Filed 7/24/26 Hiramanek v. Hiramanek CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ADIL HIRAMANEK, H051060
(Santa Clara County
Claimant and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 19PR186449)
v.
RODA HIRAMANEK,
Petitioner and Respondent,
DEBRA LUMLEY, as Administrator, etc.,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
This case is part of a series of cases involving Adil Hiramanek and his mother
Roda Hiramanek, who died in January 2020, and this appeal resembles an appeal in one
of those cases recently resolved in Hiramanek v. Hiramanek (May 26, 2026, H050904)
[nonpub. opn.], opn. mod. June 2, 2026 (Roda Hiramanek I).
In Roda Hiramanek I, Roda Hiramanek sued Mr. Hiramanek, his estranged wife
Kamal Hiramanek (now Kapadia), and her mother Pervez Kapadia, seeking to rescind a
Stipulation and Order Re Reconciliation and Dismissal of Actions filed on July 15, 2008
(2008 Stipulation and Order) on contractual and tort grounds. (Roda Hiramanek I, supra,
at pp. 1-2.) On appeal in that case, Mr. Hiramanek argued that an order dismissing Roda
Hiramanek’s claims was void because it was issued after her death and therefore the trial
court lacked jurisdiction over her claims. (Id. at p. 8.) We agreed that in the absence of
the personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate the trial court lacked authority
over the claims after her death. (Id. at pp. 8-9.) However, we concluded that Mr.
Hiramanek was not prejudiced by dismissal of the claims because the dismissal order was
voidable, not void, due to the trial court’s lack of authority, and the personal
representative of her estate, who was appointed in January 2021, had not chosen to
continue her claims in that case. (Id. at pp. 9-10.)
In this case, which was filed in July 2019 less than six months before her death,
Roda Hiramanek also sued her son, his estranged wife, and his wife’s mother seeking to
rescind the 2008 Stipulation and Order. This time Roda Hiramanek petitioned the
probate court, claiming, among other things, that the Stipulation and Order contained a
donative transfer invalid under former Probate Code section 21350. In April 2020,
uninformed of Roda Hiramanek’s death, the probate court denied the petition.
Mr. Hiramanek now appeals on behalf of himself and his deceased mother, once again
arguing that the lower court’s order dismissing his mother’s claims was void because it
was issued after her death.
We reject this appeal for the same reason that we rejected the appeal in Roda
Hiramanek I. Here again, we agree that after Roda Hiramanek’s death the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to act on her claims in the absence of the personal representative of
her estate. However, we conclude that Mr. Hiramanek has not been prejudiced because
the probate court’s authority rendered the denial of the petition voidable rather than void
and Roda Hiramanek’s claims were not continued after her death. Indeed, in this case,
even though he claims to have been the personal representative of his mother’s estate in
2020, Mr. Hiramanek did not move to continue his mother’s claims, attempt to substitute
in for his mother, or even inform the trial court of his mother’s death.
We therefore affirm denial of the petition.
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I. BACKGROUND
Like Roda Hiramanek I, this case concerns the 2008 Stipulation and Order, which
arose in part out of divorce proceedings between Mr. Hiramanek and Kamal Kapadia. In
the 2008 Stipulation and Order, in exchange for Kamal Kapadia dismissing suits against
Mr. Hiramanek and his mother Roda Hiramanek, Mr. Hiramanek, his mother, Kamal
Kapadia, and her mother Perviz Kapadia agreed to waive claims against each other and to
transfer ownership of the family residence from Roda Hiramanek to Mr. Hiramanek and
Kamal Kapadia as tenants in common, with Mr. Hiramanek owning 71 percent of the
property. Mr. Hiramanek also promised to make payments of $20,000 and $562,885.34
to Kamal Kapadia and to give her ownership of a minivan. In addition, the 2008
Stipulation and Agreement contained provisions relating to the children of Mr.
Hiramanek and Kamal Kapadia. The agreement was signed by the parties as well as the
attorneys for Kamal Kapadia and Perviz Kapadia.
In July 2019, acting pro per, Roda Hiramanek filed a petition in probate court
against Mr. Hiramanek and the Kapadias. The petition claimed that the real property
transferred in the 2008 Stipulation and Order, which she had owned, was transferred for
no consideration, or at least no meaningful consideration, and therefore was an invalid
donative transfer under former Probate Code section 21350. (See Jenkins v. Teegarden
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137-1138 [holding that former Probate Code
section 21305 governs transactions before January 2011].) The petition also alleged that
the $20,000 and $562,885.34 payments made by Mr. Hiramanek to Kamal Kapadia under
the 2008 Stipulation and Order were taken from Roda Hiramanek’s accounts without
authorization. Finally, the petition asserted a claim under the Mello-Granlund Older
Californians Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 9000-9757.5) as well as a claim for elder abuse,
and it sought a constructive trust, preliminary injunction, and both exemplary and
punitive damages.
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In support of these claims, the petition alleged that Roda Hiramanek did not speak
English, was “cognitively impaired,” and was unable to provide for her personal needs or
protect her rights. The petition further alleged that Mr. Hiramanek was involved in
wrongdoing against her. For example, the petition alleged that Mr. Hiramanek misused
his authority as Roda Hiramanek’s care custodian to transfer $562,885.34 from one of her
accounts to pay Kamal Kapadia and took $20,000 from another of her accounts to pay
Perviz Kapadia. The petition also alleged that no one explained the 2008 Stipulation and
Order to Roda Hiramanek.
Mr. Hiramanek answered the petition, admitting many of the allegations and
conceding that the 2008 Stipulation and Order should be invalidated. However, the
petition was served by mail rather than summons and personal service, and the Kapadias
did not respond to it.
On February 6, 2020, based on a notice of hearing from Roda Hiramanek, the
probate court held a hearing on the petition. Only Mr. Hiramanek appeared, and he asked
the court to rule on the papers. Two months later, the court issued an order denying the
petition. After noting that at least some of the causes of action in the petition appeared to
require summons and personal service, the probate court observed that the petition’s
allegations concerning Roda Hiramanek’s cognitive impairment and dependence on
others “call[] into question the Petitioner’s personal agency in the filing of the Petition.”
However, the court did not resolve either issue because it found the petition defective on
other grounds.
Specifically, the probate court ruled that the donative transfer claim failed because
the terms of the 2008 Stipulation and Order concerning Roda Hiramanek’s property “do
not constitute a donative transfer as contemplated in the Probate Code.” Additionally, the
court ruled that, even if the 2008 Stipulation and Order constituted a donative transfer,
the transfer fell within a statutory exclusion in former Probate Code section 21351 for
transfers to individuals related to the transferor by blood or marriage.
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The probate court also rejected the petition’s remaining claims. It held that Mello-
Granlund Older Californians Act claim failed because the petition merely restated several
code sections without asserting any actionable claim besides elder abuse. In addition, the
court continued, the elder abuse claim was time barred because the petition did not allege
a date of discovery later than the date of the 2008 Stipulation and Order. Finally, the
court ruled that constructive trusts, preliminary injunctions, and punitive and exemplary
damages are remedies, each of which requires a viable underlying cause of action. After
Mr. Hiramanek moved to correct the order, the trial court amended it to correct one fact
and several apparent typographical errors.
On May 22, 2020, after the motion to correct was filed but before the amended
order issued, Mr. Hiramanek filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Neither Kamal Kapadia nor Pervez Kapadia has filed a brief in this court, and
Debra Lumley, who was appointed to be the personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s
estate in November 2021, has not done so either. As consequence, we decide this appeal
based on Mr. Hiramanek’s opening brief and Mr. Hiramanek’s response to a request from
the court for supplemental briefing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a); see also In re
Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 233 [noting that, even absent briefing from respondents,
reversal on appeal is warranted only “if prejudicial error is found”].) However, before
addressing Mr. Hiramanek’s arguments, we address two preliminary issues: appellate
jurisdiction and judicial notice.
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
This appeal was noticed in May 2020, more than a year before Lumley was
appointed as the personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate. In October 2023,
Lumley informed the court that this appeal was commenced without her knowledge or
authorization and that she had not decided whether to seek to continue Roda Hiramanek’s
claims in this case. Mr. Hiramanek in turn contends that he filed this appeal on behalf of
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Roda Hiramanek as the personal representative of her estate and also appealed on his own
behalf. As explained below, we reject Mr. Hiramanek’s assertion that he filed this appeal
as the personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate but conclude that
Mr. Hiramanek properly appealed on his own behalf.
Mr. Hiramanek has represented to this court that in May 2020, when the notice of
appeal was filed, he “acted as the personal representative” of his deceased mother Roda
Hiramanek. However, Mr. Hiramanek acknowledges that as of that date “no court had
issued an order designating any person, including appellant, as deceased’s personal
representative.” Moreover, Mr. Hiramanek did not file a motion to substitute in for his
mother or otherwise seek authorization to act on behalf of her estate. Indeed, even
though a hearing on Roda Hiramanek’s petition was held in February 2020, there is no
evidence in the record that Mr. Hiramanek ever informed the probate court in this case
that his mother passed away the month before. In addition, Mr. Hiramanek fails to
explain how he could have been acting as the personal representative of his mother’s
estate without filing any motion in the probate court or even informing the court of her
death. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Hiramanek has failed to show that he filed the
notice of appeal in this case as the personal representative of his mother’s estate. (See In
re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 845 [“ ‘ “Contentions supported neither by
argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation and to have
been abandoned.” ’ ”]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153. 206 [“Points
‘perfunctorily asserted without argument in support’ are not properly raised.”].)
Mr. Hiramanek also contends that he filed the notice of appeal on his own behalf.
It is odd that Mr. Hiramanek seeks reinstatement of a petition accusing him of abusing
authority over his mother and misappropriating funds from her. However, his answer
admitted most of the allegations in the petition and conceded much of the relief sought in
the petition. Moreover, the petition sought to rescind the property transfers in the 2008
Stipulation and Order, and as a potential heir to his mother’s estate Mr. Hiramanek may
6
recover that property. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Hiramanek is sufficiently
interested in the relief sought by Roda Hiramanek’s petition to make him an aggrieved
party and provide standing to appeal the denial of the petition. (See In re C.P. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 145, 153 [“We are required to ‘liberally construe the issue of standing and
resolve doubts in favor of the right to appeal . . . .’ ”].)
B. Judicial Notice
Mr. Hiramanek has filed two motions to augment the record with exhibits, which
have been deemed requests for judicial notice. One exhibit is a file-stamped copy of a
petition to administer Roda Hiramanek’s estate which avers that the date of her death was
January 16, 2020. Another exhibit is a file-stamped copy of the November 17, 2021
order appointing Debra Lumley as the personal representative of the estate of Roda
Hiramanek. Because these documents are from court records and are material to the
appeal, we take judicial notice of them. (See, e.g., Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th
1122, 1135, fn. 1; see also Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, we decline to take
judicial notice of the copies of the former Probate Code sections submitted by
Mr. Hiramanek because it is not necessary to take judicial notice of such published
material. (See, e.g., Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26,
45, fn. 9.) We also decline to take judicial notice of the remaining exhibits submitted by
Mr. Hiramanek because they are not relevant to the issues addressed in this opinion. (See
Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.) For the same reason, we
decline as well to take judicial notice of the documents attached to Mr. Hiramanek’s
response to our request for supplemental briefing or his motion for a stay. Similarly, we
decline the request for judicial notice filed by Mr. Hiramanek after oral argument.
Finally, on our own motion, we take judicial notice that the appointment of Debra
Lumley as personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate was affirmed in appeal
No. H049980. (See Hiramanek v. Estate of Roda Hiramanek (Aug. 27, 2024, H049880)
[nonpub. opn.].)
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C. The Merits
We now turn to the merits of this appeal. In Roda Hiramanek I, we held that the
trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the claims brought by Roda
Hiramanek in that case because it did so after her death in the absence of the personal
representative of her estate. (Roda Hiramanek I, supra, at pp. 8-9.) Nonetheless, we
affirmed dismissal of the claims because the trial court’s lack of authority rendered its
dismissal order voidable, not void, and Mr. Hiramanek was not prejudiced by the
dismissal because the personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate had not chosen
to continue the claims at issue. (Id. at pp. 9-11.) After the Roda Hiramanek I opinion
was issued, the court asked Mr. Hiramanek for supplemental briefing addressing whether
Roda Hiramanek’s claims in this case had been continued by her estate’s personal
representative and, if not, whether Mr. Hiramanek was prejudiced by denial of Roda
Hiramanek’s petition. Mr. Hiramanek’s response implicitly acknowledges that Lumley,
the appointed personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate, did not continue the
claims brought in this case. In addition, as explained below, Mr. Hiramanek failed to
demonstrate how, in spite of the personal representative’s failure to continue the claims in
this case, he was prejudiced by the denial of those claims.
As Mr. Hiramanek acknowledges, after a litigant’s death, the decedent’s claims
cannot proceed unless and until someone is substituted for the decedent. As the Supreme
Court has stated, “judgment cannot be rendered for or against a decedent, nor for or
against a personal representative of a decedent’s estate, until the representative has been
made a party by substitution.” (Sacks v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 950,
957 (Sacks).) Consequently, when a defendant has died, “the court could, on motion,
allow the action to be continued against his representative [citation], but it could regularly
take no action in the case until there was a substitution of someone to defend the
action . . . .” (DeLeonis v. Walsh (1903) 140 Cal. 175, 179.) Moreover, this principle
applies to deceased plaintiffs and other claimants as well as to deceased defendants.
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(Collison v. Thomas (1961) 55 Cal.2d 490, 495 (Collison); Edwards v. California (1978)
82 Cal.App.3d 885, 893; Boyd v. Lancaster (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 574, 581; Scoville v.
Keglor (1938) 27 Cal.App.2d 17, 28.) Consequently, after Roda Hiramanek’s death, the
probate court lacked authority to dismiss or take any other action concerning the claims
brought by her unless someone substituted into the case in her place.
Mr. Hiramanek contends that, because the probate court lacked authority to
proceed with Roda Hiramanek’s claims in the absence of her estate’s personal
representative, any action taken by the court concerning those claims in this case was
void. That is not correct. The Supreme Court has held that “ ‘the death of a party
pending suit does not oust the jurisdiction of the court, and hence the judgment is
voidable only, not void.’ ” (Collison, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 496.) Consequently, when a
party dies and no personal representative has appeared on behalf of the party’s estate,
actions taken concerning the decedent provide no ground for reversal “in the absence of
prejudice.” (Ibid; see also Smith v. Bear Valley Milling & Lumber Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d
590, 602 [declining to reverse dismissal of action against decedent taken in the absence
of the decedent’s personal representative because “no prejudice has resulted”]; Sacks,
supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 959 [“Since we find that no party has suffered prejudice by
reason of Gaither’s untimely death, we need not reverse the judgment in favor of
Gaither.”].)
Mr. Hiramanek has not shown prejudice. Although he has been unable to
invalidate the Stipulation and Order, Mr. Hiramanek has not shown that Roda
Hiramanek’s claims would have proceeded absent the order denying the petition. It is
true that “a cause of action for . . . a person is not lost by reason of the person’s death, but
survives subject to the applicable limitations period” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.20,
subd. (a)), and “[a] pending action or proceeding does not abate by the death of a party if
the cause of action survives” (id., § 377.21). However, a cause of action does not
continue automatically after a party’s death. Instead, “[o]n motion after the death of a
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person who commenced an action or proceeding, the court shall allow a pending action or
proceeding that does not abate to be continued by the decedent’s personal representative
or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.” (Id., § 377.31.) No such motion was
filed in this case. The personal representative of Roda Hiramanek’s estate was not
appointed until November 2021, more than a year after the dismissal of the petition in
this case, and on appeal the personal representative informed the court that she had not
sought to continue the claims in this case.
Mr. Hiramanek asserts that in 2020, before the appointment of Lumley as personal
representative of his mother’s estate, he “acted as the personal representative” of his
deceased mother. However, as noted above, Mr. Hiramanek did not move to continue the
claims brought by his mother or to substitute in for her. Indeed, at the hearing following
his mother’s death, he did not even inform the probate court of her death. Accordingly,
the trial court was unaware of Roda Hiramanek’s death, as evidenced by the facts that it
noted her absence, without mentioning her death, in its April 2020 order, and then
attempted to serve the order on her. Having failed to move to continue his mother’s
claims after her death or even to inform the trial court of the death, Mr. Hiramanek
cannot now claim that he was silently acting as the personal representative of her estate.
We therefore conclude that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the claims brought by Roda Hiramanek after her death in the absence of
personal representative of her estate, but that Mr. Hiramanek was not prejudiced because
neither he nor the personal representative moved to continue those claims. Although
Mr. Hiramanek contends that the personal representative failed to fulfill her duties, we
decline to address that issue in the first instance on appeal, especially as the personal
representative has not appeared and is unable to defend herself. (See, e.g., Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548 [“ ‘ “As a general rule,
theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on
appeal . . . .” ’ ”].) In addition, because we conclude that the claims brought by Roda
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Hiramanek were not continued, we need not address Mr. Hiramanek’s arguments
concerning the merits of the trial court’s order or consider the preclusive effect of our
decision in Roda Hiramanek I. Finally, because Mr. Hiramanek has not shown that
proceedings in the other pending cases will affect the issues dispositive of this appeal, we
deny his request for a stay.
III. CONCLUSION
The denial of the petition is affirmed. Because no respondents’ briefs were filed,
no costs are awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
GROVER, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
WILSON, J.
Hiramanek v. Hiramanek
H051060