Filed 7/1/26 Hunt v. Aliso Viejo Community Assn. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JANEEN HUNT,
Cross-Complainant and G065819
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
v. 01314623)
ALISO VIEJO COMMUNITY ORDER MODIFYING
ASSOCIATION, OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING; NO CHANGE
Cross-Defendant and IN JUDGMENT
Respondent.
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 2, 2026, be
modified as follows:
On page 9, NEGLIGENCE section, insert as the first paragraph:
“The elements of any negligence cause of action are duty, breach
of duty, proximate cause, and damages.” (Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc.
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680, 687.) With regard to duty, our high court has held
that HOAs generally have the same duty as a landlord in maintaining
common areas in a safe condition. (Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn.
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 499 [“the Association is, for all practical purposes, the
Project's ‘landlord.’ And traditional tort principles impose on landlords, no
less than on homeowner associations that function as a landlord in
maintaining the common areas of a large condominium complex, a duty to
exercise due care for the residents' safety in those areas under their control.”
Fn. omitted.].) “This duty to maintain land in one’s possession in a reasonably
safe condition exists even where the dangerous condition on the land is
caused by an instrumentality that the landowner does not own or control.”
(Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.)
There is no change in the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
2
Filed 6/2/26 Hunt v. Aliso Viejo Community Assn. CA4/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JANEEN HUNT,
Cross-Complainant and G065819
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
v. 01314623)
ALISO VIEJO COMMUNITY OPINION
ASSOCIATION,
Cross-Defendant and
Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Strickroth, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Janeen Hunt, in pro per, for Cross-Complainant and Appellant.
O’Toole Rogers, Nicholas A. Rogers, and Jeffrey V. Rocha for
Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
The trial court sustained a demurrer to cross-complainant
Janeen Hunt’s complaint for a failure to accommodate her disability against
cross-defendant Aliso Viejo Community Association (AVCA), which is a
master association presiding over several sub-HOAs in the city of Aliso Viejo.
The events giving rise to her cross-complaint began with a conflict between
Hunt and a neighbor, during which the neighbor erected barriers on his
driveway, which was technically community property. Hunt appealed to
AVCA to remove the barriers, citing certain disabilities she has and stating
that the barriers create risks of harm to her in light of those disabilities.
AVCA took the position that it had no authority to remove the barriers—the
sub-HOA did. Hunt sued, and the trial court sustained AVCA’s demurrer.
We reverse in part. Hunt pleaded sufficient facts to establish, for
pleading purposes, that AVCA had authority to remove the barriers in the
neighbor’s yard, and its failure to do so violated its statutory duty to provide
reasonable accommodations to disabled persons. Because she has pleaded a
statutory violation, her negligence claim was also sufficient on a theory of
negligence per se. However, we agree with the trial court that the complaint
did not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of
fiduciary duty, or violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
ALLEGATIONS
Hunt resides in The Cape Series at Aliso Viejo (The Cape), a
condominium tract in which all streets, driveways, paving, and front yards
are common area property without exclusive use rights. The Cape Series is
governed by a sub-HOA, which has primary control over the day-to-day HOA
duties in The Cape. That sub-HOA is subject to AVCA, a master community
association that governs essentially the entire city of Aliso Viejo.
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Hunt has been disabled due to a traumatic brain injury since
2014, with symptoms ranging from impairment of her senses of taste,
hearing, and sight, to balance deficiencies, memory deficiencies, speech
impediments, and nerve damage. She also suffers from degenerative disc
disease of the spine.
Hunt and one of her neighbors, Gregory Lawrence, had a long-
running conflict, the origin of which is somewhat unclear in the complaint.
The complaint paints him as a mean and vindictive person who used his role
on the sub-HOA board of directors to make trouble for his neighbors. As part
of that conflict, Lawrence had put cones and other obstacles up on his
driveway, which prevented cars from using that space to maneuver in and
out of the cul-de-sac, which was a narrow street that was difficult to navigate
without pulling into a driveway.
In June 2022, Hunt and three other neighbors filed a written
complaint to the board of the sub-HOA regarding the cones Lawrence
maintained at the front of his driveway. The sub-HOA took no action. Around
that same time, Hunt notified the sub-HOA about her medical disability. The
following month, she made “a request for Reasonable Accommodation that
the cones and barriers be removed from the ‘common area’ driveway,” which
was sent to the sub-HOA by e-mail. The sub-HOA denied that request.
Hunt also lives with her disabled 89-year old mother, and she
alleges her mother had to move out because she had a heart attack and
emergency vehicles were delayed in getting to their house due to the presence
of the cones. Hunt also alleged that the inability to use Lawrence’s driveway
resulted in “tears of pain” due to the “agony of painful back and forth steering
to get out of her driveway” resulting from her degenerative disc disease.
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By January 2023, the sub-HOA had denied Hunt’s multiple
requests to remove the cones and obstructions from Lawrence’s driveway.
The board had also lost most of its members. Thus Hunt decided to escalate
her request for a reasonable accommodation to AVCA, the Master HOA.
However, in an e-mail, AVCA also denied her accommodation request. AVCA
referred the matter to its legal counsel who took the position that AVCA did
not have authority under the relevant Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions (CC&Rs) to act on Hunt’s request.
The underlying lawsuit was initiated by Lawrence in March 2023
against certain of his neighbors (including Hunt) and the sub-HOA. Lawrence
alleged that he has his own medical conditions that require unfettered access
to his driveway for trips to the emergency room, and that his neighbors have
obstructed his driveway and otherwise made unreasonable use of it. Against
Hunt, Lawrence alleged that she uses his driveway to pull in and out of their
street, “sometimes crushing cones the Lawrences placed on their driveway,”
which is allegedly not ‘“reasonably necessary.”’
In June 2023, Hunt filed an 82 page cross-complaint, attaching
over 300 pages of exhibits. The cross-complaint named the sub-HOA and
AVCA as defendants and asserted causes of action for federal and state
disability discrimination and various torts. AVCA demurred and the trial
court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. AVCA then demurred to
the amended cross-complaint, which the court sustained without leave to
amend. The court characterized the lawsuit as a “straightforward neighbor
dispute” unrelated to her mental or physical disabilities. The court entered a
judgment of dismissal via minute order on June 27, 2025. Hunt timely
appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I.
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
the term “discrimination” “includes refusal to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when these
accommodations may be necessary to afford a disabled person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” (Gov. Code, § 12927, subd. (c)(1).)
The federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) contains an identical provision. (42
U.S.C. § 3604, subd. (f)(3)(B).) “In order to establish discrimination based on
a refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, a party must establish that
he or she (1) suffers from a disability as defined in FEHA, (2) the
discriminating party knew of, or should have known of, the disability, (3)
accommodation is necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy
the dwelling, and (4) the discriminating party refused to make this
accommodation.” (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment &
Housing Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1592 (Auburn Woods).) Of these
four elements, one and two are not contested.
As to the third element, AVCA contends that Hunt’s easement
rights over Lawerence’s driveway extend only to “reasonably necessary” uses
per the sub-HOA’s governing documents, and Hunt’s complaint failed to
allege a reasonably necessary use. Assuming, without deciding, that there is
some logical connection between what is “reasonably necessary” under the
sub-HOA’s governing documents, and what constitutes a “reasonable
accommodation” under FEHA, we conclude Hunt has sufficiently alleged a
right to reasonably use Lawrence’s driveway for purposes of backing her car
out of the cul-de-sac. The descriptions, diagrams, and images of the street in
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the complaint all paint the picture of a roadway so narrow that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to turn a vehicle around without pulling partially
into a neighbor’s driveway. How accurate that description is and what is
ultimately reasonably necessary are issues to be decided by a jury, but Hunt’s
pleading is sufficient to put the issues in play.
AVCA also contends Hunt failed to allege a nexus between her
inability to use Lawrence’s driveway and her actual enjoyment of her
property. We disagree. Hunt alleged she was in excruciating pain when
pulling her vehicle out such that she was reduced to tears. She further
alleged that she sometimes avoided leaving her home to avoid the pain of
pulling out. Whether any of that is true also remains to be decided, but it is a
sufficient allegation of a loss of “enjoyment” of her dwelling.
AVCA’s most developed argument in support of the court’s
dismissal is directed to the fourth element of the FEHA claim. AVCA’s
position is that it had no authority to remove the cones from Lawerence’s
driveway, and it cannot be deemed to have refused to do something it had no
power to do. In theory, we agree that AVCA cannot be liable for acts (or
omissions) outside of its ability to act. However, we disagree with AVCA’s
narrow interpretation of its own authority.
AVCA takes the position that only the sub-HOA had authority to
intervene in Hunt’s dispute with Lawrence. However, at least at the pleading
stage, there is a sufficient indication in the pleadings and in AVCA’s CC&Rs
to suggest it had the authority to act. AVCA’s CC&Rs broadly grant it
authority to “Maintain or provide for the maintenance of all Community
Association Properties in a safe and attractive condition, suitable for the uses
and purposes for which the Declarant conveyed them to the Community
Association.” Similarly, it grants broad authority to “Perform such other acts,
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whether or not expressly authorized by these Covenants, as may be
reasonably necessary to enforce any of the provisions of these Covenants and
the Board Rules and Regulations.” Further, it grants AVCA a right of entry
to enforce the CC&Rs: the power to “[e]nter upon any real property in the
Subject Property, without liability to any Owner, for the purpose of enforcing
any of the provisions of these Covenants . . . .”
A number of specific provisions are arguably applicable to the
facts alleged here.
Section 10.06 of AVCA’s CC&Rs prohibit nuisances anywhere
within the community: “No noise or other nuisance shall be permitted to exist
or operate upon any portion of the Subject Property so as to be offensive or
detrimental to any other property in the vicinity thereof or to its occupants.”
(Italics added.) Hunt alleges that she has a nonexclusive easement over
Lawrence’s driveway and that the barrier he has erected is detrimental to her
and her property right.
Section 10.11 provides, “No activities shall be conducted on any
portion of the Subject Property, and no Improvements shall be constructed on
any Lot, which are or might be unsafe or hazardous to any Person or
property.” (Italics added.) Hunt has alleged that the cones and barriers are
unsafe for her in light of her disability.
Section 10.12 provides, “No unsightly articles shall be permitted
to remain on any Lot or Condominium so as to be visible from any other
portion of the Subject Property.” Based on the descriptions and images in the
complaint, a factfinder could determine that the cones and barrier Lawrence
erected were unsightly and, therefore, subject to removal by AVCA.
Section 10.13 provides, “No tent or shack or other temporary
building, improvement or structure shall be placed upon any portion of the
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Subject Property, except that the Master Architectural Committee may
permit temporary structures to be used in connection with construction on
parts of the Subject Property.” Arguably, in light of the duration of Lawrence
maintaining the barrier on his driveway (approximately one year), it
amounted to an unpermitted structure.
In reaching the conclusion that Hunt sufficiently pleaded AVCA’s
ability to intervene, we have been intentionally nondefinitive in our
interpretation of the CC&Rs. CC&Rs are to be interpreted in the manner of a
contract, and contracts must sometimes be interpreted in light of extrinsic
evidence, which, of course, AVCA was not permitted to introduce at this
pleading stage. (See PV Little Italy, LLC v. MetroWork Condominium Assn.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 132, 144 [standards for interpreting CC&Rs].)
Additionally, the parties’ briefing has left us with some uncertainty regarding
the exact nature of the property rights as between AVCA, the sub-HOA, and
the individual members. Moreover, many of these questions are factual in
nature and must be resolved at the appropriate stage of litigation. Our
holding is simply that Hunt has sufficiently pleaded AVCA’s authority to act
to avoid a demurrer on her first cause of action for violation of the FHA and
her second cause of action for violation of FEHA.
II.
TORT CLAIMS
Hunt alleged causes of action against AVCA for negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of fiduciary
duty. We conclude the court erred in sustaining the demurrer as to the
negligence claim, but properly sustained it as to IIED and breach of fiduciary
duty.
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A. Negligence
“Under Evidence Code section 669, negligence is presumed where
the following elements are met: (1) the defendant violated a statute, (2) the
violation proximately caused injury to a person or property, (3) the injury
resulted from an occurrence of a type the statute was designed to prevent,
and (4) the person suffering injury was one of the class of persons for whose
protection the statute was adopted.” (Drury v. Ryan (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
1102, 1109.) This is commonly known as negligence per se.
Here, we have already concluded that Hunt sufficiently pleaded a
statutory violation against AVCA—namely, disability discrimination. She
pleaded physical pain and suffering as a result of the barriers on Lawrence’s
driveway that AVCA declined to remove. And the purpose of FEHA’s
disability discrimination laws is to ensure disabled persons can fully enjoy
and utilize their own property, which Hunt was allegedly prevented from
doing. Thus, this was the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent,
and Hunt, as a disabled person, is in the class of persons the statute was
designed to protect. Accordingly, Hunt adequately pleaded a claim for
negligence.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“The elements of a cause of action for IIED are as follows: (1)
defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as
to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to
cause, or with reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional
distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional
distress.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273.)
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This claim fails because there is simply nothing extreme and
outrageous about AVCA’s decision not to remove cones from a driveway in a
dispute among neighbors, both of whom were claiming the cones were
relevant to their disability. It arguably was a violation of contractual and
statutory duties owed to Hunt. But it was not extreme and outrageous.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
“Directors of nonprofit corporations such as the [homeowners]
Association are fiduciaries who are required to exercise their powers in
accordance with the duties imposed by the Corporations Code. [Citation.]
This fiduciary relationship is governed by the statutory standard that
requires directors to exercise due care and undivided loyalty for the interests
of the corporation.” (Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42
Cal.3d 490, 513; see Corporations Code, § 7231.) These duties extend to
individual members. (Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Assn. (1983) 142
Cal.App.3d 642, 652.)
Under Corporations Code section 7231, subdivision (a), directors
are required to engage in “reasonable inquiry” in discharging their duties.
Under subdivision (b)(2), directors fulfill their duty of inquiry by relying on
the advice of counsel. Here, the complaint’s allegations and attachments
demonstrate that AVCA responded to Hunt’s request for an accommodation,
referred the matter to AVCA’s attorneys, and ultimately deferred to counsel’s
opinion that AVCA had no authority to act. That conclusion may turn out to
be wrong, and AVCA may be liable under other legal theories, but the
allegations do not reflect that AVCA breached its fiduciary duty of due care.
Nor is there any allegation that suggests a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Accordingly, the demurrer was correctly sustained as to that cause of action.
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III.
UNRUH ACT
The Unruh Civil Rights Act mandates that “[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,” regardless of various traits,
including disability, and “are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever.” (Civil Code, §51, subd. (b).) To prevail on an Unruh
Act claim based on disability, the plaintiff must either show a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or must show that the defendant
engaged in intentional discrimination. (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46
Cal.4th 661, 664-665 (Munson).) Hunt does not claim AVCA violated the ADA
here, and thus her claim can survive only if she properly pleaded intentional
discrimination. Intentional discrimination is “willful, affirmative misconduct
on the part of those who violate the Act.” (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors
XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1172 [superseded by statute on other grounds as
described in Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 664].)
For reasons similar to our reasoning in connection with the
fiduciary duty claim, we conclude Hunt did not plead an Unruh Act claim.
Nothing in the allegations and attachments to Hunt’s complaint indicates
intentional discrimination. AVCA responded courteously to Hunt’s request
for accommodation, took it seriously by referring the matter to counsel, then
deferred to counsel’s judgment that it lacked authority to intervene. While
the resulting denial of Hunt’s request for a reasonable accommodation may
turn out to constitute discrimination under FEHA, there is no indication it
was in bad faith, and thus it was not intentional discrimination under the
Unruh Act.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed as to Hunt’s causes of
action for violation of FEHA, violation of the FHA, and negligence. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Hunt shall recover her costs
incurred on appeal.1
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
1 Hunt’s request for judicial notice is granted as to exhibits B and
G, which are documents filed with the state or recorded with the county
registrar. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The remainder of the request is
denied because the attached documents are not subject to judicial notice.
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