Filed 9/4/26 Holly Hill Investments v. Flaherty CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
HOLLY HILL INVESTMENTS, B336900
LLC,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
19SMCV02002)
v.
VINCE FLAHERTY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Vince Flaherty, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
McKenna Brink Signorotti and Dominic V. Signorotti for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Defendant and appellant Vincent Flaherty, individually
and as trustee of the KHG Trust, appeals from a judgment
quieting title to property in favor of plaintiff and respondent
Holly Hill Investments, LLC. On appeal, Flaherty makes several
contentions that are based on challenging the validity of a
foreclosure sale and trustee’s deed of sale. We conclude the
findings made in connection with Holly Hill’s prior unlawful
detainer action established the validity of the trustee’s deed of
sale and Holly Hill’s status as a bona fide purchaser, precluding
Flaherty from relitigating the issues in this case. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Easement Creation and Property Purchase
In 1988, John and Elizabeth Roberts, as trustees of the
Roberts Family Trust (the Roberts), owned 17470 Tramonto
Drive in Pacific Palisades, which is the property at issue in this
matter. The legal description describes the property as a portion
of Block C.
At that time, adjacent property 17474 Tramonto Drive in
Pacific Palisades was owned by Alfred and Winifred Wilkes. The
legal description was Lot 1, Block 19, Tract 8923 (Lot 1).
In December 1988, the Robertses granted the Wilkeses “a
four[-]foot[-]wide easement for sanitary sewer purposes only” over
17470 Tramonto Drive that would run with the land. The
easement was recorded.
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In April 1989, the Robertses granted the Wilkeses a second
easement “for sanitary sewer and sewer maintenance purposes.”
The Wilkeses and their successors in interest agreed to accept
responsibility for the maintenance costs of the private sewer line,
restore the landscaping to the same general condition, and
maintain the area as open space for a yard, garden, or
landscaping. Any other use of the area was prohibited. This
easement was also recorded.
In September 1989, the Wilkeses, individually and as
trustees of a family trust, granted four parcels to Flaherty,
including Lot 1 and the four-foot-wide easement for sewer
purposes. The deed was recorded in December 1989.
In May 1995, the Robertses executed a grant deed
transferring title to 17470 Tramonto Drive to Flaherty, as a
single man. The deed was recorded in September 1995.
In March 2005, Villa Tramonto LLC was formed for real
estate investment and development, managed by Scott Kime.
In 2006, Flaherty obtained a loan from Countrywide Home
Loans in the amount of $6 million, which was secured by a deed
of trust recorded against 17470 Tramonto Drive.
In March 2009, Kime filed a certificate of cancellation of
Villa Tramonto LLC with California’s Secretary of State.
B. Foreclosure and Sale to Holly Hill
In 2011, a notice of default and election to sell was recorded
based on the deed of trust on 17470 Tramonto Drive. The notice
stated Recontrust Company, N.A., was acting as an agent of the
beneficiary of the deed of trust.
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On June 15, 2012, Recontrust recorded a notice of trustee’s
sale for 17470 Tramonto Drive. A non-judicial foreclosure sale
was held on July 23, 2012. Title to the property was granted
through a trustee’s deed upon sale to U.S. Bank, National
Association (US Bank), successor trustee to Bank of America,
N.A., successor by merger to Lasalle Bank, N.A., as trustee to the
holders of Zuni Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1, Mortgage Loan
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OAI (the Zuni Trust
Certificates).
In August 2012, Recontrust recorded a notice of corporate
assignment of the deed of trust from Bank of America, N.A., as
successor trustee to the holders of the Zuni Trust Certificates, to
US Bank, as successor trustee to the holders of the Zuni Trust
Certificates. The same day, Recontrust recorded the trustee’s
deed upon sale to US Bank, as successor trustee.
In October 2012, Flaherty filed a complaint against several
defendants, including US Bank (the US Bank action; Los Angeles
County Superior Court Case No. SC118787), alleging claims
arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. In the third amended
complaint filed in April 2015, Flaherty sought to quiet title to
17470 Tramonto Drive based on alleged defects in the foreclosure
proceedings. On July 22, 2016, a judgment of dismissal was
entered in favor of several defendants, including US Bank and
Bank of America. Flaherty did not file an appeal from the
judgment of dismissal in favor of US Bank.
On October 5, 2017, Holly Hill purchased 17470 Tramonto
Drive from US Bank, as successor trustee to the holders of the
Zuni Trust Certificates, and the property was transferred to
Holly Hill through a recorded grant deed.
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On December 20, 2017, Holly Hill filed a verified complaint
for unlawful detainer against Flaherty, his former wife Loriann
Hart, and their adult son Michael Flaherty (Holly Hill’s unlawful
detainer action; Los Angeles County Superior Court Case
No. SC128569). The property at issue in the unlawful detainer
action was 17470 Tramonto Drive.
Flaherty filed a verified answer to Holly Hill’s unlawful
detainer complaint alleging that Holly Hill did not hold valid title
to 17470 Tramonto Drive. He alleged that the property was not
properly sold under the power of sale in the deed of trust, the
foreclosure sale was defective and wrongful, US Bank did not
acquire valid title, and as a result, Holly Hill was not a bona fide
purchaser for value who received valid title to the property.
Holly Hill filed a motion for summary adjudication of its cause of
action for unlawful detainer.
C. Unlawful Detainer Action, and Deeds Recorded
Outside Chain of Title
In January 2018, Flaherty recorded a quitclaim deed on
17470 Tramonto Drive, purportedly executed by the Robertses in
October 1998, quitclaiming an easement to Flaherty as a single
man for slope and access purposes and another easement for
access, construction, and use of a pool and pool house for the
benefit of Lot 1.
After a hearing on March 26, 2018, in Holly Hill’s unlawful
detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment based
on Holly Hill’s representation that it was pursuing possession
only and would not seek monetary damages. The trial court
found Holly Hill had proven by admissible evidence that the
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property was sold to it in accordance with Civil Code section 2924
under the power of sale in the deed of trust, and title under the
sale was duly perfected. Holly Hill was a bona fide purchaser
insulated from Flaherty’s claims in the US Bank action. In
addition, the US Bank action had been fully adjudicated on the
merits, dismissed with prejudice, and the subsequent appeal was
dismissed. The final judgment on the merits in the US Bank
action precluded the parties from raising issues that were, or
could have been, raised in the prior action. In addition, even if
the above did not resolve the issue, Flaherty’s affirmative
defenses were barred by the statute of limitations. Claims
involving a non-judicial foreclosure were subject to a three-year
statute of limitations. Judgment was entered that day in favor of
Holly Hill and against Flaherty, Hart, and their son, ordering
that Holly Hill was entitled to possession of 17470 Tramonto
Drive. Flaherty filed an appeal from the judgment in the
unlawful detainer action in favor of Holly Hill.
On April 19, 2018, a second deed was recorded against
17470 Tramonto Drive purporting to quitclaim title from Villa
Tramonto LLC to Clair Howell, as successor trustee of KHG
Trust. This deed purported to be signed by James Courtade, as
the managing member of Villa Tramonto LLC, dated
September 1, 2017, and notarized on April 19, 2018.
On June 27, 2018, Flaherty filed an ex parte application in
the US Bank action to substitute Holly Hill for a Doe defendant
with respect to causes of action for rescission, to set aside the
trustee’s sale, and to quiet title to the Roberts property. The
application was denied.
On June 4, 2018, in Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action,
the trial court denied Flaherty’s motion under Code of Civil
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Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), for relief from the
summary judgment entered in favor of Holly Hill.
In October 2018, Flaherty recorded a deed granting 17470
Tramonto Drive to Howell, as successor trustee of the KHG
Trust. The document was purportedly executed on September 29,
1995.
In November 2018, Flaherty recorded an “easement deed”
against the property, in which Flaherty, as successor trustee of
the KHG Trust, purported to grant Hart, as a single woman, an
easement over 17470 Tramonto Drive for access, construction,
and use of a pool and pool house. The document purported to
have been executed by Flaherty on August 29, 2017, but was
notarized on October 31, 2018.
The same day, Flaherty filed an “easement deed” against
the property in which Flaherty, as a single man, granted Hart
the same easement over 17470 Tramonto Drive for access,
construction, and use of a pool and pool house.
In July 2019, Flaherty again recorded the October 1998
quitclaim deed from the Roberts to Flaherty.
D. Quiet Title Action Filed
On November 14, 2019, Holly Hill filed the complaint in the
present action to quiet title to 17470 Tramonto Drive under
California’s Quiet Title Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.101, et seq.)
against Flaherty, individually and as successor trustee of the
KHG Trust, Howell, as successor trustee of the KHG Trust, and
Hart (Holly Hill’s quiet title action). Holly Hill learned Matthew
James Courtade may have succeeded Howell as successor trustee
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of the KHG Trust. Defaults were entered as to all of the
defendants and Courtade.
Holly Hill requested a court judgment finding the six deeds
that Flaherty caused to be recorded against 17470 Tramonto
Drive after the deed transferring title to Holly Hill were void, and
quieting title to the property against all adverse interests,
including the defendants and Courtade. In the complaint, Holly
Hill initially also sought a finding that the 1988 and 1989 sewer
easements were extinguished by merger when Flaherty held title
to both the dominant and servient tenements, but ultimately,
Holly Hill withdrew claims with respect to the 1988 and 1989
sewer easements. Holly Hill requested the trial court take
judicial notice of several recorded documents.
On February 8, 2021, Flaherty’s appeal from Holly Hill’s
unlawful detainer judgment was dismissed.
E. Motion to Set Aside Default
In January 2022, Flaherty filed a motion in the instant
quiet title action to set aside his default under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 473.5, 473, subdivision (d), and 587. Flaherty
argued that the substituted service was defective; no attempt was
made to serve him at his correct home, business, or mailing
addresses; he was not served by acknowledgement and receipt; he
was not personally served; and proofs of service and requests for
entry of default were not sent to home, business, or mailing
addresses. He attached his declaration stating that his personal
mailing address was 17472 Tramonto Drive.
In March 2022, the trial court denied Flaherty’s motion to
set aside his default. The court found the motion was untimely
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as to relief sought under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b). The court noted the proof of service executed by
Holly Hill’s attorney Bruce Cornelius showed personal service of
the summons and complaint on Flaherty on December 11, 2019,
at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The proof of service raised a
rebuttable presumption of proper personal service. Flaherty’s
declaration failed to rebut the presumption. Flaherty stated that
he was never personally served but failed to offer any facts to
rebut counsel’s assertion that Flaherty was at Stanley Mosk
Courthouse on the date and time of service. Flaherty testified
that he wasn’t sure if he was at the courthouse then, which was
insufficient to refute Cornelius’s declaration. Flaherty’s claim
that Cornelius’s declaration was false was not persuasive. In
addition, the court stated Flaherty admitted 17474 Tramonto
Drive was his personal mailing address, so Flaherty failed to
rebut presumption of proper service.
The court denied the request for relief under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473.5, because Flaherty had actual notice of
the claims asserted against him by December 11, 2019, when he
was personally served. As to Code of Civil Procedure section 587,
Flaherty argued the request for entry of default was not mailed
to him before entry of default, but Flaherty did not deny that the
address on the declaration was correct, and he admitted 17474
Tramonto Drive was his mailing address. In addition, with
respect to extrinsic fraud or mistake, the court found Flaherty
knew the action was pending no later than his attendance at a
case management hearing on October 28, 2020, but he waited
until January 25, 2022, to file a motion to set aside the default,
and accordingly failed to establish diligence.
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F. Evidentiary Hearing and Judgment
In April 2022, Flaherty filed a trial brief and exhibits in the
instant quiet title action. Flaherty argued that Holly Hill did not
receive good title because there was no valid foreclosure, trustee’s
sale, or deed upon sale, and Holly Hill could not extinguish the
easements through the doctrine of merger.
Holly Hill filed a reply arguing the validity of the 2012
foreclosure sale had already been conclusively resolved in prior
judicial proceedings. Flaherty’s challenges to the 2012
foreclosure sale and the trustee’s deed upon sale were barred by
res judicata and the statute of limitations. The deeds recorded
after the sale to Holly Hill should be removed, and judgment
entered in favor of Holly Hill as a bona fide purchaser for value.
On July 26, 2022, Flaherty filed a “superseding amended”
trial brief and exhibits, continuing to argue that Holly Hill did
not have good title and the recorded deeds were valid.
At a hearing on July 28, 2022, the trial court concluded an
evidentiary hearing was required to adjudicate Holly Hill’s quiet
title action under Code of Civil Procedure section 764.010.
Defaulted defendant Flaherty had the right to appear and
present admissible evidence at the hearing. The court made
several orders to facilitate the presentation of admissible
evidence but also warned that it could not consider inadmissible
evidence.
In September 2022, Flaherty filed an extensive request for
judicial notice. Flaherty also filed an “updated trial brief in
support of the motion for an order” declaring the deed that
granted the property to Holly Hill invalid. He also filed a
declaration authenticating his exhibits.
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Holly Hill filed a supplemental brief regarding res judicata.
Holly Hill requested judicial notice of several supporting
documents, including the dockets in several court actions. Holly
Hill also filed a supplemental brief concerning the priority of
Holly Hill’s claims over the alleged deeds and easement. In
addition, Holly Hill filed a supplemental brief stating that if
physical sewer lines were located in the sewer easements, Holly
Hill would not seek to extinguish the sewer easements.
An evidentiary hearing was held over several dates
beginning on November 30, 2022, at which Flaherty appeared
and presented evidence. Holly Hill filed objections to Flaherty’s
evidence and witnesses. The trial court bifurcated Flaherty’s
defense based on wrongful foreclosure.
On December 11, 2023, the trial court entered judgment
quieting title to 17470 Tramonto Drive in favor of Holly Hill. The
court found Flaherty had a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence during the hearing, so denied Flaherty’s request to
present additional evidence. The court sustained Holly Hill’s
objections to Flaherty’s evidence that challenged the validity of
Holly Hill’s predecessor’s acquisition of title through non-judicial
foreclosure sale. In addition, Flaherty offered no admissible
evidence showing the legal description of the property stated in
the grant deed to Holly Hill was not accurate, or that the
boundaries described in the deed and testified to by Holly Hill’s
expert were not accurate. Flaherty failed to submit any
admissible survey showing the boundaries were other than
described in the grant deed to Holly Hill, or how the contested
deed and easements had priority over Holly Hill’s grant deed.
Flaherty’s request for further cross-examination of Holly Hill’s
witnesses was not reasonable. The court also sustained Holly
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Hill’s objections to Flaherty’s exhibits that had not been
otherwise addressed during the hearing.
Among other findings, the court found Flaherty’s claims
that the 2012 foreclosure was wrongful were barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. Flaherty had raised identical claims and
issues in prior cases and in opposition to the instant quiet title
action, some of the prior cases resulted in final judgments on the
merits, and Flaherty was a party to all of the cases.
Flaherty filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Entry of Default
In appellants’ briefs on appeal, Flaherty raises contentions
about the presumption of service and “clerk default judgments”
that are not coherent. We conclude Flaherty’s contentions about
service and default judgments have been waived.
“Every argument presented by an appellant must be
supported by both coherent argument and pertinent legal
authority.” (Kaufman v. Goldman (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 734,
743 (Kaufman).) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.”
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “If either is not
provided, the appellate court may treat the issue as
waived. [Citation.]” (Kaufman, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
p. 743.) “[C]onclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C., supra,
138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
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We cannot determine whether Flaherty’s factual
representations are supported by evidence in the record because
the vast majority do not properly cite to the clerk’s transcript or
the reporter’s transcript, in violation of California Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [any reference in an appellate brief to matter
in the record must be supported by a citation to the volume and
page number of the record where that matter may be found]).
Moreover, “ ‘[a] party who challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the
evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how
and why it is insufficient. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where a party
presents only facts and inferences favorable to his or her position,
‘the contention that the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence may be deemed waived.’ ” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo
Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738, italics added.)
“We need not address points in appellate briefs that are
unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis.” (Placer
County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local
Agency Formation Com. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814.)
In this case, Flaherty filed a motion to set aside his default
under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473.5, 473, subdivision (d),
and 585. The trial court denied the motion because, among other
findings, Flaherty was personally served with the complaint and
aware of the case long before he filed the motion to set aside the
default. Due to the nature of the quiet title action, however, the
court did not enter a default judgment. Instead, the court held
an evidentiary hearing and allowed Flaherty to file a trial brief
and present relevant, admissible evidence. In appellant’s briefs
on appeal, he does not set forth the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment in accordance with the standard of
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review, nor does he explain how the trial court erred with respect
to the order denying the motion to set aside his default through
legal authority and reasoned analysis. We do not reweigh the
evidence on appeal. Instead, Flaherty refers to “clerk default
judgments,” which are not at issue or reviewable in this appeal,
and makes other factual statements without proper citations to
the appellate record. Any contention about service and the order
denying the motion to set aside Flaherty’s default has been
waived.
B. Issue Preclusion
Flaherty raises several contentions on appeal based on his
assertion that the foreclosure sale was defective and the trustee’s
deed was void, including whether the preclusion doctrine was
properly applied and whether evidence related to the foreclosure
sale was properly excluded. We conclude the trial court correctly
found Flaherty precluded from relitigating whether the
underlying foreclosure sale was defective and the trustee’s deed
was valid.
1. Relevant Principles
Courts often used the term “res judicata” to refer to both
claim and issue preclusion, so the California Supreme Court has
elected to refer more precisely to “claim preclusion” and “issue
preclusion.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th
813, 823−824.) Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire
claims that were raised, or should have been raised, in a previous
action involving the same parties or parties in privity with them.
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(Ibid.) “Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the
same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final
judgment on the merits in the first suit.” (Ibid.)
Issue preclusion, historically called collateral estoppel,
prevents “the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a
previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of
action.” (Ibid.) “[A] prior judgment conclusively resolves an issue
actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Ibid.)
Issue preclusion “can be asserted only against a party to the first
lawsuit, or one in privity with a party.” (Ibid.) “In summary,
issue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an
identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in
the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the
first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.)
Finding an issue was “actually litigated” requires only
“ ‘ “the opportunity to litigate . . . not whether the litigant availed
himself or herself of the opportunity.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 452.) “ ‘ “When an issue is properly raised, by the
pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and
is determined, the issue is actually litigated . . . . An issue may
be submitted and determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, . . . or their
equivalents, as well as on a judgment entered on a verdict. A
determination may be based on a failure of pleading or of proof as
well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof.” [Citations.]’ ”
(Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 400–401
[substituted judgment ordered by probate court was issue
preclusive].)
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2. Application
In this quiet title action, Flaherty took the position that
Holly Hill did not hold valid title to the property because of
defects related to the foreclosure proceedings and the trustee’s
deed. These same issues were determined against Flaherty in
Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action. In Holly Hill’s unlawful
detainer action, the trial court granted summary adjudication of
a cause of action for possession of the property based on finding
that the property was properly sold under the power of sale in the
deed of trust, the title under the sale was duly perfected, and
Holly Hill was a bona fide purchaser insulated from the claims
asserted by Flaherty in the US Bank action. Moreover, the court
found Flaherty’s prior action against US Bank was fully
adjudicated on the merits, dismissed with prejudice, and the
subsequent appeal was dismissed. The issues in Holly Hill’s
unlawful detainer action were actually litigated on the merits,
not the result of a default judgment.
Our conclusion that the doctrine of issue preclusion was
properly applied in the quiet title action to prevent Flaherty from
relitigating the validity of the trustee’s deed resolves most or all
of Flaherty’s contentions on appeal. He contends privity cannot
arise from a defective instrument and the trustee’s deed was void
on its face, but the instrument was found to be valid in Holly
Hill’s unlawful detainer action.
He asserts prior cases involved different parcels, different
parties, and different claims, but Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer
action involved the same parties and the same issue concerning
the validity of Holly Hill’s title to 17470 Tramonto Drive. He
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asserts certain default judgments are void and cannot be the
basis for preclusion, but the trial court’s ruling is not based on
these judgments. Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer action was
resolved through a summary adjudication motion finding in favor
of Holly Hill on the merits.
Flaherty contends the quiet title judgment in this case was
not a determination on the merits, but that is not relevant in the
application of issue preclusion. Holly Hill’s unlawful detainer
action was a determination on the merits, fulfilling the
requirements for issue preclusion.
Flaherty contends discovery was improperly denied and
evidence was improperly excluded, but he has not provided
coherent argument with citations to the record showing that any
discovery he sought or evidence that was excluded was relevant
and admissible on an issue other than the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings and the trustee’s deed, which he was
precluded from relitigating.
C. Disqualification
Flaherty’s contentions about judicial conflicts and
disqualification are not comprehensible, and not reviewable in
this appeal from the judgment, and therefore, have been waived.
Section 170.1 provides specific grounds for disqualification
of a trial judge for cause, including whether for any reason “[a]
person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that
the judge would be able to be impartial.” (§ 170.1, subd.
(a)(6)(A)(iii).) The exclusive means to obtain appellate review of a
ruling concerning the disqualification of a judge is by a writ of
mandate. (§ 170.3, subd. (d).) Section 170.3, subdivision (d),
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expressly states in relevant part: “The determination of the
question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable
order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the
appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the
proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served
within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the
court’s order determining the question of disqualification.”
(§ 170.3, subd. (d).) Flaherty’s contentions concerning
disqualification have been waived.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Holly Hill
Investments, LLC is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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