Filed 7/22/26 Hochman v. Vanderbyl CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
BESSLYN HOCHMAN, B338948
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STRO08275)
LANCE VANDERBYL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael R. Powell, Judge. Affirmed.
Lance Vanderbyl, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Cheryl A. Orr and Richard S.
Conn for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Lance Vanderbyl appeals from a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) protecting his former girlfriend Besslyn
Hochman and requiring Vanderbyl to stay 100 yards away from
Hochman, her home, and her workplace. Vanderbyl contends the
trial court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO because
there was insufficient evidence of abuse. Vanderbyl also argues
the court violated his due process rights by repeatedly
interrupting his testimony and improperly excluding evidence of
email communications between Hochman’s attorney and
Vanderbyl. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Hochman’s Request for a DVRO
On December 11, 2023 Hochman filed a request for a
DVRO seeking protection from Vanderbyl, with whom she had
been in a relationship for more than 23 years. At the time of
Hochman’s request, Hochman was 75 years old and Vanderbyl
was 56 years old. They lived together in Hochman’s
condominium complex. In her supporting declaration signed
under penalty of perjury, Hochman described “ongoing verbal
abuse,” bullying, and “controlling behavior,” which had been
occurring for many years but had increased in the past year after
Hochman told Vanderbyl she wanted to end the relationship.
Hochman declared that Vanderbyl had been pressuring her
to give him access to her financial accounts. He repeatedly
requested that Hochman open a stock trading (brokerage)
account for him to manage under her name and to put his name
on her credit card. In June 2023 Vanderbyl screamed at
Hochman that she was a “‘selfish bitch’” for refusing his requests.
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Vanderbyl called Hochman incompetent and “‘stupid’” for how
she handled her money, while repeatedly attempting to coerce
her into giving him money. Hochman stated, “I am suffering
from anxiety and fear from his constant bullying, threats, and
harassment for money and access to my financial accounts.”
Hochman stated that Vanderbyl also bullied her about
storage space for his belongings in her condominium complex,
even though he had no ownership interest in Hochman’s unit.
Vanderbyl hoarded boxes of clothing and electronics in the
condominium, piled high in the living room, dining room, office,
and second bathroom (as shown in photographs attached to her
declaration), limiting her use of the space. Hochman asked
Vanderbyl to remove the boxes, but he refused. Vanderbyl also
became involved in a dispute with the homeowners association
(HOA) regarding his use of storage units in the building.
Vanderbyl wanted Hochman to sue the HOA, and he told
Hochman that if she did not cooperate, he would tell the HOA she
was “‘losing it’” to discredit her. Hochman felt Vanderbyl “‘was
capable of causing [her] physical harm.’”
Hochman also stated, without specifying dates, multiple
instances of Vanderbyl’s “abusive and frightening” behavior
throughout their relationship. Vanderbyl once threw a television
remote that put a hole in the bedroom door. Another time,
Vanderbyl slammed a door so hard that it fell off its hinges. He
repeatedly screamed at Hochman in an “uncontrollable rage.”
Further, Vanderbyl isolated Hochman by discouraging her from
maintaining friendships outside of their relationship.
Hochman explained that, as a result of these incidents, she
suffered from anxiety and stress, and she was concerned for her
safety and wellbeing. Hochman added that she avoided being in
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her home during the day but stayed at night in fear of “making
him angrier.”
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
on December 12, 2023. The TRO was served on December 19,
2023; Vanderbyl did not file a response.
B. The Hearing on the Request for a DVRO
On April 18, 2024 the trial court held a half-day hearing on
Hochman’s request for a DVRO. Hochman was represented by
counsel; Vanderbyl represented himself. At the outset of the
hearing, the court explained it conducted hearings by “ask[ing]
questions first before I allow counsel to ask questions so that I
can get to the heart of the matter.” Neither party objected.
The trial court asked Hochman whether everything in her
request for a DVRO was truthful and accurate, and she said yes.
The court then asked Hochman what she would like to add to the
account in her declaration. Hochman testified that in October or
November 2023 she told Vanderbyl that she wanted to separate
and for him to move out of her condominium. At that time
Vanderbyl was still pressuring her to open a brokerage account
and credit card that he would control. Around Thanksgiving,
Vanderbyl yelled at Hochman again for refusing to open a credit
card for him to use. He also threatened to sue her if she did not
cooperate, telling her, “I’ll embarrass you, and you’ll be crying
and crying and crying, and you will never get over it. I will
embarrass you. I know things.”
Throughout 2023 Hochman had many disagreements with
Vanderbyl regarding his accumulation of boxes in the
condominium and building storage areas. Vanderbyl purchased
more than 200 boxes of clothing, shoes, and electronics that he
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stored in her condominium unit. The boxes were piled “floor to
ceiling” and prevented access to the balcony. In January 2023
Hochman learned from the HOA that Vanderbyl had taken
possession of five storage areas and a storage room in the
building. Hochman suggested they move Vanderbyl’s items to
public storage, but he refused. Vanderbyl wanted to pursue legal
action against the HOA; he “pressured [her] and got very, very
angry” when she refused to let him represent her against the
HOA.
The disagreement about the storage units escalated over
the next several months. On April 6, 2023 Vanderbyl yelled at
Hochman, stating, “If you don’t support me in this and fight the
HOA, I’m going to spend the rest of my life to destroy you.”
Hochman said the incident was a “shock to [her] system.” That
same month, Vanderbyl threatened to “tell everybody [she was]
losing it” if she did not support his storage area claims. In the
months leading up to Hochman’s request for a DVRO, Vanderbyl
also demanded that Hochman stop seeing her friends.
Hochman filed her request for a DVRO because she was
worried about her safety. Vanderbyl’s behavior had caused
Hochman “tremendous stress” and affected her mental and
emotional state. Further, Vanderbyl continued to contact her
after the trial court issued the TRO. According to Hochman, a
day or two after Vanderbyl was served with the TRO, Vanderbyl
called Hochman and said she was a “monster.” In February 2024
Hochman’s telephone rang “about 30 times.” She did not answer
the phone but believed Vanderbyl was calling because her phone
indicated the caller was at the hotel where he was staying.
Vanderbyl admitted in his testimony that he had asked
Hochman to open a brokerage account for him for “many years.”
5
The trial court inquired why he continued to discuss with
Hochman a brokerage account and credit card in her name
instead of his own. Vanderbyl responded that he had been very
successful in the stock market, but he no longer had legal
immigration status to work or open a brokerage account or credit
card in his own name. He and Hochman had been together for
24 years, and he believed they were in love and would be together
forever. He had been working as Hochman’s assistant at a real
estate company, but he wanted to invest in the stock market to
achieve financial independence. After Hochman refused his
requests, he became homeless and realized she was
“micromanaging me.”
Vanderbyl admitted he was “hoarding the boxes” in the
condominium; the boxes contained women’s apparel from job lots
at high-end department stores. He had purchased the items to
sell and support himself. Hochman asked him to remove the
boxes, which he intended to do, but as they were opening the
boxes Hochman said he should not throw the boxes in the trash
because they contained luxury women’s apparel. Vanderbyl
acknowledged he never moved the boxes.
The trial court asked Vanderbyl whether there was
anything else he wanted to say regarding Hochman’s allegations.
Vanderbyl responded that he could not “say more,” explaining,
“[S]he’s made what I say in this court to you contingent on me
getting any financial support.” Vanderbyl did not deny that he
had pressured, yelled, or threatened Hochman.
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court granted
Hochman’s request for a DVRO. The court found Vanderbyl had
6
an expectation that Hochman would take the financial steps he
requested—to open a brokerage account and put his name on a
credit card. But Hochman decided not to take these steps
because the relationship was ending. The court explained to
Vanderbyl that Hochman “said no, and she kept on saying no,
and you kept on asking over and over and over again. That is a
form of harassment.” The court found Hochman credible, stating
“I don’t believe that she’s making that up . . . . [S]he told her
story consistently.” The court observed that during her
testimony, Hochman “was trembling” and “talked about begging
for you to stop.” The court added, “She was very upset when she
was talking about the [storage] cages. She repeatedly asked you.
She said that you told her that you were going to destroy her.”
The trial court continued, “You may be upset because you
were going to be homeless. You were upset because you weren’t
getting what you wanted to get . . . . I’m not saying that you are
a spousal abuser in the traditional sense that you hit her or
anything like that. It involves power and control . . . . You were
trying to get control” and “you were going to do that by saying to
her you need to do this.” Vanderbyl interjected, “I never
demanded anything from her.” The court responded, “Sir, this
isn’t about who gets to speak last or whatever. Don’t interrupt
me . . . .”
The trial court found Vanderbyl’s “attempts to coerce
[Hochman] with the financial issues was abusive.” In addition,
Vanderbyl’s calling Hochman after he was served with the
restraining order was abusive. The court continued, “Based on
7
the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that abuse has
been shown under Family Code section[s] 6203 and 6320.”1
The trial court issued a one-year DVRO requiring, among
other things, Vanderbyl not harass, strike, assault, threaten,
annoy by phone or other electronic means (including repeatedly
contact), or disturb the peace. The order explained that to
“‘[d]isturb the peace’” meant “to destroy someone’s mental or
emotional calm,” which “includes coercive control.” The order
required Vanderbyl to stay at least 100 yards away from
Hochman, her home, her workplace, and her vehicle. The order
also required Vanderbyl to immediately move out of Hochman’s
condominium.
Vanderbyl timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA;
§ 6200 et seq.), “a court may issue a protective order ‘“to restrain
any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic
violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons
involved” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”’”
(In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225
(Davila & Mejia); accord, Nevarez v. Tonna (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782; see §§ 6220, 6300.) The purpose of the
DVPA is “to prevent acts of domestic violence . . . for a period
sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the
causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) “The court shall consider the
1 Further statutory references are to the Family Code.
8
totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or
deny a petition for relief.” (§ 6301, subd. (d).)
The DVPA defines domestic violence, as relevant here, as
abuse perpetuated against “a person with whom the respondent
is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.”
(§ 6211, subd. (c).) “Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of
physical injury or assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Abuse includes
“plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent
serious bodily injury to that person or to another” or “engag[ing]
in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.” (Id., subd. (a)(3), (4).) Conduct that may be
enjoined under section 6320, subdivision (a), includes “molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting,
battering, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying personal
property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or
otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the
peace of the other party.” (See Hogue v. Hogue (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 833, 839.)
“‘[D]isturbing the peace’” of the other party “refers to
conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys
the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320,
subd. (c).) Subdivision (c) provides further, “This conduct
includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern
of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with
a person’s free will and personal liberty.” Subdivision (c)
provides as examples of “coercive control,” unreasonably engaging
in conduct aimed at, among other things, “(1) Isolating the other
party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support,”
“(3) Controlling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s
movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic
9
resources, or access to services”; and “(4) Compelling the other
party by force, threat of force, or intimidation, including threats
based on actual or suspected immigration status, to engage in
conduct from which the other party has a right to abstain or to
abstain from conduct in which the other party has a right to
engage.” (See Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, 583
[abuse includes “attempts to control, regulate, and monitor a
spouse’s finances, economic resources, and access to
communications”].)
“We review the grant or denial of a request for a DVRO for
abuse of discretion.” (Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 226; accord, Hatley v. Southard, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 589; In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.)
“‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.”’” (In re Marriage of G., at p. 780.)
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223;
Davila & Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226; In re Marriage
of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.) “‘“We
must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the
correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving every
conflict in favor of the judgment.’”’” (Evilsizor, at p. 1424; accord,
Herriott, at p. 223.) We defer to the trial court’s evaluation of
credibility. (Herriott, at p. 223 [“It was for the trial court to
weigh the evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of
the witness, as ‘credibility issues [are] routinely resolved by [the]
trier[ ] of fact.’”]; Evilsizor, at pp. 1426-1427 [“the trial court was
10
in the best position to evaluate credibility and to resolve factual
disputes”].)
B. Vanderbyl’s Appeal Is Not Moot
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A case becomes moot when events
‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of [the appellant], to grant [the appellant] any effect[ive]
relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements
must be met. First, [the appellant] must complain of an ongoing
harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.) In other
words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible
impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It
follows that, to show a need for effective relief, [the appellant]
must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change
in legal status.” (Id. at p. 277.)
Hochman contends Vanderbyl’s appeal is moot because the
DVRO expired in April 2025. Vanderbyl responds that his appeal
is not moot because issuance of the DVRO “triggers a 5-year
prohibition on obtaining” a license to have a firearm, which
“directly affects immigration and green card eligibility.” He also
argues issuance of the DVRO will be a part of his permanent
record in the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System (CLETS) database, which “creates a permanent record
affecting interactions with police, border crossings, and
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government agencies.” Further, the DVRO will appear on any
future background checks, which could affect his employment and
housing applications, professional licensing, and educational
opportunities.
Vanderbyl has not provided any legal or factual support for
his contentions regarding the continuing impact of the DVRO on
him. However, as the Court of Appeal explained in San Diego
Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 560, 564, an
expired restraining order may have collateral consequences in
future proceedings, and further, a one-year restraining order
typically will evade appellate review by expiring before the
appeal is decided. (See Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
141, 148 [appeal from expired DVRO was not moot because it
“will have consequences for [the parent] in future proceedings
involving custody of daughter”].) For these reasons, regardless of
whether Vanderbyl’s appeal is moot, we exercise our discretion to
consider it on the merits. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.”].)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Issuing the
DVRO
Vanderbyl contends the trial court abused its discretion in
granting Hochman’s request for a DVRO by relying only on
Hochman’s testimony and failing to consider his testimony “that
directly contradicted” Hochman’s evidence. The court did not
abuse its discretion.
As discussed, Hochman testified that during 2023
Vanderbyl repeatedly pressured her to open a brokerage account
and credit card for his use, and when she refused, he screamed at
12
her, threatened to sue her, and told her he would embarrass her
and cause her to be “crying and crying” because he “know[s]
things.” Vanderbyl also took control of multiple storage areas in
the condominium building and hoarded hundreds of boxes in
Hochman’s condominium unit. When he became embroiled in a
dispute with the HOA, he pressured Hochman to sue the HOA,
and when she resisted, he became angry, threatened to “destroy”
her, and said he would tell everyone she was “losing it.” And just
days after Vanderbyl was served with the TRO, he violated its
terms by contacting Hochman and calling her a “monster.”
Hochman testified Vanderbyl’s conduct caused her anxiety and
“tremendous stress” and affected her mental and emotional state.
She filed for a restraining order because she feared for her safety.
The trial court found Hochman’s account credible, noting
she was trembling as she testified and appeared scared and upset
by Vanderbyl’s conduct. We defer to the court’s credibility
findings. (Herriott v. Harriott, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 223;
In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698,
703; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney, supra,
237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1426-1427.)
Hochman’s testimony provided substantial evidence of
Vanderbyl’s abuse based on his repeated pressure and threats to
Hochman to force her to acquiesce to his demands and by causing
her to fear for her safety. (See §§ 6320, subds. (a) [abuse includes
“harassing” and “disturbing the peace of the other party”], (c)
[“‘disturbing the peace’” includes destroying the mental or
emotional calm of the other party and “‘coercive control’” of the
other party]; Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389,
398 [affirming renewal of DVRO against ex-boyfriend based on
multiple phone calls and texts regarding trial court issues despite
13
prior DVRO, explaining “‘protective orders can be issued because
of persistent unwanted phone calls or letters—which fall into the
same category as “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, [or] harassing” the
protected party’”]; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1140, 1144 [ex-boyfriend’s continued contact with plaintiff by
phone, email, text, and unannounced visit to her home to beseech
her to renew the relationship constituted abuse based on his
“‘disturbing the peace’” of the plaintiff under the DVPA].)
Vanderbyl argues it was error for the trial court to grant
the request for a DVRO by “exclusively relying” on Hochman’s
testimony. (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) But “[t]he
court may issue an order . . . based solely on the affidavit or
testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.”
(§ 6300, subd. (a); see Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 334 [“[e]vidence of even one credible
witness ‘is sufficient for proof of any fact’”]; In re Marriage of Mix
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614 [“‘The testimony of a witness, even the
party himself [or herself], may be sufficient.’”].) Further,
Vanderbyl admitted that he had repeatedly asked Hochman to
open a brokerage account and that he had stored the boxes in
Hochman’s apartment, even after Hochman asked him to move
them to public storage. Most significantly, he never denied that
he had pressured, threatened, and yelled at Hochman.
D. The Trial Court’s Conduct During the Hearing Did Not
Violate Vanderbyl’s Due Process Rights
Vanderbyl contends the trial court violated his due process
rights by questioning witnesses and preventing Vanderbyl from
presenting relevant evidence. He also argues he was denied the
14
right to testify and to cross-examine witnesses. Vanderbyl’s
contentions lack merit.
As discussed, at the outset of the hearing, the trial court
explained it would question the witnesses prior to counsel.
Vanderbyl contends this “unilateral alteration of procedure”
allowed the court to “exclusive[ly] control” the proceeding.
However, courts have substantial discretion in controlling the
conduct of proceedings, including by questioning witnesses. (See
People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 494 [“‘A trial court has
both the discretion and the duty to ask questions of witnesses,
provided this is done in an effort to elicit material facts or to
clarify confusing or unclear testimony.’”].) This is particularly
true in DVRO proceedings, which often include self-represented
litigants, where the court is “necessarily expected to play a far
more active role in developing the facts, before then making a
decision whether or not to issue the requested permanent
restraining order.” (Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856,
861.)
With respect to Vanderbyl’s argument that he could not
testify, cross-examine Hochman, or submit documents, he cites to
page 8 of the reporter’s transcript, which includes the trial court’s
introductory comments preceding Hochman’s testimony. As
discussed, the court explained that it intended to ask questions
before Hochman’s attorney would examine her. Nowhere on that
page (or elsewhere in the record) did the court tell Vanderbyl that
he could not cross-examine Hochman, he could not testify, or that
he could not submit documents.
After Hochman concluded her testimony, Vanderbyl did not
request to ask Hochman any questions. It is true that once he
was sworn in, the trial court proceeded to ask him questions (as
15
the court had done with Hochman). At one point Vanderbyl
stated he “will say no more” out of a concern that if he opposed
issuance of the DVRO, Hochman would cut off her financial
support for him. The court encouraged Vanderbyl to present his
version of what had happened in response to Hochman’s alleged
grounds for a restraining order. At that point Vanderbyl
provided extensive testimony about what had transpired with
respect to his requests for Hochman to set up a brokerage account
and the storage of the boxes.
Vanderbyl relies on the portion of the transcript at the end
of the hearing during which the trial court explained its decision
to grant the DVRO as an example of how the court silenced him
and prevented him from testifying. The court stated, “I’m going
to grant the restraining order. And I will tell you why. I think
that there was an expectation that you had and—” Vanderbyl
interrupted, “She told me she would do these things.” The court
responded, “Okay. It’s my turn to talk. Thank you.” The court
continued with its reasoning, stating (directed to Vanderbyl) that
when Hochman decided not to allow Vanderbyl to have a
brokerage account in her name, “you decided that you were going
to not accept that.” Vanderbyl again interjected, “No. That is not
true. I did accept it.” The court then continued, “Well, I don’t
think you did, and I will tell you why.” The court further
explained its reasoning, and Vanderbyl again interjected, “No, no,
no. That never happened after.” The court attempted to
continue, and Vanderbyl interrupted again. At this point the
court said “Sir, sir, please, just don’t talk anymore.” The court
completed its ruling (with additional interruptions). In no way
does this portion of the transcript, during which the court
16
attempted to explain the basis for its ruling, show that Vanderbyl
was denied a full opportunity to testify.
Finally, Vanderbyl fails to point to any evidence that he
was not allowed to submit (other than the email the trial court
excluded, which we discuss below). On this record, there was no
due process violation.
E. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding
an Email from Hochman’s Counsel
Vanderbyl contends the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding an email that Hochman’s attorney sent to him asking
Vanderbyl to “‘not oppose’” issuance of the DVRO and to “remain
silent at the trial.” (Italics omitted.) Vanderbyl contends the
email would have shown “threats and blackmail to silence
[Vanderbyl] at trial.” When Vanderbyl showed the email to
Hochman’s attorney and sought to have it admitted, Hochman’s
attorney objected that the email was a “settlement negotiation
communication.” Vanderbyl responded that Hochman’s attorney
was “lying” and “there [are] no settlement negotiations going on.”
He added that the court should consider the email because it
would affect whether he could “speak or not.”
The trial court clarified that Vanderbyl could testify at the
hearing, and the only reason not to speak would be if he wanted
to assert a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Thus, the
court explained, the email was not relevant because the only
issue at the hearing was whether Vanderbyl committed domestic
violence, and Vanderbyl could testify about whether he engaged
in the conduct that Hochman alleged.2 Notwithstanding this
2 Vanderbyl also contends the trial court interrupted him
“numerous times” during the hearing, citing as an example
17
clarification, when the court initially asked whether Vanderbyl’s
requests to open a brokerage account had “been going on for some
time,” Vanderbyl responded, “I will say no more,” explaining he
was told that if he opposed issuance of the DVRO, he would lose
the promised financial support. At this point the court excluded
the email, explaining it contained hearsay and was inadmissible
as a settlement communication.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. (In re Marriage of M.P. & M.C. (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107 [explaining with respect to DVRO
that appellate courts review evidentiary rulings for an “‘abuse of
discretion’”]; Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 593 [“‘“Broadly speaking, an appellate
court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion.”’”].) Because the email is not in
the record, we cannot evaluate whether it was a settlement
communication. Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the email was not relevant because
where, in response to the court’s explanation to Vanderbyl why
there was nothing preventing him from testifying about what had
happened, Vanderbyl stated, “I think if I don’t do what her
attorney said [to not testify], I must—” At that point the court
interjected, “Look, I am going to explain something to you so that
it’s very clear to you.” The court then explained what Hochman
needed to prove under the Family Code to show abuse, and that
the court was interested in hearing “what [Vanderbyl’s] version is
of those things that [Hochman] alleged.” Although Hochman is
correct that the court interrupted Vanderbyl’s statement, it did so
in an effort to encourage Vanderbyl to testify, not to prevent him
from speaking.
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Vanderbyl had an opportunity to testify at the hearing, and the
discussions between Hochman’s attorney and Vanderbyl after
service of the TRO had no relevance to whether Vanderbyl’s
behavior prior to issuance of the TRO constituted harassment
under the DVPA.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Hochman is to recover her costs on
appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
19