Filed 7/9/26 Immigrant Rights Defense Council v. Sklar CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS B343410
DEFENSE COUNCIL, LLC,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
24STCV04208)
v.
IZABELLA SKLAR et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Upinder S. Kalra, Judge. Affirmed.
Medvei Law Group and Sebastian M. Medvei for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC1 appeals
from an award of attorney fees, contending the trial court abused
its discretion by awarding a lower amount than requested.
Plaintiff also contends the court erred when it vacated and
corrected an earlier judgment. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Complaint and Settlement
On March 7, 2024, plaintiff served defendants2 with a
complaint asserting a single cause of action for violation of the
ICA. In the prayer, plaintiff sought injunctive relief, attorney
fees, costs, and “such other relief” as the court may order. Five
days later, on March 12, 2024, defendants sent plaintiff’s counsel
an email containing an initial offer to settle the case. In that
email, defendants offered to stipulate “to being enjoined from
committing any allegedly unlawful acts and to pay $2,000 for
litigation expenses.” Plaintiff’s counsel countered, offering “to
stipulate to an injunction enjoining [defendants] from further
1 Plaintiff describes itself as “a non-governmental
organization … bringing actions on behalf of the people of the
State of California under the Immigration Consultants Act [(ICA,
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22440 et seq.)] to shut down illegally
operated immigration consultant businesses in the State of
California.”
2 Defendants are Izabella Sklar and Access Legal Services
and Same Day Marriage in Los Angeles, Inc.
2
violating the [ICA] and a payment of $20,000.”3 Counsel then
exchanged short email messages about the terms of the
settlement agreement, but no agreement was reached.
On March 19, 2024, defendants’ counsel made an offer to
compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998
(section 998) by agreeing to “entry of judgment in favor of
[p]laintiff against [d]efendants for injunctive relief as prayed in
[c]omplaint, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs.” On April 12,
2024, plaintiff filed a notice stating that it had accepted
defendants’ written offer to compromise. On that same date, the
trial court entered a judgment enjoining defendants from
violating the ICA and “engaging in the business of an
immigration consultant.” The judgment also provided that
plaintiff “shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.”
B. Motion and Award of Attorney Fees
On June 24, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion seeking an award
of attorney fees and costs, supported by a declaration from
counsel claiming that the lodestar amount was $27,150, based on
36.2 hours of attorney work, at a rate of $750 an hour. Plaintiff
further sought a multiplier of 1.5 based on counsel’s testimony
that he had been retained on a contingent fee basis. Plaintiff
3 Plaintiff’s demand for “a payment” was inconsistent with
its prayer for relief, which sought injunctive relief but no
damages, and the ICA, under which an entity, such as plaintiff,
that is not aggrieved by a violation of the ICA, may seek only
injunctive relief. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22446.5, subd. (b).)
3
therefore sought a total award of $40,725 for attorney fees, plus
$60 in filing fees.
On August 28, 2024, defendants filed their opposition to the
motion for attorney fees, arguing that the requested fees were
unreasonable because, among other things, counsel’s bills were
inflated, the case included “[p]iggybacked [w]ork,” the issues
were not complex, and the rate and hours claimed were
unreasonable in light of plaintiff’s early acceptance of defendants’
section 998 offer. Defendants supported their opposition with a
declaration from their counsel describing his communications and
negotiations with plaintiff’s counsel. The declaration attached,
among other exhibits, a motion for attorney fees that plaintiff’s
counsel had filed in another matter two months prior to the filing
of the instant attorney fees motion, which sought similar fees and
included nearly identical language as that set forth in the instant
motion.
On September 3, 2024, plaintiff filed a reply, arguing that
the requested lodestar and multiplier were reasonable.
On that same date, plaintiff filed objections to defendants’
evidence, including objections to the declaration of defendants’
counsel and three of the four attached exhibits, on the grounds of
relevance, hearsay, lack of foundation, and lack of authentication.
On November 18, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing
on plaintiff’s attorney fees motion. The court stated that actions
alleging a violation of the ICA were “not complicated” and
plaintiff’s request for over $40,000 in attorney fees was
unreasonable. The court also observed that counsel had “lost
credibility” when he submitted a declaration that included
“excessive amounts.” Following argument, the court took the
matter under submission.
4
Later that day, the trial court issued a written ruling on
the fee motion. The court first declined to rule on plaintiff’s
evidentiary objections, stating that, outside the summary
judgment and anti-SLAPP contexts, it was unaware of any
requirement that it rule on individual objections and that it was
familiar with the rules of evidence and the weight to be accorded
the proffered opposition evidence. It then agreed that counsel’s
requested hourly rate of $750 was reasonable. The court
observed, however, that “billing at a high rate comes with the
expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner
that reflects the premium paid for his or her services.” (Boldface
omitted.) The court cited counsel’s March 29, 2024, billing entry
for preparation of discovery requests—for services rendered 10
days after defendants’ section 998 offer was served—as an
example of an unreasonable service, given defendant’s immediate
willingness to settle the case. The court also questioned the
accuracy of counsel’s numerous billing entries for “‘settlement
negotiations’” and “‘meet and confer re settlement’” because “the
supposed negotiations occurred via short emails with
[d]efendants’ counsel and [p]laintiff billed for some settlement
negotiation calls that did not occur.”4 The court noted that it had
4 Plaintiff’s counsel did not seek recovery for telephone calls.
He did, however, declare that he spent 0.5 hours reviewing
defendant’s section 998 offer; one hour on settlement negotiations
with defendants’ counsel, from March 20, 2024, to March 22,
2024; one hour preparing a stipulation and proposed judgment on
March 25, 2024; 0.5 hours meeting and conferring regarding a
settlement, from March 25, 2024, to March 26, 2024; 0.5 hours
reviewing defendants’ proposed stipulation and judgment;
0.5 hours preparing a revised stipulation and proposed judgment;
1.2 hours having settlement discussions with defendants’ counsel,
5
“a lot of experience in evaluating fee bills and assessing what is
reasonable. Without a doubt, the bill here is one of the most
unreasonable bills this court has ever seen. Therefore,
considering this significant amount of unnecessary and
unreasonable charges, the court finds based upon its experience
and knowledge of this type of litigation, the lack of novelty and
complexity of this case, and, to align with the hours that should
reasonably have been incurred, a reasonable lodestar amount is
seven hours.” (Boldface omitted.) The court then ordered as
follows:
“1. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED in
part;
“2. Plaintiff is awarded $5,885.66;
“3. Plaintiff to file a proposed amended judgment … .”
C. Judgment Awarding Attorney Fees
On November 18, 2024, plaintiff submitted a proposed “first
amended judgment,” which the trial court signed and filed on
November 22, 2024 (first judgment). The first judgment stated,
on March 26, 2024, to April 4, 2024; and one hour preparing an
acceptance of the section 998 offer.
In defendants’ opposition to the motion for attorney fees,
defendants’ counsel declared that between March 20, 2024, to
March 22, 2024 (when plaintiff’s counsel claimed that he spent
one hour on settlement negotiations), the parties’ respective
counsel did not speak on the phone and instead only exchanged
“a few very brief emails.” In addition, defendants’ counsel
declared that although plaintiff’s counsel claimed that he spent
1.2 hours on settlement discussions between March 16, 2024, to
April 4, 2024, “there were no discussion[s] in person or by phone
calls.”
6
“Plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees in the
amount of ... $5,885.66 to be paid jointly by [d]efendants directly
to [p]laintiff’s attorney.” On November 22, 2024, defendants filed
an objection to the proposed judgment, noting that the court, in
its final ruling, had awarded attorney fees to plaintiff, but had
not ordered that the fees be paid directly to plaintiff’s attorney.
On November 27, 2024, defendants submitted an ex parte
application to correct the first judgment, supported by a
declaration from defendants’ counsel explaining that plaintiff had
served defendants the proposed first judgment by mail and
defendants therefore did not receive notice of it until
November 22, 2024. Counsel further explained that prior to
receiving the first judgment, he had mailed a check for $5,885.66
to plaintiff and received confirmation of delivery.
On December 2, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing
on defendants’ ex parte application to correct the first judgment.5
The court granted the application, recalled the first judgment,
and ordered counsel to lodge a new proposed judgment that
conformed with the court’s November 18, 2024, order.
On December 17, 2024, the trial court entered a “first
amended judgment” that omitted the language directing
defendants to send the fees directly to plaintiff’s counsel and
instead provided only that “[p]laintiff shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of … $5,885.66” (second
judgment).
Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal from both the first
judgment entered on November 18, 2024, and the order on the ex
parte application entered on December 2, 2024.
5 The record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the ex
parte proceedings.
7
III. DISCUSSION
A. Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s failure to rule on its
objections to three exhibits—the articles of organization for the
plaintiff LLC; defendants’ offer to compromise; and a publication
about hundreds of similar lawsuits filed by plaintiff’s counsel—
and the entirety of defense counsel’s declaration, arguing that the
court had a duty to rule on the objections. But plaintiff does not
argue that the court relied on those exhibits or specific testimony
from counsel’s declaration in making its ruling on the fee
application or otherwise attempt to show how it would have
achieved a different outcome if those exhibits and specific
declaration testimony had been excluded. And, the record of the
attorney fee hearing and the court’s ruling on the fee motion
show that the court relied primarily on plaintiff’s own billing
statements, the court’s experience with adjudicating fee
applications generally and, specifically, its familiarity with these
types of lawsuits to conclude that the declaration testimony of
plaintiff’s counsel was not credible and his billing statements
were inflated.
“In order to obtain a reversal of the judgment, an appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating not only that the trial court
committed error but also that the error was prejudicial.
[Citation.]” (D.D. v. Pitcher (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1057.)
“Prejudice is not presumed.” (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 440, 455; see DiRaffael v. California Army National
Guard (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 692, 718 [“[A]ppellant makes
general claims of prejudice, and identifies some specific examples
of purported errors by the trial court, but never explains how
8
those errors affected the outcome of his case. These conclusory
assertions of prejudice are insufficient”].) Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that it was prejudiced by any presumed error. We
therefore reject plaintiff’s arguments based on its challenge to the
court’s failure to rule on the evidentiary objections.
B. Attorney Fees Award
Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it: (1) applied an “across-the-board 81 [percent] cut of [plaintiff’s]
fee request” (boldface omitted) and (2) failed to provide a “‘clear
explanation’” for its decision not to apply a 1.5 multiplier.
1. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
A prevailing plaintiff in an ICA action is entitled to recover
reasonable attorney fees and costs. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 22447.5, subd. (b).) “[A] court assessing attorney fees begins
with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful
compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly
compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of
the case.’” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132
(Ketchum).) “In fixing the lodestar amount, the trial court may
not blindly accept as reasonable the attorney-applicant’s reported
hours or their hourly rates; to the contrary, the court ‘must
carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended’ to
avoid ‘“padding[.]”’ (Ketchum, [supra, 24 Cal.4th] at p. 1132[.])
... .” (Cash v. County of Los Angeles (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 741,
747, review granted Aug. 20, 2025, S291827.) “The ‘experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services
rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject
9
to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is
convinced that it is clearly wrong.’” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20
Cal.3d 25, 49.)
“[T]he trial court is not required to include a fee
enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk,
exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to
do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee
enhancement bears the burden of proof.” (Ketchum, supra, 24
Cal.4th at pp. 1138–1139.)
2. Analysis
We reject plaintiff’s characterization of the trial court’s
ruling. Although the court awarded plaintiff fees that were less
than plaintiff requested, it did not apply an across-the-board
reduction in fees. Instead, it conducted a lodestar analysis: it
determined an hourly rate of $750 was reasonable for the services
of plaintiff’s counsel and, based on its experience with ICA fee
applications and the record of the parties’ settlement
negotiations, that seven hours was a reasonable amount of
attorney time.
Further, and contrary to plaintiff’s characterization, the
trial court provided an explanation for its ruling, by stating its
findings that: the violation alleged in the complaint was not
complicated; an attorney with the experience of plaintiff’s counsel
and corresponding billing rate should reasonably perform work in
a more efficient manner; the time claimed for negotiating the
settlement agreement was unreasonably high given the short
emails exchanged between the parties; and counsel’s purported
preparation of discovery requests was unreasonable given the
10
parties’ early settlement agreement. The court therefore did not
abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees.
C. Judgment
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred when it
filed the second because it was “without authority to vacate the
[first judgment], particularly on an ex parte basis.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.) We disagree.
According to plaintiff, the first judgment “reflects no actual
error in that it correctly awards [plaintiff’s] attorney, and not
[plaintiff], the fees in question.” But plaintiff does not dispute
that the first judgment included a direction that defendants pay
the fee award “directly to [p]laintiff’s attorney,” which was not
included in the court’s November 18, 2024, order. A “court has
inherent power either on its own motion, or on ex parte
application, or on notice, to set aside an order or judgment taken
through its own inadvertence or mistake.” (Estate of Costa (1951)
37 Cal.2d 154, 157; see also Estate of Eckstrom (1960) 54 Cal.2d
540, 544 [“A court can always correct a clerical, as distinguished
from a judicial error which appears on the face of a decree by a
nunc pro tunc order”].) Thus, the trial court here “properly
exercised its inherent power in setting aside [the first judgment]
when attention was called to the inadvertence.” (Estate of Costa,
supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 157.)
11
IV. DISPOSITION
The November 18, 2024, judgment and December 2, 2024,
order are affirmed. No costs are awarded on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
12