Filed 10/29/26 Hogan v. Ford CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LYNLEY KERR HOGAN, H053819
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 25CV466558)
v.
NICOLE MARIE FORD,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appellant Lynley Kerr Hogan (Hogan) obtained a civil harassment restraining
order in 2023 against Erica Zamora (Zamora), which the court renewed at Hogan’s
request in 2024. Respondent Nicole Marie Ford (Ford), an attorney, represented Zamora
in that matter. (Hereafter, the proceeding in which Hogan sought to renew the restraining
order against Zamora is referred to as the Zamora action or prior action.) After obtaining
the order renewing the restraining order, Hogan sued Ford for abuse of process and other
claims related to her representation of Zamora in the prior action. On July 8, 2025, Ford
filed a special motion to strike Hogan’s complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16 (special motion to strike, or anti-SLAPP motion).1 After considering the moving
1
“SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ”
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1 (Jarrow
Formulas).)
papers and Hogan’s opposition, the trial court granted the special motion to strike the
complaint on August 12, 2025. The court concluded that the claims alleged against Ford
arose out of constitutionally protected activity, and that Hogan had failed to meet her
burden of showing a probability of prevailing on her claims.
Hogan contends that the trial court erred. Based upon our independent review of
the motion and opposition papers, we conclude that Ford’s actions in defending her client
in the Zamora action were constitutionally protected activity, and that Hogan failed to
show a probability that she will prevail on her claims in the present action. Accordingly,
we will affirm the order striking the complaint.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Complaint
On May 27, 2025, Hogan, as a self-represented litigant, filed a complaint, alleging
four causes of action against Ford. The causes of action alleged were (1) abuse of
process; (2) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51); (3) violation of the
Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 (id., § 51.7); and (4) intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Hogan alleged that Ford was a licensed attorney who represented Zamora in a civil
harassment proceeding brought by Hogan under section 527.6, filed in the court below as
Hogan v. Zamora, Santa Clara County Superior Court case No. 22CH011231.2 Hogan
filed a separate civil lawsuit against Zamora, Santa Clara County Superior Court case No.
23CV416744, in which Hogan alleged that she obtained a favorable judgment of
$225,100.
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise
stated.
2
The record reflects that Ford also represented Ruben Zamora in a related civil
harassment proceeding, but that he was later dismissed from the action.
2
After obtaining a one-year restraining order against Zamora on March 14, 2023,
Hogan filed a request to renew that order on January 29, 2024. Ford’s alleged conduct as
Zamora’s attorney in these renewal proceedings is the basis for Hogan’s claims against
Ford in the present action. In her complaint, Hogan alleged that her claims were based on
“Ford’s intentional misrepresentations regarding service of process in [the Zamora
action], causing unnecessary delays and costs, emotional distress, and harm to [Hogan’s]
safety … .”
Hogan also alleged in her complaint that, in connection with the renewal
proceedings, the court initially ruled that service of Hogan’s papers was improper,
causing Hogan to serve Ford’s offices. Hogan alleged that at a hearing thereafter on
March 28, 2024, Ford “falsely and maliciously claimed no proof of service existed and
that service at her office was invalid, asserting Zamora required personal service at her
home or workplace.” At this hearing, “Ford … claimed she was not authorized to accept
service for Zamora and withheld Zamora’s new address, despite being her attorney of
record … .” As a result of Ford’s actions, the hearing was continued to May 2, 2024. At
the next hearing—after Hogan served Ford at her office and Zamora at her parents’
residence where Hogan was informed Zamora then-resided—Ford again argued that
service was improper. The court continued the hearing to June 21, 2024, at which time
the court granted Hogan a two-year extension on her restraining order.
The above factual allegations by Hogan served as the bases for each of the four
causes of action alleged in the complaint.
B. Special Motion to Strike
On July 2, 2025, Ford filed a special motion to strike the complaint and the first
through fourth causes of action alleged therein, under section 425.16, subdivision (b).
Ford asserted that each of the alleged claims: (1) arose out of Ford’s constitutional right
to petition in the context of judicial proceedings, and the claims were therefore subject to
being stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) were governed by the litigation
3
privilege as stated under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (hereafter, Civ. Code, §
47(b)).
Hogan filed written opposition to Ford’s motion. She argued, inter alia, that: (1)
Ford had failed to properly serve the motion to strike; (2) Ford had failed to meet her
burden of showing that her conduct as alleged in the complaint arose out of protected
activity; and (3) Hogan had established that her claims have minimal merit, thereby
requiring the denial of the motion to strike. Hogan noted in her opposition that the
instant lawsuit arose out of “[Ford’s] malicious refusal to accept service for Zamora at
[Ford’s] office” on several occasions in the prior Zamora action.
The special motion to strike was called for hearing on August 12, 2025. After
hearing argument, the court adopted the tentative ruling granting Ford’s special motion to
strike the complaint “in its entirety.” A formal order that tracked the court’s tentative
ruling was filed on August 12, 2025.
The trial court held in its order that Ford had met her threshold burden under the
anti-SLAPP statute of showing that the complaint arose out of constitutionally protected
activity. The court concluded that Hogan’s bases for her claims against Ford—namely,
“[b]oth in-court statements or filings and communications about pending litigation”—
constituted protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute. It concluded that, because
“[Ford’s] statements before the court regarding service of process on her client [Zamora]”
upon which Hogan’s complaint was based fell within “the parameters of protected speech
under [section 425.16], subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2),” Ford had met her threshold
burden of showing that the claims arose out of protected activity.
In performing the second step of analyzing Ford’s special motion to strike, the
court held that Hogan had failed to meet her burden of showing a likelihood of prevailing
on the merits. It found the alleged statements by Ford in the Zamora action were clearly
subject to an absolute litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b).
4
Lastly, the trial court denied Ford’s request for attorney fees. It reasoned that,
although a defendant who prevails in a special motion to strike is entitled to recover
attorney fees (see § 425.16, subd. (c)(1)), such entitlement presupposes that the defendant
has received services from an attorney for which fees were incurred. The court
concluded that Ford was not entitled to attorney fees because she was representing herself
and had not retained an attorney or incurred fees related to the motion.
Hogan filed a timely notice of appeal from the order granting Ford’s anti-SLAPP
motion.3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Peremptory Challenge
As a preliminary issue, we address Hogan’s contention on appeal that the court
erred in denying her peremptory challenge under section 170.6 of the judge who
ultimately heard and decided the special motion to strike.
Shortly after filing her complaint, Hogan submitted to the court a peremptory
challenge to judicial officer under section 170.6 seeking disqualification of the Honorable
Evette Pennypacker. The challenge was denied on June 11, 2025.
Hogan filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court challenging the denial of
the peremptory challenge. On July 16, 2025, this court denied Hogan’s petition. (See
Hogan v. Superior Court (H053389.)
A petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive means of seeking review of the
denial of a peremptory challenge under section 170.6; it cannot be challenged on appeal.
3
After the filing of her notice of appeal, Hogan filed a motion to augment the
record and to take judicial notice of documents filed with the court below. We treat this
motion as a request for judicial notice. The request for judicial notice is denied. (See
Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748,
fn. 6 [court will deny requests for judicial notice where “the requests present no issue for
which judicial notice of these items is necessary, helpful, or relevant”].)
5
(See People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 ̶ 275.) We will therefore not address in this
appeal the claim that the court erred in denying Hogan’s peremptory challenge.
B. Special Motions to Strike Generally
A SLAPP suit is one in which a plaintiff “seeks to chill or punish a party’s
exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress
of grievances.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055 (Rusheen).) SLAPP
suits may be disposed of summarily by a special motion to strike under section 425.16,
which is “a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a
summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical
Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) The statute provides: “A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The
Legislature has directed that the language of the statute be “construed broadly.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (e) of section 425.16 (§ 425.16(e)) identifies four general categories
of protected activities of petition or free speech, the first two of which being relevant
here: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive,
or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written
or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
6
interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) The exercise of speech or petitioning rights potentially
subject to anti-SLAPP protection under clauses (1) and (2) is not limited to actions that
concern an issue of public interest. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117 (Briggs).) And it is clear that under section 425.16
subdivision (e)(2), a “statement or writing made in connection with” litigation is one that
“relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some
interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266, fn.
omitted (Neville).)
Litigation activity is clearly embraced by the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Jarrow
Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 734 ̶ 735.) “The filing of a lawsuit is an exercise of
the First Amendment right to petition the government. [Citations.] Consequently, claims
that arise out of the filing of a suit arise from protected activity for purposes of the anti-
SLAPP statute.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1024
(Bonni).) Further, the statute offers protection “not only to the filing of lawsuits, but
extends to conduct that relates to such litigation, including statements made in connection
with or in preparation of litigation.” (Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537.) Indeed, courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of
what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.”
(Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian).) “[S]tatements,
writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35.)
Protection under the anti-SLAPP statute is not limited to parties to the litigation.
“[T]he statute does not require that a defendant moving to strike under section 425.16
demonstrate that its protected statements or writings were made on its own behalf (rather
than, for example, on behalf of its clients or the general public).” (Briggs, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 1116; see also Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th
624, 629 [“attorney who has been made a defendant in a lawsuit based upon a written or
7
oral statement he or she made on behalf of clients in a judicial proceeding or in
connection with an issue under review by a court, may have standing to bring a SLAPP
motion”].) Therefore, “[u]nder the plain language of section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1)
and (e)(2), as well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts
performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding
or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 479–480 (Cabral) [anti-
SLAPP statute applied to protected activities that included defense by several parties and
their counsel in the plaintiff’s prior litigation prosecuted against those parties].)
The two-step process followed by the court in resolving an anti-SLAPP motion is:
(1) whether the defendant has shown that the challenged claim arose out of his or her
constitutionally protected petitioning or speech activity; and (2) assuming the defendant
has met that burden, whether the plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on
the claim. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67
(Equilon Enterprises).) In the court’s consideration of the first step, “[t]he anti-SLAPP
statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the
defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that
activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29
Cal.4th 82, 92, original italics (Navellier).) In connection with this first step, the
defendant “bear[s] the burden of showing that each allegation supporting [the plaintiff’s]
claim of recovery is one that rests on protected activity.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
1012.) In the second step, the plaintiff is required to show that its claim has “at least
‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) Thus, “[o]nly a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of
the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks
even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.”
(Navellier, at p. 89, original italics.)
8
C. Standard of Review
“Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is
de novo. [Citation.] We consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
… upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) However, we
neither ‘weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept
as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s
evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of
law.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.) An
appellate court reviews a ruling on a special motion to strike by applying the two-step
process of determining whether the defendant has shown that the action arises from
constitutionally protected activity, and, if so, whether the plaintiff has established a
probability of prevailing. In addressing the first step, the appellate court “consider[s] ‘the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the
liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); [citations].)” (Paulus v. Bob Lynch
Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672.) In addressing the second step, the court
applies “a standard similar to that employed in determining nonsuit, directed verdict or
summary judgment motions. [Citation.] ‘[I]n order to establish the requisite probability
of prevailing [citation], the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally
sufficient claim.’ ” [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
We review the trial court’s decision, not its rationale. “If the trial court’s decision
denying an anti-SLAPP motion is correct on any theory applicable to the case, we may
affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the lower court
reached its conclusion.” (City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301,
1307.)
9
D. No Error by the Trial Court
1. Underlying Conduct Was Protected Activity
We address the first step in the analysis of a special motion to strike, namely,
whether Ford, as the moving party, sustained her burden of establishing that the claims
asserted by Hogan in her complaint arose out of activity that is protected under the anti-
SLAPP statute. (See Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.) Ford, in meeting
this “first-step burden[, was required] to identify the activity each challenged claim rests
on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim
may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of,
and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
is asserted.’ [Citation.] To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity,
courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the
defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’
[Citation.] Courts then must evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these
actions fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’ protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884
(Wilson).)
In her motion, Ford asserted that Hogan had “filed this lawsuit in an effort to
punish Defendant FORD for representing a party [Zamora] in a lawsuit … .” Ford
contended that the action was barred under subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) of section
425.16 because it was “based entirely on statements made in the context of a judicial
proceeding.”
As we have outlined, ante, Hogan alleged in her complaint that Ford was a
licensed attorney who represented Zamora in a civil harassment proceeding brought by
Hogan. She alleged generally that the present suit arose out of “Ford’s intentional
misrepresentations regarding service of process in [the prior action], causing unnecessary
delays and costs, emotional distress, and harm to [Hogan’s] safety … .” The focal point
10
of Hogan’s allegations was that Ford, in her representation of Zamora when Hogan was
seeking an extension of the harassment order, (1) falsely asserted on multiple occasions
that service of Hogan’s extension application was improper, (2) refused to accept service
on Zamora’s behalf, and (3) refused to disclose Zamora’s current address. Hogan alleged
that Ford’s conduct in claiming the impropriety of service resulted in multiple
continuances of the hearing. Hogan claimed specifically that Ford’s alleged
misrepresentations regarding service at one such hearing caused the further continuance
of the motion, thereby “delaying [Hogan’s] restraining order renewal and exposing her to
continued risk from Zamora.” And Hogan alleged that “Ford’s actions were motivated
by an improper purpose: to delay justice, protect Zamora, and disadvantage [Hogan], a
pro per hate crime victim denied victim services … .”
Hogan incorporated by reference these background factual allegations into each of
the four causes of action alleged in her complaint. Those factual allegations served as the
bases for those separate claims.
In the abuse of process claim, Hogan alleged that Ford had “falsely claim[ed]” that
Hogan’s service of papers was improper by “wrongfully misrepresent[ing]” California
Rules of Court, rule 1.21(a). Hogan alleged further that “Ford intentionally used these
legal procedure misrepresentations to harm [Hogan] by causing multiple hearing delays
… prolonging [Hogan] exposure to danger from Zamora, a known violent offender.”
Hogan alleged in the second cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act that Ford’s conduct in representing Zamora in court hearings “aided or incited
a denial of full and equal accommodations or services, to [Hogan], by discriminating
against [her] based on [her] race (White), religion (Christian), and Christian associations
(Trump supporters … ). ” She alleged that “Ford’s misrepresentations about [Hogan’s]
service … [upon] Zamora, were motivated by [Hogan’s] protected characteristics, such as
race, religion, and association … .”
11
In the third cause of action, Hogan alleged that Ford’s conduct as alleged
constituted “an act of violence through intimidation against her because of her race,
religion, ancestry, or citizenship” in violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976. She
alleged further that “[d]uring the hearings, Ford’s actions were used to intimidate
[Hogan] and facilitate intimidation by Zamora.” Hogan asserted that “[Ford’s] malicious
representations” caused her harm.
Hogan alleged in her fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress that “Ford’s outrageous conduct (misrepresentations delaying the restraining
order) was intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded [sic], severe emotional distress,
knowing Plaintiff was a hate crime victim without services … .”
After “ ‘consider[ing] the elements of the challenged claim[s] and what actions by
the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability’ ”
(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884), it is clear that Hogan’s claims against Ford are based
on her conduct as defense counsel in the Zamora action. More specifically, all of Ford’s
alleged conduct concerned her challenges on Zamora’s behalf to service of papers by
Hogan to extend the restraining order.
We next “evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these actions [alleged
in the complaint] fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘ “act[s]’ ” protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) Ford’s actions, as alleged
by Hogan, unquestionably constitute protected activity. Under the anti-SLAPP statute,
Ford’s alleged acts that are the bases for Hogan’s four causes of action are
constitutionally protected activity, namely, they are embraced within the categories of
“any written or oral statement or writing made before a … judicial proceeding …; [and]
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a … judicial body … .” (§ 425.16, subds (e)(1), (2).) Thus,
Ford’s activities on behalf of Zamora in opposing Hogan’s renewal request in the prior
action were protected: “[A]ll communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their
12
representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se
protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Cabral, supra, 177
Cal.App.4th at pp. 479–480; see also Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908
[“statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation are subject to section
425.16”].) Ford’s conduct, as alleged by Hogan in this action, in defending Zamora in
the prior action, including raising challenges to the propriety of the service of Hogan’s
papers, is precisely the type of acts that are considered protected activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute. (See Cabral, at pp. 479 ̶ 480 [attorneys’ defense of parties in prior
probate litigation was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute].)
Hogan, however, argues that Ford’s acts in defense of Zamora in the prior action
was “not protected” because they were “[n]on[]communicative” acts. She does not
elaborate upon this conclusory statement, nor does she cite apposite authority to support
her position. (See Nisei Farmers League v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1018 (Nisei Farmers League) [appellate court will deem
arguments in briefs raised in perfunctory fashion to be abandoned].)4 In any event, there
is no merit to this conclusory assertion. By their very nature, the actions as alleged by
Hogan in her complaint were communications made by Ford in the Zamora action
concerning service of Hogan’s papers, and they were thus protected under subdivisions
(e)(1) and (e)(2) of section 425.16. (See Cabral, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 479–
480.)
4
The three cases cited by Hogan do not support her position here. (See Baharian-
Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265 [breach of fiduciary duty claim against
partner for mismanagement and misuse of funds that included unnecessary expenditures
for attorneys and investigators was not subject to anti-SLAPP motion]; Booker v.
Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366 [underlying conduct of defendant—failure to
serve underlying action until a prior suit had settled—was noncommunicative]; Gallanis-
Politis v. Medina (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 600 [defendants’ acts held communicative,
reversing order denying anti-SLAPP motion].)
13
Likewise, Hogan’s contention—made below but not in her appellate briefs—that
Ford’s communications in the Zamora action were not protected because they involved
“false claims about … service” is also unavailing. (Italics added.) The truth or falsity of
litigation-related communications is not relevant to the first step of the analysis in
considering whether they are constitutionally protected activity; rather, falsity is only
relevant to the second prong, i.e., whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing. (See DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 562, 566; see also Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
118, 123 [in considering whether communications in the course of settlement of lawsuit
are protected activity under § 425.16, “protection applies, even against allegations of
fraudulent promises made during the settlement process”].)5 The alleged
communications by Ford during the prior litigation concerning service of process,
irrespective of their claimed falsity, were protected activity under section 425.16.6
Ford met her burden of establishing that each of the claims asserted by Hogan in
her complaint arose out of activity by Ford that is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.
(See Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)
5
A narrow exception to this principle exists where “the defendant concedes, or the
evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity
was illegal as a matter of law.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320, see also id.
at pp. 316–317.) This exception has no application here.
6
Hogan also contends, citing Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, that “[a]n anti-
SLAPP motion may only strike discrete causes of action that satisfy both prongs of the
statute; the court has no authority to strike unprotected claims.” Irrespective of the
accuracy of Hogan’s recitation of the holding in Baral—a matter on which we need not
comment—the trial court’s granting of the special motion to strike here did not involve
“unprotected claims.” The alleged actions by Ford that form the basis of liability in each
of the four claims asserted in Hogan’s complaint involve, indisputably, only protected
activity; thus, each of the claims was subject to Ford’s special motion to strike.
14
2. Hogan Did Not Show Probability of Prevailing
Because Ford met her burden of establishing that the claims in the complaint
arose out of protected activity, it was thus incumbent upon Hogan to establish under the
second step of the anti-SLAPP motion analysis that there is a likelihood that she would
prevail in the lawsuit. (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Hogan argues that she established through admissible evidence that her claims
have “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.) She asserts that her
abuse of process claim was supported by evidence of: (1) Ford’s “[r]efusals [that]
delayed hearings despite compliance” with service requirements; (2) Zamora’s
nonappearance at any hearing on the extension request; (3) Hogan’s having obtained a
$225,100 civil judgment against Zamora in another case; and (4) a bench warrant having
been issued against Zamora due to her failure to appear for a debtor’s examination in that
case. Hogan contends that her second and third causes of action were supported by
evidence that: (1) Ford “[f]acilitated harm from Zamora’s hate crime targeting, race,
religion, and politics”; and (2) Hogan gave a detailed explanation on the record at the
June 21, 2024 hearing on her request for an extension of the restraining order as to her
reasons for fearing Zamora. And as to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Hogan cited evidence that she had been in therapy since 2025 “for anxiety,
trauma, and depression caused by the related cases.”
Ford argued below—and the court so found—that Hogan’s claims were barred by
the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b). That statute provides in relevant
part that a publication or broadcast is privileged if it is made “[i]n any … judicial
proceeding … .” (Ibid.)
As stated by the California Supreme Court, “the [litigation] privilege applies to
any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or
other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4)
that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990)
15
50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) “ ‘[C]ommunications with “some relation” to judicial
proceedings’ are ‘absolutely immune from tort liability’ by the litigation privilege
[citation]. It is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but
may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p.
1057.)
“[T]he absolute privilege established by [Civil Code] section 47 [(b)] serves the
important public policy of assuring free access to the courts and other official
proceedings. It is intended to ‘ “assure utmost freedom of communication between
citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy
wrongdoing.” ’ ” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360.) The
statute also “promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys
to zealously protect their clients’ interests.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 214.)
As the California Supreme Court has explained: “Because the litigation privilege
protects only publications and communications, a ‘threshold issue in determining the
applicability’ of the privilege is whether the defendant’s conduct was communicative or
noncommunicative. [Citation.] The distinction between communicative and
noncommunicative conduct hinges on the gravamen of the action. [Citations.] That is,
the key in determining whether the privilege applies is whether the injury allegedly
resulted from an act that was communicative in its essential nature.” (Rusheen, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 1058.)
Here, the gravamen of Hogan’s action concerned Ford’s representation of Zamora
in the prior action, and, more specifically, her statements to the court challenging the
propriety of service of Hogan’s papers. This conduct plainly involved “act[s] that [were]
communicative in [their] essential nature.” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058.) And
the injury Hogan alleges that she sustained resulted from Ford’s alleged communicative
conduct. The litigation privilege applies in this case.
16
Hogan, however, contends that the litigation privilege is inapplicable, asserting
that “[i]t does not extend to independent non[]communicative wrongful acts.” She makes
the conclusory argument, unsupported by legal authority, that “[r]efusals to accept
authorized service are procedural abuse, not protected communication.” We need not
address this contention. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [appellate
court may treat as forfeited any legal argument for which there is no citation of
authorities for the point made].) We conclude that Ford’s acts during the prior litigation
that underly the claims in Hogan’s complaint were communicative; therefore, the
litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b) applied as an absolute bar to each of
the four causes of action alleged in the complaint.7 Hogan has failed to establish a
likelihood that she will prevail in this action.
The claims alleged in the complaint were based on conduct that was
constitutionally protected under subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) of section 425.16. Hogan
has not demonstrated a probability that she will prevail on those claims. Accordingly, the
trial court properly granted the special motion to strike the complaint.8
7
Although the plaintiff bears the burden in resisting a special motion to strike of
establishing the second prong that her claim has merit, the defendant bears the burden of
proving any affirmative defenses. (Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769.) Nonetheless, in addressing the second
prong of an anti-SLAPP motion, “a plaintiff must show that any asserted defenses are
inapplicable as a matter of law or make a prima facie showing of facts that, if accepted,
would negate such defenses.” (Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 288; see
also Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263, fn. 7 [if alleged conduct is subject to
litigation privilege, plaintiff cannot establish probability of prevailing to defeat an anti-
SLAPP motion].) Here, Ford established her defense of the litigation privilege, and
Hogan failed to show that the defense was either inapplicable as a matter of law or that
there were facts which, if accepted, would negate the defense.
8
Hogan raises two additional arguments. She contends that the trial court erred in
its ruling on Ford’s request for judicial notice because it “failed to address objections …
.” Hogan provides no argument in support of this conclusory assertion. We will deem
the claim abandoned. (See Nisei Farmers League, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018
[appellate court will deem arguments in briefs raised in perfunctory fashion to be
abandoned].) Hogan also argues that the court erred by denying sanctions based upon
17
III. DISPOSITION
The August 12, 2025 order granting respondent’s special motion to strike the
complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is affirmed. Respondent
shall recover her costs on appeal.
Ford’s motion being, inter alia, “frivolous.” Since we have concluded the trial court did
not err in granting Ford’s special motion to strike the complaint, it necessarily follows
that the court did not err in denying Hogan’s request for sanctions.
18
_____________________________________
WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
__________________________
LIE, J.
Hogan v. Ford
H053819