Filed 10/7/26 Hazari v. Brady CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CYRUS HAZARI, H052587, H052767
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff, Super. Ct. No. 16CV295730)
v.
MANDY J. BRADY,
Defendant and Respondent;
DAGMAR HORVATH,
Third Party Claimant and
Appellant.
Third party claimant Dagmar Horvath appeals from the judgment entered in favor
of defendant Mandy J. Brady following denial of Horvath’s third party ownership petition
(case No. H052767). She also appeals from the judgments entered after the trial court
granted Brady’s motion to add Horvath as a judgment debtor (case No. H052587). We
have consolidated the two appeals for purposes of record preparation, briefing, oral
argument, and disposition. While the record supports the denial of Horvath’s third party
ownership claim, it does not support adding Horvath as a judgment debtor. We will
therefore reverse the judgments adding Horvath as a judgment debtor and awarding
Brady statutory attorney fees.
I. BACKGROUND
We derive the following factual summary from the parties’ supporting declarations
and documents, as well as the factual summary from our unpublished opinion in the
related case Horvath v. Brady (Aug. 11, 2025, Nos. H051571, H051574) [nonpub. opn.].
The current appeals arise from a property dispute between Cyrus Hazari and
Mandy Brady concerning Hazari’s property located on Felter Road in San Jose. The trial
court entered judgment against Hazari in 2021 as a terminating sanction for violating his
discovery obligations and awarded Brady $586,427 (plus interest) in attorney fees. The
trial court entered another order in August 2021 deeming Hazari a vexatious litigant.
After Brady confirmed that Hazari held title to the Felter Road property, she
obtained a writ of execution in November 2022 and commenced a levy against the
property. Notice of a sheriff’s sale was made in May 2023 setting the sale for June 28,
2023.
A. HORVATH’S LAWSUIT AGAINST BRADY
Horvath is Hazari’s friend, physician and co-investor. After Brady obtained the
writ of execution, Horvath sued Brady in December 2022, asserting that Hazari had
quitclaimed the property to Horvath in 2019. Horvath’s complaint sought tort damages
for slander of title and other causes of action, as well as a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction of the sheriff’s sale of the property.
Documents show Hazari and Horvath purchased the Felter Road property together
in 1998, and Horvath transferred her interest to Hazari in 2000. According to a June
2015 agreement between Hazari and Horvath, Hazari was unable to make an April 2015
balloon payment on the mortgage. In order to prevent foreclosure, Hazari agreed to sell
his personal residence and use the proceeds to pay off part of the balloon payment.
Horvath agreed to allow Hazari to live in her guesthouse, work in her office and added
him to her business health insurance plan. The 2015 agreement does not specify the
amount of Hazari’s debt to Horvath, but characterizes it as a “second mortgage” secured
by the property and provides that Horvath and Hazari would execute a new mortgage
2
note with an updated accounting of Hazari’s debt, including any of Horvath’s future
payments to Hazari. In return, Hazari agreed among other things to quitclaim the
property to Horvath if he was unable to repay the loan and cover the property’s carrying
costs within five years.
In July 2019, Horvath and Hazari executed a note secured by a deed of trust in
which Hazari acknowledged owing Horvath approximately $1,650,000. He agreed to pay
principal and interest on that amount either upon sale of the property, or fifteen years
from January 2019, whichever was earlier. Despite the fifteen-year repayment term of
the July 2019 agreement, Horvath alleged that Hazari quitclaimed the property to her in
November 2019 because he could no longer pay for the property or its maintenance.
Horvath did not record the 2019 quitclaim deed until June 2023 (i.e., about six months
after filing her complaint against Brady).1
Brady moved to strike Horvath’s complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure,
section 425.16 (known as the anti-SLAPP statute, SLAPP being an acronym for
“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”). The trial court granted Brady’s motion
to strike the complaint and denied Horvath’s application for a preliminary injunction.2
Horvath appealed and this court affirmed both orders in Horvath v. Brady (Aug. 8, 2025,
case Nos. H051571, H051574) [nonpub. opn.].
B. HORVATH’S THIRD PARTY OWNERSHIP PETITION
While Horvath’s appeals were pending in Horvath v. Brady, she petitioned under
Code of Civil Procedure section 720.110 for a determination of her third party ownership
1
Horvath asserts that Hazari attempted to record the deed, but it was rejected by
the Santa Clara County Recorder’s Office because of the then-existing first mortgage on
the property; she also asserts that he gave her the original unrecorded deed the next day,
which she then kept in her physical possession.
2
Two days before the scheduled June 28 sheriff’s sale of the property, Hazari
declared bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the sale. The trial court denied
Horvath’s application for a preliminary injunction for lack of any possible irreparable
injury while the bankruptcy stay was in effect. The federal bankruptcy court granted
Brady’s motion for relief from the automatic stay in January 2024.
3
claim and for an order releasing the property from Brady’s notice of levy and writ of
execution. As in her lawsuit against Brady, Horvath asserted ownership of the property
based on the 2019 quitclaim deed. She alleged that Brady had received constructive
notice of the unrecorded deed when Hazari produced documents to Brady’s counsel in
June 2020. In the alternative, Horvath requested an order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 720.390 requiring a reimbursement of approximately $1.5 million to her from the
sheriff’s sale of the property for the amounts that she claimed to have invested in the
property over the years.
In opposition, Brady argued that Horvath’s petition was simply her latest attempt
(acting as Hazari’s proxy because he had been declared a vexatious litigant) to prevent
enforcement of the judgment against Hazari. Brady asserted that Hazari’s and Horvath’s
statements and conduct established the 2019 deed had not been legally delivered to
Horvath before Brady’s levy. Brady submitted evidence that Hazari had claimed
ownership of the property for years after the purported transfer until as late as October
2022, and in June 2020 had stated in response to a discovery request that he had
“commemorated the loans” from Horvath “in a mortgage and provide[d] a quitclaim deed
that she can record immediately if I die in lieu of the mortgage that I owe her.”3 Brady
argued that Horvath had not asserted ownership until March 2023, when she submitted a
declaration in support of Hazari’s June 2023 request in federal court for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff’s sale of the property.4
3
Brady argued that Hazari’s statement made the 2019 quitclaim deed void as an
attempted testamentary disposition. (Meyer v. Wall (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 24, 27
(Meyer); 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) § 8:43.)
4
In her declaration, Horvath states that Hazari had decided to give the property to
her in 2011 (upon his death, which he believed was imminent) and that she had paid the
mortgage, property taxes and other costs and expenses for years. She also states that in
2019, Hazari (once again) believed he was going to die soon and quitclaimed the property
to her instead of repaying his debts. After that, she had the quitclaim deed notarized and
paid off the first mortgage and continued paying the property fees and costs (other than
disputed property taxes in another litigation).
4
Brady also challenged Horvath’s shifting testimony and conflicting answers
regarding her purported physical possession of the deed. Horvath initially testified at her
creditor’s examination that Hazari had given her a copy of the deed in November 2019,
but she did not recall ever receiving the original, which she believed Hazari had kept.
Horvath also testified that she did not intend to record the deed until 2029, after Hazari’s
option to reacquire the property from her expired, and she claimed to be a second
mortgage holder even after the deed was executed in 2019.
Horvath later asserted that she did own the property and filed a declaration stating
that her creditor’s examination testimony had been mistaken because she later realized
that she had received the original deed from Hazari and given it to her attorney before the
creditor’s examination, and that her attorney had later told her that she had given him the
original deed. Horvath’s attorney submitted his own declaration stating that Horvath had
provided him with the original deed, but after the examination. Brady contended that
discrepancies in Horvath’s various statements as well as her attorney’s account further
undermined her credibility regarding her physical possession of the deed.
C. BRADY’S MOTION TO ADD HORVATH AS A JUDGMENT DEBTOR
After Horvath filed her petition, Brady moved to amend the judgment and attorney
fee award against Hazari to add Horvath as a judgment debtor pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 187. Brady argued that Horvath should be added as a judgment debtor
because she testified at her creditor’s examination that she had funded Hazari’s litigation
against Brady until 2018, had controlled and delegated responsibility for the litigation to
Hazari for their mutual financial benefit, had paid the property’s expenses since 2011,
and was the real party in interest based on her assertions of ownership pursuant to the
unrecorded 2019 deed.
Brady also argued that Horvath had submitted misleading declarations and
medical opinions in support of Hazari’s disability accommodation requests that did not
disclose her financial interest in the litigation or that Hazari actually did not require
disability accommodations, given that Horvath could have hired legal counsel but chose
5
to let Hazari proceed as a self-represented litigant.5 Brady asserted that Horvath
knowingly permitted Hazari, a vexatious litigant, to pursue harassing litigation which
cost Brady substantial legal fees she sought to recover.
Given Horvath’s involvement and financial interest in Hazari’s litigation, Brady
argued it would be inequitable to permit Horvath to prevent her from collecting on the
judgment by now claiming that Horvath had owned property since 2019 based on an
undisclosed and unrecorded quitclaim deed. According to Brady, Horvath knew that the
property was Hazari’s only asset capable of satisfying the judgment.
D. THE AUGUST 6, 2024 ORDER
The trial court granted Brady’s motion to amend the judgment and attorney fees
award to add Horvath as a judgment debtor, and denied Horvath’s third party ownership
claim. The court found that Hazari and Horvath were “bound by their admissions and
conduct which indicate that title to the Property was never effectively transferred until
long after Ms. Brady’s levy of the writ of execution. Dr. Horvath only began to assert her
belated claim after the levy process began.” The court also found the “fact that the deed
held by Dr. Horvath was not recorded or was recorded a long time after it was executed
indicates the lack of an intention by [Hazari]6 to immediately vest title in Dr. Horvath.”
The trial court found “that Dr. Horvath knew, among other things, that Mr. Hazari
was litigating a case in propria persona, that she helped him in connection with this
litigation, and that she apparently knew the nature of the case. [¶] The evidence also
shows that she for years submitted declarations and opinions to this Court concerning Mr.
Hazari’s purported health problems without revealing that she claimed ownership of the
5
Specifically, Horvath testified that she knew that handling the litigation was bad
for Hazari’s health, but did not hire a lawyer to assume control of the litigation after the
2019 purported ownership transfer because she did not know the litigation’s status and
she considered the litigation to be Hazari’s responsibility. Horvath also testified that she
knew when the quitclaim deed was executed in 2019 that the property was Hazari’s only
asset other than his government disability payments.
6
The order mistakenly refers to “Mr. Horvath” rather than “Mr. Hazari.”
6
property under the unrecorded 2019 deed.” The court concluded that it was “satisfied
that the evidence here shows that the purported incremental transfer of the disputed
property from Mr. Hazari to Dr. Horvath is laced with indicia of a fraudulent
conveyance” and also therefore that Horvath’s third party ownership claim was not valid.
The court ruled that “[w]hen a judgment lien is imposed on property before an
executed deed is delivered by the grantor, the title has not yet transferred. Therefore, the
judgment lien is senior and the grantee receives the title subject to the judgment lien.”
The November 2024 judgment elaborated that the court had rejected Horvath’s third-
party ownership claim on the ground that she had “failed to carry her burden of proving
that title to the Property was effectively transferred to her prior to the levy on the
Property, or that Ms. Brady had knowledge of the unrecorded Quitclaim Deed prior to the
levy on the Property.”7
In case No. H052587, Horvath appealed from the August 6, 2024 order and a
September 10, 2024, Amendment To Judgment Entered Herein On February 4, 2021 So
As To Add Dagmar Horvath As A Judgment Debtor that followed the trial court’s entry
of August 6, 2024 Orders On Submitted Matters.
In case No. H052767, Horvath appealed from the September 10, 2024 Amendment
to Judgment Entered Herein On February 4, 2021 So As To Add Dagmar Horvath As A
Judgment Debtor, filed on November 1, 2024; a November 4, 2024 judgment denying
Horvath’s third party claim; and a November 4, 2024 judgment amending the May 2021
Order granting Brady’s Attorney Fees award.
7
Although the trial court’s order and judgment did not cite the evidence it relied
upon in determining that Horvath had failed to carry her burden regarding Brady’s
knowledge of the unrecorded quitclaim deed prior to the levy on the property, we infer
that the court credited Joshua Rosenberg’s (Brady’s husband) declaration stating that he
had reviewed all of documents produced by Hazari in discovery and did not find the
quitclaim deed.
7
II. DISCUSSION
A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DENIAL OF HORVATH’S THIRD PARTY
OWNERSHIP CLAIM
Horvath argues that the trial court failed to apply the correct presumption of legal
delivery that arises from her physical possession of the 2019 quitclaim deed. Relying on
Stewart v. Silva (1923) 192 Cal. 405, 409, Horvath contends that her physical possession
of the deed establishes a prima facie case of completed delivery and therefore Brady
should have had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was
not legally delivered. Brady responds that Horvath’s evidence does not establish legal
delivery and even if it did, there would be no presumption of delivery because Stewart
was tacitly overruled by the California Supreme Court in Miller v. Jansen (1943)
21 Cal.2d 473 (Miller).
1. Standard of Review
We examine the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Adams v.
Adams (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 654, 656.) Under that standard, we determine only
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the
finding of fact. We do not judge the effect or value of the evidence, weigh the evidence,
consider the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. We only determine whether
the evidence before the trier of fact supports its findings. (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 754, 766.) “[A]ll conflicts must be resolved in favor of the successful
party in the court below” (Lauder v. Wright Investment Co. (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 147,
151), and “all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if
possible.” (Jackson v. Burke (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 519, 521–522.) We independently
review the trial court’s determination of questions of law. (Dickson v. Mann (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 935, 946 (Dickson).)
2. Legal Principles
A deed conveying real property does not transfer title to a grantee until it has been
legally delivered by the grantor. (Civ. Code, § 1054 [a grant of property “takes effect, so
8
as to vest the interest intended to be transferred, only upon its delivery by the grantor”];
Miller, supra, 21 Cal.2d at pp. 475–476; Luna v. Brownell (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 668,
673.) A deed that is not validly delivered is void. (Meyer, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at
p. 27.) “The term ‘delivery’ does not refer to the mere physical act of manually
transferring the instrument to the grantee. A legal delivery refers solely to the intention
of the grantor. If the grantor has the requisite intent, there may be a legal delivery even
though the instrument has not been physically given to the grantee. If the grantor does
not have the required intent, there is no legal delivery even if the grantee obtains physical
possession of the instrument.” (3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) § 8:41.)
Thus, delivery is a question of intent. (Luna, at p. 673; Perry v. Wallner (1962)
206 Cal.App.2d 218, 221 (Perry).) “[T]o constitute a valid delivery there must exist a
mutual intention on the part of the parties, and particularly on the part of the grantor, to
pass title to the property immediately. In other words, to be a valid delivery, the
instrument must be meant by the grantor to be presently operative as a deed, that is, there
must be the intent on the part of the grantor to divest himself presently of the title.”
(Henneberry v. Henneberry (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 125, 129 (Henneberry).)
Delivery of a deed is a question of fact to be found from the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. (Hotaling v. Hotaling (1924) 193 Cal. 368, 382; Donahue v.
Sweeney (1915) 171 Cal. 388, 391; Blackburn v. Drake (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 806
(Blackburn); Perry, supra, 206 Cal.App.2d at p. 221.) All presumptions and inferences
regarding delivery are rebuttable and may be overcome by contrary evidence.
(Henneberry, supra, 164 Cal.App.2d at p. 129; Blackburn, at pp. 812–813; 3 Miller &
Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) § 8.42.) Ultimately, “[b]ecause the issue of the
legal delivery of the instrument is factual, none of the factors that bear on the issue is
conclusive. Each must be weighed in view of all the other matters relevant to the final
determination of the question.” (3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) § 8.42.)
“The grantee’s physical possession of the instrument raises the inference that it has
been delivered.” (3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) § 8:42, italics added.)
Section 600 of the Evidence Code defines the terms presumption and inference. A
9
“presumption” is “an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.” (Evid. Code, § 600,
subd. (a), italics added.) An “inference” is “a deduction of fact that may logically and
reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action.” (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b), italics added.) An inference is permissive in
that it allows, but does not require, the factfinder to infer the ultimate or elemental fact
from the existence of one or more evidentiary or basic facts. A presumption is mandatory
insofar as it requires the factfinder to find the elemental fact upon proof of a particular
evidentiary fact (or facts), at least until the other party has come forward with some
evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. (People v. Roder
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–498 [construing Pen. Code, § 496’s mandatory rebuttable
presumption].)
3. No Presumption of Delivery Arises from Possession of the Deed
Based on the foregoing legal principles, we reject Horvath’s argument that her
physical possession of the 2019 quitclaim deed is prima facie evidence giving rise to a
rebuttable presumption of legal delivery that Brady was required to rebut with evidence
of fraud. Horvath’s possession of the executed deed creates an inference of legal
delivery, not a presumption. (Blackburn, supra, 211 Cal.App.2d at pp. 811–812; Estate
of Pieper (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 670, 685 (Pieper’s Estate); Mecchi v. Picchi (1966)
245 Cal.App.2d 470; 20th Century Plumbing Co. v. Sfregola (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 851,
853 [“possession of a deed by the grantee named therein is prima facie evidence of its
delivery and hence gives rise to an inference the instrument was duly delivered”];
3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) § 8.42.).
As explained by the appellate court in Pieper’s Estate, the California Supreme
Court clarified in Miller that the presumption created by Civil Code section 1055 applies
only to the date and not to the fact of delivery (i.e., a delivered instrument is presumed to
have been delivered on the date it bears, and therefore possession by the grantee of a deed
gives rise to an inference rather than a rebuttable presumption that the instrument was
10
duly delivered, which in the face of contrary evidence becomes a question of fact for the
trial court.) (Pieper’s Estate, supra, 224 Cal.App.2d at pp. 685–686 [rejecting putative
grantee’s reliance on Stewart to argue delivery presumed from physical possession];
Blackburn, supra, 211 Cal.App.2d at p. 812.) We find Pieper’s Estate and Blackburn
persuasive and agree that under Miller, physical possession of the deed by the grantee
gives rise to an inference (not a presumption) that the instrument was duly delivered.
We likewise reject Horvath’s characterization of Miller’s holding as dictum.
“ ‘[D]ictum consists of general observations of law which go beyond the facts and issues
of the case.’ ” (Estrada v. Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 915, 924.) The Miller
court concluded the evidence supported the lower court’s finding that the deed at issue
had not been delivered, reasoning that the presumption under Civil Code section 1055
“arises only as to the date, not the fact of delivery” and that language in decisions
suggesting otherwise “does not state the correct meaning of that section.” (Miller, supra,
21 Cal.2d at pp. 476, 478.) Thus, the court’s interpretation of Civil Code section 1055 is
precedential, not dictum, and we are bound to follow it. And even if the statement in
Miller were dictum, we note that Supreme Court dictum “ ‘is not to be blithely ignored’ ”
and is typically followed by intermediate courts. (Department of Fair Employment &
Housing v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 93, 103.)
Because only a permissive inference of delivery arises from Horvath’s purported
physical possession of the 2019 quitclaim deed, the trial court was not required to infer
legal delivery. Where “the evidence will support different inferences, the choice of
inferences is for the trial court; and its finding, based on the inferences drawn, cannot be
disturbed on appeal. [Citation.] The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility
of the witnesses.” (Maslow v. Maslow (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 237, 243, abrogated on
another ground in Liodas v. Sahadi (1977) 19 Cal.3d 278, 287, fn. 3.) By the same token,
the burden did not shift to Brady to establish that the transfer represented by the 2019
quitclaim deed was fraudulent.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Horvath did not
carry her initial burden of proving her prior ownership interest in the property. (Dickson,
11
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 945.) Hazari and Horvath were “bound by their admissions
and conduct which indicate that title to the Property was never effectively transferred
until long after Ms. Brady’s levy of the writ of execution[;] Dr. Horvath only began to
assert her belated claim after the levy process began”; and the “fact that the deed … was
not recorded or was recorded a long time after it was executed indicates the lack of an
intention … to immediately vest the title in Dr. Horvath.” The evidence includes
Hazari’s 2020 statement that he had executed the 2019 quitclaim deed so that Horvath
could record it immediately if he died, in lieu of repaying the mortgage amount that he
owed her. It also includes Horvath’s initial 2023 creditor’s examination testimony that
Hazari had not given her the original 2019 deed. (3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th
ed. 2026) § 8:42 [“If the grantor retains possession of the instrument, it is presumed that
it has not been delivered.”].) The trial court could infer from those statements that Hazari
had executed (but not recorded) the 2019 quitclaim deed because he did not intend to
transfer the property’s title to Horvath unless and until he died, and that the 2019 deed
was only recorded in 2023 for the purpose of preventing Brady from levying on the
property. The court’s inference is also consistent with Horvath’s initial testimony that
she understood she held a second mortgage on the property even after the 2019 deed was
executed. Nor did Horvath assert ownership until 2023, while Hazari had claimed
ownership from 2019 to 2022.
4. Horvath Has Forfeited Her Section 720.390 Argument
Horvath also appeals from the trial court’s denial of her alternative request for
reimbursement of the amounts she claimed to have paid toward property expenses.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 720.390.) Horvath asserts that she “is entitled to the return of these
funds, as the payments were made as the owner of the Property pursuant to the deed by
Mr. Hazari transferring title to the Property to Dr. Horvath.” She argued that otherwise
Brady would “receive a windfall and be unjustly enriched” at Horvath’s expense, for
without Horvath’s payments, Brady “would have received the proceeds from the Property
with significant encumbrances by a mortgage and property taxes.”
12
Horvath argues the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that any issues she
has about disposition of the proceeds of sale to satisfy the judgment lien can be worked
out between her and Hazari. Specifically, she states the trial court abused its discretion
because the statute directs the trial court to consider the “ ‘respective interests of the
parties’ meaning [Brady] as creditor and [Horvath] as the third party claimant, not
Dr. Horvath’s potential interests relative to someone else.” But Horvath does not support
her challenge with any cogent argument supported by legal authority. “When points are
perfunctorily raised without adequate analysis and authority, we may treat them as
abandoned or forfeited.” (City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1302.)
Even if we consider the merits of Horvath’s argument, we conclude the trial court
complied with the statute by considering the interests of the parties, including Hazari’s.
We see no abuse of discretion in concluding that Brady’s interests as an innocent party
attempting to enforce a judgment were superior to Hazari’s interest as a judgment debtor
and Horvath’s interest as a third party. As we have discussed, substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s conclusions that Hazari only intended to transfer ownership to
Horvath after Brady sought to enforce the judgment against him. Substantial evidence
also supports the finding that Horvath had not only been aware of and involved in her
friend and co-investor Hazari’s litigation against Brady, but also that Hazari’s purported
transfer of the property to Horvath was “laced with indicia of a fraudulent conveyance”
for the purpose of preventing enforcement of the judgment. Given the trial court’s
conclusion that title did not transfer to Horvath until after Brady attempted to enforce the
judgment (and for the purpose of preventing enforcement), she is not entitled to
reimbursement “of the substantial sums that she made towards the Property in reliance on
being the owner of the property.” (See Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059 [One “ ‘ “who comes into Equity must come with clean
hands.” ’ ”].)
13
B. HORVATH WAS IMPROPERLY ADDED AS A JUDGMENT DEBTOR
Horvath argues that the order granting Brady’s motion to amend the judgment and
award attorney fees is not supported by substantial evidence. In particular, Horvath
contends that “there is no evidence demonstrating that the 2019 notarized quitclaim deed
constituted a fraudulent transfer” or that she attempted to frustrate Brady’s enforcement
of the judgment against Hazari, which she asserts is required when the trial court relies on
equity to amend a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 187.8
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, “[w]hen jurisdiction is, by the
Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer,
all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this
jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the
statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear
most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.) The statute
grants to every court the power to use all means to effect its jurisdiction, including the
authority to amend a judgment to add judgment debtors. (NEC Electronics, Inc. v. Hurt
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772, 778.)
Horvath argues Code of Civil Procedure section 187 does not allow a court to add
an individual as the judgment debtor of another individual. Adding a new party as
judgment debtor “ ‘stems from the concept of the alter ego doctrine’ ” (8451 Melrose
Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1274 (8451 Melrose
Property)), which arises when a corporate entity is disregarded to hold individual
8
Horvath contends that the trial court failed to articulate whether it had concluded
she should be added as a judgment debtor under an “alter ego” theory or the equitable
doctrine to prevent injustice. However, it is apparent that the trial court relied on the
equitable doctrine by citing Favila v. Pasquarella (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 934 (Favila), in
which the appellate court ruled it was appropriate to add a new party based on the
equities and to avoid injustice where the parties added to the judgment had attempted to
put assets out of reach of the judgment creditor. Accordingly, we do not address
Horvath’s alter ego arguments.
14
shareholders unjustly using the corporate form liable for the actions of the corporation.
(Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 510–511.) By adding a party as
an alter ego judgment debtor, the court is solely inserting the name of the correct
defendant. (Id. at p. 508.) To prevail on a motion to add an alter ego judgment debtor,
the judgment creditor must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the party
to be added as a judgment debtor had control of the underlying litigation and was
virtually represented in that proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the party already on the judgment and the
party to be added do not in reality exist; and (3) an inequitable result will follow if the
acts of the party on the judgment are treated as its acts alone. (Relentless Air Racing,
LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd. Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 815–816.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 187—virtually unchanged since its enactment in
1872—grants courts “all the means necessary” to effect their jurisdiction. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 187; Danko v. O’Reilly (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 732, 735.) That “broad grant of
authority” does not require an alter ego relationship be shown when granting relief would
otherwise be appropriate. (8451 Melrose Property, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.)
A party may be included as a judgment debtor “if the equities overwhelmingly favor the
amendment and it is necessary to prevent an injustice.” (Favila, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at
p. 949; see id. at p. 942.) These equitable concerns extend to individual partners. (8451
Melrose Property, at pp. 1286–1287.)
Adding a judgment debtor where alter ego liability cannot be established is
permissible in limited circumstances “to avoid sanctioning a fraud or promoting an
injustice.” (Favila, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 944.) Only when a third party’s post-
judgment actions intentionally frustrate or deprive a judgment creditor’s ability to collect
on a judgment may the third party be held responsible for the judgment. (Id. at pp. 943–
944 [collecting cases].) Third parties have been added as judgment debtors where they
have “systematically drained the [original debtor] of all its assets” or
“exercise[d] … control over the [original debtor]” such that they are “effectively … the
successor” to the named debtor. (Ibid.)
15
We review the ultimate decision to add Horvath as a judgment debtor for abuse of
discretion, and we review the factual findings underlying the decision for substantial
evidence. (Favila, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.)
2. Equity Does Not Support Adding Horvath as a Judgment Debtor
Horvath argues that unlike in Favila, there is “zero evidence” she undertook any
improper steps to knowingly frustrate enforcement of the judgment. With respect to the
trial court’s finding that the “the purported incremental transfer of the disputed property
from Mr. Hazari to Dr. Horvath is laced with indicia of a fraudulent conveyance,” she
contends the evidence shows the 2019 transaction was a legitimate transfer that occurred
long before Brady obtained the judgment against Hazari in 2022. She contends there was
only evidence of her “privileged exercise of her right to petition the courts to protect her
Property” through her post-judgment lawsuit against Brady and separate third party
ownership petition, which she argues is protected by the litigation privilege and is
insufficient to amend a judgment to include her based on the equities.
The trial court’s determination was based on the conclusion that Hazari and
Horvath fraudulently claimed title had transferred to Horvath before the attempted levy in
order to frustrate enforcement of the judgment against Hazari.9 The evidence supports
the trial court’s conclusion that Hazari’s purported transfer of title to Horvath was “laced
with indicia of a fraudulent conveyance.”10 The record also shows Horvath attempted to
9
Even if the trial court had explicitly concluded that Horvath’s litigation efforts
were fraudulent insofar as they were all premised on the transfer of interest intended to
prevent Brady from enforcing her judgment against Hazari, the litigation privilege would
not apply here. That privilege “ ‘ “generally protects from tort liability any publication
made in connection with a judicial proceeding” ’ ” (Pech v. Doniger (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 443, 465) and is intended “to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost
freedom of access to the court without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative
tort actions.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.)
10
For the same reason, we reject Horvath’s reliance on Overton v. Schmitt (1936)
7 Cal.2d 163 to argue that the 2019 deed takes precedence over Brady’s subsequent
attachment and judgment lien. We find Overton distinguishable because the trial court
here concluded the transfer showed indicia of fraud, whereas the Overton court found that
16
limit enforcement of the judgment through her post-judgment ownership claims. She
knew Hazari was representing himself in the litigation and stood to financially benefit
from the case but never disclosed her involvement or financial interest until after the
attempted levy. She also aided Hazari’s litigation against Brady by providing financial
support and by supporting disability accommodation requests.
Nonetheless, we are mindful that adding an individual as a judgment debtor where
facts are not present to support an alter ego finding is proper only where “the equities
overwhelmingly favor the amendment.” (Favila, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 949.) We
are aware of no authority to add an individual as a judgment debtor simply for financing
underlying litigation or claiming ownership of disputed property. The appellant in Favila
did not control the underlying litigation involving the original debtor company, but was
properly added as a judgment debtor because she actively transferred assets away from
the original debtor company and controlled all assets of the post-judgment successor
company. (Favila, at pp. 947–949.) Similarly in 8451 Melrose Property, individual
partners who did not control the underlying litigation involving a different partner were
still added as judgment debtors because they benefitted from allowing the debtor partner
to treat the partnership debt as his own while comingling personal and partnership
transactions, pooling investments and income, and accessing partnership cash flow at all
times. (8451 Melrose Property, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1287, 1290–1291.) Thus a
person may be named as a judgment debtor when that person acts to hold, secrete, or
remove the named debtor’s assets from the court’s enforcement jurisdiction. But in
contrast Brady at best demonstrated that Horvath had been helping Hazari in service of
his own interests and that Horvath’s litigation served the same interests. We decline to
expand an equitable doctrine to create liability under the circumstances here.
Given the trial court’s disposition of the third party claim (that we now affirm on
appeal), the trial court abused its discretion by relying on Horvath’s nonexistent third
it could not be “successfully contended that the conveyance … was made in pursuance of
any scheme to defraud appellant” as a judgment creditor. (Id. at p. 167.)
17
party interest in making its judgment debtor determination. (Olsen v. Harbison (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 278, 285.) The ability to add a judgment debtor is an equitable measure
that prevents a named debtor from escaping responsibility by effectively conveying assets
to a successor owner. (Favila, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 944.) The trial court rejected
Horvath’s assertions that she had a pre-existing ownership interest in the property, and as
there was no effective conveyance here, the property remains subject to enforcement of
the judgment without the addition of Horvath as a judgment debtor. And as the trial court
found title had transferred to Horvath after the judgment lien was recorded, the property
remains subject to the judgment lien.
III. DISPOSITION
The November 4, 2024 judgment denying Third Party Claim is affirmed. The
November 1, 2024 Amendment to Judgment and the November 4, 2024 Amendment to
Decree of May 26, 2021, Awarding Mandy Brady Attorney Fees so as to add Dagmar
Horvath As An Obligor, are reversed. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
18
____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Wilson, J.
H052587, H052767
Hazari v. Brady