunts. They declined to visit with mother.
The children reported to the investigating social worker that mother drank and got
angry frequently. Mother made statements about harming herself in their presence, was
verbally abusive toward them, hit them, and drove drunk. On the day of mother’s
August 9, 2025 arrest, mother was drunk and yelling at the children. She wanted to take
the children shopping, but they refused because she had been drinking. During this
incident, mother threw her phone and An.A.’s phone into a clogged sink and pushed or
tripped An.A. She slapped Au.A. on the top of her head multiple times and tried to
prevent her from calling anyone. Eventually, the children were able to call family
members4 to pick them up, but their half sibling was left with mother. Mother then took
4 It is unclear who the children called. The children’s half sibling reported a
grandmother and uncle came to pick them up. An.A. reported calling her aunt to come
4.
the children’s half sibling to get something to eat, at which point she was pulled over.
The children also reported they had witnessed domestic violence between mother and her
former boyfriend. Both admitted to lying to the department during past child welfare
referrals because mother was present and/or advised them to lie. They reported feeling
safe with their paternal aunts.
The social worker interviewed father, who advised that he traveled to Madera
twice a month. He lived in Mexico from May 2022 through December 2023, lived in
Madera for some time, and then moved back to Mexico in February 2025. He spent a lot
of time with the children when he was in Madera County. Father denied having any prior
child welfare referrals. He reported he thought mother may have had other referrals, but
“he was not a part of it.” When asked about criminal history, father reported he was
placed on probation and received drug and alcohol services in 2022 for an incident where
he inappropriately touched a woman he met at a bar in 2018. The department confirmed
he had a felony conviction from 2019 for sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a))
for which he was placed on probation for a period of three years.
Father reported one of the reasons he left his relationship with mother was because
she was “aggressive and violent.” He told the social worker he was aware of mother’s
drinking, anger issues and unstable mental health but was not aware it had gotten so bad.
He thought mother had stabilized when she got together with the children’s half sibling’s
father, her former boyfriend. Father reported mother had not allowed him much contact
with the children and that she had hidden her alcoholism. After he learned of mother’s
August 9, 2025 DUI arrest, he spoke to her about it on August 11, 2025 and advised her
to give the children to the paternal aunt and to get help. Father expressed interest to the
social worker in moving in with the parental grandfather who lived closer to the children,
pick her up, but did not specify which aunt. Mother reported the paternal aunts, who
were the children’s care providers, picked them up.
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so he could take placement of them. The children later expressed a desire to stay with the
paternal aunts.
The department’s detention report indicated there had been multiple past child
welfare referrals involving mother and mother’s former boyfriend. Notably, there was a
referral from August 6, 2025, for general neglect and emotional abuse of the children,
that was noted to be “Under Investigation,” but no other facts were included.
Additionally, there were two referrals from June 2025 and one from November 2016 that
were deemed unfounded or inconclusive.
On August 25, 2025, the social worker called the sheriff’s department to discuss
the department’s concerns, and the sheriff’s department placed a section 300 hold on the
children. That day, the department held a Child and Family Team (CFT) meeting. The
department asked the parents, a maternal aunt, and the paternal aunt’s wife if the children
had any known Indian ancestry, and they all responded no. It was determined at the
meeting’s conclusion that the department would file a petition recommending family
reunification services for mother and placing the children in foster care with the paternal
aunts.
On August 27, 2025, the department filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf
of then 13-year-old An.A. and then 12-year-old Au.A. The petition alleged that the
children came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions
(b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse or neglect of sibling). The petition specifically
alleged that mother’s alcohol abuse; untreated mental health issues including self-harm
statements and angry and aggressive behavior; and DUI arrest with the children’s half
sibling in the car put the children at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.
There was one jurisdictional allegation pertaining to father, which read:
“b-3 The children … suffered or are at risk of suffering serious physical
harm due to [father’s] failure and/or inability to protect his children from
[mother]. On August 19, 2025, [father] reported to [the social worker] that
he was aware of [mother’s] drinking, anger issues, and unstable mental
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health. [Father] knew or reasonably should have known the children were
at risk of physical harm and neglect while in the care of [mother] and had
failed to make adequate arrangements to protect the children. [Father’s]
failure to protect the children places the children at substantial risk of
serious physical harm and further abuse/neglect.”
The juvenile court conducted an initial detention hearing on August 28, 2025, and
only mother was present. The court asked mother if she or father had any American
Indian relatives, to which mother answered no. The court found based on the available
information that ICWA did not apply. Father was declared presumed father of the
children. The court made temporary detention findings and continued the matter for
detention so that father’s attorney could have a chance to speak with him.
At the continued detention hearing on September 2, 2025, father made his first
appearance, and the juvenile court asked him if he was aware of any Indian ancestry in
his family, to which he said no. The court confirmed the detention findings and set a
jurisdiction hearing.
Jurisdiction Hearing
For jurisdiction, the department recommended the court sustain the petition, and
father set the matter for contest.
The contested jurisdiction hearing was conducted on October 9, 2025. The court
received and admitted the department’s detention and jurisdiction reports into evidence,
and the department submitted on the reports.
The maternal grandmother testified on behalf of father. She testified that she
called father in June 2025 to ask him to arrange for the children’s care. At that time, the
maternal grandmother knew mother was drinking; she had seen her in an inebriated state
and told her several times she needed to stop drinking and go to a rehabilitation center.
She denied telling father these specifics, however. After speaking to the maternal
grandmother, father spoke to the paternal aunt, and the paternal aunt began to
communicate with the maternal grandmother in early July. At some point around that
time, the children stayed with the maternal grandmother, and the paternal aunt later took
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placement of them. Later, the children were returned to mother and were living with her
at the time of her DUI arrest “[b]ecause they were [mother’s] girls.” At some point in
early August, father had come to see the children for his visitation time, and the maternal
grandmother told father, “we have to get [mother] help.” At the end of his visit, father
returned the children to mother and knew that she had not yet received any alcohol abuse
treatment. Neither maternal grandmother nor father called the department regarding
mother’s drinking.
Father testified on his behalf. He testified he and mother were in a relationship for
four years, approximately 2010 to 2014, from when he was 19 years old to 23 years old.
His and mother’s relationship ended because they did not get along and were not a good
match. When they were together, he never saw her treat the children badly in any way.
He witnessed mother drink alcohol while they were in a relationship, but it was a few
beers on the weekend and nothing that would raise a red flag. He was not concerned
about leaving the children in mother’s care when they separated.
Father explained he did not really have much contact with mother after their
separation, as he did child exchanges with the maternal grandmother, and he did not
know mother’s drinking had gotten out of hand. He did not know she got a DUI in 2016,
but later stated he heard she had gotten one around the time they broke up or in 2015.
When he visited the children, he would ask them how things were going; he would ask
things like, “How’s everything going [at] school? How’s your mom treating you? How’s
your step-dad—her boyfriend, does he hit you guys?” The children would respond that
everything was fine. Father stated that when he lived in Madera County in 2024,
everything seemed stable and like things were going well for mother.
Father testified that sometime in June 2025, the maternal grandmother told father
that mother had broken up with her boyfriend, they were arguing, and that father should
go there. The maternal grandmother mainly spoke about mother’s problems with her
boyfriend and that the boyfriend did not like the children. She did not say anything about
8.
mother’s drinking problems. Father offered to have the children come to Mexico with
him, but the maternal grandmother said she did not think mother would want to do that.
He admitted he recalled a conversation with the maternal grandmother regarding
mother’s drinking, but he could not recall if it occurred before or after mother’s DUI
arrest.
Father said that after speaking with the maternal grandmother in June, he spoke
with mother on the telephone for the first time in years on July 1. She confirmed she had
broken up with her boyfriend and that “it was really ugly.” Father then went to see the
children. He thought mother was having issues with depression, not necessarily with
alcohol.
According to father, he first learned of mother’s alcohol issues in late July 2025,
about a week before she got her DUI on August 9. The paternal aunt had told him that
mother had stayed the night at the paternal aunt’s house and appeared to be drinking out
of a flask, but she could not be certain. He explained, “So I was starting to get clues but I
never knew … for sure until she got the DUI” on August 9.
Father said he found out about mother’s August 9, 2025 DUI a couple of days after
it happened. He was concerned about the children, so he spoke to the paternal aunt and
told her to go get the children. He did not contact the department because he was
concerned that “if it didn’t work, it would have caused a lot of trouble with me seeing my
kids.” He was “not at all” opposed to the department being involved, however. At the
paternal aunt’s suggestion, he wrote her an e-mail explaining that he was out of the
country, mother was unstable, and he wanted the children to stay with the paternal aunt.
That e-mail was dated August 10. He attempted to move to Madera County by asking
family members for a place to stay, but they did not have room for him, so he asked the
paternal aunt to “hang on to [the children] for a second,” and she agreed. He did not
attempt to file for emergency custody with family court because the department had
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gotten involved, and the children were placed with the paternal aunt, so he did not see the
need.
When confronted with statements he made to the social worker about mother
being aggressive and violent, father admitted he said mother was aggressive, but that it
was all directed toward him, and he never saw her act that way toward the children. It
“never crossed [his] mind that she would put them in any danger or treat them badly.”
When confronted with his statements that he told the social worker he was aware of
mother’s drinking, anger issues, and unstable mental health, father stated he said that
based on his learning that she had gotten a DUI. He had only suspected she may have
been drinking based on the conversation that he had with the paternal aunt in late June.5
He denied telling the social worker that he knew mother was hiding her alcoholism.
According to father, the children never spoke to him about mother’s drinking.
Father’s attorney argued the jurisdictional allegation pertaining to father was not
supported by the evidence. He noted mother’s drinking issues seemed to have escalated
very quickly, and father made efforts to arrange for the paternal aunt to take care of the
children.
Minors’ counsel argued that father was put on notice that mother had a drinking
problem by the maternal grandmother and returned the children after his visit and
therefore “did not do what he needed to do to protect the children.”
County counsel argued that he was “not trying to paint [father] as a bad guy or an
irresponsible father” and that he “commend[ed father] for staying in his children’s lives,
especially during periods where he’s long distance.” He argued that the statements father
made in the report combined with the maternal grandmother’s testimony, however,
“demonstrate that there were discussions being had. That [father’s] knowledge of
[mother’s] drinking problem, whether or not it was appreciative of the extent to which
5 Father testified earlier that the conversation took place in late July, so it is possible
this was an inadvertent misstatement.
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she had a problem, but I don’t think [father’s] testimony that this just came out of the
blue on August 9th is credible.”
In ruling, the juvenile court noted that it “largely agree[d] with what [county
counsel] said as no comments were disparaging of [father], but I agree … that the notice
was there.” The court went on, “[Father’s] action was not there, an action to address
[mother’s] alcohol issues, perhaps other issues as well, that father became aware of.” The
court noted it was suspicious that father may have been somewhat aware of mother’s
long-standing and ongoing alcohol problems but was not factoring that into the court’s
decision, because it was speculation. Finally, the court stated the “burden of proof is low
at a jurisdiction hearing, that burden has been sustained.”
Disposition Reporting and Hearing
Ahead of the disposition hearing, the department was recommending the children
be adjudged dependents of the juvenile court and be removed from both parents’ custody.
Both parents were recommended to participate in family reunification services. Father’s
case plan was to include a parenting education program, through which he was to “work
on learning how to create a healthy relationship with [the children],” including
“[e]nforcing age-appropriate/developmental parenting practices”; “[c]reat[ing] a positive
and healthy parent-child bond”; “[m]aintaining a healthy co-parenting relationship and
maintaining positive and respectful communication”; and “[p]racticing age appropriate
communication with [the] children.”
Father was participating in monthly supervised visitation with the children and
communicating with them via telephone. Father reported to the department that he
wished for the children to stay with the paternal aunts, and then mother, if she were to
recover. If the children were unable to be placed with mother, he would find a way to get
them into his care. The children opted not to visit or communicate with mother.
During a CFT meeting in October 2025, mother reported she was participating in
criminal court-ordered services, including inpatient treatment, with an alcohol detecting
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ankle monitor and outpatient treatment upon release. The children were doing well with
the paternal aunts and were noted to be very communicative with the social worker and
able to express their needs to her. Another social worker described the children as being
strong advocates for themselves. The children expressed they wanted to stay with their
aunts and did not want to live with mother or father. Father expressed he was not
surprised to hear that because he may have been a “visitation dad,” but further shared that
he felt mother contributed to him being unable to build a relationship with the children.
Father set the disposition hearing for contest. His attorney filed a memorandum of
points and authorities stating that he opposed removal and requested the court grant the
department discretion to place the children with him and for an order for unsupervised
visitation.
When asked if the children wanted to have unsupervised visits with father, Au.A.
reported she was fine with it, but An.A. stated she was not okay with it because she felt it
was “safer” to have supervised visits. After An.A. said this, Au.A. stated that if An.A.
was doing supervised visits, she would only do supervised visits too. When the social
worker informed father of the children’s request for supervised visits, father stated he
would not do supervised visits and would be appealing the decision. The recommended
case plan submitted by the department provided that the social worker would arrange for
unsupervised visitation between father and the children.
The contested disposition hearing was conducted on November 13, 2025. The
court received and admitted the department’s reports into evidence, and the department
submitted on the reports. Mother submitted on the reports, and father did not offer any
evidence, only argument through his attorney. Father’s attorney withdrew father’s
request for placement of the children and explained he was primarily contesting the
recommendation that he take a parenting class. Counsel argued that the department had
not shown that father’s relationship with the children was unhealthy and thus did not
support that the parenting class should be part of his case plan.
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County counsel responded that a parenting class “is a fairly unobtrusive way to
promote an enhanced and more healthy relationship between a parent and children.”
County counsel noted that both children had stated they did not want to live with father
and were more comfortable with supervised visitation. He went on to say, “Nobody’s
trying to imply that [father] is a bad parent, but there are substantiated allegations here”
and underscored that father was not a nonoffending parent.
Minors’ counsel expressed agreement with county counsel and added that father
was not aware of some of the issues that were happening in the children’s home, even
though he did speak with them and visit with them. He added that “a parenting class
would be very beneficial so that this kind of thing would not be a problem in the future;
that he would have such a relationship that one of the things that he does check on is his
daughter[s’] welfare.”
In ruling, the court stated, “I agree no one is saying that … father is a bad person
or a bad father. Still, there is a nexus between the service requested by the [d]epartment
and the jurisdictional findings. I think it is appropriate.” The court adopted the
department’s recommendations. In the written order signed by the court, the court
indicated it found “that there is insufficient information indicating or suggesting that the
child is an Indian child” and that ICWA did not apply.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
Father contends the evidence did not support that he failed and/or was unable to
protect the children from mother and, as such, that the jurisdictional finding as to him
must be reversed, rendering father a nonoffending parent.6 We disagree.
6 While father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings pertaining to mother,
father asserts his claim is not moot because the finding pertaining to him serves as the
basis of the dispositional order that he participate in a parenting class, which he is also
challenging in the present appeal, and because it could be prejudicial to him in the current
or future dependency proceedings. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 266, 284–287.)
13.
A child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) when, as relevant here: “The child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of”
“[t]he failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or
protect the child.” To obtain a jurisdictional determination under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), a child welfare department must “prove three elements: (1) the
parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child;
(2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.)
We review father’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge for substantial evidence;
we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the
jurisdictional findings. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘ “In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are
the province of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Father contends the evidence shows that he acted appropriately and diligently to
protect the children by arranging for them to live with the paternal aunts as soon as he
learned of mother’s August 9, 2025 DUI. According to father, the juvenile court’s
inference that he was put on notice of the risk mother posed to the children and should
The department has not argued that father’s claim is moot and has addressed the
substance of father’s claim.
We note father does not expressly address what the proper disposition for the
children should be in terms of removal from/placement with him in the event we reverse
the jurisdictional finding as to him. Father does not challenge the dispositional
detriment/substantial danger finding the juvenile court made as to him, does not directly
assert the order denying placement with him should be reversed, and does not ask for
placement of the children. For these reasons, there remains a slight question of
justiciability in our mind, but we nonetheless address father’s claims on their merits.
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have acted any earlier was based on speculation rather than substantial evidence. He
further contends that, to the extent any of his actions or inactions put the children at risk
of harm, any risk no longer remained since he arranged for the children to stay with the
paternal aunts, with whom the department ultimately placed the children.
This is an extraordinarily close case, and we appreciate father’s arguments. We
acknowledge that he lived out of the country, some distance from the children, but
maintained regular visitation and contact with them. We acknowledge that after he was
notified of mother’s August 9, 2025 DUI, he promptly made what appear to have been
appropriate arrangements for the children’s care. We also acknowledge that, prior to that
time, he had to balance any growing concerns about the children’s safety in mother’s
home with potential real or perceived limitations on his ability to act by the custody
arrangements and other circumstances of his and mother’s coparenting relationship. In
applying the substantial evidence standard, however, we conclude there was enough to
support the juvenile court’s conclusion that father failed to protect the children, putting
them at risk of harm, and that risk still existed at the time of the hearing.
In our view, the evidence supports a strong and reasonable inference that father
failed to properly investigate the children’s safety in mother’s home when he was initially
told there were concerns by the maternal grandmother in June 2025, and this deficiency
affected his ability to properly arrange for the children’s protection. When the maternal
grandmother expressed to father she had serious concerns about mother, it is undisputed
that father knew mother had an aggressive streak based on her past behavior toward him,
had heard she had gotten a past DUI and possibly had prior child welfare referrals, and
knew to some extent, based upon the conversation with the maternal grandmother, that
her mental health was suffering. His concern was great enough that, according to him, he
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offered to take the children to Mexico7 and, according to the maternal grandmother,
called the paternal aunt, which resulted in the paternal aunt speaking with the maternal
grandmother directly. At that time, however, he clearly did not do enough to protect the
children from further risk of harm but, more importantly, the evidence shows he could
have, had he attempted to gather more information regarding the maternal grandmother’s
concern.
We acknowledge both the maternal grandmother and father denied that she told
him specifically about mother’s drinking, but the maternal grandmother certainly was
aware of mother having a drinking problem, as evidenced by her testimony that she had
seen mother in an inebriated state and advised her to get rehabilitation treatment. Had
father asked appropriate follow up questions, we think it is reasonably likely he could
have better determined the extent of the risk mother posed to the children and taken more
proactive protective action sooner. Father’s failure to obtain more information, which the
evidence shows was available to him, demonstrates, at best, negligent, or, at worst,
willful, ignorance regarding the safety of the children. This failure was compounded
when father learned from the paternal aunt in July 2025 that mother may have been
drinking and was informed again by the maternal grandmother in early August 2025 that
mother needed help and still failed to do more to ascertain the condition of mother’s
home and returned the children to mother after his visitation time.
Father’s failure to act ultimately put the children at risk of physical harm because
they were eventually subjected to the events of August 9, 2025, which not only included
mother driving in an intoxicated state with the children’s half sibling in the vehicle, but
behaving in a violent and aggressive manner toward the children requiring them to
personally seek intervention from family members. We acknowledge that father now
7 Though he later reported to the department, and he argues on appeal, he did not
believe this was possible because of a court order prohibiting the children from being
taken out of the country.
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appears to understand the risk that mother posed; however, his continued insistence that
he could not have done anything differently to understand the conditions in which the
children were living demonstrates the risk of father’s lack of protective capacity still
existed at the time of the hearing.
Though we do appreciate how close this case is, for the foregoing reasons, we
conclude the court’s jurisdictional finding as to father, that he “reasonably should have
known” mother posed a risk to the children, failed to protect the children from that risk,
and continued to place them at risk, was supported by substantial evidence.
II. Parenting Education Program
Section 362, subdivision (d) authorizes the juvenile court to “direct any reasonable
orders to the parents” of a dependent child as the court deems necessary and proper to
ensure appropriate care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the
child. (§ 362, subd. (d).) The order “may include a direction to participate in a
counseling or education program, including, but not limited to, a parent education and
parenting program.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) “The program in which a parent or guardian is
required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the
court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d).)
The juvenile court has “broad discretion to determine what would best serve and
protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this
discretion.” (In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25.) We review the juvenile court’s
disposition orders for an abuse of discretion (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 522)
reviewing any factual findings underlying the orders for substantial evidence (In re K.T.,
at p. 25).
Father contends the parenting education program ordered by the juvenile court as
part of father’s case plan was not supported by an adequate factual basis and was not
designed to eliminate the conditions leading to the children’s dependency.
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We conclude a parenting education program was appropriate and reasonably
related to the conditions leading to the children’s dependency. Based on the children’s
statements at the outset of the case, mother’s neglectful and abusive behavior had been
going on for some time. According to father, however, despite having frequent visits
with him, the children never shared anything negative about their life in mother’s care.
In contrast, there was evidence that the children were forthcoming and “strong
advocates” for themselves in the care of their aunts, suggesting the children could be
expressive under certain circumstances and for some reason were not comfortable sharing
with father. The children expressed they did not want to live with father and did not want
to have unsupervised visitation with him for unspecified reasons. Further, as we have
stated above, father failed to ask pertinent follow up questions when faced with concerns
about mother’s ability to parent the children, showing a lack of protective capacity and
coparenting skills.
A parenting education program could improve father’s ability to communicate
with the children in a healthy and open manner and to develop coparenting skills to
enable him to identify signs that mother was being neglectful or abusive toward the
children.
Father compares his case to In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137. In In re M.C.,
the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that the children
came under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), where the father failed to protect the child
from risk of harm due to the mother’s drug abuse. (In re M.C., at p. 151.) It credited the
father’s argument, however, that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering the
father to complete a parenting education class because he had already taken the class.
(Id. at p. 155.) The appellate court noted, “It is entirely unclear why a parenting class
would benefit [the child] or [the father] given that [the father] had already parented his
three now-adult children and his ex-wife testified that [the father] ‘has always been on
top of everything in regards to his children since they were born.’ ” (Ibid.) The appellate
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court nonetheless concluded the error was harmless because he had already completed the
class. (Ibid.)
The present case is distinguishable. There was no evidence that father had raised
any other children, and although he maintained a relationship with the children despite
living hours away, the children still expressed discomfort with living with him or even
having unsupervised visitation with him. These were older children who appeared to be
articulate and forthcoming under other circumstances, as we have stated. Father himself
admitted he may have been a “visitation dad,” as an explanation for why the children did
not want to live with him. Additionally, as the department points out, the parenting
education program at issue here was not necessarily aimed at basic childcare but in
“strengthening parental judgment, supervision, and child-safety decision-making,” issues
related to the jurisdictional finding sustained as to him.
Another case relied on by father—In re K.T., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th 20—is
inapposite. There, the appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s order requiring the
appellant father to participate in a parenting course, where the juvenile court had also
stricken the jurisdictional allegation pertaining to him that he failed to protect the child
from their mother and ordered the child to remain in the father’s custody. (Id. at pp. 23,
24.) In contrast, here, we have concluded the jurisdictional allegation pertaining to father
was supported by substantial evidence and serves as part of the basis for the parenting
education program order.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the juvenile court’s order that father
participate in a parenting education program as part of his reunification case plan was not
an abuse of discretion.
III. Visitation
Father argues that, to the extent the juvenile court ordered supervised visitation,
the order should be reversed. In response, the department points out that the case plan the
juvenile court adopted provided for unsupervised visitation, and thus father has not
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established error. Father recognizes the department’s concession that he should be
receiving unsupervised visitation and does not further address the issue.
We agree with the department that the juvenile court unambiguously ordered
unsupervised visitation. Therefore, father’s argument that the court erred by ordering
supervised visitation fails as it is not supported by the record.
IV. ICWA
Under Cal-ICWA, the court and county child welfare department “have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child,” who is the subject of a
juvenile dependency petition, “is or may be an Indian child,”8 in order to determine
whether the proceedings must be conducted within the provisions of ICWA. (§ 224.2,
subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9; Cal. Rules of Court,9 rule 5.481(a).)
As relevant here, the department’s initial duty of inquiry includes “asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
The agency “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description
of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received
pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this
information was provided to the relevant tribes.” (Rule 5.481(a)(5).)
Before finding ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court must make a finding that the
agency conducted “proper and adequate further inquiry” and exercised “due diligence” in
8 An “Indian child” is defined in ICWA as an unmarried individual under 18 years
of age who is either (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is eligible
for membership in a federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member of
a federally recognized Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a)
[adopting federal definitions].)
9 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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doing so, and that “there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know whether a
child is an Indian child for substantial evidence, and the court’s finding that the agency
has conducted a proper and adequate inquiry and due diligence for abuse of discretion.
(In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 600–601.)
Father contends the juvenile court’s implied finding that the department conducted
an adequate inquiry under the provisions of ICWA and Cal-ICWA was error. He contends
the department failed to complete its duty of initial inquiry because it did not inquire of
all available extended family members and others with an interest in the children known
to the department, namely, the biological paternal aunt, paternal grandfather, maternal
grandmother, maternal uncles, a paternal uncle, and a paternal great-aunt.
The department contends its inquiry of the parents, the maternal aunt, and the
paternal aunt’s wife, all who denied Indian ancestry, went far enough and was therefore
adequate.
We agree with father. Under the inquiry provisions of Cal-ICWA, the department
has an obligation to contact extended family members who are “reasonably available.”
(In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76,
81.) Courts disagree about how much action Cal-ICWA requires the child welfare
department to take in making contact with extended family members. (See e.g., In re
Claudia R., at pp. 86–87 [department’s required scope of inquiry extends beyond the
family members it encounters during its investigation at least to those it is required to
locate in accordance with its family finding efforts]; In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th
379, 381 [department adequately discharges its duty of inquiry by asking people it would
contact in its usual course of business and is not required to “go further afield”].)
We need not take a definitive approach here because no matter which approach we
take, although we review the juvenile court's finding regarding the adequacy of the
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inquiry and ICWA’s applicability with deference (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1140–1141, 1144), on this record, we cannot say the department conducted an
adequate inquiry.
Here, the department only documented inquiry with the parents and one family
member on each of side of the children’s family. Had these individuals been the only
ones available, and the department documented reasonable efforts to obtain a more
complete inquiry of both sides of both parents’ families, the juvenile court would have
had a reasonable basis to determine whether inquiry was adequate. The department,
however, most notably did not document inquiry of the biological paternal aunt who was
the children’s care provider, or the maternal grandmother, who testified at the jurisdiction
hearing, attended a CFT meeting, and had visitation with the children. And, as father
points out, the department also did not attempt to contact family members who they
reasonably could have obtained contact information for or may have been required to
contact pursuant to family finding requirements of section 309, subdivision (e). In light
of the sparse information the department gathered through the parents and two other
family members,10 we conclude the department was at least required to make inquiry
with those individuals with whom it had contact through in the regular discharge of its
duties.
For these reasons, the juvenile court’s implied determination that the department
had conducted an adequate inquiry was an abuse of discretion on the record before us.
The parties agree that in the event we conclude the juvenile court erred, a limited
conditional remand is the proper disposition.
We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply
and remand for further proceedings. The juvenile court, upon remand, is best suited in
10 Just because the parents and family members inquired of denied Indian ancestry
does not mean the other family members would not have meaningful information related
to the children’s status as Indian children. (See In re Claudia R., supra, 115 Cal.App.5th
at p. 81.)
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the first instance to evaluate the department’s subsequent efforts to comply with the
inquiry provisions of ICWA and Cal-ICWA, in accordance with the views expressed in
this opinion. We further advise the juvenile court to bear in mind, among other pertinent
authority, this court’s prior guidance, that courts should ensure “an adequate initial
inquiry is made of maternal relatives on both sides where available and paternal relatives
on both sides where available, and that the inquiry and its results are documented in the
record, as required by California law.” (In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 619.)
“This will supply evidence upon which the juvenile court may exercise sound discretion
in determining there has been ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence.’ ”
(Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings is
conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with
the inquiry and notice requirements of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation
provisions of rule 5.481(a)(5). If the court thereafter finds a proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence has been conducted and concludes ICWA does not apply
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the court shall reinstate its finding. If the court concludes ICWA
applies, then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. In all other
respects, the juvenile court’s findings and orders from which father appeals are affirmed.
DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
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