Filed 7/29/26 Hope and Trust Trading v. Ciling CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
HOPE AND TRUST TRADING, B351756
INC. et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 19STCV29553)
v.
SAMMY CILING et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Alison M. Mackenzie, Judge. Affirmed.
Sammy Ciling, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant
Sammy Ciling.
Anke Ciling, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant Anke
Ciling.
Debbie Sutz for Plaintiffs and Respondents Hope and Trust
Trading, Inc. and Seyedjalil Firoozabadi.
______________________________
In 2019, Seyedjalil Firoozabadi and his company, Hope and
Trust Trading, Inc. (collectively, HTT), filed a complaint alleging
that married couple Sammy and Anke Ciling had breached a
contract to sell to HTT shares in a medical imaging business.1
Following a four-day court trial, the court found that the
Cilings had engaged in fraud and had breached the agreement
“intentionally and without justification.” The court then entered
a $2.6 million judgment in favor of HTT.
Four years later, HTT filed a motion seeking approximately
$650,000 in attorney fees and costs incurred in its attempt to
collect on the still-unsatisfied judgment. In support, HTT’s counsel
submitted a declaration detailing the Cilings’ efforts to evade the
judgment by transferring certain of their properties to sham
business entities and by filing a frivolous federal lawsuit against
HTT. The trial court concluded that HTT could recover its
postjudgment fees and costs, but found that the $500 hourly billing
rate for one member of HTT’s legal team—a disbarred attorney
performing paralegal tasks—was unreasonably high. Accordingly,
the court awarded HTT fees and costs in the reduced amount of
$356,223.
The Cilings now ask us to reverse the award. They argue
the court abused its discretion by (1) awarding fees related to
“collateral litigation activity” unnecessary to enforce the judgment,
(2) “compensating extensive litigation services performed by a
disbarred attorney,” and (3) “denying [the Cilings’] repeated
requests for a verified accounting of prior collections, offsets,
1 In the complaint, Seyedjalil uses the surname
“Mirjafarifiroozabadi” rather than “Firoozabadi.” The parties,
however, do not dispute that “Seyedjalil Mirjafarifiroozabadi”
and “Seyedjalil Firoozabadi” are the same individual.
2
operational recoveries, and enforcement proceeds.” (Capitalization
omitted.)
We, however, conclude the Cilings fail to demonstrate
any reversible error: HTT’s counsel’s billing records specifically
describe the tasks performed, and they do not contain any charges
for litigation activity other than work related to collecting on the
judgment. The Cilings cite nothing in the record supporting that
the disbarred attorney’s work for HTT constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. And the challenge to the court’s prior rulings
denying the Cilings’ request for an accounting is not properly before
us.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.
On April 13, 2021, the trial court entered an approximately
$2.6 million judgment in favor of HTT and against the Cilings.2
The $2.6 million award included $800,000 in punitive damages and
approximately $200,000 in attorney fees, costs, and expenses.
On October 16, 2025, HTT filed a request—styled as a
“motion to amend judgment to add costs of enforcement”—
for $643,300 in attorney fees and $3,833 in costs incurred in
attempting to enforce the April 2021 judgment, which HTT
asserted the Cilings had failed to satisfy even in part. HTT further
requested that the court “amend the . . . judgment . . . to reflect the
2 The judgment also includes as liable defendants two entities
for which the Cilings serve as authorized agents: Sanath, Inc. and
California Medical Imaging Corp. These entities are not parties to
this appeal.
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additional costs, interest, and attorney[ ] fees.” (Capitalization
omitted.)
In support, HTT submitted a declaration from its attorney,
Debbie Sutz, detailing the Cilings’ conduct and the attorney fees
and costs HTT incurred as a result of its collection efforts. Sutz
attested, in pertinent part, that she had substituted into the case in
January 2024 to assist HTT in enforcing the judgment. She learned
from her review of the case materials that HTT’s prior attorneys
had attempted to satisfy the judgment by levying on a property
owned by the Cilings located on Carancho Road in Temecula,
California. Karl Lowry, a friend of the Cilings, had impeded HTT’s
efforts by filing an action against HTT in Riverside County. In
the Riverside action—which the parties litigated for nearly three
years—Lowry alleged that he was the beneficiary of two trust deeds
against the Carancho property.
In March 2024, Sutz filed a first amended cross-complaint
(FACC) in the Riverside action on behalf of HTT against Lowry,
the Cilings, and certain entity defendants. The FACC challenged
Lowry’s trust deeds against the Carancho property, a third trust
deed against that property held by NewRez LLC, trust deeds
recorded against two of the Cilings’ other Temecula properties, and
the Cilings’ homestead exemption. In advance of the July 2025 trial
date in that case, Lowry and HTT negotiated a settlement pursuant
to which Lowry agreed to release all the trust deeds.
Two days before the scheduled trial, however, a new party—
Ultim8 Equities LLC (Ultim8)—filed an ex parte application to
intervene in the Riverside action and stay the trial. Ultim8 claimed
that it owned certain of the trust deeds against the Carancho
property by virtue of an assignment executed over a year earlier.
Sutz attested that “[t]he Ultim8 claim was obviously a sham
because it was coming in at the eleventh hour; the original
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transferee was an LLC owned by one of the Ciling children; and the
transaction in which Ultim8 claimed to be the owner of those trust
deeds made no logical sense.”
The court in the Riverside action denied the ex parte
application and entered the stipulated judgment between Lowry
and HTT, as well as a default judgment against the Cilings.
Ultim8, however, appealed the denial of its ex parte application,
and the Cilings appealed the default judgment entered against
them. Sutz attested that, as a result, HTT was forced to incur
attorney fees to oppose each appeal.
Sutz further attested that, in July 2025, the Cilings filed a
frivolous federal lawsuit against HTT, HTT’s former counsel, and
Sutz herself. In that suit, the Cilings alleged that the April 2021
judgment and the judgments in the Riverside action were void due
to fraud and due process violations. Sutz attested that she “spent
a substantial amount of time reviewing and opposing the federal
court action” on behalf of HTT, and that a motion to dismiss the
case then was pending.3
Sutz attached to her declaration 14 exhibits, including the
complaints and judgments in the Riverside action, the notices of
appeal filed by Ultim8 and the Cilings in the Riverside action, and
the federal court complaint. The exhibits also included billing
records from Sutz and from Michael Rubin, the disbarred attorney
whom Sutz had hired to assist her with HTT’s matter. The billing
3 The federal court later granted the motion to dismiss with
leave to amend. And in April 2026, in response to a renewed motion
to dismiss by HTT, the federal court dismissed the action with
prejudice. (See Sammy Ciling et al. v. Omid Mir Jafari et al.
(C.D.Cal. Apr. 22, 2026, 8-25-cv-01649-MRA-ADS).) We take
judicial notice of these rulings pursuant to Evidence Code
section 452, subdivision (d).
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records reflect that Sutz and Rubin each charged a $500 hourly rate
and collectively performed 1,286.6 hours of work on HTT’s matter,
resulting in total attorney fees of $643,300.
As relevant here, Sutz attested that Rubin had “performed
investigation, research, and extensive writing,” and that his
“services ha[d] been performed under [Sutz’s] supervision”
“in strict compliance with California State Bar rules.” Rubin
submitted a declaration in which he likewise attested: “I have
assisted Ms. Sutz in this case from the time she was initially
hired . . . . As an unlicensed attorney, I am authorized, under
State Bar rules, to conduct support work like investigation, legal
research, and writing. The work I performed in this case has been
limited to those areas.”
The Cilings filed an opposition to HTT’s motion for fees
and costs, arguing, inter alia, that (1) HTT could not engage in
litigation because its corporate status “was forfeited and inactive
with the California Secretary of State,” (2) Seyedjalil Firoozabadi
had changed his legal name to Omid Mir Jafari and had improperly
used different names “to his advantage . . . seeking judgments
as one man while avoiding capture as another,” (3) HTT had
seized two of the Cilings’ “multimillion-dollar [medical imaging]
businesses[,] along with receivables and equipment,” through
fraud, and (4) the court must order a verified accounting before
authorizing “further collection” or “any increased . . . judgment
amount.”
Following a November 12, 2025 hearing, the trial court
issued a written order granting HTT’s motion in part. The court
explained that, although styled as a “motion to amend judgment,”
HTT’s motion was more properly characterized as (1) a motion for
an order awarding postjudgment costs and attorney fees under
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Code of Civil Procedure4 section 685.090, and (2) an application
for a renewal of judgment under section 683.120. The court
rejected the Cilings’ various arguments as unsupported by
pertinent legal authority. It then concluded that HTT could
recover its postjudgment fees and costs, but that Rubin’s claimed
billing rate of $500 per hour was “unreasonable.” The court
further concluded that “a reasonable hourly rate [was] $200,”
and therefore awarded HTT $356,223 in fees and costs, rather
than the approximately $650,000 originally requested. Finally,
the court denied without prejudice HTT’s request to renew the
judgment because HTT had “improperly included [its] application
for a renewal order in [its] motion for an order awarding costs.”
The Cilings timely appealed the award.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Under . . . section 685.040, a judgment creditor is
entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing
the judgment.” (Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th
602, 604–605 (McQueen), fn. omitted.) Attorney fees expended in
enforcing a judgment—even if incurred in a separate proceeding—
qualify as collectible costs if the underlying judgment includes an
award of attorney fees authorized by contract.5 (See §§ 685.040,
1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A); see McQueen, supra, at pp. 612–613
[“Although incurred in a separate proceeding, the attorney fees
[the] plaintiff claims . . . were expended in an effort to maintain
4 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
5 The Cilings do not dispute that the judgment here includes
an award of contractually based attorney fees.
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assets in [the] defendant’s hands for potential satisfaction of the
judgment in this case. They therefore came within the scope of
what could be claimed . . . under section 685.040” (italics omitted)].)
“The judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by
[s]ection 685.040 by noticed motion.” (§ 685.080, subd. (a).) “Upon
the filing of an order allowing the costs,” such “[c]osts are added to
and become a part of the judgment.” (§ 685.090, subd. (a)(1).) We
review a trial court’s authority to award postjudgment fees and
costs de novo. (See Jaffe v. Pacelli (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 927,
934.) We otherwise review an order awarding such fees and costs
for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
B. The Cilings Fail To Demonstrate that the
Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding
Fees and Costs
The Cilings contend the trial court abused its discretion
in three ways—namely, by (1) awarding attorney fees for
“collateral litigation activity” unrelated to enforcing the April
2021 judgment, (2) compensating HTT for work performed by
Rubin, notwithstanding his disbarred status, and (3) denying
the Cilings’ “repeated” requests for a verified accounting of any
“prior recoveries” or “offsets” against the underlying $2.6 million
judgment.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court [order] is ordinarily presumed to be correct[,] and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed
an error that justifies reversal of the [order].” (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).) And here, the Cilings
fail to satisfy their burden.
First, HTT’s counsel’s billing records specifically describe the
tasks performed, and they do not contain any charges for litigation
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activity other than work related to enforcing the judgment.
Further, the Cilings’ related argument that “the record lacks
substantial evidentiary findings” ignores that substantial
evidence—including the Sutz declaration and attached exhibits—
supports the court’s implied finding that the fees were reasonable
and necessary costs of enforcing the judgment. (See Agnone v.
Agnone (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 758, 767 [“ ‘[e]ven where there are
no express findings, we must review the trial court’s exercise of
discretion based on implied findings that are supported by
substantial evidence’ ” (italics omitted)].)
Second, the Cilings cite no specific entries in the billing
records (or any other specific portions of the appellate record)
supporting that Rubin’s work for HTT constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. (Cf. Estate of Condon (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1138,
1142, fn. 4 [“[n]onmembers of the California State Bar may recover
fees for services that nonattorneys may legally perform”]; Rules
Prof. Conduct, rule 5.3.1(a)(5) & (c) [providing, in pertinent part,
that “[a] lawyer may employ, associate in practice with, or assist
an ineligible person,” including “a member whose current status
with the State Bar of California is disbarred,” “to perform research,
drafting or clerical activities”].)
Third, and finally, the Cilings’ claim that the court erred by
denying their earlier, “repeated requests for a verified accounting”
is not properly before us. Nothing in our appellate record indicates
the Cilings attempted to appeal these rulings.6 Further, even were
the issue properly presented, the Cilings’ failure to provide an
6 Only one such ruling appears in our appellate record: An
October 13, 2025 order summarily denying Sammy Cilings’ ex parte
application for an accounting. Neither the application itself nor any
transcript of the hearing on the application appears in the record.
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adequate appellate record would prevent us from reviewing their
claim. The Cilings assert that they have “identified approximately
89 to 96 pages of [accounts receivable] documentation” supporting
that HTT already has seized from the Cilings two medical imaging
businesses worth millions of dollars. But none of these accounts
is in the record before us. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609
[“ ‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that
the issue be resolved against [the appellant]’ ”].)
We therefore conclude the Cilings fail to demonstrate the
court abused its discretion in awarding HTT postjudgment fees and
costs.7 Accordingly, we affirm.
7 In light of our conclusion, we need not address HTT’s
argument that the Cilings forfeited their claims in this appeal by
failing to oppose HTT’s separate November 29, 2025 memorandum
of costs after judgment.
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DISPOSITION
The November 12, 2025 order is affirmed. Respondents
are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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